In 2001 Australian policy was that Australian forces were in Afghanistan for the "War on Terror", not for "Afghanistan", meaning Australia was not there for nation building. As a consequence Australia sent the very tip of its land based spear. The very effective Special Air Services Regiment (SASR). The SASR is trained to be highly independent and conduct extended operations, behind enemy lines, and without resupply for a week or longer.

John Howard recently announced that the SASR will be heading back to Afghanistan for a twelve month tour. This was met by many in Australia with a sigh of relief that we would be sending "more troops" to help out. But the SASR isn't for civil order, or police work. They are not infantry, they are for discovering and destruction of enemy forces. From what I can glean from different news reports, it seems the US may be winding down its special forces operations in Afghanistan. The British are also preparing to send five thousand of their infantry to Afghanistan, with the British SAS and Australian SAS preparing the way for them. The final reason is that there has been a resurgence of Al Queda and Taliban fighters, especially in, near, or on the Pakistan border.

History

The SASR were first deployed in Brunei during Konfrontasi . Indonesia maintained pressure against Malaya throughout the early 1960s, with Indonesian special forces constantly breaking the border in Borneo. This was a platoon level conflict of jungle patrols - an ideal environment for highly trained and independent special forces. In Borneo one of the main opponents was the forerunner to Suharto's KOPASSUS. SASR later fought in Vietnam, working with US Special Forces. It was a similar environment to Konfrontasi, dominated by platoon level leadership and operations in a jungle environment. The SASR was deployed in East Timor in 1999 where they came up against KOPASSUS again. The SASR has also been used in numerous United Nations operations as security, training or as medical assets.

Afghanistan

The Australian SAS Regiment were heavily involved in the Afghanistan conflict, from December 2001 onwards. This included operations such as Slipper, ANACONDA and Mountain Lion. The latter which was along the Pakistani border. Initially US commanders did not understand the capability of the SASR. Australian SAS are trained to go deep behind enemy lines on protracted missions, often as long as a week without resupply, whereas many US Special Forces are more insertion and extraction. The US has far more hardware and back-end to support such operations. Australia does not, as a consequence stamina, independence operations and sustained tempo are valued qualities of the SASR.

Once the US Commanders discovered this aspect of the SASR, they were happy to use them to their full capability ;

Initially US intelligence thought the SAS[R] had found Bin Laden, says Adam [a SASR soldier]. A jet was called and dropped a 500kg bomb but it exploded over 100 meters away in a creek bed. Follow up air-raids by A-10 warthog aircraft killed a number of suspected Al Qaeda fighters but opinions are still divided about the success of the raid.

Adam says the bomb missed, resulting in the escape of the high value target, who he suspects was Tur Yuldashev, the head of the al-Qaeda-linked Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan and a highly experienced commander. But a recently published book about the operation, written by respected US Army Times journalist Sean Naylor, has suggested the target was Al-Zawahiri, Osama Bin Laden's personal physician and al-Qaeda's second in command.

The independent streak of the SASR extended to their being denoted by long hair and beards. In November 2002 they returned to Australia.

Iraq

The SASR were used in the invasion of Iraq as the tip of the coalition spear , entering the country a full two days before formal hostilities started. The SASR entered Iraq by ground and air; the ground forces hitting Iraqi resistance thirty kilometres in. This was one of the first ground engagements of the invasion. The SASR groups that were dropped in by US air assets were the closest coalition forces to Baghdad for several days. Within a week in the SASR's area of operations, Iraqi military resistance had been neutralised. The SASR later captured Al Asad airbase which contained over fifty Iraqi Mig aircraft and nearly eight million kilograms of explosives.

Between the Afghanistan and Iraq conflicts, the SASR have earnt the Australian forces international recognition for their effectiveness. Even being mentioned in the US Security White Paper. American military commanders are no idiots, they know good troops when they see them. Since the SASR proved their worth in Afghanistan they have become an integral part of coalition operations.

