Queensland Senator Ian McDonald has an interesting proposal for a Queensland Senate or Legislative Council . He argues that the Mayors should represent the Upper-house on fixed four year terms. McDonald doesn't say they would have to sit, so possibly some form of virtual arrangement can be made since the Mayor's will have responsibilities to their cities and towns. Interesting.

The speech contains some party bashing at the very beginning and end, however the good stuff is right in the guts;

A few weeks ago the Queensland Premier, Mr Beattie, was waxing lyrical about reform of the Senate. His reform, you might recall, consisted of giving him and his fellow Labor premiers a seat in this chamber of the Australian parliament. I do not understand how the presence of these people in the Senate would add any substance or intellect to this chamber, although I suspect it is one way to get a few more Labor senators into the chamber, which they seemed incapable of doing at the general election. If Mr Beattie is so interested in reform of the upper house, perhaps he should get his own house in order first.

Queensland is the only state in Australia with a unicameral system. I believe that two houses of parliament would better protect liberties in our state. Perhaps more importantly, from my point of view, a bicameral legislature would give the ability to tap into new and different thoughts and would help to ensure fairness and progress right across the state, not just in the south-east corner, where the majority of voters are.

In the 2004 state election, with just 47 per cent of the primary vote, the ALP secured 63 of the Legislative Assembly's 89 seats and a rare third term in office. This was not because of a malapportionment or a gerrymander but simply the result of an electoral system based on single-member constituencies in one house of parliament.

Queensland, like most Liberal democracies, is an increasingly diverse place. An electoral system in which the contest for effective political will is divided between two partisan groups with a winner-take-all outcome is less representative than it could or should be. Why don't we have an upper house in Queensland? The Legislative Council in Queensland was abolished in 1922 in dubious circumstances following a referendum in which Queensland electors voted against abolition. The then Labor government packed the Legislative Council with its own nominees, who then voted themselves out of existence.

Many would have said, perhaps, that an upper house was obstructive. Many would say that upper houses do not work because, in spite of the best intentions of the founders of our systems of parliament, these houses have become the playthings of political parties, either to rubber-stamp or to obstruct the democratically elected lower house of parliament. I say `rubber-stamp' or `obstruct' depending on whether the government of the day has a majority in the upper house or whether the opposition of the day has the upper chamber.

An upper house, including the Senate in my view, should not be able to hold up legislation indefinitely and should not be able to bring a government down. As in recent reforms in the House of Lords, upper houses, in my view, should be able to delay and, in circumstances, amend government legislation but not reject it. An upper house can allow proper scrutiny of government decisions and can, by delaying legislation, give opportunity for expression of popular disagreement. If an upper house were unable to bring down a government or permanently reject the will of the popularly elected chamber, political partisanship in the upper house would be unnecessary.

And what better way to address the complaint that having a second chamber would involve a costly election than to have an upper chamber of people who have already been popularly elected--members who are closest to their constituents, parliamentarians who are at the coalface or grassroots of democracy and governance. Queensland already has 125 of such people. They are mayors from all over the state, democratically elected on a fixed date for a four-year term. That figure of 125 is soon to be reduced by about one-third, by announcements the Queensland government has made and which it intends to bring into effect in the future.

Having a second chamber comprised of mayors drawn from all over the state, intimately attuned and connected to Queenslanders, would provide benefits that would be tangible, particularly for those of us who live in the north or the west of the state, and there would be no cost in monetary, political or governance terms. I am proposing that there should be some research into a new upper house for Queensland. The upper house would be composed, as I say, of popularly elected mayors. The upper house members would get, perhaps, a daily allowance while sitting in parliament but would otherwise continue to rely on their existing mayoral salary.

The upper house would be able to delay legislation for a maximum of, say, six months. In some cases it could amend legislation but not bring down a government by blocking supply. Any delay of legislation would allow popular pressure to be brought to bear against legislation seen to be unfair or just plain stupid. The benefits would include real and independent scrutiny of all Queensland government decisions, because--and I repeat--the inability to block legislation or bring down a government would mean that political grouping or political point scoring would not be necessary. Having mayors from all over the state as part of the legislature for a fixed four-year term would bring stability and continuity to government processes and would mean that the needs and aspirations of those parts of Queensland outside the south-east corner would be better served and recognised.

It is all very well for Mr Beattie to ignore the governance arrangements in his own state and venture into activities on how to reform this chamber, which I believe works very well, even with a government majority. This government has senators who are still prepared to critically examine government legislation and to make recommendations to the parliament that at times conflict with the government--something you would never experience were the Labor Party ever in control of the Senate and in power in the lower house of parliament. Nevertheless, Mr Beattie, rather than worrying about reform of this chamber, should look at his own governance arrangement. A unicameral system in Queensland has certain inadequacies and deficiencies, and it does not have the ability to protect the liberties that those of us who are Queenslanders might like to expect.

