Two inbred drongoes in Britain decided to get married and Australia thinks the Republican debate is revived? The truth is the Republican debate has been a permanent part of the Australian political landscape. The real story has been how the existing political class has managed to keep Australia from being a Republic. The reason the Republic debate has persisted through Australian history is because it is a superior form of government that is based on merit and popular will rather than hereditary blood lines and implied arbitrary power.

The Polls Are In! - The Woman's Weekly Loves It

Our good old anglospheric Liberal government, founded by a royalist sycophant , was quick to chime in;

The Australian Government has offered its best wishes to Prince Charles and Camilla Parker Bowles on their plans to marry.

Anti-royalism is a valid Republican sentiment. For many years it was only sentiment keeping the republican debate alive. All the pee-cee and be nice to people doesn't stand with an institution that avoids the accountability of merit. The monarchy is a repugnant institution to its very core. No equitable and egalitarian society or culture can support a hereditary political class that is above the democratic will of the people.

The "Bearded Men" screwed up. Big time. They left us with a Constitution that is a fiction - a wet noodle. Other than a popularly elected Senate, it carries none of the innovations of the American Constitution which was ratified one hundred and twenty years before the Australian Constitution. Our constitution carries none of the political advances of the enlightenment. It is a caricature of a sixteenth century constitution, rather than a post-enlightenment aspirational political document.

The Rickety Old Bridge

The Australian Constitution is a fiction. We all close our eyes, cover our ears and speak softly of it to maintain that fiction. We pretend our formal constitution matters and proclaim that Whitlam and Lang were aberrations, that the entropy of power toward an anti-federalist Canberra is "natural". We are as complicit in the fiction as the politicians. We swallow the triumphalism of Federation and the obstructionism of our current political masters as they covet more and more power to themselves.

A good analogy for the Australian Constitution is an old bridge. The only bridge that exists. One that has traffic - that was unthought of when it was designed and built - streaming across it in ever larger numbers. The bridge has deep design flaws, physical weaknesses and construction faults. Partly through the design/build companies own ignorance and partly by their own limiting choice.

Think of the Harbour Bridge, without any of the grace, architecture, engineering or construction quality. Even though the constitutional bridge was built in 1901, it skipped the innovations of 1787 and instead used the materials, knowledge and technology from the 1600's. This bridge would be like an old rickety country bridge in great danger of being washed away by a flash flood of tyranny. An old rickety bridge trying to carry the volume of high speed traffic the coathanger does. Where the only way people can use the bridge is by closing their eyes and repeating over and over, "the bridge doesn't matter, the bridge doesn't matter, the bridge doesn't matter."

A new bridge needs to be built. One which incorporates the constitutional innovations of the enlightenment and post-modern society. One that reflects the aspirations and progressive values of the people. One that defines an unwavering framework for freedom, liberty and equity.

The Debate Never Left Us

With the inbreeds getting engaged, John Warhurst of ARM made the point;

The national chairman of the Australian Republican Movement, John Warhurst, says the news should prompt Australians to again consider pursuing the idea of becoming a republic.

Republicans have been a permanent part of the landscape. They have been thwarted by obstructionists like William Wentworth, Henry Parkes, Samuel Griffiths, Alfred Deakin, Edmund Barton through to 1999's John Howard. The Westminster system allows undue power to reside with the Executive. This is informally the Prime Minister. The poor separation of powers means the Executive not only makes the laws, but also funds those same laws and then implements them. With faction discipline the notion of impugned dictator - or a government based on the arbitrary will of an individual - is a very close description.

The Westminster system and party discipline combine to replicate the role of the King in the Prime Minister. A position capable of taking the country to war without Parliamentary approval. A position capable of enforcing indefinite detention and leaving an individual at the whim and mercy of a minister. A position capable of abusing the public purse to entrench their power, position and glory.

The politicians of the current major factions do not really want a Republic. If they are for a Republic, they merely want the Queen of England removed from the constitution. Paul Keating and John Howard both feared their power as Prime Minister being challenged or reduced with a popularly elected Governor-General. With the absolute power the Prime Minister fields there is little reason for politicians in the major parties to support any Republic other than a minimal one which leaves the current system intact.

This is the form that obstructionism has taken, once those in power see the unadultered access to the vehicle of state that exists, they see little reason to diffuse that near absolute power. Republicanism has been obstructed in this country by those that betray the rational for the passions of absolute greed and unencumbered power.

The Republican debate will always be on, it is a superior form of government - unfortunately, the debate has too often been defined by the time of day the obstructionists are willing to give it.

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Another site that many of us frequent has held MFCs (music fun challenge) and WFCs (writing fun challenge). The equivalent in the political sphere is constitution writing. It is also an area that Australia has not excelled at. So in the interests of increasing Australian constitution writing skills, South Sea Republic is holding an informal and friendly competition to write a constitution, or part of a constitution.

The "Bearded Men" pretty much botched the Australian constitution, and the states haven't improved much either. Queensland recently rewrote their constitution into one document and it was pretty ordinary too. States like Tasmania, South Australia and Western Australia still do not have one, the sovereignty for their government system is spread across numerous Acts, including British ones.

