The Federalist Papers were published by Alexander Hamilton, James Madison and John Jay in New York during 1787 and 1788. They were published to sway opinion in New York into ratifying the new American constitution. One of the most influential of the Federalist Papers is No.10 which was written by James Madison. It discusses the role of faction, liberty and the process of government to control the excesses of faction.

Federalist Paper No.10

Ron Chernow, who authored the most recent biography of Alexander Hamilton, believes that Federalist Paper No.10 is the most influential of the eighty-five Federalist Papers published between 1787 and 1788 in New York. Although all were written under the pen-name "Publius", the predominant author of the Federalist Papers was Alexander Hamilton who wrote fifty-seven of them. James Madison wrote twenty-one and John Jay five. Additionally three were collaborated on by Hamilton and Madison. Federalist Paper No.10 was written by James Madison.

James Madison was one of the most influential of the American founding fathers. The son of a plantation owner from Orange County, Virginia he studied at Princeton and became involved in local Virginian politics before being involved in the Continental Congress. Madison later represented Virginia at the Constitutional Convention in Philadelphia and had a leading role in the drafting of the Constitution of the United States.

After the constitution was ratified, Madison became a leader in the Congress, drafting legislation that created the Executive Cabinet positions and later drafting the legislation that would lead to the Bill of Rights. Madison became the Secretary of State during the Thomas Jefferson presidency before being voted as President in 1808. Madison's terms presided over the war of 1812 with Britain.

Madison's devotion to the principles of a republic and liberty was uncompromising and despite the pressures of the war he refused to enact legislation or measures that would compromise this. Unlike later presidents such as Abraham Lincoln of George W. Bush who both suspended habeous corpus in times of pressure on government. Madison believed that adherence to the principles of a republic gave America an advantage over Britain and compromising that through government oppression would make the US no better than a monarchy. He was proved correct as the US was able to thwart British attentions on the US.

Faction

Central to the tenth paper in the Federalist series is faction. The argument Madison makes is that faction and liberty are inseparable. Instead of focusing on trying to eliminate the causes for faction, the choice of government can control the effects of faction. Madison makes the argument that the means to control the causes of faction is to stamp on dissenting opinions, and remove liberty. In other words oppress until all the polity is of the same opinion. This is totalitarianism. Madison dismisses this as being against the nature of man;

As long as the reason of man continues to be fallible, and he is at liberty to exercise it, different opinions will be formed

Faction is a normal part of liberty, and wrapped in the fallibility of humankind. John Stuart Mills makes similar arguments as to why freedom of expression should never be curtailed. An individual can never be sure that they are not suppressing a truthful opinion as humanity's reasoning abilities are not perfect. Madison uses a similar argument to Mills as to why liberty cannot be abolished in a functioning government;

Liberty is to faction what air is to fire, an aliment without which it instantly expires. But it could not be a less folly to abolish liberty, which is essential to political life, because it nourishes faction than it would be to wish the annihilation of air, which is essential to animal life, because it imparts to fire its destructive agency.

From this Madison concludes that liberty and faction are essential in any healthy government system. What isn't healthy is the violence of faction. Madison argues that controlling the effects of violent faction can be achieved through the Republican model of government.

Controlling Effects

Any individual needs to be concerned about government using the apparatus of the nation-state for the purposes of coercion. Madison was also concerned with this issue, he saw the violence of faction being when a group of individuals created a faction with a common interest that was adverse to individual rights, the rights of minorities and against the common good. Madison's view of common good is similar to the Aristotlean notion of virtue being necessary in the ruling elite.

Madison also shares Aristotle's disdain for the workability of a democracy. Aristotle wrote that a democracy fails as the individual is too distracted with the day to day trivialities like working and eating to have an understanding of the public good. Aristotle believes that only an idle class have the time and hence virtue to devote themselves to the public good and the glory of the nation-state.

Madison writes that humankind naturally falls into animosity and this clouds the ability of individuals in a democracy to be aware of the common good and articulate legislation for that purpose.

So strong is this propensity of mankind to fall into mutual animosities that where no substantial occasion presents itself the most frivolous and fanciful distinctions have been sufficient to kindle their infriendly passions and excite their most violent conflicts.

