An article by Gary J. Bass, What really causes civil war? argues that a country's wealth is a better determinant of whether it will suffer civil war than internal differences such as race, ethnicity or sectarianism.

Bass writes that the general explanation for the civil wars in Yugoslavia, Rwanda, Sudan, Lebanon and now Iraq are that there are political splits along sectarian or ethnic lines which inevitably lead to civil strife.

He questions this premise;

... there is a growing body of work that suggests that multiethnic countries are actually no more prone to civil war than other countries.

A study conducted in 2003 found that the best determinant of probability of civil war lay in a country's wealth;

They [Fearon and Laitin] found that regardless of how ethnically mixed a country is, the likelihood of a civil war decreases as countries get richer. The richest states are almost impervious to civil strife, no matter how multiethnic they might be ...

And while the poorest countries have the most civil wars, Fearon and Laitin discovered that, oddly enough, it is actually the more homogeneous ones among them that are most likely to descend into violence.

That wealthy countries don't fracture into civil war makes intuitive sense. It is good that there is some empirical evidence to back it up. But why do more homogeneous societies appear more prone to falling into civil war when faced with poverty?

The article does not explain though there is the suggestion that the majority is more likely to exploit a very small minority. Which presumably take up arms against the government as rebels leading to civil strife.

The conclusions of Fearon and Laitin have been challenged by other researchers, and they also put caveats on the environment most prone to create civil war - which unsurprisingly includes a corrupt and weak central government.

It should be noted that the closest Australia ever came to civil war was during the depths of the depression in 1932 when NSW and the Commonwealth Government were hours away from open conflict.

Daniel Byman and Kenneth Pollack have a long article in the Washington Post which discusses the challenges in Iraq and some policy remedies. The article is titled, What Next? Their opening sentence declares that Iraq is in civil war, the recommendations in the article are from this position.

Civil war is difficult to describe and is usually thought of factions inside a nation-state warring openly against each other in a manner that consumes most of the state. This is complicated in Iraq by the presence of the US Forces in such large numbers. Byman and Pollack argue in the article that the only dampener on the civil war in Iraq being worse is the presence of these troops.

The violence in Iraq is high; higher month to month than the recent Lebanese conflict. Which is an important point that Byman and Pollack make in relation to the greater destructive nature of civil war than an open conflict between nations. The label this destruction and disruptive force "spillover".

They identify several aspects of spillover;

• Refugees
• Terrorism
• Radicalisation of neighbouring populations
• Copycat secessionism
• Foreign intervention

They also write that once a civil war starts it can take greater than twenty years to dampen its effects. A recent example being Lebanon which can trace its roots back to the 1920s. War in Lebanon has occurred in the 1970s, then the Syrian occupation, and more recently the Israeli conflict with Hezbollah.

It is important to note that the main agitator of Israel, Hezbollah, did not exist until the 1980s. They are product of conflict as much as the weakness of the Lebanese state.

The conflict in Afghanistan promoted massive refugee flows, with nearly 29% of the population displaced. Anecdotal, but the fellow I chat with at the local deli, who is probably a bit older than me, used to live in Kabul. Given the radicalised nature of Afghanistan, I doubt he wants to go back.

Australia's refugee intake has matched the instability of world affairs. We have a strong Lebanese population due to that nation's constant conflicts in the 70s through to the present day. Vietnamese refugees used to be common, but now we are finding that Afghans and Iraqis are seeking solace in Australia's stable environment.

The author's argue that the main damage of refugee flows is in neighbouring countries who have to deal with the massive influx which often serves as a recruitment point for terror and militia groups, as well as radicalising the local populations in support of their neighbours.

The authors use Africa as an example with Rwanda's troubles leading to Hutu refugee flows into the Congo as Tutsi militia invaded Rwanda back from Uganda. Two years later the disturbances led to civil war in the Congo.

These are linked to the radicalisation of neighbouring populations and the appearance of terrorism which moves outside of the boundaries of the original conflict. For instance militant Hezbollah was originally in response to the civil war in Lebanon, but in the past had hit international targets through terror operations.

Iraq is composed of three fairly significant ethnic groups; Sunni, Shiite and Kurd, all of which of have large populations in other countries. It is likely that the nation-state boundaries will either dissolve in secession, with the Kurds the most likely candidate, or neighbouring nations will be prompted by a self-serving government or radical populations to intervene. Something Iran is doing already, but this could involved the whole region from Turkey, to Saudi Arabia to Bahrain.

Policy Prescriptions

Byman and Pollack argue that the US, Europe and Asia should;

• Persuade Iraq's neighbours not to intervene. The authors point out the difficult of coercing the Sauds and Kuwaitis, as well as some compromise needed with Iran to limit, rather than stop their meddling.
• Avoid picking factional winners. The current strong local leaders are rarely the ultimate winners. For instance the Taliban which ran Afghanistan didn't exist when Russia chose to support Najibullah.
• Keep the Kurds from seceding. This could cause wider conflict in Turkey and Iran if the Kurds decide to become a nation-state. The authors argue this may require more economic aid to the Iraqi Kurds
• Maintain the borders. This includes stemming the flow of refugees, militia, foreign invaders and terrorists. The point of this policy is keep the violence in Iraq and stop it spilling over into a wider regional conflict and civil war.

The conclusion by Byman and Pollack is a depressing one as the point out that no nation has managed to stop the spillover effects of civil war. The only way a civil war has been stopped in the past by outside coercion was by massive injection of military power. This is the Bosnian intervention. With Iraq's population it is likely that 450,000 troops would be needed; something that is beyond US power, if not the combined power of the globe's wealthiest nations.

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