So we need more constitution writing skills in Australia.

South Sea Republic is heavily constitutionally focused, so it makes sense that a fun challenge involve constitution drafting and writing skills. So this is your challenge;

Write a constitution or part of constitution for an ideal government.

The parts can include;

• Executive
• Legislative
• Judicial
• Preamble
• Governor-General
• States
• Rights
• anything else

It doesn't have to be complete, it can be as small or as large as you like. It does not have to be perfect, innovate ideas to solve constitutional and procedural issues will be highly valued.

You can also enter as many entries as you like and is not limited to Australian entries either. Rewrite the American constitution, Swiss constitution, or Iraqi constitution ... anything is fair game.

End of May is the cut-off date.

It occurred to me that a grand contribution to NaCFCWriMo would be a democratic Chinese constitution. Alas, no sooner did it occur to me than I realised what an overwhelmingly difficult task it would be. 1.3 billion people, 23 provinces (more or less), 5 autonomous regions, 57 years of communist rule, regional GDP per capita that ranges from Portugal to Kyrgystan, environmental and demographic problems, a colelction of scary border and sovereignty disputes, and the world's oldest continuous bureaucratic tradition. The only way to govern such a massive and diverse polity is surely with a very light central hand and a lot of regional leeway; but to offer such leeway is to risk the less eager provinces, such as Tibet, declaring independence, a result which would enrage the nationalist majority.

Working with existing constitutional arrangements is also difficult; in many ways they are still works in progress. Deng Xiaoping, for instance, though widely acknowledged in his time as China's political leader, never held the Presidency or Premiership. Hu Jintao and Wen Jiabao seem to have settled into Head of State / Head of Government roles in public, but the actual mechanisms and everyday policy decisions remain murky manoeverings amongst party commitees. The PRC does have a parliament, which could be given teeth instead of a rubber stamp.

Looking for inspiration in the constitutional arrangements of the Republic of China (nowadays Taiwan), the explicit document from 1928 is an interesting one, containing Five Branches of Government , including one for examining civil servants. However the constitutional arrangements in practice have been rather turbulent ones, with the constitution being suspended in Taiwan from 1947 to 1988, and progressive local parties considering it now rather out of date. Seeing as it was written with the land mass of late Qing dynasty China in mind, including claims to now independent (Outer) Mongolia, you can see their point.

Given all this, and though I remain confident in future government of, for and by the Chinese people, I have left a democratic constitution as an exercise for the alert reader, and simply changed the front page poll .

Current parliamentary systems provide legislative and executive capability but do not strike a perfect balance of representing the will of the people, while providing effective and efficient government.

Introduction

There has been an ebb and flow for generations in opinion about the forms and benefits of legislative bicameralism and the balance of power between the legislative and executive branches of government.

A parliamentary system should:

• Represent the will of the people by providing a forum in which the various views of the electorate can be presented with appropriate weight;
• Provide reasonable legislative review that resists arbitrary change and limits any tyranny;
• Deliver an effective Executive.

A solution has never been implemented that appropriately balances these interlocking requirements, here is a suggestion.

Legislative Review

A bicameral parliament is the only demonstrated mechanism that provides sufficient legislative review within a democracy. The composition, size and responsibilities of the two houses needs to be determined.

The Will of the People

The will of the people should be manifested through a legislative assembly that best represents the different and complex viewpoints of the electorate. To achieve this representation, the legislative assembly should be constructed utilising proportional representation and preferential balloting.

It is clear from Senate elections in Australia that 12 representatives in an electoral district is too few to overcome the inertia of the major parties, and from Knesset elections in Israel that 120 is far too many. A balance needs to be struck that permits minority viewpoints to be heard without paralysing the legislative process.

The Role of Women in the Political Process

Although universal suffrage swept most of the democratic world early last century, essentially every aspect of political process from pre-selection through election to the operation of parliament has been designed and developed by men competing with other men. When women run for public office they do not share a level playing field in this mans game, and the female public by and large only have the opportunity to vote for which male should represent them.

To fully enfranchise women I propose (a) that the legislative assembly consist of equal numbers of men and women; and (b) that election should be gender-specific - men should vote for men and women for women.

Executive Power

There is a valid line of logic that a government needs a mandate, and pretty much any mandate is better than no mandate at all. To achieve this, systems for electing executive positions typically disavow proportional representation and electorates have one member and may not provide preferential balloting.

If the legislative assembly inherently represents the will of the people through proportional representation, then executive power - the role of government (including opposition) - should be vested in the Senate, with an electoral system that ensures that at any given time it should be dominated by one of the major parties.

The Composition of the Legislative Assembly

The total electorate should be divided into five regions of equal population, divided as much as possible between dissimilar interests, such as urban versus rural and regional Australia; and haves versus have nots. The regions need not be physically contiguous.

Each electoral region should elect 30 representatives, 15 men and 15 women, for a total of 150. Voting should be by preferential balloting, providing the opportunity for minority viewpoints to be heard where they represent more than 6% of generally held opinion.

A Legislative Bill should obviously require a majority of votes to pass, however a discussion would be worthwhile to analyse if an absolute majority or a 60%-or-so super-majority would be an improvement over the more usual relative majority.