Another flaw that Madison identifies in a democracy is that it allows individuals to be their own judge in their own interests. This assumes that an individuals self-interest will blind an individual to the public or common good. A notion that individuals are not capable of public good without the coercion of the nation-state. Madison writes;

No man is allowed to be a judge in his own case, because his interest would certainly bias his judgement, and not improbably, corrupt his integrity. With equal, nay with greater reason, a body of men are unfit to be both judges and parties at the same time.

Madison uses this argument toward the notion that a democracy is flawed as it allows individuals to be judges in their own case. This supports the Aristotlean view that an understanding of common good and hence virtue is exclusive to the idle and ruling classes. This is a repugnant meme. If taxpayers had greater control over where their tax contributions were going, it would over-whelmingly be to common good programs such as public transport, medical research and far, far less on farming subsidies or the industrial-military complex.

Property

The founding fathers were the propertied elite of the colonies in the America at the time. Those that weren't propertied were in professions or private practice in industries such as law. For many of the southern founding fathers, the definition of property extended to humans as well. Washington took seven slaves with him to New York when he became president. Both Jefferson and Madison did not dissolve their slave properties after ratification of the constitution, nor when they were president. Madison in Federalist Paper No.10 writes that property and its unequal distribution is the most constant source of faction. He is undoubtedly correct, that the new federal government kept in place the practice of allowing one human to own another is testament to this.

Madison argues from the opposing points of view of creditors and debtors. Legislators are subject to the advocacy of their constituents, and if this advocacy is biased by a faction, then there is no justice in the legislation, as the larger party or faction will drown out the smaller factions. With the recent changes in the US system of advocacy being dominated by lobbyists and money, the public good has been ignored by legislators in areas such as intellectual property. Legislators have created new forms of property and property crimes in an ever expanding definition of what can be owned by corporate interests.

The Republic

The Federalist Paper No.10 argues that a republic is capable of controlling the effects of faction, more so than a democracy. The reason put forward is that a system of representation is more capable of protecting the rights of individuals and minorities, as well as being better able to balance the needs of the public good. Madison notes that representatives are more divorced from the issues being raised by factions and consequently better able to create just legislation that is compatible with rights and the public good.

Madison does not explore the issue that representatives concentrate the access to the power and coercive nature of legislation. In essence they are a point of failure for a system that ignores the needs of the electorate and public good. Recently in the United States the system has been skewed by the abnormal power of lobbyist groups who have been exceedingly successful in having representatives further their causes. Lobby groups such as the RIAA and MPAA have successfully had representatives expand what can be called property, the ownership of this artificial form of property and the property crimes stemming from it.

In the essay Madison argues that a danger of a representative system is in having too few representatives as the passions or corruptions of an individual representative can skew the system. From this Madison argues that the republican system scales better and works more effectively the larger the republic is.

Conclusion

The environment that Madison wrote this in needed to explain how the new constitution and republican form of federal government would have greater stability than the previous continental congress. The paper also needed to explain how the system would protect against the competing factions drowning out the rights of minorities and the public good. It also needed to explain how it would halt mob rule. All issues that had posed problems in the self-government of the colonies previous, during and after the revolution of 1776.

Madison sees faction as an unavoidable in a polity of maximum liberty, and consequently seeks to minimize the violence of faction through the system; in other words controlling the effects of faction. Representative government is the process by which Madison seeks to temper this.

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More Federalist Papers Articles

Short Essay on Federalist Paper No.57
Is The Electoral College Fair?
Multiple Magistrates in an Executive Council
Three US Presidents on Partisanship
The Federal Character of the Electoral College

In the Federalist Papers it is interesting to read Alexander Hamilton's arguments against an executive council. It appears he feared shared power in the executive would make the executive weak and unable to perform its duties but also allow the executive to avoid responsibility.

The Westminster system is no stranger to the Executive Council. Originally the executive council was a means to remove executive power from the monarch while still maintaining their ceremonial authority. The Prime Minister position became rather presidential. From British history we remember strong Prime Ministers such as Pitt and Disraeli.

