Deakin marked Thomas Playford from South Australia as a confederate. Deakin can be pretty nasty in his book to those who didn't share his views or competed with him; ie George Reid , so it might be good to check from the 1891 debates what Playford did actually foresee in the Australian Constitution.

Playford was reasonably active at the 1891 convention, chiming in, and interjecting, on several subjects. His opinion on the Senate was that the states should appoint Senators;

This is a point on which we can consult the experience of America, where exactly the same clause has worked for 100 years. I have never learned that they desire to alter their mode of electing senators.

It is a great deal better that we should say distinctly that the parliaments of the colonies should elect the senate in the way they have said it in America, than that we should leave it to the different states to decide the manner and mode of elections.

If the states decided the question we might have a considerable amount of difference in the mode. We know that the American system has given eminent satisfaction; but we have no means of knowing whether the system proposed by the hon. member, Mr. Kingston, would give equal satisfaction.

If the hon. member wishes to carry out his idea, certainly he should not strike out the words he proposes to omit, for this reason: you must provide some mode of election of the senators so as to give the different states an opportunity of deciding how they will elect them, because through some obstinate lower or upper house in some of the states a deadlock might occur, and they might not be able to decide in time for an election on any particular lines. Consequently there would be no persons chosen to represent the state.

The hon. member would, therefore, do better to leave the words as they are, fixing this mode "until the states otherwise direct." I would very much like to give the states the power to decide as to the manner and mode of electing senators if I thought it would be productive of good results; but with the experience of the United States before us I do not think we can do better than to adopt their form of election.

So he was for the American style of appointed Senate. The US Senate is now elected in the same manner as the Australian Senate as multi-member seats divided by state but back in 1891 it was appointed by the states.

Playford engaged in the debate over how electors would be determined for the house. He stated that the type of election be uniform across all states, rather than each state manage the elections locally. Which suggests a federalist approach to the house.

Playford has an exchange with Gillies over limiting the rights of federal government to interfere, or even make legislation repugnant to the states. Gillies seems to be arguing for states rights, or a more restrictive federal constitution, but uses - horror - women's suffrage to make his point. I am not sure if Playford is goading him in the following exchange, but he does say;

Mr. PLAYFORD: Cannot the hon. member trust the federal parliament?

Mr. GILLIES: We are not speaking of trusting the federal parliament. We might as well say, "We need no provisions in the constitution that will limit their power or tie their hands in any way."

What the hon. member practically contends for is that the federal parliament shall be given a constitution in blank, so that it can do what it likes, without any limitation whatever to its powers. That is the meaning of his interjection.

Mr. PLAYFORD: They will represent the people!

Mr. GILLIES: We will trust the federal parliament on the grounds and on the provisions contained in the constitution.

What is the meaning of the words "state rights" if they do not mean that certain provisions are to be inserted in the constitution which will control the federal parliament, which the hon. gentleman would have us trust implicitly?

His idea is that we should absolutely pass over to the federal parliament the rights of all the states individually, even of the smallest of them. If that were done, we could swamp them tomorrow simply because we had a majority.

It appears that Playford is for the Westminster style of responsible government in the lower house with popular franchise.

Limits on Legislation

One of the points debated was that the federal government should be limited in the area of taxation to tariffs and excises. Playford argues for unlimited Commonwealth taxation for the reason of free trade;

We are not considering, at the present moment, what responsibilities we will take over from the several colonies.

The question we are considering is the power we will give to the parliament of the commonwealth in the matter of taxation; and so far as my reading extends, no commonwealth in the world has existed, or can exist, without possessing unlimited power of taxation.

It is so in the case of the United States, in the case of Canada, and also in the cases of Germany and Switzerland. If you take away the general power, and draw the line at customs and excise duties, then those who believe in a free-trade policy will have no hope whatever of being able to give effect to that policy.

We want the people of these colonies to be perfectly free so far as taxation under the commonwealth is concerned to decide what form or mode of taxation they will adopt for the raising of the necessary revenue.

If you limit the power of the commonwealth in the way suggested, those who hold free-trade views will never be able to give effect to them.

That is a very federalist view, and one that has led us to vertical tax imbalance today.