The Composition of the Senate

Each state and territory should divide their total electorate by the number of allocated Senate seats to elect one representative in each region. Preferential balloting should be utilised to allow for gradual change in the balance of power between several major parties.

To maximise effectiveness a Senate Bill would require a relative majority of 50% to pass.

Conclusion

This proposed political structure incorporates only a small number of subtle changes to the current Australian system, with significant potential benefits. Attempting to implement them at a federal level would require a constitutional amendment to be proposed by a Government and then accepted by the people through a referendum. With no established precedent that is virtually impossible.

State and territory legislatures offer a more suitable proving ground since, within some limits, changes can be instituted through legislation alone and have far less reaching effects.

We would be a republic now if the elite and the people could agree on a way to appoint the president. The polls consistently show that the Australian people wish to elect the president. Repeated statements by the government and opposition show the elite rejects the idea of popular election.

Looking for a way to resolves this, I thought about British Columbia, Ontario and the Netherlands. All of them are using Citizens Assemblies, randomly elected, to deal with electoral reform.

My idea is to elect a ceremonial president by the same process. Chapter 4 is part of a complete constitution which is still a work in progress. So is the explanatory memo, but that's another story.

Contrary to elite mythology, writing down the rules for a parliamentary system is actually easy, so easy it is actually the norm to which Australia, Britain, Canada and New Zealand are the exceptions. Even within the UK, the Scotland Act and the Government of Wales Act have written rules for electing and dismissing the First Minister in the two devolved governments.

I've pulled ideas from many places and tried to write them in a common style. The presidential council is an example. Most republican proposals say the senior state governor. That could be a real problem in any state either abolishes its governor or makes it an elective position. The council model followed by Ireland and Iceland is a better idea.

The sections aren't numbered because this is still a work in progress. There is one remaining title to Chapter 4 which will deal with issues like treaty-making, defence, and public appointments. So here is Chapter 4 of an imaginary constitution.

Chapter 4 The Executive
Title 1 The President of the Republic

Executive Power
The executive power of the Republic is vested in the President of the Republic and extends to the execution and maintenance of this Constitution, and of the laws of the Republic and is exercisable only with, and in accordance with, the advice of Ministers responsible to the National Assembly.

The President
The President of the Republic-

a is the Head of State;

b must uphold, defend and respect the Constitution as the supreme law of the Republic;

c promotes the unity of the nation and the advancement of the Republic; and

d takes precedence over all other persons in the Republic.

Powers and functions of the President
(1) The President has the powers entrusted by the Constitution and the laws, including those necessary to perform the functions of Head of State.

(2) The President is responsible for -

a assenting to and signing Bills;

b summoning the National Assembly, the Senate or the Parliament to an extraordinary meeting to conduct special business;

c dissolving the National Assembly in terms of Chapter 3, Title 1;

d dissolving both the National Assembly and the Senate Deadlocked Bills;

e making any appointments that the Constitution or the laws require the President to make;

f appointing commissions of inquiry;

g proclaiming a referendum as required by law;

h receiving and recognising foreign diplomatic and consular deputies;
i appointing ambassadors, plenipotentiaries, and diplomatic and consular deputies;

j pardoning or reprieving offenders and remitting any fines, penalties or forfeitures; and

k conferring honours.

(3) The President must act on the advice of the Executive Council, the Prime Minister or the appropriate Minister who are collectively and individually responsible to the National Assembly for the advice they tender to the President.
(4) The Parliament may make laws with respect to the exercise of the executive power.
(5) The President is entitled to request from the Executive Council, the Prime Minister or another Minister as appropriate, information on any particular matter relating to the government that is relevant to the performance or exercise of the President's functions or powers.

Election of President
(1) Whenever necessary to fill a vacancy, a Citizens Assembly must elect an Australian to be the President. A Citizens Assembly for the election of the President must be convened not less than 2 months before the end of the presidential term.

(2) The method of election must be the single transferable vote and the ballot must be secret.

(3) An election to fill a casual vacancy in the office of President must be held at a time and on a date determined by the Justice Chancellor, but not more than 30 days after the vacancy occurs.

(4) The President must, on the day of election, be capable of being elected as a deputy or senator.

(5) A candidate for President may be nominated by any political party represented in the National Assembly or the Senate or by one-tenth of the delegates to the Citizens Assembly.

Assumption of office by the President
(1) A new President must assume office within 14 days by swearing or affirming faithfulness to the Republic and obedience to the Constitution in accordance with Schedule 2.

(2) The oath or affirmation must be made before the Citizens Assembly which elected the President or a person authorised by the Citizens Assembly to administer the oath or affirmation.

Term of office of President
(1) The President's term of office is 5 years from the day on which the President assumes office.

(2) No person may hold office as President for more than two terms.

Removal from office of President
(1) A Citizens Assembly, by absolute majority, may remove the President from office only on the grounds of -

a a serious violation of the Constitution or the law;

b serious misconduct; or

c incapacity to perform the functions of office.

(2) The National Assembly or the Senate, by absolute majority, may convene a Citizens Assembly for the purpose of removing the President from office.