SASR back to Afghanistan

The SASR will be sent back to Afghanistan for another tour . This will most likely involve one hundred and fifty SASR troops. The twelve month deployment will incur a cost of approximately one hundred million AUD. John Howard did not make plainly clear why in his announcements, but it appears it is due to multiple reasons. There has been a resurgence of Taliban and Al Queda insurgents and operatives in Afghanistan which have been operating on, in, or nearby the Pakistan border. This is ideal territory and terrain for the SASR's capability. Howard was quoted as saying ;

The decision to send the troops was made after requests at a military level from the US, Afghanistan and other countries to help deal with resurgent Taliban and al-Qaeda forces, Mr Howard said.

It also appears that the SASR will be used in conjunction with the British SAS to clear the way for the deployment of five thousand British regular infantry to Afghanistan ;

Up to two squadrons of British special forces are preparing to go to Afghanistan within weeks to provide the reconnaissance for an expected British deployment of more than 5,000 troops. ...

The British and Australian special forces will fan out across the territory to be covered by the British battle group. They will identify the most serious threats in the region and gather intelligence on any Taliban activity.

The troops face a hostile environment, with Taliban fighters regrouping in southern Afghanistan backed up by members of Al-Qaeda, including specially trained suicide bombers.

It also appears that there is a possibility that either US Special Forces are being moved to Iraq, from Afghanistan, or US Special Forces are being over-whelmed in Afghanistan. Bob Brown was quoted as saying ;

Particularly with increasing reports now coming from Europe that the US wants to reduce and withdraw its forces from Afghanistan, Australia shouldn't be a convenient substitute for George Bush's domestic foreign policy

Since Afghanistan got some NATO and European approval, which Iraq did not, it is possible that the US is focusing on Iraq, and leaving Afghanistan to Europe and other nations who are politically incapable of committing forces to Iraq.

Australia's Policy

The Australian policy of going to Afghanistan for the War on Terror and not Afghanistan itself is being broken. John Howard is also sending a Provincial Reconstruction Team. This will comprise about two hundred people. Richard Woolcott's comment on Iraq, that no matter how effective the Australian assets there are, Australia is not committing enough manpower, nor money, to make Iraq a stable and reconstructed democratic nation, stands true for Afghanistan as well.

Two hundred members of a Provincial Reconstruction Team will not change the security relationship outside of Kandahar, nor will one hundred and fifty members of the SASR. The latter being for the tracking down of Taliban and Al Queda fighters in the mountainous country along the Pakistani border. As a consequence, Australian policy toward both Iraq and Afghanistan is ad-hoc, and unfocused. This is in part a result of the Prime Minister not having to pass overseas deployments of troops through parliament. There is no accountability on the deployments mission, nor the policy that informs the mission of our military deployments.

We do the Australian Defence Force a dis-service by allowing this situation to persist.

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The recent announcement of Australia sending the SASR to Afghanistan along with a Provincial Reconstruction Team points to the unfocused nature of Australia's involvement in the American led "War on Terror". The Howard government chose to join the United States pursuit of terrorism as a military issue. This is in part due to the "Great and Powerful Friends" (GAPF) doctrine of foreign policy that the Liberal Party adheres to. But equally influential on our policy toward Afghanistan has been the weak manner in which Australia has contributed. We are not in control of the outcome, and consequentially the Howard government is just floating along with no focus, and no possible means to take the expeditions in Afghanistan and Iraq to any conclusion. Australia needs to return to the policy of December 2001, pull out of Iraq, and focus its full energies on defeating Al Queda and the Taliban in Afghanistan.

Afghanistan

In December of 2001, Australia sent the SASR over to Afghanistan to contribute in the over-throw of the Taliban. Australia's policy then was that our military were there for the "War on Terror", not for "Afghanistan". Recently explaining the recent resending of the SASR back to Afghanistan John Howard said;

When Australia withdrew those forces [SASR from Afghanistan in 2002], they were withdrawn against a background that it has always been the Australian position that we would provide some support of an elite kind at the sharp end, and that we were never disposed at the beginning to have that long-term - what I might loosely call - peacekeeping role ...

