Australia deployed light infantry as part of a United Nations force to East Timor which it led. Indonesia lost its political fight in East Timor and withdrew KOPASSUS and TNI support for the pro-Indonesian militia. Australia's force structure was unobtrusive and non-abrasive. Tellingly though, Australia secured the political environment before the military deployment. This can inform Australian policy on Iraq and Afghanistan.

Australian force structure is geared toward expeditionary deployment. The Great and Powerful Friends doctrine of foreign policy and a deficit in Australian projection power have led to this outcome. Australia has also been a strong supporter of United Nation initiatives, deploying in all manner of UN projects and aims.

The United States in comparison is unrivalled in hard power, projection, ability to sustain that power and technological might. The United States can destroy an opposing nation-state's military and infrastructure in the blink of an eye. Reducing the nation-state to a name only and without any reach of civil order influence.

This poses an issue for neo-conservative doctrine which contains regime-change through military action as one of its political tools. As the US found in Iraq and Afghanistan, and Israel has discovered in Lebanon, nation-states are relatively fragile technologies.

Reducing the power of a nation-state means that many of the responsibilities and services of a nation-state will be replaced by non-state entities. Interestingly they are normally social in origin rather than commercial.

This has given a huge opening for Islamic non-state actors who bind their politics, militancy, social services, legal systems and political morality (ie no corruption) with religion. This is proving a very powerful organisational method. The West in Iraq, Afghanistan, Lebanon and Palestine is having difficulty innovating beyond these non-state actors.

Brian E. Humphreys writes in an article titled; Learning From Hezbollah ;

Whatever the objective truth of Hezbollah's motives, its many supporters in southern Lebanon believe fervently that it is their organisation, not an Iranian surrogate.

Few if any American units in Iraq have achieved anything close to this level of success in winning support of the local population.

Of more concern is the fact that few Iraqi security units or political leaders appear to have done so either.

The Australian conservative-nationalists, in as far as they do follow neo-conservatism when it was the foreign policy fashion, deployed Australian forces to East Timor and the Solomons.

East Timor was particularly informative as it required the balancing of Australian projection power as both a threat and deterrent, as well as Australian diplomatic influence with Indonesia and the United Nations.

Australia did not move to deploy until it had done the soft power diplomacy where Indonesia asked for the UN to bring in a force to East Timor. This would not have been possible if Australia did not have a credible military capability in the North.

Australia's lack of close in support power may have helped its cause in East Timor. Where the US has conducted Fallujah like operations and Israel has assassinated Hezbollah and Hamas leaders with missiles from Helicopters, the militia situation in East Timor was quickly brought under control by the Australian and New Zealand light infantry.

John Robb quotes from the FMFM 1-A ;

As a practical matter, the forces of most of our non-state, Fourth Generation adversaries will be all or mostly irregular light infantry. Few Fourth Generation non-state actors can afford anything else ...

Light infantry is the best counter to irregulars because it offers...

First, good light infantry (unless badly outnumbered) can usually defeat almost any force of irregulars it is likely to meet. It can do this in a "man to man" fight that avoids the "Goliath" image.

... it can enjoy the same mobility as the irregulars (enhanced, as necessary by helicopters or attached motor vehicles).

Second, when it uses force, light infantry can be far more discriminating than other combat arms and better avoid collateral damage. This is critically important at both the mental and moral levels.

East Timor had a political element to it though. Indonesia had given up politically on East Timor. Since the militia were backed by KOPASSUS and the TNI there was no political will in Jakarta to maintain that aggravation in East Timor.

After the initial tensions Australia's long haul transport system became more important as the deployment was maintained in its low tempo state.

It was mainly by a mix of good diplomatic and military management that East Timor was a success as well as a bit of luck due to Australia's force structure. We didn't have the super-hard power that the US or Israel does.

Even with the recent civil strife and tensions between the East Timorese President and Prime Minister with the Army and Police splitting on ethnic lines, this wasn't a result of pushing back against the Australian presence.

This wasn't a david vs goliath political situation. It was an internal political tension that came to a head over ethnic regional division, personal political ambitions and an ambiguous constitution on executive power.

This does not help the United States in Iraq much as the divisions being drawn are political, cultural and religious now. Throw in a great dollop of lawlessness and it quickly becomes unmanageable.

However, this does inform Australian policy on Iraq. We should leave the country. Australia is not in a position with its forces, political will, or money spent to affect the outcome of Iraq in being a secure liberal democratic nation.

It is beyond our capabilities and political will.

Afghanistan is a different issue. There our military forces of the SASR, Commando battalions and RARs can make a difference in eradicating the Taliban and Al Queda from the country in what is a low tempo conflict.

Australian military capability is perfect for this scenario. The Australian Army is well known for its ability and effectiveness to act independently in small units for long periods of time.

This would also give the military and foreign policy a mission statement that is concrete, achievable and easily explained to the Australian citizenry. It would also be popular in public opinion.

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