Australia adopted similar patterns whether the executive relationship was formal or informal through a single constitution or multiple legislative acts. For instance the Prime Ministerial behaviour of Australia, Canada and even Queensland were very similar despite Canada and Queensland not having formal constitutions until recently.

The Prime Minister has become an increasingly Presidential position in all parliamentary systems.

The only system I can think of that has multiple magistrates in or above the executive council is Iran with its theocratic Supreme Leader and Council of Guardians.

Alexander Hamilton has the strongest arguments for a singular executive in Federalist No.70 . He argues that since the sole purpose of the Executive is to execute the law, there should be no dissension in the execution which an executive council might cause. The place for bickering is in the legislative when the law is being made, but once it becomes law, then it becomes fundamental that it is implemented as the legislators saw fit;

Wherever two or more persons are engaged in any common enterprise or pursuit, there is always danger of difference of opinion. If it be a public trust or office, in which they are clothed with equal dignity and authority, there is peculiar danger of personal emulation and even animosity. From either, and especially from all these causes, the most bitter dissensions are apt to spring. Whenever these happen, they lessen the respectability, weaken the authority, and distract the plans and operation of those whom they divide.

If they should unfortunately assail the supreme executive magistracy of a country, consisting of a plurality of persons, they might impede or frustrate the most important measures of the government, in the most critical emergencies of the state. And what is still worse, they might split the community into the most violent and irreconcilable factions, adhering differently to the different individuals who composed the magistracy.

There is particular irony here in the Bush Administration recently giving the Vice-President increasing executive power through executive orders. Much of what the Bush Administration has done has been hostile to the intentions of the founders of the American Republic, this is another.

Hamilton also argues that accountability and responsibility are strong arguments for a singular executive. Colloquially this is best known as Harry Truman's "The buck stops here" placard on his desk. Hamilton writes;

But one of the weightiest objections to a plurality in the Executive, and which lies as much against the last as the first plan, is, that it tends to conceal faults and destroy responsibility. Responsibility is of two kinds -- to censure and to punishment. The first is the more important of the two, especially in an elective office.

Man, in public trust, will much oftener act in such a manner as to render him unworthy of being any longer trusted, than in such a manner as to make him obnoxious to legal punishment. But the multiplication of the Executive adds to the difficulty of detection in either case. It often becomes impossible, amidst mutual accusations, to determine on whom the blame or the punishment of a pernicious measure, or series of pernicious measures, ought really to fall. It is shifted from one to another with so much dexterity, and under such plausible appearances, that the public opinion is left in suspense about the real author.

The circumstances which may have led to any national miscarriage or misfortune are sometimes so complicated that, where there are a number of actors who may have had different degrees and kinds of agency, though we may clearly see upon the whole that there has been mismanagement, yet it may be impracticable to pronounce to whose account the evil which may have been incurred is truly chargeable.

Responsible government and ministerial responsibility is being trashed in Australia but I do not believe it is because of the executive council. It is modern media management. John Quiggin has an interesting response which provides a solution in the Australian example of government .

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A criticism of the electoral college is that it gives too much prominence to the smaller states with its winner takes all electoral technology and warps the population's will such as the popular vote. The American founding fathers used the electoral college to protect against tyranny and usurpation by nobled tyrant, but also to try and balance the 'federal' and 'national' characters of the Washington system.

The Electoral College is an indirect voting mechanism. US citizens vote for representatives who then cast ballots for the US President. The electors do not have to cast their ballots as per the popular will in that state, they can defy the voters if necessary. This was done to protect against tyranny or a noble trying to usurp the democratic system. The convention however is that the electors vote in a block as per the citizen voters wishes. I imagine there would be all sorts of public discord and trouble if they did not.

The number of electoral college votes a state has is in direct proportion to the number of senators and representatives the state has. For instance California has fifty-five electors while Arizona has ten. For a President to be elected they must have a majority of electoral college votes. An advantage of this system is that it tends to legitimize the president-elect as the winner takes all system makes a larger winning margin than the national popular vote.

Most who argue that it is unfair base the injustice of the system on the electors being indirect, the states being winner takes all, and the popular will of the nation not necessarily being reflected in the electoral college outcome. James Madison and Alexander Hamilton defend the electoral college as an electoral method in Federalist Papers No.39 and No.68.