Suspension from office of President
(1) The President may be suspended from office by the Executive Council, pending action by the Parliament, for --

a a serious violation of the Constitution or the law (including refusal or failure to act in accordance with the advice of the Cabinet, the Prime Minister or the appropriate Minister, or acting, or purporting to act contrary to, or without, any such advice);

b serious misconduct; or

c incapacity to perform the functions of office.

(2) A decision by the Executive Council to suspend the President from office does not require any assent by the President.

(3) If the President is suspended from office, the Prime Minister must immediately inform the Speaker, the Convenor and the Chief Justice of the suspension and of the reasons for it.

(4) If the President is suspended from office the Speaker and the Convenor must, as soon as practicable, call a meeting of the Parliament at which the matter of the suspension must be the first item of business after any formal business and, if necessary, the election of a Speaker or Convenor.

(5) The suspension may be lifted at any time by both the National Assembly and the Senate.

(6)  Unless within 14 sitting days of the suspension, the National Assembly or the Senate decides, by absolute majority, to convene a Citizens Assembly for the special business of removing the President from office, the suspension ceases at the end of that time.

Presidential Council
(1) When the President is suspended from office, absent from Australia or otherwise unable to fulfil the duties of President, or during a vacancy in the office of President, the powers and functions of the President must be exercised and performed by the Presidential Council.

 (2) The Presidential Council is composed of the Chief Justice, the Speaker of the National Assembly, and the Convenor of the Senate.

 (3) The next senior Justice of the High Court must act as a member of the Presidential Council in the place of the Chief Justice on any occasion on which the office of Chief Justice is vacant or on which the Chief Justice is unable to act.

 (4) The Acting Speaker of the National Assembly must act as a member of the Presidential in the place of the Speaker of the National Assembly on any occasion on which the office of Speaker of the National Assembly is vacant or on which the Speaker is unable to act.

 (5) The Acting Convenor of the Senate must act as a member of the Presidential Council in the place of the Convenor of the Senate on any occasion on which the office of Convenor of the Senate is vacant or on which the Speaker is unable to act.

 (6) A Presidential Council may act by any two of their number and may act despite a vacancy in their membership.

 (7) A Presidential Council has the responsibilities, powers and functions of the President.

 (8) Before assuming the responsibilities, powers and functions of the President, the members of the Presidential Council must swear or affirm faithfulness to the Republic and obedience to the Constitution, in accordance with Schedule 2.

(9) A member of the Presidential Council must not exercise or perform any of the other powers and functions of their offices, except that the Chief Justice may complete any proceedings actually commenced before them unless other suitable arrangements can be made.

(10) The Parliament may provide for the designation of members of the Presidential Council in any contingency which is not provided for by this section.

Executive Decisions
(1) A decision by the President must be in writing if it is taken in terms of this Constitution or the laws or has legal consequences.

(2) Every decision by the President must be countersigned by the Cabinet member responsible for the decision.

(3) Proclamations, regulations and other instruments of subordinate legislation must be accessible to the public.

(4) The Parliament may provide the manner in which, and the extent to which, instruments mentioned in subsection (3) must be tabled in the Parliament; and approved by the Parliament.

State Matters
The Parliament may provide for the exercise and performance of state powers and functions by the President under the Constitution of any state where that Constitution so provides.

Commander-in-Chief
The command in chief of the defence forces of the Republic is vested in the President.

Terms and conditions of employment of President
(1) The President must not hold any office or position or engage in any calling other than that of, or an office or position associated with, his office as President, except with the consent of the Executive Council.

 (2) Subject to this Constitution, the terms and conditions of employment of the President are fixed by law.

 (3) Except with the consent of the President the terms and conditions of employment of the President must not be changed to his detriment during their term of office, and any law that changes them must recite the terms of the consent.

Title 2 The Executive of the Republic

Composition of the Executive Council
(1) There must be an Executive Council of the Republic to advise the President in the government of the Republic.

(2) The Executive Council is composed of the Prime Minister and the other Ministers, including any Vice-Ministers and Junior Ministers.

(3) A reference in any law to the President-in-Council or to an Order-in-Council is a reference to the President acting with, and in accordance with, the advice of the Executive Council and to an order made by the President acting with, and in accordance with, the advice of the Executive Council.

Meetings of Executive Council
(1) The President must preside over the Executive Council.

(2) However, if, for good reason, the President cannot attend, a member designated by the President must preside; or if the President has not designated a member to preside, the most senior member present must preside.

(3) Any matter decided by the Executive Council in the President's absence must be presented to the President for assent.

(4) The Executive Council must not deal with any business at a meeting unless it has been summoned to meet by the President's authority; and at least 2 members, other than any presiding member, are present for the entire meeting.

(5) The President may introduce any matter for discussion to the Executive Council.

(6) The President may convene meetings of the Executive Council but must convene a meeting when requested by the Prime Minister to do so.

(7) A meeting of the Executive Council must not be convened except by the President.

(8) The Justice Chancellor must be present at meetings of the Executive Council and when matters are presented to the President of the Republic for assent.

(9) The Ombudsman also has the right to attend these meetings and presentations.

