I have written on the Australian Flying Corps [AFC] since 1997, producing approximately many hundred pages of web based content through the years. I have done so as an amateur historian, who, until recently was not aware of historical methodology such as modernism, postmodernism, great dates or multiple narratives. So what did I learn and what was my approach to recording this niche area of Australian history?

Firstly the great dates style of history, while a triumphalist form, is not very compelling to read. It is fine for a summary, but it tends to focus on the events or dates of note such as; squadron formed, squadrons first victory, squadron's one hundred victory, aces twentieth victory etc.

C.E.W. Bean of the official history of WWI fame wrote to F.M. Cutlack who wrote the AFC volume of the official history;

You have avoided [in writing the 8th Volume of the official history] the great danger of making it a mere string of dogfights. You have obtained breadth and possess modesty - two qualities which make the book attractive. You have told the story in a manner neither to grandiloquent nor yet in any way unappreciative - just the mean which is so difficult to obtain.

One of the easiest pieces of data to get in the histories is the Combat in the Air Reports. These were filed by pilots whenever they had a dogfight, so there is plenty of this style of narrative available for anyone wanting to do a great dates style of dogfight history. Bean is congratulating Cutlack on avoiding that.

Dates are integral to history, after all, it is the study of what happened and when, but this raises the issue of narrative and how to approach the telling of history in such a way as to impart knowledge to the reader in a manner that is compelling rather than soporific.

I feel for those researching Aboriginal history as the written word is exceptionally minimal and the primary sources cannot be quoted to support the history. Since I am recording an early 20thC event there was not only written records, bureaucratically collected data, personal diaries, etc; but there was also photographs and in one rare occasion video.

Primary sources become an important part of the narrative. They allow the participants to tell their story in their own words and have it placed into a wider historical context by the author.

For instance this repatriation report by Lt Rintoul shows how effective the Royal Navy's blockade of Germany had been in limiting food supply by late 1918 - Germany was on the point of starvation;

was then in turn taken to the following lagers - Karlsruhe (1 month), where the treatment was considerate. Landshut, Bavaria (6 Weeks), where I met Lieutenant Flight and Lieutenant Feez (now repatriated). There the treatment was harsh. Fort Prince Karl Ingolstadt (3 weeks) with French Officers. Fort Ten (1 month) in the same district, where we had fair treatment although on one occasion we were fired upon by German sentries, for cheering three re-captured prisoners. Kamatigall (East Prussia) 6 weeks until the Armistice was signed when all restrictions were withdrawn.

Food was very bad, but the Red Cross parcels were good though not too regular, being occasionally held up owing to German methods. Medical treatment was bad, also the sanitary arrangements.

Or this quote by Captain John Wright on the Sopwith Snipe which adds first person data and experience to the historical controversy over whether the Sopwith Snipe was an improvement over the Sopwith Camel;

They [Sopwith Snipe] were of slightly more robust construction than the Camel, but were a little less maneuverable. However. their rate of climb was better than the Camel, a ceiling of 15,000 feet could be reached in 30 minutes, a Camel took upwards of 45 minutes.

Then there becomes the problem of who's story are you telling? Is it your story? Is it the nation's? Is it those that took part in that history as individuals or as a group? The title of the history gives insight into how it was approached but sometimes the data and primary sources leave the historian in a conundrum of which way to approach it.

A good example is the nomenclature of the AFC squadrons. The AFC used the British logistics and book-keeping in the Middle East and Europe. While there was an AFC Headquarters, the AFC used the British Wings for data processing and archival.

Australia raised No.1 Squadron at Point Cook and then sent them off to Egypt to be equipped with combat aircraft from British supplies. The Royal Flying Corps [RFC] stamped this squadron as 67 Sqn RFC in their book-keeping.

There were a couple of reasons for this; one, to avoid confusion with the No.1 Sqn RFC which was currently in France, but two, because many in the RFC command though Australia was raising a dominion squadron for the RFC, rather than an AFC squadron for the Australian Imperial Force [AIF].

This is much like the Article XV squadrons from WWII which came from the Empire Air Training Scheme [EATS] where Australian pilots from the Royal Australian Air Force [RAAF] were grouped into Royal Air Force [RAF] squadrons and given RAAF designations in the RAF nomenclature. Confusing. Especially as many of these Article XV squadrons were Australian in name only and half their air and ground crew complement in some cases were English, Canadian, New Zealand etc.

