John McEwan, the long time deputy Prime Minister to Robert Menzies, claimed in an interview that one of his greatest achievements was the sending of the HMAS Adelaide to New Caledonia in 1940 to do some gunboat diplomacy. Historically, McEwan's claim has not been confirmed, but is possible within the manner that the first Menzies' government managed policy and cabinet decisions. As Peter Edwards wrote in an essay titled, "The Royal Australian Navy in Australian Diplomacy", this instance is interesting because of its rarity. Australian mythology always gives dominance to the Army through the ANZAC legend/myth. This has led to a policy, media and nationalistic view of the military as dominated by the Army and segmented in capability - a jointery.

New Caledonia

In 1940, Australia faced the problem of its sea lines of communication being cut between itself and the United States. Common mythology in Australia is that Japan was seeking to invade Australia. This is not true, Japan wanted Indonesia's oil first and foremost, secondly it wanted to isolate Australia from the United States. Japan did not have the troop numbers to invade Australia, in stead the plan was to take New Guinea, the Solomons and then New Caledonia to deny communication and logistical routes between Australia and America.

Ultimately, the Australian Army denied Japan from establishing themselves in southern New Guinea, and the US Marine Corp denied the Japanese the Solomon Islands. New Caledonia, however, was French, and with the collapse of France, there was a tension between the Free French and the Vichy French. The former were partial to the west, while the Vichy were partial to Japan, potentially creating a liability for Australia with was clouds darkening in the Pacific between Japan and America.

The cruiser, HMAS Adelaide under Henry Showers was dispatched to New Caledonia to enable the Free French to maintain control. Peter Edwards writes;

Showers achieved this goal without a shot being fired - a major achievement in the use of the threat of naval force to gain a diplomatic end.

This helped to secure, and stabilise Australia's out-lying region, and vulnerable areas to ensure that the sea lanes between Australia and the United States were not threatened with changing circumstance between Japan, Australia and America.

But that was in World War II, when big grey hulled ships sailed the oceans and fought for blue water supremacy in massive battles between air and ocean going fleets. The modern environment contains mixes of tensions between nation-states, between nation-states and non-state actors, as well as the possibility of nearby nation-states balkanizing, or flat out failing in their ability to maintain consistent law and order. Is the ANZAC myth, and our "Great and Powerful Friends" [GAPF] doctrine sufficient in such a complex and demanding environment.

Nationalising The ANZAC Myth

Myths overtake reality and often end up forming a popular narrative of their own. The ANZAC myth is a perpetuation of the popular bushman myth from the 1800s, propagated into a Nietzschian creation of the nation-state through national blood letting. It is not a surprise that the bushman myth and ANZAC myth were combined in a song, "And the band played Waltzing Matilda".

The ANZACs are commonly equated with the battles at Gallipoli, where Australian forces fought in close proximity to Turkish troops, in what was often brutal, bloody and misguided battles. The Australians achieved, despite the horrendous conditions, and often naive leadership, from both the Australian and British leaders, but ultimately could not stave off defeat and had to withdraw.

It was Charles Bean, the official historian, who propelled Gallipoli into the ANZAC myth. He helped popularise the ANZACs in 1915 with a book describing the heroics and valour of the troops in Gallipoli. This was continued with the description of the "Black ANZACs" who led the first Australian charge in Europe once Australian Imperial Force troops were deployed in France and Belgium. The men who fought at Gallipoli called themselves "Peninsula Men", and there was prestige in World War I amongst the troops between them, especially if they were Lighthorse.

The focus on the ANZACs, especially in modern times has led to a focus on the Army as the strength of the Australian military. This has been helped by Australia's constant focus on an expeditionary foreign policy inside the GAPF doctrine. Yet, in World War I, Australia was the only dominion to develop and deploy a Flying Corps, which was to become the Australian Air Force. The Navy has had a harder time, as it has never been developed by government policy into an independent and autonomous force. Consequently, myth has overtaken a consolidated view of the Australian military as achieving national objectives.