My proposal for an upper house takes away the objections of obstruction for obstruction's sake. It takes away the objection of a costly chamber--one that would be costly to elect and costly to maintain. You would get some of the very best people--some of the very best brains--some of the people who are closest to public attitudes in Queensland into the Parliament of Queensland. Not all the mayors that I know of are independent. Some of them are very obvious members of the Labor Party, like Tony Mooney in Townsville and a few others around the place. There are also, of course, many mayors who are members of the Liberal Party, like the mayor of Cairns and the mayor of Brisbane. One could name quite a number of other mayors who are, or have been, members of the Liberal Party. But, across the board, you would get a group of people who are more interested in their constituency than in playing political games. It would be such a change from the Labor Party in this chamber or in the other place, who only oppose for opposition's sake and to try to make some political points.

It should be noted that the Brisbane City Council has better separation of powers than the Queensland Parliament. Due to Queensland's unicameral structure there is only the Assembly which embeds the entire authority of the executive and legislative.

The idea of using elected mayors to act as a check on legislation is an interesting one, kind of like a state based version of federation - a provincialisation(?). Innovative, I haven't heard of that before.

McDonald is right in my opinion to advocate for a bicameral structure in Queensland. The constitution was rejuvenated in 2001 , but was just a formalisation of the existing procedures and conventions into one document, rather than the multiple acts that had served as an informal constitution previously. So it probably won't be amended in any significant amount unless there is a great deal of public pressure for it.

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The Nebraskan State Legislature in the United States is a unicameral house. There is no upper house such as the Senate in the Australian system or the Legislative Councils in the Australian states. The Nebraskan Senators at the federal level recently proposed that the state adopt a bicameral legislative structure.

From the article, Senators question Unicameral set-up ;

Friend argued that a two-house system could provide more checks and balances of laws, prevent what he called legislative tyranny and infuse the lawmaking process with more information and precision.

In the Nebraskan Constitution the Legislature must be at least thirty members but no larger than fifty. Which is a relatively small body of legislators in what is a small state. Nebraska did not adopt a unicameral legislative structure until 1937 when the motion passed by referendum.

Half the house is up for election every four years, so it kind of operates in a staggered format such as the Australian Senate does. Unlike the Australian parliamentary systems, Nebraska has a separate executive from the legislative so issues of separation of powers are not the same as in a unicameral parliamentary system. Additionally the Nebraskan House does not recognize parties with the intent of creating more independent legislators.

The Nebraskan Constitution recognizes several formal executive positions which are all elected;

• Governor
• Lieutenant-Governor
• Secretary of State
• Auditor of Public Accounts
• Treasurer
• Attorney-General

I think a bicameral system is a necessity in a Parliamentary system because there is little to no separation of powers between executive and legislative. A bicameral structure in a parliamentary system at least provides for the chance of a pure legislative check on the executive.

The Nebraskan system in contrast has strong separation of powers between executive and legislative. The number of members in the Nebraskan House is also pretty small which carries its own efficiencies. I don't believe a bicameral legislative structure is as important in a system with a separate executive.

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Matthew Yglesias has an article where he argues that a unicameral British legislature is better than a democratic bicameral one where the House of Lords is elected in the Australian or American manner that the Senate's are:

Now the U.K. has a de facto unicameral regime and I think it's working just fine. Bicameralism arises for some understandable historical reasons--the legacy of aristocracy in the U.K., an 18th century political compromise in the U.S. -- but in this case it looks a lot like a solution in search of a problem. Maybe Brown should ask Barack Obama about some of the hassles involved in an upper house with actual power.

The American Senate is more powerful than the Australian Senate as it creates money bills, something the Australian Senate cannot do (I should check that to make certain). However the US Senate started off as an appointed Federal body where State Governors would appoint the two Senators to represent their state in the national bicameral body. It has since moved to a democratic system where the Senators are elected.

In Australia, despite the innovation of the Labor Party's 'pledge' and the absolute party discipline that comes with it, the weakest bodies have been the unicameral ones. The Queensland parliament has been less able to fight off corruption than the bicameral parliaments have. Joh Bjelke-Peterson is probably the shining example of this.

The absolute party discipline that the Australian parties have has meant that the Senate at the national level has been an important check and balance on the House of Representatives.

I would argue that a bicameral body is more efficient than a unicameral one simply because it can act as a check on absolute executive power that comes more easily in the parliamentary system than a Washington one.

If the British do adopt a democratic bicameral parliament then the parties will inevitably get their hooks into the upper house and extend party discipline, if not the executive into the House of Lords, like they have done in Australia with the Senate.

While Americans decry the messiness of their system and its imperfect party discipline, I consider it a feature. It is actually one of the few things I agree with Alfred Deakin on.