The Australian Defence Force must defend and project across an air-sea gap. This requires long range autonomous strike weaponry. The Joint Strike Fighter does not solve this issue and detrimentally places added pressure on Australia's limited force of air-to-air tankers. The world's defence manufacturers are not creating strike platforms that solve Australian needs. For this reason, Australia needs to look to other nations with similar defence needs. In this case, Japan, South Korea and Taiwan all face defending an air-sea gap. Australia should enter a partnership with these nations to create a strike fighter that satisfies the strategic needs of defending an air-sea gap. The benefits of such a partnership will be many.

Australian Projection

The primary focus of any nation-state's military force is to ensure the nations sovereignty and independence from external martial coercion. This requirement demands that a military force be able to project force over the geographic approaches to the nation state. As Australia is an island-continent, this requires the Australian Defence Force (ADF) to be able to project over the air-sea gap that exists between Australia and Indonesia. Australia also contains economic assets of oil and fisheries on the continental shelf that may need to be defended as well. Consequently the defence of Australian sovereignty from outside martial force demands weaponry that is capable of projecting across and defending that air-sea gap.

Australia does not invest heavily in force multipliers and back-end support equipment such as logistical support. Certainly not to the level that the United States (US) military does. For this reason, Australian strike weaponry needs to be largely autonomous. While force multipliers such as the Wedgetail Airborne Early Warning and Control (AEW&C) system are a necessity in modern projection, other force multipliers such as tankers are in relative short supply in the ADF. Australia has few enough tankers that the loss of even a couple will have a great bearing in the Air Force's capability and operational tempo. This risk is potentially large enough that the Air Force will not be able to project across the air-sea gap and leave Australia poorly defended.

The General Dynamics F111 which is still in service with the Royal Australian Air Force (RAAF), is an example of an autonomous strike weapon. The F111 is capable of ranging over five thousand kilometres out into the Indian Ocean, across the Timor Sea and up through Java. The F111 carries a large payload of precision weaponry that can be used against multiple targets in the one long operational mission. The F111 is a powerful statement in strike projection. The F111 is nearing the end of its operational life span and there is no replacement to the F111 in the world's armoury.

The Joint Strike Fighter

Australia has recently chosen to join the development phase of the Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) program. Signifying an almost certain procurement of the JSF for the Australian air force. The JSF will be a sophisticated piece of weaponry, but it is designed to solve the strategic needs of the United States and the United Kingdom. Both are nations that desire global projection and have the supporting infrastructure to achieve that role for the JSF. Australia does not have the same infrastructure behind the JSF and will ultimately become reliant on the US to supply that capability in any medium or high intensity conflict.

The JSF has a two thousand kilometre range without supporting tankers. This is an improvement over the F18's one thousand kilometre range but far short of the F111's five thousand. The JSF is being chosen by Australia to replace both the F18 and F111, so it requires the capability to be able to take over the roles that these aircraft fulfilled. For the JSF to be able to perform the capability that the F111 currently satisfies, the JSF requires force multipliers, and most notably tankers to achieve this. The tankers are something that the Australian Air Force has in short supply. There is no governmental discussion of future expansion of this important component of the Australian air force. Consequently the JSF procurement places added pressure on the already in demand and small Australian tanker force.

The tankers come with other issues, since the JSF will use the tankers with greater rapidity than the F111's, this will require the tankers to be placed in positions of greater risk. Consequently, the tankers themselves will be required to be defended by JSF formations. Tieing up strike resources away from strike projection. The Joint Strike Fighter is a global projection weapon that was designed with the understanding that it would be operated by an Air Force that has a complete set of force multipliers such as tankers, and the means to defend those force multipliers. Australia does not require global projection, and does not have the back-end forces to support such a heavily integrated and dependent weapon system as the JSF.

Australian Strategic Needs

Australia's strategic requirement to defend and project across an air-sea gap is not being met by the world defence manufacturers. The United States and Britain are making global projection platforms whose effectiveness is predicated on a large and voluminous support infrastructure of force multipliers. Europe is still making point to point weaponry that is more suitable to western European cold-war conflicts. There is nothing in the world armoury to replace the F111 or to completely fill the requirements that Australia's air-sea gap strategy demands. However - Australia is not alone with these needs.

Several other island and peninsula nations have air-sea gaps to defend. Most notably Japan, South Korea and Taiwan. These nations face similar predicaments to Australia when choosing from the current defence systems that are on the world market. Their requirements for defending across an air-sea gap are not being met either. There is considerable common ground here for Australia to explore - most notably in developing, manufacturing and deploying an Austral-Asian strike weapon as a co-ordinated effort between Australia, Japan, South Korea and Taiwan.

All four nations are Australian trading partners, with democratic forms of government and well established, powerful, technologically based economies. These nations have defence requirements that have left them disenfranchised by the world's defence manufacturers. The partnership to develop a strike platform would have regional economic, defence, security and stability benefits as well as ensuring the nations that have air-sea gaps to defend armed their military with the hardware that matched their needs.

Benefits of an Austral-Asian Strike Fighter

• Strike weaponry that matches Australia's defence requirements exactly
• Increase indigenous aerospace capability
• Genuine technology sharing
• Lesser dependence on US defence manufacturers
• Lesser dependence on US military infrastructure
• Development cost sharing
• Increased regional political focus
• Increased regional focus on security and stability
• Increased potential for disruptive technology

Indigenous Aerospace Industry

The Australian Air Force in the 1930's was faced with the possibility of being cut off from the Europe and the United States with no local aerospace manufacturing capability. Air Marshal Richard Williams recognised this weakness and embarked Lawrence Wackett to head the Commonwealth Aircraft Corporation. This company produced Wacketts, Wirraways and Boomerangs for Australia in the second World War. Even designing innovative prototypes such as the Kangaroo and Woomera.

This indigenous capability was slowly lost as Australian industry became less and less involved in the aircraft Australia purchased. In 2003, Australia signed on to be involved in the development work of the Joint Strike Fighter. A far cry from the involvement Australian industry had in the 1940's and 50's. More importantly, the Joint Strike Fighter program does not allow for much in the way of technology sharing with Australian industry. Australia has become a locked-in vendor to the Pentagon and American defence industries.

