Kenneth M. Pollack argues that the Iraq War and ongoing occupation did not have to be a failure . Going by the rules of thumb for numbers of boots on the ground from previous occupations, there is good evidence that the invasion was politically unachievable in the United States.

Wolfowitz's highly optimistic and idealistic estimate of the numbers of troops required for securing Iraq came from Operation Provide Comfort. This was a US military mission to provide food and water to Kurds that were being forced north by the Iraqi Army into the mountain regions after the 1991 Gulf War.

Rather then risk establishing permanent refugee camps, the US military decided to manoeuvre through the Kurdish region and offer the Iraqi Army an option of retreating, or being surrounded by US forces - not to mention being under the scrutiny of US air-power.

The Iraqi Army chose to retreat instead of fight once they were isolated. The US State Department put a stop to it once they found out, as the annexing of territory meant that the Kurds were now permanently under US protection with the implication an open-ended commitment.

It was expected that speed of manoeuvre would lead the Iraqi Army to collapse infront of the US military as occurred during Operation Provide Comfort which led planners such as Wolfowitz and other neo-conservatives to think that a small force will be necessary and the shock of manoeuvre will leave civil order in place. There was serious expectation that only 30,000 troops would be need after Hussein was deposed. Planning was made for that eventuality.

In peace-keeping situations the rule of thumb after Bosnia had become that for every fifty civilians, there would need to be one soldier. This is what has led to the rule of thumb figure of 450,000 troops for Iraq, and 300,000 with the Kurdish region being excluded.

Source: Rand MR1753 Chapter 9 [pdf]

Currently there are 140,000 troops in the US, plus there are about 30,000 troops from other nations and about 20,000 contractors. This gives a force in the area of 200,000. Which is a third short of the requirement of soldiers per capita even with the Kurdish region removed.

The recent "surge" policy would add another 20,000 - 40,000 to that number, which is still short of the pre-war estimates. But is a force of 350,000 possible without the US resorting to a draft?

The US Army currently has about 500,000 on active duty , with the National Guard another 350,000 and the Reserve a further 200,000. But not all of those numbers are trigger pullers, most are what are called the tail. Normally the teeth to tail ratio is somewhere around one to six or one to seven. So for every trigger puller, or every pair of boots on the ground there is approximately six soldiers supporting them.

Another issue the military forces face is a sustainable presence requires rotations. So for every pair of boots on the ground in Iraq, there is a pair of boots resting, and another pair of boots getting ready to go back to Iraq. So suddenly the million troops that the US has its fingertips with the US Army, National Guard and Reserve is whittled down to about 140,000.

The hope that international armies could fill the gap is unrealistic. A United Nations force would have difficulty matching the US's numbers anyway. Australia is one of the world's biggest spenders on defence (we are 16th IIRC) and we can only afford a sustainable force of 1,000 in Iraq. Our small army of 25,000 is already stretched with deployments in the South Pacific.

The British spend approximately 2.5% GDP on their defence forces, which is a large amount, yet the maximum force they could bring to bear in Iraq was 8,000 soldiers. The truth of the matter is, the only nation who could deploy a force of 300,000 in the field and sustain that presence is the United States. It has the population, the wealth, and the existing logistical infrastructure to support such an extended deployment.

The problem is, the only way that number of boots on the ground can occur is through a draft - which is not politically achievable. Not then, not now. This is a war of choice, not necessity.

I think Pollack is incorrect when he argues that the Iraq War and occupation did not have to be a failure. It was never politically possible in the United States.

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