Between the deployments of the SASR in Afghanistan, Australian maintained a personnel of one in the country - a mine clearance officer. This was fitting with the original Australian policy. Our commitment was minimal, and contributed to the over-throw of the Taliban, unfortunately, in the US, the political climate changed and Afghanistan was quickly cast aside, and Iraq focused on. Australia's GAPF foreign policy meant that John Howard found himself joining the American and British governments in selling a war to an often cynical and unbelieving public.

Afghanistan was never followed through entirely to ensure that the Taliban and Al Queda would not resurge in the mountain ranges of the Pakistani border. Australia did not commit sufficient troops to pursue that goal without American and British support. As a consequence, when the SASR, along with American forces, were moved to the Iraqi border, the Taliban and Al Queda were able to regroup in the harsh eastern Afghan country.

Iraq

Australia followed the United States into Iraq, with the Australian Defence Force (ADF) committing aircraft, special forces, naval vessels and logistical support to the operation. This was quickly wound down after the initial success of the American march on Baghdad. After hostilities ceased the largest numbers of ADF members in the Gulf were an ANZAC Frigate and a Surface to Air Weapon System - totalling approximately 1600 troops. With the recent deployment of 450 additional troops this brings Australia's current commitment to approximately 2000 troops.

John Howard did not make any policy commitment on Iraq, preferring to balance the reticence of a public still not behind the conflict, and the pressure from the United States, Britain and other nations to commit greater forces. Like Afghanistan, it has meant that Australia can have no effect on the outcome, we are dependant upon American success for Australian success. Richard Woolcott commented;

The reality is that Australia's presence, however capable and efficient our forces, can make no meaningful contribution to the two major objectives: the reconstruction of that country [Iraq] and the establishment of a viable democratic government there.

Iraq is an American project that requires an American response - lots of troops, lots of money and lots of patience for an ongoing medium intensity conflict. Only the United States can handle that. Australia is best playing to its strengths, and focusing on Afghanistan.

The SASR are the very tip of the spear in the ADF's land capability, but the spear gets fat pretty quickly with the Australian Army - 1st RAR and 4th RAR both maintain commando battalions. These forces are ideally suited to the Afghanistan conflict which is a low intensity, low tempo, land based conflict requiring a high level of skill and training at the individual and platoon level. The Australian Army has always over-excelled in these situations, and presently has existing assets that fulfil that role perfectly.

Clarity of Policy

Australia's response in 2002 toward Afghanistan should have been an escalation of our commitment there with the purpose of eradicating Al Queda and the Taliban. Iraq was a diversion, a distraction that has defrayed Australian policy; leaving it unfocused. Australia needs the clarity of policy again that was present in December of 2001.

Australia needs to remove its forces from Iraq and make a commitment to the United States and Afghanistan that it will see the "War on Terror" in Afghanistan through to its natural conclusion - which is the eradication of Al Queda and Taliban operatives from the country.

We should deploy the commando battalions as well as another Regiment to Afghanistan along with the necessary Army and Air Force airlift capability. The SASR and Commando Battalions will be able to range independently while the RAR will have the capability to do insertion and extraction with Australian rotating and fixed blade air assets.

More importantly, Australia should establish a command and control structure in Afghanistan where Australian commanders are entirely in control of Australian forces. We have not seen the rise of a Monash or Williams in the recent campaigns because Australian forces have been deployed piecemeal under other nation's forces. Australian solutions to Australian problems are superior, and with Australia taking responsibility and ownership of the destruction of Al Queda and the Taliban in Afghanistan, it will allow Australian commanders to pursue that goal by managing the Australian forces at their most efficient and full capability.

Conclusion

The Australian troops would not be in Afghanistan for nation-building, manning checkpoints, or doing police work. They would be focused on a military goal, and an achievable outcome. This would not be politically untenable with the Australian public and would most likely enjoy greater popularity than the current piecemeal and ad-hoc deployment of troops in Iraq and Afghanistan.