Australian applied scientists and engineers are more than the equal of any other nations. The Collins class Submarines and ANZAC Frigates have shown how well Australian industry can design, develop and manufacture world class systems. It is time the aerospace industry received the same confidence and oppurtunities from the Australian government and people as the maritime industries have. Australian aerospace companies, applied scientists and engineers will produce an aircraft that are dominant in their field, economic to develop and maintain as well as innovative technologically.

Genuine Technology Sharing

Of the weapon systems currently being developed or procured by the Australian Defence Force, there is only one system that includes genuine technology sharing. For most weapon systems, especially US developed weapon systems, Australia is not much more than a licensee of vendor equipment. When Australian defence companies are developing the weapon systems that the ADF uses then Australia will have complete access to the technology. This is important for a the creation of a sustainable and self-reliant defence force.

The increasing capitalisation costs of the defence industry have led to the US government putting fewer contracts out to bid for system development. This has led to the consolidation of the US defence industries into a few monstrous behemoths including Lockheed-Martin, Boeing, McDonnell-Douglas and Raytheon. The downside of this consolidation is that these companies are large enough and sufficiently devoted to their main client, the Pentagon, that they can ignore many requests from a small purchaser like Australia. Requests like the need for Australia to have the source code for the systems being purchased. This further entrenches the reliance of the Australian military on outside vendors and places greater restraint on the ability for the ADF to be self-reliant.

Lesser Dependence on US Defence Industries

With the consolidation of the American defence industries into a few extremely large companies, Australia's bartering position with these companies has been weakened. Australia is not a large enough procurer of their weapons and systems to warrant special attention as a large procurer and investor like the United States government is. In the 1990's Australia has faced more and more issues in getting simple things such as the source code for the systems purchased. Without the source code, Australia is largely placed at the mercy of international governments and vendors. Argentina was placed in a similar position during the Falklands War when it was unable to replenish its inventory of Exocet missiles.

Australian companies that integrate the weapon systems on many of the Australian land, naval and air assets often find themselves doing little more than integrating in existing American technologies from the large American defence companies. Australia requires a sustainable and independent force. The powerful place that American defence companies have on Australian weapon systems is not in the ADF's long term interests. Expanding Australia's indigenous defence industries alleviates this reliance.

Lesser Dependence on US Defence Infrastructure

Australian procurement in the last several years was heavily based upon the Australian ability to take advantage of the American support and logistical infrastructure. The purchase of the second-hand Abrams tanks were an example of the Federal Government expecting the ADF to transparently slide into the US military in an operation. This was the same methodology that the Australian Navy was procured with in the 1930's. This was disastrous. It left Australia without an independent Navy in 1942 with little blue water command and control capability. The same policies in the 21st century will produce the same results from 1942 for the ADF, should Australia become involved in a medium or high intensity conflict.

The other lesson from the 1930's was that Britain was quickly and easily over-extended. The US is currently embroiled in a regional conflict in Iraq, the possibility for the US to become over-extended is real should another medium-intensity conflict arise. The policy of relying heavily on the US military infrastructure for Australian capability and operational tempo is a naive, reckless and potentially disastrous policy. The Australian Defence Force should be independent and sustainable. One that is not reliant on an outside military for any capability.

Development Cost Sharing

One of the largest costs for a new weapons platform is the development cost. The development cost for the F/A-22 was nineteen billion USD over twelve years, for the JSF it is expected to be over twenty-five billion USD with nations other than the US contributing four and half billion. Australia currently maintains a defence budget of over sixteen billion AUD. This covers salaries, maintaining existing platforms as well as new platform development and procurement. The Australian defence budget is approximately 1.9% GDP which is on the low side compared to the British 2.5% and American 3.5%.

There is room for increased Research and Development in the Australian Defence Budget. Even so, the cost for a new weapons platform is high. With a partnership of other nations, the cost of development for a new platform is defrayed. This will make the task and the cost more acceptable to the Australian treasury and the Australian people.

If Australia was to develop a strike platform the cost could be expected to add approximately three billion AUD to the Australian defence budget each year. If Australia was an equal partner in developing a new strike platform, this cost would drop to approximately an extra one and half billion each year. This money would be going directly to Australian industry. By comparison, the cost of purchasing one hundred JSF aircraft is expected to be eighty billion AUD with most of the money heading off-shore.

Increased Regional Political Focus

Japan, the US, China and South Korea are Australia's top trading partners. Of Australia's top seven export markets, five are regional including Japan, China, New Zealand, South Korea and Taiwan. These are the realities of the modern Australian economy. Australian foreign and defence policy has been far more focused on the United States - to the point of imbalance. A regional partnership between democratic nations such as Australia, Japan, South Korea and Taiwan to develop defence platforms will enhance the the political focus of the Asia-Pacific to regional issues.

While the development of an Austral-Asian strike fighter is intended to overcome deficiencies in the JSF and its lack of bearing on Australia's strategic requirements, there will be added benefits in the recognition of common strategic interests by Australia and its regional partners.

Increased Regional Focus on Security and Stability

A regional partnership for a Strike Fighter will focus more public, media and political attention on the common goal of regional security and stability. China has shown remarkable growth in moving to a market economy and Indonesia will ultimately do the same. As these nations come to economic and political maturity, it is important that their growth to maturity is not hampered or destroyed by regional stability concerns. Increased globalization of capital and trade has made the Pacific-rim economies interdependent. It is only in a stable and secure regional environment that economic growth and its benefits can be sustained.

Increased Potential for Disruptive Technologies

The high-tech boom of the 1990's came through the disruptive technology of the internet. This created demand in new fields such as software that education institutions could not match demand for. The labour markets were expanded as new positions were created, that allowed those who showed endeavour to achieve. The internet came from government investment, by the US military in DARPA and by applied science investment from Europe in CERN. These investments in applied science and engineering led to the high tech boom.

Private companies are unwilling to spend large amounts of high risk capital on research and development in the applied science and engineering fields. It is a risky long term investment and private industry is focused on short term returns for shareholders. Unfortunately, it is the long term investment from research and development that produces disruptive technologies such as the internet. Disruptive technologies also fuel as a by-product labour market expansion and economic expansion. Defence Research and Development spending serves as stable, long-term funding in the applied sciences and engineering. It is from this long term funding that disruptive technologies appear.