There is another interesting exchange on the federal government under-writing state debts;

Mr. THYNNE: The colonies are now proposing to give away this security, and the consequence will be, as suggested by the hon. member, Sir Harry Atkinson, that any one of the colonies being unable from misfortune to meet its engagements with its creditor, the federal parliament will of necessity and duty be bound to come to the rescue and take the responsibility upon itself.

Mr. PLAYFORD: There is no harm in that!

That exact situation nearly led to Civil War in Australia in the 1930s when the Premier of NSW, Jack Lang purposely defaulted on loans in order to negotiate better interest rates. The problem was that federal government had under-written those loans, and the Prime Minister, Joe Lyons had no intention of paying NSW's debts.

Before The Governor, Phillip Game dismissed Jack Lang, NSW and the federal government came within an angels breath of open civil war. The Lighthorse was moved to protect Canberra from the NSW police force - who had rifles, steel helmets and armoured cars. There were also federal and state militia forming all over the place.

A hidden part of Australian history that does not get talked about much.

Water and Rivers

Playford's views on the federal government stepping in over water rights has a state focus, especially downstream states. Though Deakin and Playford had an exchange over water conservation (irrigation) in which Playford replied to Deakin;

Leave that to the states!

The Senate Again

I think Playford's speech on the Senate on April 6th gives an understanding as to what those involved in the Constitutional Convention thought the difference between Confederacy and Federation is;

I have been very much astonished in listening to the views put forward by some hon. members. We have been deliberately told that unless we give equal powers to the senate we go for unification [Confederacy], and that if we do give equal powers to the senate we go for federation.

That is a most absurd statement. Hon. members well know that it depends upon the power which you give to parliament whether you take power from the senate or not, and not as to the distribution of that power between the two branches of the legislature.

It is not a question as to whether you distribute powers this way or that as regards state rights; but it is a question as to whether you take from the states certain powers and give them to the parliament.

We are now discussing, not the taking of powers from the states, but as to how we intend to distribute the legislative powers of the commonwealth between the two houses-the senate on the one hand and the house of representatives on the other; and the question of unification or federation does not come in.

It will be just as much a unification, even if the senate have very small powers compared with the other house, if you take away the powers from the states, and give them to the central parliament as a whole; and it will be as much a federation if they leave large or small powers.

The question of unification has nothing to do with the point at present under discussion. The hon. member, Mr. Thynne, asked me one question which I will attempt to answer. Responsible government, he asserted, could adapt itself to any circumstances.

I will ask the hon. member does he know where responsible government has ever adapted itself to the circumstances of two co-equal houses? Nowhere in the world.

I suppose the hon. member has read history sufficiently to enable him to know that in England we never obtained responsible government until the coequal power was taken from the House of Lords.

At one time, in fact, that House had greater power than the Commons; but we never obtained responsible government in the mother country until the power of the House of Lords was taken away and lodged in the House of Commons.

I hold to the opinion I have previously expressed on this point, that I believe you cannot carry on responsible government satisfactorily with two absolutely coequal houses. That is an opinion which I have expressed from the first.

I have also expressed myself to the effect that personally I have not the slightest objection to ask the people of this great continent to agree to a commonwealth in which the two houses shall be coequal, and in which the executive shall be elected by the two houses in the same way as is done in Switzerland.

I find, however, in speaking to hon. members on this subject, that there are very few who agree with me. Even a number of those who are in favour of coequal powers being given to the senate will not go in for doing away with responsible government.

Therefore, so far as this question is concerned, it seems hopeless to argue upon it. I hold to the opinion that responsible government cannot work satisfactorily with two houses coequal in power.

Another point, upon which I wish to say one or two words, has reference to the statement which has been made to the effect that without equal power the small states will be ridden over rough-shod by the larger states that, as the last speaker stated, the smaller states will be practically at the mercy of the larger states.

Will any intelligent man take up this proposed constitution bill and examine the proposals contained in clause 55, and tell me that the smaller states will be at the mercy of the larger states?

First, they have equal representation; secondly, they have equal powers on all matters, excepting money bills, relating to the ordinary annual expenditure on the ordinary service of the year, and dealing with taxation. They have the power of amendment in regard to all but two classes of money bills-the power of absolute amendment coequal with that of the other house.

With regard to those two particular classes of bills, they have a right to suggest to the other house amendments in any clause or parts of a clause. The Constitutional Committee have adopted precisely the mode adopted in the colony of South Australia, where it has been in force for between twenty or thirty years.