The deployment of the SASR, Commando Battalions and a RAR to Afghanistan along with the support infrastructure, including command and control as well as air assets, would allow Australia to pursue a focused policy that would have genuine value in the conflict with organized Wahabi Extremism. It would give Australia a national and political purpose beyond following whatever the great and powerful friend does. Australia would have ownership over a very important component of this conflict, one that is quantifiable, and one that has an publicly knowable ending.

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Well not exactly. Beazley got a run in an E.J. Dionne WaPo op-ed article titled, "First Step? Admit There's a Problem" [reg req]. Neither American Republicans or Democrats have any plan for what to do in Iraq. Clarkes op-ed on the same page, on the same subject, basically says Bush has no plan . Clark then manages to not offer one in return.

Beazley reckons;

Beazley proposed the redeployment of American forces to Iraq's borders with Syria and Iran on the road to departure. At the same time, Washington needs to "refocus attention on Afghanistan," particularly the border areas with Pakistan, where he sees the real war on terrorism being waged. And the United States must turn its attention to the Iraq war's perverse effect, which has been to "advance Iranian power."

So where I differ with Beazley is that he thinks the US forces should take over the Afghan border, I reckon the Australian forces should ;

But equally influential on our policy toward Afghanistan has been the weak manner in which Australia has contributed. We are not in control of the outcome, and consequentially the Howard government is just floating along with no focus, and no possible means to take the expeditions in Afghanistan and Iraq to any conclusion. Australia needs to return to the policy of December 2001, pull out of Iraq, and focus its full energies on defeating Al Queda and the Taliban in Afghanistan.

Note to John Howard and Kim Beazley, my skills in defence policy are always on the market.

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Australia deployed light infantry as part of a United Nations force to East Timor which it led. Indonesia lost its political fight in East Timor and withdrew KOPASSUS and TNI support for the pro-Indonesian militia. Australia's force structure was unobtrusive and non-abrasive. Tellingly though, Australia secured the political environment before the military deployment. This can inform Australian policy on Iraq and Afghanistan.

Australian force structure is geared toward expeditionary deployment. The Great and Powerful Friends doctrine of foreign policy and a deficit in Australian projection power have led to this outcome. Australia has also been a strong supporter of United Nation initiatives, deploying in all manner of UN projects and aims.

The United States in comparison is unrivalled in hard power, projection, ability to sustain that power and technological might. The United States can destroy an opposing nation-state's military and infrastructure in the blink of an eye. Reducing the nation-state to a name only and without any reach of civil order influence.

This poses an issue for neo-conservative doctrine which contains regime-change through military action as one of its political tools. As the US found in Iraq and Afghanistan, and Israel has discovered in Lebanon, nation-states are relatively fragile technologies.

Reducing the power of a nation-state means that many of the responsibilities and services of a nation-state will be replaced by non-state entities. Interestingly they are normally social in origin rather than commercial.

This has given a huge opening for Islamic non-state actors who bind their politics, militancy, social services, legal systems and political morality (ie no corruption) with religion. This is proving a very powerful organisational method. The West in Iraq, Afghanistan, Lebanon and Palestine is having difficulty innovating beyond these non-state actors.

Brian E. Humphreys writes in an article titled; Learning From Hezbollah ;

Whatever the objective truth of Hezbollah's motives, its many supporters in southern Lebanon believe fervently that it is their organisation, not an Iranian surrogate.

Few if any American units in Iraq have achieved anything close to this level of success in winning support of the local population.

Of more concern is the fact that few Iraqi security units or political leaders appear to have done so either.

The Australian conservative-nationalists, in as far as they do follow neo-conservatism when it was the foreign policy fashion, deployed Australian forces to East Timor and the Solomons.

East Timor was particularly informative as it required the balancing of Australian projection power as both a threat and deterrent, as well as Australian diplomatic influence with Indonesia and the United Nations.