Conclusion

The Australian Defence Force is a defending an air-sea gap and must do so without Australia making large investments in back-end support platforms such as tankers. Consequently the strike platforms the ADF requires must be largely autonomous. Australia is not alone in its strategic needs, other democratic nations such as Japan, South Korea and Taiwan are also having their requirements ignored. It would benefit Australia and the region to create a partnership between these nations to develop, manufacture and deploy a strike platform that fits the needs of the respective defence forces. The benefits of undertaking the task of an Austral-Asian Strike Fighter are many.

Cameron Riley

The Australian Republican doctrine is built upon, amongst others, principles of independence, autonomy and the belief that Australian solutions to Australian issues are superior. Australian foreign policy has been afflicted for a century by the "Great and Powerful Friends" doctrine. This foreign policy has been a constant failure, has weakened Australian military capability and is not compatible with Republican principles. Consequently the Australian military needs revision.

Australian Republican Doctrine

Australian Republican doctrine is founded on several basic principles that have wider application. These principles have been the basis for Australian Republican doctrine for the last two hundred years and serve as a powerful conduit for individual, cultural and political growth. They are;

• Independence
• Autonomy
• Inviolable Rights
• Equity under the Law
• Australian solutions to Australian issues are superior.
• Self-confidence on the global stage.

These have been achieved at the individual, social and cultural levels - it is only our government that lags behind us. The areas where the government is dragging the ball and chain of the 16th Century with them is in the areas of constutition, foreign policy and military policy. The latter two are entwined issues and need a good dose of Australian Republican doctrine to straighten them out.

Foreign Policy

Australian Governments have used the "Great and Powerful Friends" doctrine of foreign policy since Billy Hughes used Britain's influence at Versaille in an attempt to further Australian international interests. This foreign policy is a failure and has been for a century. As Gareth Evans said;

The ... underlying reality about Australian foreign policy in the contemporary era is that we have very little capacity to advance our interests, however defeined, by relying on our great and powerful friends. Those days are over. Our great and powerful friends have interests of their own.

Evans is incorrect, those days never even existed. One of the worst aspects of the foreign policy is how it defrays Australian military self-sufficiency. The most critical example of this was in 1942 when Australia found itself without a navy to challenge for blue water superiority. Australia also lacked an air-force that could defend Australia.

In 1942 the Royal Navy was tied up in Europe. The Australian Navy was an ad-hoc collection of cruisers that were not capable of command and control, they were themselves designed to slot into a larger British capital ship group. In terms of aerial projection, Australia was defending New Guinea with one fighter squadron. Australia was undefended by any Australian fighter aircraft - fortunately the US supplied a couple of their squadrons to defend Darwin until 1943.

Richard Williams had established an Australian aerospace industry which ultimately produced the CAC Boomerang "Panic Fighter" in late 1942. Without that foundation, the Boomerang would never have appeared. Williams had to fight with the Navy and Singapore for funding. In the 1930s, the Australian Government indulged in defence on the cheap, and what money it did allocate to the Australian military, it gave eighty percent of it to the Navy and Singapore. Both the Navy and Singapore were dismal flops in WWII because they were designed around our "Great and Powerful Friend".

Force Multipliers

Modern capability and projection is a networked affair of multiple inputs that sum to be greater than the parts. Until Australia invests fully in force multipliers it will be a second rate force unable to operate independently or sustainably. What is a force multiplier? From the Fundamentals of Australian Aerospace Power;

Force Multipliers provide external capabilities to increase the effectiveness of combat systems.

In an aerospace context, Air to Air Refueling (AAR) is an example of this. It allows an airborne combat system to increase its endurance, and consequently its capability. Airborne Early Warning and Control (AEW&C) is another example. Space based communications and surveillance systems another. These are areas that the Australian Defence Force (ADF) is highly deficient.

Our tankers are converted 707 from the 1960s. We are only just getting AEW&Cs, and we have no space based capability. We are dependent upon the United States leasing us space capability when we need it. Both major factions - Liberal and Labor - place heavy weight in their political defence doctrine on the United States leasing us what we need when we want it. Even small and simple systems. This is not unlike the Australian Government in the 1930s expecting the Royal Navy to sail into the Pacific en-masse when needed.

Behind The Times

The lack of high-tech systems has been an ongoing issue for Australian combat systems. From "Highest Traditions", an example of an Australian Canberra bomber in Vietnam not having the latest technology putting the crew in peril;

[They] ... were flying ... close to the Loation border ... just as they turned left ofr the attack, the sky to their immediate 2 o'clock position lit up with angry fireballs of flak. .... A hurried call to their United States ground radar controller that they were taking heavy AAA solicited the query, "Roger Magpie, confirm that your ECM gear is on?". The navigator quickly countered: "What ECM? We're a bloody Canberra!"

ECM is electronic counter measures that jams the enemy systems that try to get a firing solution on the aircraft.

Weakened Australia

Another issue that is ongoing with Australian procurement of American weapon systems is that there are so many restrictions placed on it. Every US Senator puts their own little piece of legislation on export of military technology so that Australia is unable to procure complete systems.

The consolidation of the US Defence industry also means that Australia's bartering position against these giant American firms is weakened - to the point that Australia has trouble getting source code from firms like Lockheed Martin, Boeing and General Dynamics.

The large US Defence firms also reduce Australian engineers to integrators of American technology. Of all the defence projects mentioned in the 2003 Defence Budget, only one partnership - between Australia and the UK for a missile system - involved genuine technology sharing. The rest were integration projects.

A Military Doctrine

The "Great and Powerful friends" foreign policy doctrine is a meme that must die. It is the complete anti-thesis of Australian Republican doctrine. The "Great and Powerful friends" is dependent, subservient, weakening and a good example of the Australian political cringe. So that both major factions do not rely on this reflexive cringe any longer, it is important that the Australian military become a capable force based on independent strategic doctrine, autonomous capability and sustainable projection power.

