The Australian Government recently announced that it would expand the Army by two Battalions to reduce some of the pressure on the large number of deployments Australia has committed to, and seemingly, the expectation of a long infantry-based conflict with extremists and guerrillas in the Middle East. Fourth Generation Warfare [4GW] is the current buzzword, and has been put into modern language by John Robb who writes about the effects of Global Guerrillas and their effect on modern state and economic structures.

There is also the suggestion that all nation-states will feel some kind of domestic 4GW disturbance, such as France did recently, and that the technology of the nation-state and its military structure is ill-equipped to handle it.

The professional military rose in the nation-state due to the high capital investment that was required in the nation-state's military capability. In the 18th Century the Navy was the dominant form of projection and nation-state power. Ships and maritime technology development was highly expensive and the civil and military bureaucracy that supported them was both expensive and complex. John Reeve writes in The Navy and the Nation ;

Navies have been, for centuries, probably the most complex institutional creations of human society and certainly of human governments. The British Navy - the strategic weapon which built the greatest empire the world has ever seen - was, by the eighteenth century, arguably the largest and certainly the most sophisticated organisation within British society.

To build and sustain a navy has, traditionally, required the balancing and integration of human, technological, environmental, fiscal, economic, political, diplomatic and military factors.

The development of armoured warfare and precision based aerospace warfare place similar demands on the nation-state which develops, supports and sustains such a structure in government, civil and martial backing.

Capitalism is the process of commoditisation of economic products. It works with a fury toward this end until anything on the market approaches its cost of production. Military technology has not been immune to the process of capitalism. Much of the military technology that was unique to nation-states, solely for reasons of capitalisation, are now becoming cheap enough that non-state actors can afford them; satellites, UAVs, chemical weapons, etc.

Governments like professional militaries as they are far more obedient than volunteer, conscripted or militia forces. The American and Australian experience of Vietnam being a case in point. Both countries used conscription and faced social disturbance at home with what was an unpopular war. The coercion of civilians into the military forces spread the social dissatisfaction. New Zealand, in contrast, only sent regular forces to Vietnam, and did not face the same civil disruptions domestically.

Militia

The strength of civilian armies, or militia, has been a basis of republican government for a long time. Machiavelli advocated for militia forces as he believed they were more committed to the state than mercenaries. Presumably this isn't a concern of the modern-state but the conflict in Iraq has shown a disconcerting outsourcing of military functions. Though this may be for domestic political purposes, in order to deflect the true size and cost of the military deployment.

The Jefferson and Madison advocacy for militia was based on the fear of a standing army usurping the constitution; something we saw recently in Thailand, and not so long ago in Pakistan. On our borders we have also seen Suharto's Indonesia where the military become indiscernible from civil government in an unhealthy mix which Indonesia is still struggling to remove from their system. Jefferson wrote in 1799;

I am for relying, for internal defence, on our militia solely, till actual invasion, and for such a naval force only as may protect our coasts and harbours from such depredations as we have experienced; and not for a standing army in times of peace, which may overawe the public sentiment; nor for a navy, which, by its own expenses and eternal wars in which it will implicate us, will grind us with public burthens, and sink us under them.

Capital costs of defence and the level of specialisation in the 1800s quickly surpassed Jefferson's beliefs and the United States ended up with a standing army and navy. It is pretty unavoidable given the level of capitalisation and organisation required - only a nation-state can do it.

Australian Militia

Australia has a strong militia tradition which has only been dropped in the last forty years or so, though it still exists civilly in organisations such as the Bush Fire Brigade and State Emergency Services. The Defence Act of the 1900s enforced a morality on the government's approach to military affairs by requiring that only volunteers serve outside of Australia. This was a very moral law .

This meant that the First and Second Imperial Force's were volunteer forces. The Citizen's Military also played a massive role in World War II, especially in New Guinea which was an Australian territory at the time so the government could send militia units there without contradicting the Defence Act. By the end of the war though the Curtin government had moved the definition of Australia as being somewhere just short of the Phillipines. However, Kokoda was one of the great militia victories.

Australia used to maintain militia air squadrons in the 1950s as well but increasing costs of airwarfare platforms eventually scuttled it. The modern professional military is only a recent thing and prior to the 1960s a large component of the Australian military and readiness was wrapped up in militia.

