Back in November 2004 Avocadia asked, " Where is the gain in refusing to sign up to the ASEAN Treaty of Amity and Cooperation?"

It remains Alexander Downer's turn to answer that question .

Foreign Affairs Minister Alexander Downer has signed a non-aggression treaty with Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN).

Signing the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in South-East Asia was the condition for Australia's admission to the East Asia Summit.

Heh. From the World Today; Amity treaty spells an end to Australia's pre-emption policy

The treaty specifically calls for signatories to renounce the threat of the use of force, emphasising respect for territorial integrity, free from external interference or coercion.

Indonesia was the first to say it meant the end of John Howard's pre-emptive strike policy in Asia. Malaysia's Foreign Minister Syed Hamid Albar was less explicit, but said Canberra understood the implications of what it was signing up to.

Which suggests the pre-emption was just talking tough prior to an election. But in November 2004, Downer raised a good point in how the Treaty limited Australia. Downer said;

"(This) has been interpreted by successive Australian governments as making it impossible for any Australian government for example to criticise Burma on human rights issues," Mr Downer told ABC TV.

Yet at the pre-ASEAN conference in Kuala Lumpar Malaysia has been strident in criticising Burma, with Downer joining in . So has this issue with the Treaty been resolved? Was this the only sticking point? Journalists can feel free to ask Alexander Downer these questions.

Anything that brings us toward Indonesia is a good thing in my opinion. South Pacific prosperity is going to come through Australia and Indonesia having a tight political, diplomatic, economic and trading relationship. Our prosperity will come through Indonesia, just as their prosperity will come through us.

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Paul Dibbs has an interesting article in the SMH on the changing power relationships in the Middle East and Northern Asia titled; As one nuclear flashpoint reaches a lull, another simmers away . Two paragraphs on South Korea's relationship with its neighbours caught my attention.

Paul Dibbs writes;

Japan's relations with South Korea are at a low point, partly over Japan's view of the history of World War II but also because of territorial disputes, which Seoul has elevated to the level of national pride, threatening the use of military force. This is occurring when, from Tokyo's perspective, South Korea is drifting from the orbit of the US alliance and getting uncomfortably close to China, as well as appeasing North Korea.

South Korea has been a neo-conservative dream. While practicing Asian-capitalism, South Korean youth are moving toward a credit and consumption based economy. Of the North and South-East Asian nations I thought it would be the first to adopt an American/Australian style of economy.

South Korea has also chucked out autocratic rule and in 1988 established a multi-party liberal democracy with firm separation of powers. If the neo-conservative view of foreign policy holds, then South Korea should be forging closer ties to the global trading system within US hegemony - as Australia has done - rather than moving toward China.

I tended to think of South Korea's relationship to North Korea as similar between West and Eastern Germany where ultimately the more modern, wealthier and democratic nation bought its former enemy - amalgamating them into their political and economic system - at great pain to themselves.

The North Koreans desperately need it since China and Russia have discovered it is more profitable to trade with the west than to prop up ideologically compatible but unsustainable isolationist regimes.

This speech in 2003 by Alexander Downer mimics many of the conservative view points of current Australian foreign policy and methodology but contains genuine concern for Australian interests;

Our top four trading partners, for example - Japan, United States, China and South Korea - would be directly affected by any security crisis [on the Korean Peninsula].

However, as per Australian GAPF foreign policy doctrine, Australia participates mainly through its bilateral relationship with the US.

As to Dibbs' claim that South Korea is drifting away from the US and to China seems to be predicated on South Korea not following or adopting US policy toward North Korea.

For instance this article by Lee Kyo-kwan in the Asia Time titled, Seoul and Washington closer to divorce ;

South Korea and the US have drifted so far apart on North Korea policy there is now speculation the longtime partners are getting close to divorce. ...

It is believed US officials no longer trust their South Korean counterparts on North Korea policy.

Kyo-kwan lists several instances where Roh has opposed US policy and pressure toward the Jong-Il regime. It appears the political conflict in South Korea over such a path is a similar one facing Australian foreign policy makers - accept US hegemony in foreign policy and work inside it, or strike out on an independent path;

In South Korea, the progressive camp continues to seek a security policy much more independent of the United States regardless of concern over the weakening partnership, while the conservative camp strives to resurrect the struggling alliance.

South Korea is the tenth largest economy in the world, we may have to ask ourselves, just how big does a country have to be to strike out on a foreign policy path that is independent to the US?

The military coup which suspended the Thai constitution occurred in September 2006 - which is eight months ago now. Since then Thailand has been run by a military junta that is operating under a state of emergency. Australia signed a Free Trade Agreement with Thailand in January 2005.

Prior to the neoconservative policy of pre-emption, the main international method for dealing with powerful nations operating outside of the liberal democratic tradition was through a mix of economic, political and military containment. So what has our policy toward Thailand been?

Alexander Downer in a speech last year said:

In my portfolio of foreign affairs, the over-riding imperative is of course the national interest, both in security and economic terms.

The key idea or organising principle, however, that guides this imperative and guides our policy is the concept that liberal markets and democracy are the best mechanisms for addressing global problems.

The Howard Government was willing to put some muscle behind that by displacing a dictatorship in Iraq and replacing it with what has become a non-functioning democracy, but I think that was more neoconservative fashion, than any deep-down conviction from the Howard Government.

I think they rate the 'Great and Powerful Friends' doctrine, and its continuance, more important than any deep ideological conviction that democracies should be established by military force.