The only way this can be achieved is if Australia creates a technologically perfect force that matches our regional needs. We are not alone in this need. Many of our Asian neighbours are also disenfranchised from American foreign policy and the US Defence industries. Japan recently changed a law that prohibited their defence industry from exporting military technology. This was so they could join in projects that required technology sharing. The oppurtunities are there for Australia to partner in new technology sharing defence projects to fill our capability and projection gaps.

Australian military spending on defence needs to increase by forty percent. This will add approximately six billion to the defence budget. This is an affordable increase that must - and I repeat - must go to research and development. Not toward procurement of American weapon systems. Australia must develop its own technologies or partner with like-minded countries in genuine technology sharing projects with this money. It is not for useless big ticket items that the Navy and Army lust after.

The six billion is a subsidy to applied science and engineering which is essential in any high-tech economy. This coupled with business managers that can turn an R&D dollar into a product/service dollar it makes for a powerful economy. Capitalism is geared toward technology, and it rewards innovative business models that leverage technology. The dot-com boom of the 1990s was on the back of the internet. A classic disruptive technology. The internet came from US Military engineering investment in DARPA and European applied science investment in CERN.

Conclusion

The sustained funding of military technology and military research and development will give the Australian Defence Force the systems it requires to become an independent, autonomous and sustainable force. It will remove the anti-Republican "Great and Powerful Friends" doctrine from Australian foreign policy. Finally it will advance Australia away from a commodity-based "hole in the ground" economy toward a high-tech economy that has an increased possibility of supplying the world with the next disruptive technology.

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From the ABC; Defence Force considers South Pacific recruitment .

A spokesman for the Defence Personnel Minister De-Anne Kelly has confirmed it will be part of a review of how to increase recruitment into the ADF, although he says it is in the early stages.

A Canberra-based defence analyst Mark Thomson says one suggestion is to recruit up to 2,000 Pacific Islanders into the Australian Army.

The ADF is having problems meeting recruitment targets. Low unemployment and skills shortage being the ADF's explanation for it. Unlike the US, the ADF is not heavily engaged in Iraq, certainly not to breaking point as the US Army, US National Guard and Marines are.

I have no problem with the ADF recruiting in the South Pacific, or even New Zealand. It is fitting with the history of the Australian Army. During World War I, the Army asked if you were a subject of the King, and even if you replied no, they still took you. The Australian Imperial Force contained Danes, Russians, Americans, Canadians, English, Singaporeans, New Zealanders, English, Irish, Scots - all sorts.

I see recruiting outside of Australia as consistent with the history of the Australian military.

In the past the Navy has been the centre of imperial pride. The ships themselves are often inhumanely large, are capital intensive to design and build, not to mention expensive to maintain. Australia has never really done the Navy well, the "great and powerful friends" doctrine of foreign policy has meant we have ended up with a small and dependent Navy that can slot in to either the British or American Navies. Warfare is changing, the potential of conflict between nation-states will continue to exist; but networked warfare between nation-states and non-state actors is appearing as technology and communications commodify. The Navy will have to adapt to meet the traditional challenge of warfare between nation-states, in addition to decentralised systems warfare and national purpose.

The Air-Sea Gap

The military policy of a nation-state is defined by its vulnerabilities. In Australia's case, our geographic vulnerabilities are the North-West shelf, the Timor Sea and the Coral Sea. This vulnerability is commonly known as the Air-Sea gap. This is the area that Australia must project force across, not only to repel any potential aggressor, but also to maintain a sustained presence as there are numerous energy and fishing assets in these areas.

The speedy projection of force is best done by air, and for this Australia has the soon to be retired strike platform of the F111, as well as the long range P3C Orion. it is presumed that the F18, coupled with our aging Boeing 707 Air to air refuelling assets will cover for the F111's huge range, strike power, and autonomy as a weapons platform.

The Navy currently provides blue-water projection through the Collins class submarines and the ANZAC Frigates. The Collins subs are an excellent strike platform, helped by the fact that diesel submarines are quiet, and the ocean is noisy. The Collins class often out-performs itself in naval exercises and operations. The Frigates are the more utilitarian of the Naval platforms and far more suited to the pragmatic and multiple uses which the Australian government forces the Navy to perform.

Unfortunately, the Australian Navy still remains hobbled, mainly by the government's unwillingness to spend the amount of money needed on the weapon and communication systems, as well as force multipliers which would make the Navy an independent and autonomous force, capable of projecting without care or concern for other forces. Money is not the entire issue, however, the dominant problem is the Australian government's inability to untangle its military policy from its submissive foreign policy.

Defeating The Great And Powerful Friends Doctrine

Since Billy Hughes, Australia has practised what is known as the "Great and Powerful Friends" [GAPF] doctrine of foreign policy. This is where Australia becomes submissive to the dominant superpower of the time in its foreign policy, and instead attempts to further the aims of the superpower through Australian diplomacy and foreign policy. Supposedly the gains are that Australia can then assert its will through the superpower and pursue its interests by manipulating the superpower. The other goal of this foreign policy was that it would bring security, defence and economic benefits. Unfortunately, it is a failure.

In 1919, Australia had no significant Navy and Australia's major trading partner was Britain - with approximately eighty per cent of exports heading there. Hughes was concerned that if Canada was more loyal to Britain, it would get favourable trade terms with the UK. He was also worried about the "yellow peril" in the Pacific. As a consequence he sought the Royal Navy in the Pacific to guarantor Australian security. Both premises for his actions were flawed, but that did not stop Hughes perusing this policy.

Unfortunately government's have never stopped doing it, despite putting Australia in grave danger by doing so. In the 1930s, it was known that Singapore was money-sink and would not stop any determined aggressor, or even delay them until the Royal Navy could sail into the Pacific. It was also known that the Royal Navy could not fight a war in the Atlantic and Pacific concurrently, yet Australia still pursued the GAPF.

In 1941 we were left with a Navy that could not act independently, and despite the valiant efforts of the ships and crews, it was the US Navy which established blue-water supremacy in the Pacific. The Australian Navy also suffered from being behind in technology, we did not get an aircraft carrier until the 1950s, and then lost that projection capability in the 1980s with the retirement of the Melbourne.