Australian Militia and 4GW

The modern fourth generation of warfare is exposing the weakness of centrally controlled regular units who rely on firepower and force multipliers to complete their mission. The Iraqi experience has shown that local para-military groups are far more effective in rooting out and destroying insurgents and guerrillas.

Jim Hoagland wrote on the insurgency in Iraq and the realisation that the media and punditry are coming to on the issue of fourth generation warfare;

"Insurgency is here to stay," Jeb Nadaner, deputy assistant defense secretary for stability operations, said at a recent U.S.-British conference in Washington on reorganizing governments to fight irregular warfare.

Other speakers -- including conference organizer John Hillen, the State Department's top political-military expert -- spoke bluntly to the group about the continuing failure of the U.S. military and civilian bureaucracies to adapt to an era in which armor and infantry battles occupy only a small space on the overall battlefield and are in any event too costly to be carried on for very long.

As France has shown there are implications when fourth generation warfare is applied locally. At the domestic level it should be handled by civil responses, such as the police force and in extreme circumstances of emergency the Bush Fire Brigade and State Emergency Services but if the issue does spiral to armed militia the Australian military will be of limited to no use.

The other issue Australia is facing is that it will have great difficulty expanding its Army in a tight labor market and one where soldiers are being deployed everywhere and anywhere. It is best to make up a reserve pool by increasing the militia franchise outside of the Army Reserve format. The Swiss have an interesting compulsory system which is something between a regular and volunteer force. Not unlike the mixes Australia used to have in the early 1900s.

Given the decentralised nature of terrorism and systems disruption, it is probably a good idea to train as many as possible in emergency response, civil (BFB and SES) and military (Regular and Irregular) incase the nation-state suffers catastrophic collapse. I do not think Australia will, but it is wise to lay the foundations of social organisation so that if something of that nature does occur it is quickly and easily dealt with.

We may have to change our thinking of state on state violence as well. It is possible that the capital intensive form of warfare and military sustenance in the industrial era was an aberration which we will not see again. It certainly appears that 4GW has more in common with pre-industrial warfare than twentieth century violence.

I think we should change the structure of the ADF from an industrial military force to a more decentralised one; and this means moving as much of the knowledge and expertise into militia structures as possible.

General David Petreaus commanded the US 101st Airborne in the initial invasion of Iraq and through quick action stopped Mosul from going out of control. Since being given command of the Iraq theatre he has assembled a 'dream team' of fourth generation warfare scholars which includes Australia's Lt. Col. David Kilcullen.

Kilcullen's Twenty-Eight Articles: Fundamentals of Company-level Counterinsurgency [pdf] recently did the rounds of the US military. Kilcullen served for 21 years in the Australian Army including a command in East Timor. He has a doctoral thesis on counter-insurgencies in Indonesia. More recently he has been loaned to the US State Department to give advice on asymmetric warfare.

The 28 Articles reminds me of the powerpoint by US Army Capt. Travis Patriquin, How to win the war in Anbar [pdf]. Sadly his life was taken by an explosive device. Which suggests there is consensus on the manner with which the insurgency operates on the ground, in the military command (with Petreaus's appointment), in the intellects driving military policy and in the civil experts and specialists.

The issue with Iraq has always been the political conduct of the war. Since it has been domestically focused in the US and Australia, many political decisions have adversely affected the military's capability to conduct a winning strategy.

An early example of this which Thomas E. Ricks described was the political announcement of WMDs, which was known to be false and chosen as a political sell, led to US commanders not blowing up arms cache's as they found them. Added to the lack of manpower which the Department of Defense used to invade Iraq this meant the US Commanders had no troops to guard the caches and couldn't blow them up for fear of biological or nuclear contamination. Consequently they were quickly looted - arming the insurgents and militia.

Another good example which wreaked civil havoc was de-Baathification, which many commanders such as Petreaus and the commanders of the 101st Airborne were opposed to. It was a political decision by the CPA, DoD and it seems possibly the White House was involved too. So political decision making from Washington DC has pretty much been bad the whole time.