The Tip Of The Spear

The military is one of the few government institutions who must be finely tuned to national objectives. The Jeffersonian view of the Republic sees a standing military as being an offence to liberty, as a central government will use, and abuse it for tyrannous ends. This was challenged during the United States' war with England in 1812, when the US Navy, or Adams' wooden walls were the only capable defence for the US in the early stages of the war.

Another reality of a nation-state, is that generally only the collective wealth of the people can fund, maintain, and develop such a capital intensive arm of government as a standing military of highly technical platforms and manned by professionals. Because of the expeditionary focus of Australian foreign policy, we tend to think of the Australian spear as being the Army, and in particular the Army's rapid deployment forces, such as the SAS and Commandos.

This does a dis-service to the technical capability of the Air Force and Navy. Since the late 1960s, the force projection into Australia's national vulnerabilities has been the F111, the P3C Orion, and attack submarines; the latter recently being filled by the Collins class. In expeditionary deployments, it has usually been the Army that has born the brunt, to the point that conscription was needed during the Vietnam conflict. The Air Force and Navy have been deployed in either piecemeal fashion, or as a small component integrated into a large force, such as the US Air Force or Navy.

More recently, with deployments to East Timor and the Solomons, the Australian Defence Force has been required to provide integrated solutions that incorporate the Army, Navy and Air Force; rather than focusing on one arm to the exclusion of the others. The Iraq conflict also involved considerable aviation assets, but it has been the SAS which has garnered the most media attention. Security is also based on perception, both international and domestic. Unfortunately the integrated capability of the ADF to provide regional solutions has been largely ignored, and the 2003 election included a fight between the two major parties over who was the most committed to the US Alliance.

Bill Hayden has also lamented in the past that the electorate's marriage to the ANZUS Treaty often defies reality, but it is politicians that have enforced that dependency, through their rhetoric, policy and actions. Australians have not seen the ADF act as an integrated capable force, even when it has. The GAPF doctrine, the media, the ANZAC myth and the political attempt to militarise political history have seen this glossed over. As a consequence the GAPF doctrine becomes self-prophesying at the political and public opinion levels.

Back To ANZAC

Claims to nationalism and security are a cheap political means to collapse opinion and power to the centre. James Madison warned at the founding of the United States, that was is to be avoided as it offers nothing but executive aggrandizement. Cries to insecurity serve the same purpose, something we have seen recently with the open ended "War on Terror" and the political manoeuvring to make the Australian population's concern for their safety dependent upon the federal government.

This federal government's reaction to the war on terror has been to militize Australian policy both internationally and domestically. We have seen piecemeal deployments to Afghanistan and Iraq in support of the US, as well as media shots of black balaclava'd special troops dropping from Blackhawks at home. This is despite a terrorists rarely being armed with more than a bomb - which state police could easily handle.

Another irony of this domestic view of anti-terror, is that our troops are clad in black masks to hide their identity, as are the jihadists which appear on Al-Queda training and propaganda videos. While ours drop from Blackhawks, Al-Queda jump over obstacle courses, clutching AK47s and other cheap arms. This is a totally inappropriate image of domestic security, most likely designed to install the same fear in the population that terrorism does. Terror is a civil issue, best handled by state police, and it is the face of the state police which should be equated with terrorism, not the ADF.

At the same time, the Liberal Party has also moved to try and militarise Australian history, and equate it with the Liberal Party. We have had odd claims such as making children in school learn about Simpson and his donkey as an example of Australian values. History is an essential component of any education, but warping it to political ends through the education system is an inferior way to impart knowledge.

The GAPF doctrine of foreign policy is inherently limiting, it denies Australian independence, autonomy and self-destiny. Equating the ANZAC myth to political nationalism will only serve to further entrench the flawed, and failed policy of the GAPF. The ANZUS Treaty is no longer relevant, being a cold war document which helped enforce the GAPF in the Australian political mind. It needs to be junked, and the Australian politicians starting to focus on the wider capability of the ADF as the nucleus of a larger, more capable, integrated force that it is, and can be in the popular mind.

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