After September 11th and the flood of US politicking on the issue, I suspect that the neoconservative fashion was adopted in Australia predominantly for electoral advantage.

However that fashion did extend to East Timor, and the ASPI's "Our Failing Neighbour" report led to a mission into the Solomons a week later. It should be noted, that neither of these were done by military force; Australia's diplomatic, military projection and public moral agreement were used to establish these missions without force.

It is fair to say that Australia's commitment to democracy and liberal democratic institutions is political and moral; not military or coercive - with Iraq being the blunder that went against that policy.

Political and moral support, or displeasure, has its limits as well. For instance a small island on our front doorstep with little political power in relation to Australia, Fiji, has flipped between democracy and junta more times than flash Nick from Jindavik. We have been powerless to stop, or even retard that behaviour.

The impetus for democracy is an internal one. Freedom has to come from within, not from without, nor can it be established by external force. Downer in another speech:

We need to support the spread of democracy and good governance in Southeast Asia.

Indonesia is an example of what democracy can offer - improved access to justice, a stronger, more open economy, a place where all citizens have a voice and the choice of how, when and where to practice their faith.

Unfortunately it has taken forty years to get to the point and required the Indonesians themselves to oust Suharto's military dictatorship. We supported decolonialisation of Indonesia and the establishment of an Indonesian Republic, but this was subverted by Sukarno.

Then there is the economic problem; do you punish juntas, oligarchies and dictatorships with economic measures? The military containment of Hussein effectively crippled his war-making ability but it was not enough to remove his grip on political power. Sanctions against North Korea have meant that the countryside is in darkness while the dictator enjoys Cadillacs and Harley-Davidsons.

Yet the Tiger Nations, and now China, are built on the Japanese Development-State model which places an autocratic government in charge of an export driven economy. Singapore remains autocratic, Thailand is now a junta, Indonesia is a democracy, as is Taiwan and South Korea, while Japan remains a one-party state.

Economic liberalism gives the middle classes economic freedom, and enough political freedom that they are not impaired economically; but challenges to the state are still put down coercively.

Chile's Pinochet is probably the best example of this, while adopting all the principles of free markets; domestically and politically, he was a tyrannical ogre.

Did Pinochet's embrace of market liberalism lead to Chilean democracy? No. Chile was a democracy prior to Pinochet's coup and dictatorship.

With the Tiger Nations, economic liberalism is not proving a guarantee either. It is fair to say that democratic forms must come from a domestic will to establish them, even in the face of force and coercion.

Which brings us back to a policy for Thailand and the FTA. Should we use it as a carrot or stick?

The three big economies in the region are Australia, Indonesia and Thailand - so dumping the FTA is not to be sniffed at. Given that the military and King of Thailand have a protectionist economic model called the "Sufficiency Economy" then it might be wise to keep the lever of the FTA there in keeping the Thai market open.

But Thailand is running in a state of emergency which means laws and treaties come under the junta's whim. There is no guarantee the FTA will be honoured should it fail to fit the junta's economic policies.

Thailand does not appear to be threatening to move outside of its borders. The emergency remains domestic, not international, so there is no need to round up support for military, economic and political containment.

I cannot find any news articles recently that mention both Thailand and Alexander Downer. Either; it isn't newsworthy, the government doesn't want to talk about it, or political relations between Australia and Thailand have frozen up.

It is probably a mix of all three, with the latter dominating.

So what to do with the FTA? Leaving it stand is probably the best policy. Australia should continue to pressure the junta to get around to establishing that democratic constitution they say they were going to with the reminder that Thailand had a functioning democratic constitution prior to their coup.

Given the King's idea of economic self-sufficiency, the FTA probably cannot be used as a significant stick to beat the King or junta with. Then again, the Thai business lobby groups may have an interest in seeing it continue, and can pressure the junta over it.

Thailand remains a political problem at the moment, even if it is one off the news radar because of the chaos in Iraq. The junta cannot provide good governance because of their unconstitutional establishment. Their legitimacy is through force and their interest in democratic forms is selfish in nature.

Tim Dunlop has an article on Alexander Downer mentioning that he might go into state politics. I think that would be a good thing. Australia does not have enough vertical movement, up or down, between state and national politics. The other issue is that the Liberal party is electorally moribund at the state level and Downer would add instant authority to any state election.

Australian state politics has seen three Premiers leave while firmly entrenched in power. ICAC kind of followed Carr out, but Bracks and Beattie left with most of their reputations intact.

In American politics a successful Governorship is the first step in a Presidential run. The current presidential candidates includes former Governors such as Romney, Huckabee and Richardson, as well as a former city mayor. This is a good method of gaining executive experience in state politics before transitioning to the national executive.

I have always been surprised that Australia, or more accurately Westminster Government, has so little vertical movement between the state/provinces and national parliament. There was Joh's attempt at federal politics but he was a disgraced entity by then.

I recall former NSW Premier, John Fahey, joining national politics, but I can recall feeling that his authority was compromised and diminished as he had to follow the talking points of the national party leader. I think this is why it is seen more in the US system as the former Governors don't have to come under legislative or shadow-cabinet party discipline. Their executive authority remains intact.

I suspect Downer will have an easier run of it if he does go from the national stage to the state stage. Especially if he leaves national politics willingly or through a lost election where he leaves as a cabinet minister.

I hope it happens as I would like to see more vertical political movement in Australian politics.