(10) If the Justice Chancellor objects to the lawfulness of a proposed decision of the Executive Council, the Justice Chancellor must make an objection, with reasons, on the matter. If the objection is ignored, the Justice Chancellor must have the objection entered in the minutes of the Executive Council and, where necessary, must report the matter to the National Assembly (together with any information in relation to the case the Justice Chancellor considers appropriate to include); and if the decision in question has not been made, may stay the decision until the National Assembly considers the matter.

(11) Subject to this section, the procedure of the Executive Council must be determined by the Council.

Choice of the Prime Minister
(3) When a Prime Minister is to be appointed, the question of the designation must be the first matter for consideration, after any formal business and any election of a Speaker, on the next sitting day. If the National Assembly is not in session when a Prime Minister is to be appointed, the Speaker must immediately call a meeting of the National Assembly.

(1) If one of the following events occurs, the National Assembly must within the time allowed designate one of its members for appointment as Prime Minister. The designation of the next Prime Minister by a vote of no confidence satisfies the requirements of this subsection.

(2) The events are-  
 
a the first meeting of the National Assembly after a general election;
 
b the resignation of the Prime Minister;
 
c the office of Prime Minister becoming vacant otherwise than by resignation.
 
(3) The time allowed is 28 days beginning on the day on which the event in question occurs; but-
 
a if another of those events occurs within the time allowed, that time is extended for a further 28 days beginning on the day on which the new event occurs, and
 
b the time allowed ends when the President appoints a person as Prime Minister.
 
(4) The Speaker must recommend to the President the appointment of a Prime Minister who is designated by the National Assembly.

(5) If the Prime Minister resigns after a general election but before the first meeting of the National Assembly, the Speaker must recommend to the President the appointment of that deputy who is most likely to command the confidence of an absolute majority in the National Assembly, pending designation by the National Assembly.

Votes of no confidence
(1) If the National Assembly, by absolute majority, passes a vote of no confidence in the Prime Minister, the Prime Minister must, within 7 days, either resign or advise the President to dissolve the National Assembly.

(2) If the National Assembly, by absolute majority, passes a vote of no confidence in the Cabinet excluding the Prime Minister, the Prime Minister must advise the President to reconstitute the Cabinet.

(3) Every motion for a vote of no confidence in the Prime Minister must designate the next Prime Minister.

(4) If the National Assembly passes a vote of no confidence in the Prime Minister and the Prime Minister does not earlier either resign or advise the President to dissolve the National Assembly, the person designated the next Prime Minister becomes the Acting Prime Minister, pending appointment by the President, 7 days after the vote.

Appointment of Prime Minister and other Ministers
(1) The President may, on the advice of the Prime Minister -

a appoint a deputy or senator to be a Minister; and

b terminate the appointment.

(2) The President may, on the recommendation of the Prime Minister -

a appoint a deputy or senator to be a Vice-Minister or junior Minister; and

b terminate the appointment.

Acting Prime Minister
(1) When the Prime Minister is absent from the Republic or otherwise unable to fulfil the duties of Prime Minister, or during a vacancy in the office of Prime Minister, an office-bearer in the order below acts as Prime Minister:

    a     The Deputy Prime Minister designated by the President on advice of the Prime Minister;

    b     A Minister designated by the President on the advice of the Prime Minister;

    c     A Minister designated by the President on the advice of the Cabinet;

    d     The Speaker, until the National Assembly designates one of its other members.

(2) An Acting Prime Minister has the responsibilities, powers and functions of the Prime Minister.

(3) Before assuming the responsibilities, powers and functions of the Prime Minister, the Acting Prime Minister must swear or affirm faithfulness to the Republic and obedience to the Constitution, in accordance with Schedule 2.

Term of office of Ministers
(1) The appointment of the Prime Minister takes effect on the day specified in the instrument of appointment and terminates if they -

a cease to be a deputy;

b have their appointment terminated by the President;

c resign by writing delivered to the President; or

d when the National Assembly first meets after a general election;

e or (in the case of an Acting Prime Minister) when the Prime Minister resumes the powers and functions of his or her office.

(2) The appointment of a Minister, Vice-Minister or junior Minister  takes effect on the day specified in the instrument of appointment and terminates if they -

a cease to be a deputy or senator;

b have their appointment terminated by the President;

c resign by writing delivered to the President; or

d when the appointment of the Prime Minister terminates.

(3) A Prime Minister whose appointment is terminated must continue in office until a new Prime Minister is appointed if so requested by the President.

(4) A Minister whose appointment is terminated must continue in office until a new Minister is appointed if so requested by the President or the Prime Minister.

Conduct of ministerial business
(1) The President, in accordance with the advice of the Prime Minister, may, by instrument in writing, assign to the Prime Minister or any other Minister responsibility for the conduct (subject to this Constitution and any Act) of any ministerial business, including responsibility for the administration of any department of the Government.

(2) Ministers are responsible collectively and individually to the National Assembly for the exercise of their powers and the performance of their functions.

(3) Ministers must act in accordance with the Constitution; and provide the Parliament with full and regular reports concerning matters under their control.

Oath or affirmation of Ministers
(1) A member of the Executive Council must, before assuming office, swear or affirm faithfulness to the Republic and obedience to the Constitution in accordance with Schedule 2.