Australia did not move to deploy until it had done the soft power diplomacy where Indonesia asked for the UN to bring in a force to East Timor. This would not have been possible if Australia did not have a credible military capability in the North.

Australia's lack of close in support power may have helped its cause in East Timor. Where the US has conducted Fallujah like operations and Israel has assassinated Hezbollah and Hamas leaders with missiles from Helicopters, the militia situation in East Timor was quickly brought under control by the Australian and New Zealand light infantry.

John Robb quotes from the FMFM 1-A ;

As a practical matter, the forces of most of our non-state, Fourth Generation adversaries will be all or mostly irregular light infantry. Few Fourth Generation non-state actors can afford anything else ...

Light infantry is the best counter to irregulars because it offers...

First, good light infantry (unless badly outnumbered) can usually defeat almost any force of irregulars it is likely to meet. It can do this in a "man to man" fight that avoids the "Goliath" image.

... it can enjoy the same mobility as the irregulars (enhanced, as necessary by helicopters or attached motor vehicles).

Second, when it uses force, light infantry can be far more discriminating than other combat arms and better avoid collateral damage. This is critically important at both the mental and moral levels.

East Timor had a political element to it though. Indonesia had given up politically on East Timor. Since the militia were backed by KOPASSUS and the TNI there was no political will in Jakarta to maintain that aggravation in East Timor.

After the initial tensions Australia's long haul transport system became more important as the deployment was maintained in its low tempo state.

It was mainly by a mix of good diplomatic and military management that East Timor was a success as well as a bit of luck due to Australia's force structure. We didn't have the super-hard power that the US or Israel does.

Even with the recent civil strife and tensions between the East Timorese President and Prime Minister with the Army and Police splitting on ethnic lines, this wasn't a result of pushing back against the Australian presence.

This wasn't a david vs goliath political situation. It was an internal political tension that came to a head over ethnic regional division, personal political ambitions and an ambiguous constitution on executive power.

This does not help the United States in Iraq much as the divisions being drawn are political, cultural and religious now. Throw in a great dollop of lawlessness and it quickly becomes unmanageable.

However, this does inform Australian policy on Iraq. We should leave the country. Australia is not in a position with its forces, political will, or money spent to affect the outcome of Iraq in being a secure liberal democratic nation.

It is beyond our capabilities and political will.

Afghanistan is a different issue. There our military forces of the SASR, Commando battalions and RARs can make a difference in eradicating the Taliban and Al Queda from the country in what is a low tempo conflict.

Australian military capability is perfect for this scenario. The Australian Army is well known for its ability and effectiveness to act independently in small units for long periods of time.

This would also give the military and foreign policy a mission statement that is concrete, achievable and easily explained to the Australian citizenry. It would also be popular in public opinion.

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Another data point for a state having no legitimacy unless it takes a social democratic approach. Nathanial Fink describes the counter-insurgency campaign in Afghanistan:

Consider, for example, the question of roads. When U.N. teams begin building new stretches of road in volatile Afghan provinces such as Zabul and Kandahar, insurgents inevitably attack the workers. But as the projects progress and villagers begin to see the benefits of having paved access to markets and health care, the Taliban attacks become less frequent.

Non-state actors gain their political legitimacy in the same way. Hezbollah and Hamas both have social democratic and judicial components which not only replaces a weak state but helps keep it out of those areas.

Hezbollah is the second largest employer in Lebanon. It runs hospitals, orphanages, discount pharmacies and garbage collection. All of those are services which governments in Australia provide.

Fink continues with the benefits that a social-democratic approach bring:

New highways then extend the reach of the Karzai administration into previously inaccessible areas, making a continuous Afghan police presence possible and helping lower the overall level of violence -- no mean feat in a country larger and more populous than Iraq, with a shaky central government.

Basically it extends the reach of the state, and hence, its legitimacy. The state is essentially a technology for the reduction of organised and arbitrary violence.

There appears to be an equilibria where the state must supply a certain level of services and infrastructure to maintain its popular legitimacy. Ironically market approaches to services are eroded the state to an extent and allowing non-state actors to rival the state in social approaches and hence challenging the legitimacy of weak states.