The Decentralised Navy

The Australian Navy must be able to project a sustained presence, both air and sea, in the areas of national vulnerability. These are the seas and oceans immediately bordering Australia. The assymetry and commodification of technology will mean that the Navy will be facing non-state forces who are capable of disrupting systems of national and economic importance. As the recent attack on a cruise ship by RPG shows, non-state actors can be exceptionally open and disruptive with cheap, low-tech weaponry.

Unmanned Aerial Vehicles [UAVs] will most likely become the next cheap technology that ceases to be monopolised by nation-states. Usually only capital intensive weapons remain in the domain of nation-states. The computer chip and minitiarisation mean that the cost of these will be in the domain of anyone who wants it. While a UAV in the US Air Force might be able to concurrently track three hundred angels on a pinhead, a UAV controlled by cell phone is more than able to deliver, in kamikaze fashion, a warhead into a ship, a city, or even an oil platform in the Timor Sea.

The ANZAC Frigates are an excellent platform, which act in a utilitarian manner to the often contradictory political operations the government sends them on. It is retarded to have a four hundred million dollar, finely tuned projection platform such as an ANZAC Frigate pull refugees out of the water. But they do not enable fixed wing projection. Australia will need autonomous platforms that have weapon systems for air, surface and underwater. These platforms will also need to be capable of carrying and operating fixed and rotating wing assets.

The next generation of Frigates will need to have some through-deck ability, or at the least larger landing areas to accommodate larger UAVs and maybe even the VTOL Joint Strike Fighter. As weapon systems have miniaturised, specialisation in ships has not been as necessary. For instance, the battleship, cruiser, destroyer and corvette have largely been collapsed into the one platform. It is time to increase the aviation assets of the current Frigates in a new platform that can carry at least three larger aircraft or UAVs. The Tasmanian company, Incat has designs which lean toward this view.

Operational Autonomy

Australia has never really done the Command and Control [C&C] as a core competency, as this contradicts the expeditionary policies of the government, but when Australia has done command and control, it is has excelled. East Timor being a recent example. This component will need to have money spent on it, so that each sea going platform can act as a C&C platform, for not only the fleet, but also other ADF assets, including airborne force multipliers. The idea behind this is to have the Navy nodal, so if one node goes, then another can quickly replace it. Since threats can be non-state based, it is important that there be instant C&C capability in any locality.

Since the Navy will have sustained projection in the Air-Sea Gap as its primary role this will require more investment in back end and support infrastructure. Logistics is exceptionally important for any military force. Logistics is often the deciding factor in a force's tempo and capability. During the East Timor operation the HMAS Jervis Bay was leased due to a hole in Australia support and logistical capability. This will also help to make US logistical support unnecessary in situations where Australia is maintaining a significant force outside of Australia, in the South Pacific region.

A National Military And Foreign Policy

The GAPF doctrine stands in the way of a genuinely effective navy. We end up uncritical supporters of the super power of the time, and too often Navy procurement is piecemeal and lacking policy direction. The current Air Warfare Destroyers [AWD] do not help maintain projection power in the Air-Sea gap.

Neither do the Landing Helicopter Docks [LHD] which the Navy wants. They are for hitting a hot beach, and the AWDs are for protecting them while they are doing that. It is simpler and cheaper, to have aircraft maintain air superiority over any possible expedition that requires the Navy to perform that duty. In an expeditionary force, the US will provide that capability, so they will only ever likely be used regionally anyway, where they can be under the ADFs air umbrella.

For a truly national defence policy, which incorporates regional projection, an economic factor is required. Several democratic nations in Asia region face similar vulnerabilities to Australia. Japan, South Korea and Taiwan all need to defend an Air-Sea gap. Since Australia will have to develop platforms and weapon systems to provide naval force projection in the region, the cost of this can be defrayed by partnering with other nations.

This would have multiple benefits; it would reduce development costs, there would be genuine technology sharing, it would involve our larger trading partners and lead to greater economic and defence integration.

Conclusion

Our national vulnerabilities require us to have a Navy which is capable of a sustained surface and air presence in the seas and oceans off Australia. This presence may need to deter both nation-states and non-state actors. As a result, ships must be both capable of command and control, individual autonomy, as well as integration into the wider ADF structure.

The Australian Navy needs to develop a platform to replace the ANZAC Frigates which is capable of not only completing the existing tasks that are required of the Frigates, but also capable of carrying helicopters, UAVs and possibly a couple of VTOL JSFs. These would replace the AWDs, LHDs, and eventually the ANZAC Frigates. Several of our democratic trading partners face the same projection and vulnerability challenges as Australia does. These nations can be partnered with to develop a regional projection platform that contains air, surface, underwater and aviation capability.

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John McEwan, the long time deputy Prime Minister to Robert Menzies, claimed in an interview that one of his greatest achievements was the sending of the HMAS Adelaide to New Caledonia in 1940 to do some gunboat diplomacy. Historically, McEwan's claim has not been confirmed, but is possible within the manner that the first Menzies' government managed policy and cabinet decisions. As Peter Edwards wrote in an essay titled, "The Royal Australian Navy in Australian Diplomacy", this instance is interesting because of its rarity. Australian mythology always gives dominance to the Army through the ANZAC legend/myth. This has led to a policy, media and nationalistic view of the military as dominated by the Army and segmented in capability - a jointery.

New Caledonia

In 1940, Australia faced the problem of its sea lines of communication being cut between itself and the United States. Common mythology in Australia is that Japan was seeking to invade Australia. This is not true, Japan wanted Indonesia's oil first and foremost, secondly it wanted to isolate Australia from the United States. Japan did not have the troop numbers to invade Australia, in stead the plan was to take New Guinea, the Solomons and then New Caledonia to deny communication and logistical routes between Australia and America.

Ultimately, the Australian Army denied Japan from establishing themselves in southern New Guinea, and the US Marine Corp denied the Japanese the Solomon Islands. New Caledonia, however, was French, and with the collapse of France, there was a tension between the Free French and the Vichy French. The former were partial to the west, while the Vichy were partial to Japan, potentially creating a liability for Australia with was clouds darkening in the Pacific between Japan and America.

The cruiser, HMAS Adelaide under Henry Showers was dispatched to New Caledonia to enable the Free French to maintain control. Peter Edwards writes;

Showers achieved this goal without a shot being fired - a major achievement in the use of the threat of naval force to gain a diplomatic end.

