In a Washington Post article, Wes Clark writes that the attack on Fallujah's military outcome is not as important as its political ramifications. There is no doubt that the US will dominate in Fallujah, but there is no guarantee that the attack on Fallujah will demonstrate that the US, and by proxy, Alliwi's provisional government has the monopoly on violence which is necessary for a nation-state.

Clark argues that the Bush Administration and the Coalition Provisional Authority has not concentrated enough on the diplomatic and political process that will ultimately lead to the success of Iraq. This is Australia's problem as well. Despite the rhetoric of "stay the course" and "til the job is finished", Australia has not put enough forces, assets, or money into Iraq to have any effect whatsoever on the desirable outcome of Iraq being a stable democracy.

General Richard Myers claimed that the battle for Fallujah had been won, and the city liberated. Clark argues that there is no doubt the US forces would win, their might is indomitable and their technology unparralled. But the definition of won in terms of the recent conflict in Fallujah is difficult to quantify. Clark writes;

But it's hardly surprising that the measure of success in Fallujah is elusive: There's no uniformed enemy force, no headquarters, no central command complex for the troops to occupy and win. At the end, there will be no surrender.

Instead, the outcome of the battle must be judged by a less clear-cut standard: not by the seizure and occupation of ground, but by the impact it has on the political and diplomatic process in Iraq. Its chances for success in that area are highly uncertain.

To Clark the definition of winning is having a stable democratic Iraq, and the first test of this is the upcoming elections in January. Despite the often changing arguments for the invasion of Iraq, from the spurious weapons of mass destruction, to liberation, to Saddam was a madman - it is obvious now that the neo-con foreign policy was to create a new West Germany as the frontline in the conflict with fundamentalist wahabism.

There is no guarantee that Iraq will become a success like West Germany was. With the end of the Cold War all of western and most of eastern Europe democratized. West Germany even bought their old foe, East Germany and unified their country. Another attempt to establish a frontline outside of the US in Vietnam, failed miserably.

Clark argues that the definition of winning has to be wider than sound-bites of "liberation" and footage of troops taking territory, it must include a wider realisation;

To win means not just to occupy the city, but to do so in a way that knocks the local opponent permanently out of the fight, demoralizes broader resistance, and builds legitimacy for U.S. aims, methods and allies. Seen this way, the battle for Fallujah is not just a matter of shooting.

It is part of a larger bargaining process that has included negotiations, threats and staged preparations to pressure insurgent groups into pre-emptive surrender, to deprive them of popular tolerance and support, and to demonstrate to the Iraqi people and to others that force was used only as a last resort in order to gain increased legitimacy for the interim Iraqi government.

Clark argues that much of the support for the insurgents and terrorists has been through external mechanisms. Such as Syria providing a porous border, Iran meddling in the hope of an Iraqi theocracy and Saudi support for Sunnis. Clark sees this as a challenge for American diplomacy to stop the outside support for insurgents, so that, unlike Vietnam, this support doesn't become a permanent barrier to the US holding a monopoly on force in Iraq.

Clark also identifies several errors made by the Bush Administration that have led to this predicament;

Which brings us back to some of the factors that made last week's battle of Fallujah inevitable: a series of circumstances and errors in 2003 -- an initial coalition occupying force too small to achieve dominance over a historically restive population, the lack of a skilled political corps to reorganize the local inhabitants, the proscription of Baathist participation in the early postwar recovery and the disbanding of the Iraqi military.

Then there was the aborted April 2004 effort to subdue the city, in which an under-strength Marine assault was called off by the White House. A silly plan of turning the city back over to a thrown-together Iraqi force left the enemy in control of the battlefield and turned Fallujah into even more of an insurgent stronghold.

One of the errors of Vietnam was the micro-management of the military campaign by politicians, who attempted to serve their political efforts through their military efforts. This Administration has proved little different. It is not surprising that the Fallujah offensive came soon after the election.

But if these errors are well known by American political commentators, where is Australia in all this? Since Australia has been such a strong an uncritical supporter of the US, why isn't Australia providing the forces to ensure Iraqi security and stability? Why isn't Australia providing the diplomatic expertise to stop Syria, Iran and Saudi Arabia supporting the insurgency? Where is Australian leadership on this issue?

Sadly Australia, through the actions of John Howard have led us on a fools errand. Australia's only stake in this was reminding the US that we still existed as an uncritical supporter of their foreign policy, no matter how inept, illegitimate or inane. Richard Woolcott writes ;

The reality is that Australia's presence, however capable and efficient our forces, can make no meaningful contribution to the two major objectives: the reconstruction of that country and the establishment of a viable democratic government there.

Until Australia decides to truly "finish the job", Australian success will be dependant entirely upon American success. Despite the re-election of the Bush Administration, their first term was dominated by bad decisions and flat-out incompetence due to ideology trumping empirical policy. There is little to suggest that their second term will improve their record.

This is the failure of Australia not having an independent foreign policy and defence policy. We trade our international legitimacy for our uncritical support of the US. This "great and powerful friends" policy has a century of failure behind it, the political cringe must go the way of the cultural cringe - unfortunately our politicians do not have that kind of courage. I do not see it happening soon.

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