It appears that the correct approach to a weak or failing state is spending on social democracy rather than an authoritarian, dictatorial or pure neo-liberal approach.

Gary Sauer-Thompson discusses the complexity of issues to do with Afghanistan, Iraq and the Australian relationship with the United States. It is a curious nexus of politics, morality and foreign policy doctrines in navigating a path of least dissatisfaction through through the three areas.

Democratically and militarily Australia cannot completely rebuff the US in Afghanistan and Iraq. Australia is too reliant on America for the continuance of Australian military power. Democratically there is a strong conservative media that idealizes the Great and Powerful Friends doctrine who have to be placated, not to mention a significant enough constituency that concurs on the policy.

There is the politics as well. As Hugh White writes Rudd wants to disengage from Iraq while maintaining the relationship with the US. White writes:

Hence Rudd's dilemma. He wants to do the Bush administration some favours, but he is reluctant to send more troops to Iraq. The compromise seems to be that he and his colleagues will urge the Europeans to do more without promising that Australia will do more itself.

White argues that strategically Afghanistan is of no interest to Australia, and he is correct. As he noted extremists are operating in Pakistan now, and the likelihood of Afghanistan transitioning to a secular free-market democracy are slim.

The main difference is morality. Afghanistan is easier to swallow from a moral point of view than Iraq is. We went into Afghanistan to bring Osama Bin Laden to justice for his crimes against humanity. For that reason alone it is more morally palatable than Iraq is, the latter which was predicated on fraud, propaganda and incompetence. I think this is why the Rudd Government will choose to focus on Afghanistan in their policy.

It seems that Obama is going to send more troops to Afghanistan. I used to think that Afghanistan was a just war, especially in comparison to Iraq which was more a made up war, but these days I think Afghanistan is another open ended commitment with no real goals and a languishing presence because no-one is certain what the absence of American and NATO forces there would mean.

Kevin Rudd is Washington DC at the moment meeting with Obama when the opportunity arises; and since Australia has approximately 1,000 troops in Afghanistan it seems a given that Rudd will commit those to the American presence in Afghanistan since the Great and Powerful Friends doctrine is based upon how much Australia loves America as an ally, friend and foreign policy kissing mate. Rudd was quoted:

Australia takes its alliance with the United States very seriously, that's why we've been with America for a long time in Afghanistan and will be with America for the long haul

Then again I consider the GAPF policy lame and lacking in imagination. For all the rhetoric Australia is only committing one thousand servicemen there.

So where are we left with Afghanistan? It was considered a just war as the Taliban was hiding Osama Bin Laden. But we never found Osama Bin Laden and were not able to bring him to justice. The Taliban are neither here nor there, and the Afghanistan government is corrupt and propped upon American money and power.

There is no long term policy to speak of. Just an increasing commitment of troops and resources as politics dictates. I suspect America is going to be in Afghanistan forever, in the same way the US will be in Iraq forever. And even if things clean up and right themselves, American will still be stuck in those places as arbiters of local power anyway.

It is easy to think in idealistic terms, of bringing democracy, liberalism, free markets and all the other basic things that make for a prosperous 21stC nation. However, none of those things are easy, and while we may consider them the end of history, or inevitable, they are incredibly difficult to get started, and even harder to keep going in that form. Modern liberal democracies have to deal with executive exceptions, protectionism, nativism and the abrogation of individual rights. These are not easy things to maintain.

I think we should leave Afghanistan. I don't see it going anywhere, and instead see it as an open ended commitment, without policy, without goals, and potentially an increasing consumption of American resources, money and power.

I was born in the early seventies so the Soviet Union as the empire of evil ready to nuke the civilized world into oblivion for political and economic ideological reasons never resonated with me. By the time I was a teenager and able to comprehend the complexity of politics the Soviet Union was another failed nation that couldn't feed its people.