To make matters worse in the AFC nomenclature, the Australian book-keeping was less than rigorous and the AFC raised two "2nd Flying Squadrons" at the same time. One in Egypt and one in Victoria. Once this error was discovered, the squadron in Egypt was named 2 Sqn, while the one in Victoria was named 3 Sqn. This is despite the Victorian squadron being raised before the Egyptian one.

Then the British slotted those squadrons into their book-keeping, and they called No.2 Sqn AFC in their records No.68 Sqn RFC. No.3 Sqn AFC became known in the British records as No.69 Sqn RFC. A similar thing occurred when Australia raised a fourth AFC squadron for combat in France.

Once the Australian civil and military leadership found out that Britain had renamed their squadrons they immediately complained. The Australian leadership in WWI was very protective of the national character of their forces and would not allow the British to transfer Australian pilots to British squadrons.

Unlike the Canadians and New Zealanders who allowed the RFC to recruit directly in their forces, the Australians would only allow infantry and lighthorse to join the AFC. This is in direct contrast to WWII when Australian civil and military leadership in most instances handed over sovereignty of their forces to the British - the EATS being the dominant example.

After the Australian complaints the British relented a little and decided that the Australian units would be known as Australian Flying Corps, but they would keep the British numbering. So;

• No. 67 RFC became No.67 AFC in British book-keeping
• No. 68 RFC became No.68 AFC in British book-keeping
• No. 69 RFC became No.69 AFC in British book-keeping
• No. 71 RFC became No.71 AFC in British book-keeping

Yet to the AIF these units were known as No.1 through 4 squadrons AFC. The numbering still wasn't to the Australian leadership's satisfaction so they continued to complain and finally the RFC relented. British and Australian book-keeping finally came into synchronisation;

• No. 67 AFC became No.1 AFC in British book-keeping
• No. 68 AFC became No.2 AFC in British book-keeping
• No. 69 AFC became No.3 AFC in British book-keeping
• No. 71 AFC became No.4 AFC in British book-keeping

The damage had been done. When you go through the Australian Nominal Roll, the air and ground crew in it are recorded as being in every possible unit from No.67 to No.1 to AFC, RFC, etc. This is in addition to the normal areas of known AFC members being mistakenly recorded in machine gun Battalions etc.

So, apart from recording the controversy over nomenclature, what is a historian to do?

I took the stance that I am writing on the AFC from their perspective, so the AFC nomenclature is dominant. On the AFC pages I call the squadrons by their AIF and AFC names.

I am backed up in this by Richard Williams who wrote on the issue in his diary;

Neither AIF Headquarters in Egypt nor 5th Wing RFC there was aware of our imminent arrival although 5th Wing had advice of the formation of a squadron in Australia which would join his command and be known as No.67 (Australian) Squadron, RFC. There was no more authority for calling us a squadron of the RFC than there was, for example, for calling the 9th Battalion AIF the 23rd Battalion of the Middlesex Regiment.

This was what might be called a "flow-on" of the wish expressed in London that Dominion personnel should serve in the RFC and it took much correspondence before we were referred to by the RFC in official correspondence (in January 1918) as No.1 Squadron Australian Flying Corps

And Williams again on the issue;

About this time too, we were advised that henceforth we would be known officially as No.1 Squadron Australian Flying Corps - it had taken almost two years to get rid of the RFC No.67 and even this was for some unexplained reason done in two bites, for during 1917 an AIF order stated that we were to be known as No.67 Australian Flying Corps. I cannot imagine who was clever enough to work out a reason for that.

A friend of mine is researching Combat in the Air Reports in the RFC, RNAS, RAF and AFC for World War I. He has discovered combat reports from No.2 Sqn AFC that have been filed under No.2 Sqn RAF. So the issue is never simple.

But all I have learned, and the approaches I have had to take, are the right ones for the subject in my opinion. I have come to them independently without academic or political guidance which suggests neither is necessary to be a historian or recorder and narrator of history.

This has led to my narrative on No.2 Squadron's history. This includes dates, primary sources, historical narrative that is neither grandiloquent or unappreciative. I think it tells Australian history well without any academic or political baggage.