(2) The Prime Minister and the other Ministers must, before assuming office, swear or affirm faithfulness to the Republic and obedience to the Constitution in accordance with Schedule 2.

(3) An oath or affirmation must be made before the President or a person authorised by the President to administer the oath or affirmation.

Remuneration of Ministers
The Prime Minister and the other Ministers must be paid such remuneration as may be fixed by or under Act.

This article introduces the Copernican paradigm. The Copernican Group advocates establishing an Australian republic by replacing the Queen with a popularly-elected Head of State. The Copernican Gazette (PDF) was published earlier in 2006 to convey the proposals of the group and they are looking for replies to publish.

This article is to introduce members of the South Sea Republic to the Copernican paradigm. The Copernican paradigm was discovered independently by five contributors to republican debate. The five agreed to collaborate and draw strength from their different backgrounds and interests.

The Copernican Group advocates establishing an Australian republic by replacing the Queen with a popularly-elected Head of State with ceremonial powers and a power to appoint and dismiss the Governor-General and state Governors with limited discretion.

Other proposals implicitly merge the roles of Governor-General and Head of State - a superfluous step which has served only to divide republicans into minimalist and direct-election camps. The Copernicans have found a better way, retaining proven constitutional checks and balances, while delivering true sovereignty to the people through their elected Head of State. A model that changes the least and offers the most is best model to put to the Australian people.

The name Copernican was chosen because of fundamental difference between this new approach and other proposals. The original Copernican paradigm overturned centuries of assumption and doctrine to allow us to observe the universe in a new and more realistic way. The Copernican Group believes that there are unconscious presumptions that have created an unresolvable three-cornered contest between monarchists, minimalist republicans and direct election advocates.

It is only in this incomplete view of our constitutional system would one assume a future republic must involve "the Queen and Governor-General replaced by a president". But that is exactly the formulation of both the 1999 referendum question and models that directly elect the Governor-General. Prof. John Power calls this the "merger assumption."

Sure, it may make intuitive sense to follow this formula. But that's exactly the mistake that ancient and medieval astronomers made when they put the Earth at the centre of the universe. Republican attempts to re-engineer the Governor-General into a president under Australian conditions must inevitably resolve a range of tangential issues, which make such a project unviable. The real objective is to make Australia independent of the Queen and so long as the focus remains on the Governor-General, that goal becomes evermore distant.

As Copernicus demonstrated conclusively, intuitive sense sometimes fails us. He challenged the age-old assumptions and took a new interpretation of the heavens beyond the imagination of his fellows. Likewise, republicans will find a solution when they move their technical focus from the Governor-General to the Queen. After all, the Queen is the fulcrum of the whole debate.

Copernicus did not postulate a more complex view of the universe but a simpler and more elegant one. For an Australian republic, this should be as simple as codifying the one actual duty left to the Queen - the appointment of the representative governor on the advice of the prime minister or premier. To complete the codification, the constitution would vest executive authority in the head of state, but reserve the actual exercise of power in the Governor-General or state governor as required. This would allow the relationship between the Governor-General and Prime Minister, including the exercise of reserve powers, to continue to be guided by unwritten convention.

Absent of real executive power, the new head of state may be directly elected and yet above politics. Separate from the business of government, they cannot implement policy and thus any electoral campaign cannot be based upon promises or establishing a mandate. The fear of a popular President taking power away from the parliament is completely dissipated when the Copernican Paradigm is applied.

The Copernican Group is not an advocate of just one model. Last year members of the South Sea Republic read of the Honorary President Model ( http://www.southsearepublic.org/story/2005/7/3/154653/3937 ). The other named models are The Sovereignty Model and The Egalitarian Model. There is a model involving Council of State and another where the States have an active role in defining the Presidency.

The Copernicans are not automatically opposed to codification, but the paradigm has the unique advantage over other direct-election models in that codification is unnecessary. This gives republicans options. The conventions can be maintained as non-judiciable, unwritten rules that can evolve to suit changing political circumstances. Alternatively, we can make a case for codification, not because we have to constrain Presidential power, but because we'd like to constrain governmental power. In other words, we codify when it makes sense to codify. This is a process that will and should continue over the centuries, rather than completed in one hit.

Critics of the Copernicans have said they understate the amount of constitutional change necessary to achieve a republic. It is interesting that in no particular instance has any model been shown to be deficient in that regard. In reply, it can be pointed out that the amount of constitutional change absolutely necessary has been overstated by republican advocates. This has given monarchists the political ammunition to recast reform as radical social policy and promote themselves as the defenders of the constitutional system.

The Copernican Paradigm is redefining the republican debate. Minimalist and conservative republicans now have a supportable direct-election option that they can support. Codification is no longer required for a directly-elected presidency. The focus of the debate is returning to the Queen and the role of an Australian Head of State. Each of these developments is good news for republicans. More importantly it is good news for Australia.

The Copernican Gazette was published this earlier in 2006 to convey the proposals of the group forward and put the paradigm in the hands of every parliamentarian in Australia, state and federal. For the next issue of the Gazette we are looking for letters to publish to encourage debate on the paradigm, to identify difficulties and extend the range of designs and concepts already available. Read a copy of the Gazette (issue 1) here: http://www-personal.usyd.edu.au/~dlatimer/archive/Gazette-Issue1-Final.pdf .