It has become a talking point that the lack of moral support on the US domestic front is leading to the loss of the war of in Iraq. In reality, those most to blame for the current anarchy and disorder in Iraq are the US Executive - namely the White House and Department of Defence, as well as the early US military commanders in the Pentagon.

Kilcullen's fundamentals focus on the company level of command. This has been an area of Australian speciality, mainly due to the need to conduct jungle warfare in Australian north. The command structures in such an environment quickly flatten and require a great deal of independent thought to operate tactically within the strategy. Kilcullen defines the insurgency as:

If you have not studied counterinsurgency theory, here it is in a nutshell: this is a competition

with the insurgent for the right and the ability to win the hearts, minds and acquiescence of the

population. You are being sent in because the insurgents, at their strongest, can defeat anything weaker than you. But you have more combat power than you can or should use in most

situations. Injudicious use of firepower creates blood feuds, homeless people and societal

disruption that fuels and perpetuates the insurgency.

The most beneficial actions are often local politics, civic action, and beat-cop behaviors. For your side to win, the people do not have to

like you but they must respect you, accept that your actions benefit them, and trust your integrity and ability to deliver on promises, particularly regarding their security. In this battlefield popular perceptions and rumor are more influential than the facts and more powerful than a hundred tanks.

Whenever I read these types of things I cannot help thinking that a military is the wrong weapon in these types of situations. A counter-insurgency needs police, judges and good governance to dampen it. I think rather than sending in the 101st Airborne and the SASR we should be sending in the Los Angeles Police Department and the NSW Tactical Response Group.

Police are armed well enough to take down an insurgent or a terrorist. They also don't carry all the overhead, weaponry and equipment of a soldier. Nor do they have such isolationist bases or camps. Police live amongst the population and use technology which is widely available to all citizenry. They aren't an 'other' like the military are.

Kilcullen's points include:

• Know your turf
• Organize for intelligence
• Organize for inter-agency operations
• Travel light and harden your CSS
• Train the squad leaders and then trust them
• Rank is nothing, talent is everything
• Avoid knee jerk responses to first impressions
• Prepare for handover from day one
• Remember the global audience
• Engage the women, beware the children
• Local forces should mirror the enemy, not ourselves
• Practice armed civil affairs. From that section, "Counterinsurgency is armed social work; an attempt to redress basic social and political problems while being shot at. This makes civil affairs a central counterinsurgency activity, not an afterthought."
• Build your own solution – only attack the enemy when he gets in the way.

Kilcullen's analysis advocates a lightweight, decentralised, rapidly mobile, locally and political sensitive force which engages the overall strategy and only intercepts the enemy when it interferes with their capability of adhering to the strategy.

It is not a surprise that the Australian SAS Regiment was prized in Afghanistan and Iraq as Kilcullen's points cover the manner of special forces operation. The grunts, artillery, infantry, air force and navy though? They are for destroying nation-states and their military forces. Harder task for them to do that.

Fabius Maximus has an interesting discussion of Kilcullen's work. He argues that fourth generation warfare must be split into two types for a strategy to be determined:

• Violence between two or more local groups, who can form from any combination of clans, governments, ethnicities, religions, gangs, and tribes.
• Violence between two or more sides, where at least one is led by foreigners - both comprising, as above, any imaginable combination of factions.

Fabius argues that these types of conflicts are only winnable when the locals do all the fighting, outside support, in money and information management are important, but ultimately the local police, military and politicians have to dampen the disorder. He uses the Malayan Emergency as an example. This leads fabius to conclude:

• Insurgencies are easiest to defeat at home
• Do not look to wars won by the locals for lessons how we can win when fighting in foreign lands
• That we avoid foreign wars, except when we only assist local forces

Fabius writes that Kilcullen has advanced fourth generation warfare theory but suspects that his points are more use for fighting a domestic insurgency than one in a foreign land.

With Petreaus leading the US Army in Iraq, and fourth generation warfare theorists providing the intellectual backing for the chosen strategy hopefully Iraq will be tamed such that it can make the transition from disorder to civil order. Sadly I don't think the US political management is up to it, and will probably hamper any US military efforts, no matter how hard the soldiers and commanders bend their backs to the task.