This helped to secure, and stabilise Australia's out-lying region, and vulnerable areas to ensure that the sea lanes between Australia and the United States were not threatened with changing circumstance between Japan, Australia and America.

But that was in World War II, when big grey hulled ships sailed the oceans and fought for blue water supremacy in massive battles between air and ocean going fleets. The modern environment contains mixes of tensions between nation-states, between nation-states and non-state actors, as well as the possibility of nearby nation-states balkanizing, or flat out failing in their ability to maintain consistent law and order. Is the ANZAC myth, and our "Great and Powerful Friends" [GAPF] doctrine sufficient in such a complex and demanding environment.

Nationalising The ANZAC Myth

Myths overtake reality and often end up forming a popular narrative of their own. The ANZAC myth is a perpetuation of the popular bushman myth from the 1800s, propagated into a Nietzschian creation of the nation-state through national blood letting. It is not a surprise that the bushman myth and ANZAC myth were combined in a song, "And the band played Waltzing Matilda".

The ANZACs are commonly equated with the battles at Gallipoli, where Australian forces fought in close proximity to Turkish troops, in what was often brutal, bloody and misguided battles. The Australians achieved, despite the horrendous conditions, and often naive leadership, from both the Australian and British leaders, but ultimately could not stave off defeat and had to withdraw.

It was Charles Bean, the official historian, who propelled Gallipoli into the ANZAC myth. He helped popularise the ANZACs in 1915 with a book describing the heroics and valour of the troops in Gallipoli. This was continued with the description of the "Black ANZACs" who led the first Australian charge in Europe once Australian Imperial Force troops were deployed in France and Belgium. The men who fought at Gallipoli called themselves "Peninsula Men", and there was prestige in World War I amongst the troops between them, especially if they were Lighthorse.

The focus on the ANZACs, especially in modern times has led to a focus on the Army as the strength of the Australian military. This has been helped by Australia's constant focus on an expeditionary foreign policy inside the GAPF doctrine. Yet, in World War I, Australia was the only dominion to develop and deploy a Flying Corps, which was to become the Australian Air Force. The Navy has had a harder time, as it has never been developed by government policy into an independent and autonomous force. Consequently, myth has overtaken a consolidated view of the Australian military as achieving national objectives.

The Tip Of The Spear

The military is one of the few government institutions who must be finely tuned to national objectives. The Jeffersonian view of the Republic sees a standing military as being an offence to liberty, as a central government will use, and abuse it for tyrannous ends. This was challenged during the United States' war with England in 1812, when the US Navy, or Adams' wooden walls were the only capable defence for the US in the early stages of the war.

Another reality of a nation-state, is that generally only the collective wealth of the people can fund, maintain, and develop such a capital intensive arm of government as a standing military of highly technical platforms and manned by professionals. Because of the expeditionary focus of Australian foreign policy, we tend to think of the Australian spear as being the Army, and in particular the Army's rapid deployment forces, such as the SAS and Commandos.

This does a dis-service to the technical capability of the Air Force and Navy. Since the late 1960s, the force projection into Australia's national vulnerabilities has been the F111, the P3C Orion, and attack submarines; the latter recently being filled by the Collins class. In expeditionary deployments, it has usually been the Army that has born the brunt, to the point that conscription was needed during the Vietnam conflict. The Air Force and Navy have been deployed in either piecemeal fashion, or as a small component integrated into a large force, such as the US Air Force or Navy.

More recently, with deployments to East Timor and the Solomons, the Australian Defence Force has been required to provide integrated solutions that incorporate the Army, Navy and Air Force; rather than focusing on one arm to the exclusion of the others. The Iraq conflict also involved considerable aviation assets, but it has been the SAS which has garnered the most media attention. Security is also based on perception, both international and domestic. Unfortunately the integrated capability of the ADF to provide regional solutions has been largely ignored, and the 2003 election included a fight between the two major parties over who was the most committed to the US Alliance.

Bill Hayden has also lamented in the past that the electorate's marriage to the ANZUS Treaty often defies reality, but it is politicians that have enforced that dependency, through their rhetoric, policy and actions. Australians have not seen the ADF act as an integrated capable force, even when it has. The GAPF doctrine, the media, the ANZAC myth and the political attempt to militarise political history have seen this glossed over. As a consequence the GAPF doctrine becomes self-prophesying at the political and public opinion levels.

Back To ANZAC

Claims to nationalism and security are a cheap political means to collapse opinion and power to the centre. James Madison warned at the founding of the United States, that was is to be avoided as it offers nothing but executive aggrandizement. Cries to insecurity serve the same purpose, something we have seen recently with the open ended "War on Terror" and the political manoeuvring to make the Australian population's concern for their safety dependent upon the federal government.

This federal government's reaction to the war on terror has been to militize Australian policy both internationally and domestically. We have seen piecemeal deployments to Afghanistan and Iraq in support of the US, as well as media shots of black balaclava'd special troops dropping from Blackhawks at home. This is despite a terrorists rarely being armed with more than a bomb - which state police could easily handle.

Another irony of this domestic view of anti-terror, is that our troops are clad in black masks to hide their identity, as are the jihadists which appear on Al-Queda training and propaganda videos. While ours drop from Blackhawks, Al-Queda jump over obstacle courses, clutching AK47s and other cheap arms. This is a totally inappropriate image of domestic security, most likely designed to install the same fear in the population that terrorism does. Terror is a civil issue, best handled by state police, and it is the face of the state police which should be equated with terrorism, not the ADF.

At the same time, the Liberal Party has also moved to try and militarise Australian history, and equate it with the Liberal Party. We have had odd claims such as making children in school learn about Simpson and his donkey as an example of Australian values. History is an essential component of any education, but warping it to political ends through the education system is an inferior way to impart knowledge.

The GAPF doctrine of foreign policy is inherently limiting, it denies Australian independence, autonomy and self-destiny. Equating the ANZAC myth to political nationalism will only serve to further entrench the flawed, and failed policy of the GAPF. The ANZUS Treaty is no longer relevant, being a cold war document which helped enforce the GAPF in the Australian political mind. It needs to be junked, and the Australian politicians starting to focus on the wider capability of the ADF as the nucleus of a larger, more capable, integrated force that it is, and can be in the popular mind.