REFERENCES

Copernican Information Page http://www.copernican.info

The Copernican Constitution http://www.quadrant.org.au/php/archive_details_list.php?article_id=1125

Honorary President Model http://www-personal.usyd.edu.au/~dlatimer/honpres/

Egalitarian Republic Model http://7gs.com/republic.html

Submissions to the Senate Republican Inquiry
Peter Carden: http://www.aph.gov.au/Senate/committee/legcon_ctte/completed_inquiries/2002-04/republic03/submission s/sub105.doc
David O'Brien: http://www.aph.gov.au/Senate/committee/legcon_ctte/completed_inquiries/2002-04/republic03/submission s/sub126.doc
Prof John Power: http://www.aph.gov.au/Senate/committee/legcon_ctte/completed_inquiries/2002-04/republic03/submission s/sub28a.doc

Malcolm Turnbull in 1998;

Our Constitution read in isolation provides a most misleading and inadequate description of our system of government. Is it too much to ask that our most important law should be written in a manner that makes sense to people who are not lawyers and politicians?

That is a strong statement which correctly identifies the biggest problem in Australian federal government and the strength of Australian Republicanism; its formal grounding in constitutional issues.

Yet this strength, the recognition that our constitutional arrangements are largely in court law, rather than the constitution itself, was politely ignored during the republican referendum.

Monarchists took what Turnbull called an ain't broke don't fix it "cave-man conservatism", while many influential republicans decided that a pragmatic stance of language change was best but no effort to address the problems in the constitution itself.

In 1992, during a speech to the National Press Club, Turnbull said;

.. some conservatives fail to come to terms with the debate. The most common defence of the monarchy is a shoulder shrugging 'If it ain't broke, don't fix it' cave-man conservatism.

Consider for a moment where human progress would be if that approach had been taken to art, literature, technology or politics?

The truth is that all human progress has been based on the desire to make something which is better.

Societies that have turned their back on social or political progress have invariably atrophied and collapsed.

That is a very Jeffersonian and Harpurian statement. It shows the republican belief that constitution is not only a progressive document which must match its people, rather than its political elite, but also that it must represent that maximal social and political achievement that is possible.

Thomas Jefferson covered this issue in great detail in a letter to Samuel Kercheval in 1816;

Some men look at constitutions with a sanctimonious reference, and deem them like the ark of the covenant, too sacred to be touched.

They ascribe to the men of the preceding age a wisdom more than human, and suppose what they did to be beyond amendment.

I knew that age well; I belonged to it, and labored with it.

It deserved well of its country. It was very like the present, but without the experience of the present; and forty years of experience in government is worth a century of book--reading; and this they would say themselves, were they to rise from the dead.

I am certainly not an advocate for frequent and untried changes in laws and constitutions.

I think moderate imperfections had better be borne with; because, when once known, we accommodate ourselves to them, and find practical means of correcting their ill effects.

But I know also, that laws and institutions must go hand in hand with the progress of the human mind.

As that becomes more developed, more enlightened, as new discoveries are made, new truths disclosed, and manners and opinions change with the change of circumstances, institutions must advance also, and keep pace with the times.

The colonial Australia at Federation, which was enthralled by its British ancestry and found its sense of meaning and purpose in the Commonwealth and under the Crown is long gone.

The same mindset which feared a popularly elected Head of State, a Bill of Rights and other constitutional innovations is also long gone.

People don't fully trust politicians, or Canberra meddling in constitutional affairs, and quite rightly too. At best it is mildly self-serving, at worst blatant. Despite the difficulty of constitutional amendment forced by the constitution, Australian referendum results have shown a distrust of Canberra, with very few making it across the line.

The referendum for Federation in 1899, given its low franchise, would not pass muster under today's constitutional arrangements.

One of the challenges for Australian Republicanism will be having public opinion come around to the viewpoint that the constitution can be trusted as a working document in the hands of republicans.

In the letter, Jefferson comes to a quite logical point of view, that of constitutional sunsetting;

And lastly, let us provide in our constitution for its revision at stated periods. What these periods should be, nature herself indicates.

By the European tables of mortality, of the adults living at any one moment of time, a majority will be dead in about nineteen years. At the end of that period, then, a new majority is come into place; or, in other words, a new generation.

Each generation is as independent as the one preceding, as that was of all which had gone before.

It has then, like them, a right to choose for itself the form of government it believes most promotive of its own happiness; consequently, to accommodate to the circumstances in which it finds itself, that received from its predecessors; and it is for the peace and good of mankind, that a solemn opportunity of doing this every nineteen or twenty years, should be provided by the constitution; so that it may be handed on, with periodical repairs, from generation to generation, to the end of time, if anything human can so long endure.

It is now forty years since the constitution of Virginia was formed. The same tables inform us, that, within that period, two--thirds of the adults then living are now dead.

Have then the remaining third, even if they had the wish, the right to hold in obedience to their will, and to laws heretofore made by them, the other two--thirds, who, with themselves, compose the present mass of adults?