My memory of the glory of the Soviet Union was food lines and people waiting days on end for toilet paper. My experience of food and other essentials in Australia during the seventies and eighties was abundance. Consequently the Soviet Union got lumped in my mind with other nations that couldn't feed their people like Kampuchea and Bi-Africa. For me it wasn't a state to be feared, if anything it was to be pitied.

Eventually the Berlin wall came down, but again, me not being a cold war warrior and Germany being a long way away from Australia it was all a pretty abstract concept and something that happened on the other side of the world.

Since my knowledge of Cold War and Soviet history is pretty poor I recently picked up Gregory Feifer's book on the Soviet - Afghanistan conflict. Gregory Feifer writes:

Most Americans view the Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan as a naked act of aggression by a ruthless, totalitarian state. The reality was far more complex. For more than a year, Soviet leaders rejected pleas from the Afghan communist government to send troops to help put down rebellion by the rural population protesting the regime's merciless modernization program.

After Moscow did invade, it found itself locked in conflict - essentially a civil war - it could barely comprehend. While it cannot be said that Afghanistan triggered the Soviet collapse, it did project the image of a failing empire unable to deal with a handful of bedraggled partisans in a remote part of its southern frontier.

It certainly looks like the Afghan politicians used the Soviets to build their own legitimacy and make up for their own bad governance, especially their inability to resolve internal political conflicts without violence.

The modernization program killed numerous people in the rural areas, robbing Afghanistan of its tribal leadership and stability. Added to that the political violence as the different communist factions in Afghanistan fought with each other using Army and Air Force loyalists didn't make for much pleasant in Afghanistan.

The Soviets were concerned about American influence in Afghanistan after the Revolution in Iran which was anti-American. Previously to that Iran had been pro-American and the Soviets were concerned that America would start to seek influence in Afghanistan instead.

Additionally it seemed Brezhnev was sentimental for the ousted leader of Afghanistan and made an emotional decision to send in the Soviet troops on a large scale. Brezhnev was aging and the core group that made up the Soviet decision makers shielded him from bad news in Afghanistan which largely led to the conclusion that Soviet intervention was necessary.

Originally the Soviets didn't want to get involved in the communist revolution in Afghanistan. The Afghans tried to turn the social organization from tribal and land ownership to one where the peasants received land under state ownership. To do so they killed and displaced tribal elders, tribes and land owners. This caused a great deal of social unrest.

After the Soviets came, the inconsistencies of communism's ability to provide basic things to the Army such as food meant that a black market system built up around the supply routes where officers got first pick of stuff. As a consequence the lowest rank soldiers often stole and looted for supplies, clothes, alcohol and food. Often they would kill Afghans in the process.

The war was violent, with the Soviets wiping out villages with their superior firepower, and the social situation was also often violent with the killing being arbitrary. The attempt to establish communism in Afghanistan failed and the civil war continued up until American forces invaded Afghanistan after September 11th. Gregory Feifer;

Twenty-four years after the Politburu's contemplation of a quick invasion of Afghanistan in 1979, the Bush Administration believed it could withdraw within months of invading Iraq. The inherent contradictions of the American use of force to try to plant democracy in countries with no tradition of representative government differ little from the Soviet attempt to build communism in Afghanistan.

The same problem exists for the US in Afghanistan as well. The Karzai government is corrupt and illegitimate. The United States is doing deals with Karzai simply because no other form of political and social stability exists in Afghanistan.

It turns out Afghanistan and Iraq were fool's errands. Both were strategic mistakes and the zealots that led the movement for them to occur should have no place in modern political dialog.

I thought Afghanistan was justified even though Iraq was not. I was wrong. Afghanistan was not justified. After reading Feifer's book of the Soviet experience in Afghanistan I don't know how Afghanistan is going to progress to a modern state.

After all the killing the Afghans did, then the Soviets did and now another prolonged COIN conflict with suicide bombers in civil areas; I don't know what Afghanistan is going to do. Leader after leader has been killed and those that remain have only flourished in the forty or so years of war that have been the way of life in Afghanistan.