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Australia has not produced a Defence White Paper since 2000. I recently argued that we needed a new Defence White Paper as the 2003 Update and Defence Capability Plan were not sufficient enough to determine future defence doctrine. The United States military recently released the Quadrennial Defense Review Report [QDR] which acts as a similar statement on doctrine, capability and force planning as the Defence White Paper does in Australia. Since Australia adheres to the "Great and Powerful Friends" doctrine of foreign policy where Australian forces accept American leadership and the ADF is designed to slot in transparently into US forces, this will have an effect on Australian doctrine as well.

Quadrennial Defense Review

The document opens with a political statement of the military's challenges;

Since the attacks of September 11, 2001, our Nation has fought a global war against violent extremists who use terrorism as their weapon of choice, and who seek to destroy our free way of life. Our enemies seek weapons of mass destruction and, if they are successful, will likely attempt to use them in their conflict with free people everywhere. Currently, the struggle is centered in Iraq and Afghanistan, but we will need to be prepared and arranged to successfully defend our Nation and its interests around the globe for years to come. This 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review is submitted in the fifth year of this long war.

The rhetoric of the long war is an indication that the military spending from the Cold War is no longer a state of exception, but now one of permanence . There will be no peace dividend; where money that flowed to the military to contain the Soviet Union can now serve as tax cuts, or be diverted to social programs. The United States is now on a permanent war footing as it was during the Cold War. This reflects Neo-conservative thinking, where political power is an extension of military power, and the military is used as a blunt instrument of political change. The industrial-military complex becomes the political-industrial-military.

September 11th was a case of central planning, one which sends fear through nation-states who are themselves very centralised in control and planning. But since then, rather than big centralised operations, or attempts to blow up dirty bombs in Baltimore, asymmetric warfare has taken a reductionist path, and has not needed to go beyond small bombs strapped to a person, or detonated remotely. Systems disruption which attacks the weaknesses in centralised structures has been sufficient enough to immobilise efforts.

The statement also includes that the military's focus will be global. A war without end and without limits. The statement carries the implication that success of the Nation in this war, and the freedom of the people of the globe, is dependent upon the state. The 2002 Fundamentals in Australian Aerospace Power manual notes the political change as to what determines security;

The concept of national security has changed. It has expanded to incorporate individual security as well as the earlier ideas of national defence.

This fits with the Neo-conservative foreign policy and statist domestic policies of the Bush Administration. The domestic security policies in Australia under the Howard government have followed a similar path. Gary Sauer-Thompson has called this domestic view of security the National Security State .

From Clash Of The Nation-States To ...

A nation's defence doctrine is determined by its vulnerabilities. These can be geographical, natural resources, political, economic or even social. From the document and the list of shifts in emphasis, it appears the Pentagon sees the current military structure of the United States military as a vulnerability. The shifts in emphasis include;

• From a peacetime tempo - to a wartime sense of urgency.
• From a time of reasonable predictability - to an era of surprise and uncertainty.
• From single-focused threats - to multiple, complex challenges.
• From conducting war against nations - to conducting war in countries we are not at war with (safe havens).
• From "one size fits all" deterrence - to tailored deterrence for rogue powers, terrorist networks and near-peer competitors.
• From responding after a crisis starts (reactive) - to preventive actions so problems do not become crises (proactive).
• From crisis response - to shaping the future.
• From threat-based planning - to capabilities based planning.
• From peacetime planning - to rapid adaptive planning.
• From a focus on kinetics - to a focus on effects.
• From 20th century processes - to 21st century integrated approaches.
• From static defense, garrison forces - to mobile, expeditionary operations.
• From under-resourced, standby forces (hollow units) - to fully-equipped and fully-manned forces (combat ready units).
• From a battle-ready force (peace) - to battlehardened forces (war).
• From large institutional forces (tail) - to more powerful operational capabilities (teeth).
• From major conventional combat operations - to multiple irregular, asymmetric operations.
• From separate military Service concepts of operation - to joint and combined operations.
• From forces that need to deconfl ict - to integrated, interdependent forces.
• From exposed forces forward - to reaching back to CONUS to support expeditionary forces.
• From an emphasis on ships, guns, tanks and planes - to focus on information, knowledge and timely, actionable intelligence.
• From massing forces - to massing effects.
• From set-piece maneuver and mass - to agility and precision.
• From single Service acquisition systems - to joint portfolio management.
• From broad-based industrial mobilization - to targeted commercial solutions.
• From Service and agency intelligence - to truly Joint Information Operations Centers.
• From vertical structures and processes (stovepipes) - to more transparent, horizontal integration (matrix).
• From moving the user to the data - to moving data to the user.
• From fragmented homeland assistance - to integrated homeland security.
• From static alliances - to dynamic partnerships.
• From predetermined force packages - to tailored, flexible forces.
• From the U.S. military performing tasks - to a focus on building partner capabilities.
• From static post-operations analysis - to dynamic diagnostics and real-time lessons learned.
• From focusing on inputs (effort) - to tracking outputs (results).
• From Department of Defense solutions - to interagency approaches.

But the US military has been very effective in combat situations over the last four years. Afghanistan and Iraq were good examples of the dominance of the US Military. The organised insurgency in Afghanistan is now limited to Al Queda and Taliban operatives unable to penetrate far beyond the Afghan-Pakistan border. The limitation there is political, not military.

The US military is already exceptionally mobile. Force projection is rapid and global through the US Carrier fleets. The United States Marine Corp can bring great force to bear on the ground in a quick and sustainable manner. Not to mention the US logistical train which quickly brought 140,000 troops into the Middle East and has sustained that commitment and tempo for over three years. The US military is mobile, rapid and can maintain a large force indefinitely.

The bullet points do contain Neo-conservative thinking in them. For instance the; From crisis response - to shaping the future. This sums up the invasion of Iraq. The military were used as a political instrument. Much of the turgidity and failure of Iraq has been the lack of military goals once the Iraqi military was destroyed as a fighting force. Since then the political goals have moved constantly in response to the domestic American political climate. That is no way to run a military.

