The Judicial Appointments Commission in the UK is pretty new, it was only implemented in April this year, and won't choose its first High Court Judge until October, 2006. The commission has fifteen members on it including two legal professionals, five judges, a tribunal justice, a magistrate, and six citizens (lay people) including the chairman. They are also backed by a staff of one hundred people. The make up is interesting as it collapses specialist with informed citizenry and excludes the political specialists - ie politicians.

From Wikipedia the current board is made up of;

Chairman:The Right Honourable The Baroness Prashar, CBE

Professional: Mr Edward Nally, Mr Jonathan Sumption, OBE, QC

Judicial: The Right Honourable Lord Justice Robin Auld, The Honourable Mr Justice John Goldring, The Right Honourable Lady Justice Heather Hallett, Her Honour Judge Frances Kirkham, District Judge Charles Newman

Tribunal: His Honour Judge David Pearl

Lay justice: Dame Lorna May Boreland-Kelly

Lay: Professor Hazel Genn, Sir Geoffrey Inkin, Ms Sara Nathan, Mr Francis Plowden, Ms Harriet Spicer

There was a recent Times article by Frances Gibb on the new arrangements titled; Taps on the shoulder make way for job applications. The article writes that is an important modernisation of the judicial process for England and Wales. The article points out some of the issues faced in prior appointment of judges;

Then there is the infamous automatic consultations with 75 senior judges. "Everything we have seen . . . confirms our previously stated view that traditional automatic consultation should end." It was wasteful of judicial time and of limited value, with judges unwilling to be too critical of applicants. Whether candidates were known by senior judges was also a key factor in their success. Only 18 women applied and no applicants indicated an ethnic origin other than white.

Instead, the commission suggests the idea of "structured reference-taking" using properly qualified senior selection experts, although this would be costly and could be done only with a smaller list of candidates. There should also be interviews, it says, as part of the assessment process.

Finally, there is the role of the Lord Chancellor. The audit revealed one occasion when the Lord Chancellor "appeared to favour someone other than the top candidate (or candidates) favoured by the selection panels" and by the senior judges. The Lord Chancellor's candidate was still within the handful judged to be in the "outstanding" category; but he regarded him as "better fitted" to the nature of the vacancy in question. In the end he appointed the candidate he preferred.

In circuit judge appointments, there had been four candidates where the Lord Chancellor declined to follow the presiding judges' advice -- and no detailed reasons were given. Under the new system, set up under the Constitutional Reform Act 2005, the Lord Chancellor will not be able to appoint a candidate unless he or she is recommended by the new commission.

The Westminster system is a creaky old construct and Australia carries many of the worst excesses of absolute executive power that pop up in it. Judicial appointments is one. Australia needs a system at the federal level, which either draws specialists into the decision making, or takes advantage of our federal character and brings the states in as well. Any appointment remains the Executive's decision, but also must be overseen by a legislative confirmation.

I am in favour of some form of independent Judicial Council which gives a short-list to the Executive to choose with a final check and balance of a Senate confirmation to make sure the process of short-listing and appointment isn't being abused.

cam

More Reading on Judicial appointments commission

• Judicial Appointments Commission
• Judicature
• British Judicial Appointments Commission