We have worked under that system for between twenty or thirty years. The upper house have the right to make suggestions, and those suggestions-taking the case as showing how the system would work if it were adopted for the commonwealth-have been as respectfully treated and considered by the lower house as any amendment which has ever been made in connection with any bill.

They have been quietly and intelligently debated in the lower house; they have been agreed to either with or without amendment, or disagreed to, as the case may be, and they have been sent back to the legislative council precisely in the same way as is proposed here.

Ever since we made the compact in consequence of the claim of the Legislative Council in South Australia to coequal powers with the House of Assembly in dealing with money bills, except as regards initiation-ever since we entered into that compact, nearly thirty years ago, we have never had the slightest trouble with regard to the working of the compact.

It has worked in the most harmonious manner, and, so far as the Legislative Council is concerned, I have never heard a single member of that body-and I have been in the Parliament since 1868-utter a wish that the compact should be broken in any way, though in the Lower House a late treasurer brought forward a motion only a year or so ago to the effect that we should break the compact between the two houses because it gave the Legislative Council too much power.

With the right on the part of the senate, in the first instance, to veto any measure brought before it; with equal powers in respect to all proposed laws, except those imposing taxation, and appropriating the necessary supplies for the year, which the senate may affirm or reject; with a right to insist that any bill dealing with new taxation shall be so subdivided that only one subject at a time can be dealt with-with the senate possessing all these powers, and with the immense preponderance of votes which the smaller colonies will have in the senate, how can any man in his senses say that the smaller colonies need have any fear whatever of being overridden in the legislation of the country if this proposal is adopted? I fail to see any such danger.

I try to look at the matter with a dispassionate eye. I try to look at it from the standpoint of a smaller colony, being myself a representative of a small colony.

I think I can foresee as well as any member here what the course of legislation is likely to be, and I have come to the honest conviction that if these clauses are carried the senate will have all the powers they ought to have, and that to give them any more power would be injurious to the interests of the commonwealth.

The people of the community as a whole must rule.

You cannot get away from that, and if you do not provide that this shall be to some degree, at all events, the effect of your legislation I fail to see how it will be possible to induce the larger colonies to come into the federation.

I shall support the clause as it stands in preference to the amendment. I desire to say that I do not agree with the amendment of the hon. member, Mr. Wrixon. As to the bugbear that has been raised, that the smaller colonies are going to be overridden, and their influence destroyed by the larger colonies, if we do not give the senate equal power with the house of representatives, I contend that that is a mistake.

It is a myth; it does not exist, and will not exist if the constitution is adopted in the form now proposed.

I am a bit confused by it, but it seems the point of contention is should the Senate have equal power, and if they do, it is a Confederacy?

Sounds like some wedging was going on in Deakin's book and at the convention. Since the Confederacy lost the US Civil War to the Union (federalists), I guess confederacy in the convention was being equated to weakness and other negative human passions.

Playford seems to believe in the Westminster style where the will of the people comes through the House, while the states moderate against federal excess through the Senate. That seems typical small state thinking in a federation.

I thought it interesting that he alluded to an election of the President in the Swiss manner by both houses. We often forget how influential the Swiss Constitution was during federation; it and the US Constitution pop up constantly.

After that speech by Playford he spends the next series of debates defending himself and the history of the South Australian Legislative Council.

Interestingly Dibbs argues that if the Senate and House cannot agree then they should use the Norwegian method and meet as one house until they have thrashed it out. This is similar to the system Victoria uses today.

Playford's vision of state's rights also included the state appointing their own Governors, rather than the monarch doing so.

Conclusion

I think Deakin painting Playford as a confederate is unfair. I suspect it was more a result of trying to wedge a small colony representative who was more concerned with the rights of small states getting swamped in a federal system by NSW and Victoria. Deakin is also known for being less than gratuitous toward his political competitors.

Playford seemed to be for a strong Senate that represented the states and could act as a limit on federal power. He was for responsible government and a uniformly elected popular house. The US system at the time had an appointed Senate and was no less federalist for it.

I think this was Deakin playing politics, rather than historian in his book.

More Reading on Thomas playford

• Thomas Playford
• Alfred Deakin
• 1891 Constitutional Convention
• Federation
• Confederacy
• Thomas Playford and the Constitutional Conventions