Political management of the media may be two-faced, fraught with deception and in perpetual policy motion, but this is not a suitable manner to guide military goals. The task of reconstructing Iraq and ensuring it is a safe and secure democracy is a civil task, not a military one. This is a limitation of Neo-conservative ideology.

Decentralised Strength

The report also notes the vulnerability of civil systems;

Non-state enemies could attempt to attack a wide range of targets including government facilities; commercial and financial systems; cultural and historical landmarks; food, water, and power supplies; and information, transport, and energy networks. They will employ unconventional means to penetrate homeland defenses and exploit the very nature of western societies - their openness - to attack their citizens, economic institutions, physical infrastructure and social fabric.

The main vulnerability is the centralised nature, and interdependence of western systems; energy, water, sewerage etc. These are largely artifacts of the economies of scale achieved in post World War II town planning. These are not military issues, as much of this mis-named war on terror, but instead civil problems.

Source: QDR 2006

There is a lot of science, technology and development of decentralised systems, but this is often thwarted by big centralised government enforcing its demands on the population and town planning. For instance a decentralised water/sewerage/timber system of town planning was envisaged by Sydney-sider P.A. Yeomans in the 1970s. Tasmanian Bill Mollison wrote in detail of decentralised food production in his Permaculture book .Big response statism has also led to the world's dryest continent being dependent on centralised water systems.

Unfortunately the terrorists of September 11th did not use unconventional means to penetrate the United States, or its domestic airline system. They used passports and drivers licenses. This is definitely not a weakness of western openness. Bot documents are a fact of life in participating, rental cars require driver's licenses, drinking requires verification etc etc.

Blunting Asymmetric Warfare

The report sees the increase of Special Forces as a means to defeat terrorism. The number Special Operations Forces will increase by 15% and the Special Forces Battalions by one third. This places them around the fifty thousand mark. Almost double Australia's Army, and approximately ten percent of the US's Army.

Australia has used its Special Forces domestically, one of the recurring images during the Sydney 2000 Olympics was black balaclavad SASR dropping from an Australian Army Blackhawk. The QDR also includes the capability for the military to become involved in domestic security;

To strengthen homeland defense and homeland security, the Department will fund a $1.5 billion initiative over the next five years to develop broad-spectrum medical countermeasures against the threat of genetically engineered bio-terror agents. Additional initiatives will include developing advanced detection and deterrent technologies and facilitating full-scale civil-military exercises to improve interagency planning for complex homeland security contingencies.

I question the utility of this approach. Terrorism is a civil issue, and the terrorist attacks in the last several years could have been stopped with the force that a citizen or policeman can bring to bear. The fourth aircraft on September 11th and the shoe-bomber are good examples of this. Recent catastrophes in the United States have also shown the resilience of the population and civil emergency structures, September 11th, the NY Black-out and Katrina Hurricane did not require a full scale military response.

In Australia's case the separation of civil and military responsibilities is important. Australia has volunteer civil structures like the State Emergency Services and the Bush Fire Brigade. It is far better to train agencies such as these than maintain the knowledge with specialists in the military. Not only is a knowledgeable population one, a ready one, but the volunteer nature means that know-how will disperse through the wider population.

Another reason to ensure a separation of military and civil forces, even in an emergency, is that unscrupulous political leaders will use the military to political advantage. To our near north, Suharto's Indonesia used the military to ensure civil order. Until recently Indonesia did not have a police force, its military supplied nearly half its number toward civil order. KOPASSUS was used as a political instrument domestically, as well as in Malaya, Thailand, East Timor and Irian Jira.

Seven years later the Indonesians are doing everything they can to eradicate the military influence in their government and economy, but remnants of the entwining of military and civil power still remain.

We Love Our Great and Powerful Friends

Australia's relationship with the US gets a mention;

The United States places great value on its unique relationships with the United Kingdom and Australia, whose forces stand with the U.S. military in Iraq, Afghanistan and many other operations. These close military relations are models for the breadth and depth of cooperation that the United States seeks to foster with other allies and partners around the world. Implementation of the QDR's agenda will serve to reinforce these enduring links.

The United States should be ticked off at us. For all our rhetoric, and flag-waving support, we have about 1,000 troops in Iraq. Approximately 0.66% of the American contingent. Richard Woolcott wrote in 2004 that ;

The reality is that Australia's presence, however capable and efficient our forces, can make no meaningful contribution to the two major objectives: the reconstruction of that country [Iraq] and the establishment of a viable democratic government there.

The Great and Powerful Friends doctrine is a passive one - we become dependent upon other nations, and other militaries for our success. We leave ourselves no control over the outcome, whether success or failure. The Australian involvement in Iraq has been no different.

Macro-weaponry

The United States still sees China as its next potential nation-state opponent. This poses projection problems for the United States. The report lays out plans to;

Develop a new land-based, penetrating long range strike capability to be fielded by 2018 while modernizing the current bomber force.

Restructure the Joint Unmanned Combat Air System (J-UCAS) program and develop an unmanned longer-range carrier-based aircraft capable of being air-refueled to provide greater standoff capability, to expand payload and launch options, and to increase naval reach and persistence.

Nearly double UAV coverage capacity by accelerating the acquisition of Predator UAVs and Global Hawk.

The first item is interesting. Australia is retiring its long-range strike bomber early due to maintenance costs but it is leaving us with a drop in projection ability. Australia's geographic vulnerabilities are the North-West shelf, the Timor Sea and the Coral Sea. A land based strike bomber would increase Australia's capability and projection in that area.

If there is a Dreadnought in the US's armoury, it is the Unmanned Aerial Vehicles [UAV]. I do not doubt that this technology will quickly commoditise and become available to all militaries, if not civil operators as well. UAVs actually carry higher operational costs than a standard manned fighter. The pilots rotate in three shifts, which increases labor costs beyond a manned aircraft. In addition the UAV requires all the ground based support that a manned aircraft does. UAVs are an area that Australia can re-establish its aerospace industry. We should pursue domestic development programs for this technology.

Australian technology also gets a mention in the QDR;

Source: QDR 2006

Which begs the question, why aren't our defence industries more involved in developing new technology - rather than just being integrators of American systems.

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