For Madison it was important politically, constitutionally and electorally to balance the federal and national aspects of the Washington System. As a federation, the US system was an amalgam of political equals in the colonies which are now known as the states. It was necessary to bring on board the smaller states in such a way that they would not be politically swamped by the larger ones of Virginia, New York and Pennsylvania. Today the large states are New York and California.

The 'federal' character of the system, such as the Senate and the electoral college keep the smaller states politically within the system as equal partners. The Washington system also contains national character such as the House which expands electorates based on population alone. The national aspect of the electoral college is that the number of electors expands with population, so while Montana gets a discrete voice with its electors, it is swamped by the larger number of electors in Florida.

Madison writes:

The next relation is, to the sources from which the ordinary powers of government are to be derived. The House of Representatives will derive its powers from the people of America; and the people will be represented in the same proportion, and on the same principle, as they are in the legislature of a particular State. So far the government is national, not federal.

The Senate, on the other hand, will derive its powers from the States, as political and coequal societies; and these will be represented on the principle of equality in the Senate, as they now are in the existing Congress. So far the government is federal, not national.

The executive power will be derived from a very compound source. The immediate election of the President is to be made by the States in their political characters. The votes allotted to them are in a compound ratio, which considers them partly as distinct and coequal societies, partly as unequal members of the same society.

The eventual election, again, is to be made by that branch of the legislature which consists of the national representatives; but in this particular act they are to be thrown into the form of individual delegations, from so many distinct and coequal bodies politic.

From this aspect of the government it appears to be of a mixed character, presenting at least as many federal as national features.

Consequently Madison saw it as important for the executive to carry both the federal and national characteristics while maintaining a buffer against the executive being usurped by tyranny with the indirect election that comes through the electors. This also gives the states a voice in vetoing an executive that is not governing, or not going to governing in the federation's interests as well. Hamilton writes:

It was desirable that the sense of the people should operate in the choice of the person to whom so important a trust was to be confided. This end will be answered by committing the right of making it, not to any preestablished body, but to men chosen by the people for the special purpose, and at the particular conjuncture.

It was equally desirable, that the immediate election should be made by men most capable of analyzing the qualities adapted to the station, and acting under circumstances favorable to deliberation, and to a judicious combination of all the reasons and inducements which were proper to govern their choice.

A small number of persons, selected by their fellow-citizens from the general mass, will be most likely to possess the information and discernment requisite to such complicated investigations.

It was also peculiarly desirable to afford as little opportunity as possible to tumult and disorder. This evil was not least to be dreaded in the election of a magistrate, who was to have so important an agency in the administration of the government as the President of the United States. But the precautions which have been so happily concerted in the system under consideration, promise an effectual security against this mischief.

The choice of several, to form an intermediate body of electors, will be much less apt to convulse the community with any extraordinary or violent movements, than the choice of one who was himself to be the final object of the public wishes. And as the electors, chosen in each State, are to assemble and vote in the State in which they are chosen, this detached and divided situation will expose them much less to heats and ferments, which might be communicated from them to the people, than if they were all to be convened at one time, in one place.

The United States has been a stable democracy for two hundred years now but in 1787 there was no guarantee that executive power would pass from one President to another without violence or on-going revolution. Consequently we look at the indirect nature of the electoral college as a historical anachronism.

The United States is also an increasingly national political system than a federal one. The ongoing expansion of centralized power in Washington DC has meant that the policy prerogatives of the states is getting smaller and smaller with each Presidential term. The Bush Administration and Republican Congress for instance expanded central power into the states territory with the No Child Left Behind act. No state refused the money, weakening the federal character and state independence further.

So is the Electoral College unfair?

Not really. The national voice is provided for in its unadulterated form in the House. The federal voice is pure in form in the Senate. The election of the President and Vice President is intended to be a mix of the two with the added safety valve of indirect election. It has worked well for the US so far and the winner takes all aspect of the federal system in the electoral college has given added legitimacy to Presidents who have barely won the national popular vote. The Electoral College as an electoral system sits neatly within the design and goals of the Washington system of politics and constitutional structure.