If they have not, who has? The dead? But the dead have no rights. They are nothing; and nothing cannot own something. Where there is no substance, there can be no accident. This corporeal globe, and everything upon it, belong to its present corporeal inhabitants, during their generation.

They alone have a right to direct what is the concern of themselves alone, and to declare the law of that direction; and this declaration can only be made by their majority.

That majority, then, has a right to depute representatives to a convention, and to make the constitution what they think will be the best for themselves.

In that passage Jefferson shows his faith and trust in future generations.

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A quick look at the federal referendums as told by graphs in percent states and electors for.

Wikipedia has an excellent section on the Australian Referendums with plenty of data. These graphs are built from there. The Section 128 of the Australian Constitution states (abbreviated);

This Constitution shall not be altered except in the following manner:--

The proposed law for the alteration thereof must be passed by an absolute majority of each House of the Parliament, ...

And if in a majority of the States a majority of the electors voting approve the proposed law, and if a majority of all the electors voting also approve the proposed law, it shall be presented to the Governor-General ...

This is sometimes called the triple majority requirement. An absolute majority in parliament, the states and electors. Which is fair enough in a federalist system where it is expected that state electors would be precious of state's rights.

One of the questions is, does this triple majority make the constitution too difficult to alter, and is this why the High Court has taken to altering constitutional practice outside of referendums; and why the federal government elicits signed agreeance from the states to allow the federal government to oversee what are state responsibilities rather than constitutionally required federal responsibilities.

% States

The referendum which allowed the territories to vote did not allow the territories to count toward a state majority in referendums. So throughout federal referendum history, four of six states must pass a referendum.

The columns marked in green were successful. Note that there were a lot that achieved three out of six states in the for column, but that was not sufficient enough for a majority.

% Electors

Since 1977 the territories count toward the national total for referendums.

The green columns note the successful referendums. An interesting pattern is that many of the referendums hovered just under the fifty percent mark and some over. There are relatively few referendums that had the popular vote and not the state majority, but many of them had high 40s support and no state majority.

What is obvious, is that the referendums which did pass into constitutional change were very popular.

The small number of Australian states can make the results for referendums seem wildly for or against, despite the pattern of the elector's voting to be predominantly be mildly for or mildly against. This makes constitutional change that sparks ambivalence in even a small minority difficult to pass.

These two graphs alone don't answer the question's posed earlier in the article, a closer examination of what the referendum's were, on what topics, and what they represented is needed. I will deal with that in another article.

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I have broken the referendums down into the categories of centralisation, democracy, illiberalism and other in order to determine what the voters have been rejecting over the last century. It turns out that voters have been rejecting centralisation, overwhelmingly, with only three referendum being passed in the category, and twenty-four failing.

The referendum's have been categorised as centralisation, democracy, illiberalism and other. The centralisation category is where the federal government has sought to increase its responsibilities via referendum. This isn't to say they are all bad, for instance the referendum on civil aviation makes federalist sense, however many of the referendum for further centralisation did not.

The democracy category is taken as referendums that seeks to increase democratic franchise, democratic practices and ensure individual rights. For instance the referendums asking whether the territories should be counted toward the national majority in a referendum.

The illiberalism category is instances that remove rights or liberty under the liberal democratic system. An immediate candidate for that is the referendum to ban the communist party. The other category is anything that doesn't fit into the others.

• 1906 Senate Elections; Democracy - Passed
• 1910 State Debts; Centralisation - Passed
• 1910 Surplus Revenue; Centralisation - Failed
• 1911 Trade and Commerce; Centralisation - Failed
• 1911 Monopolies; Centralisation - Failed
• 1913 Trade and Commerce; Centralisation - Failed
• 1913 Corporations; Centralisation - Failed
• 1913 Industrial Matters; Centralisation - Failed
• 1913 Trusts; Centralisation - Failed
• 1913 Monopolies; Centralisation - Failed
• 1913 Railway Disputes; Centralisation - Failed
• 1919 Legislative Powers; Centralisation - Failed
• 1919 Monopolies; Centralisation - Failed
• 1926 Industry and Commerce; Centralisation - Failed
• 1926 Essential Services; Centralisation - Failed
• 1928 State Debts; Centralisation - Passed
• 1937 Aviation; Centralisation - Failed
• 1937 Marketing; Centralisation - Failed
• 1944 Emergency Powers for Reconstruction; Centralisation - Failed (included rights, but was a cynical attempt to bundle many prior failed referendums with freedom of speech and religion - hence centralisation)
• 1946 Social Services; Centralisation - Passed
• 1946 Marketing; Centralisation - Failed
• 1946 Industrial Employment; Centralisation - Failed
• 1948 Rents and Prices; Centralisation - Failed
• 1951 Communism; Illiberalism - Failed
• 1967 Parliament; Democracy - Failed
• 1967 Aboriginals; Democracy - Passed
• 1973 Prices; Centralisation - Failed
• 1973 Incomes; Centralisation - Failed
• 1974 Simultaneous Elections; Democracy - Failed
• 1974 Mode of Altering the Constitution; Democracy - Failed
• 1974 Democratic Elections; Democracy - Failed
• 1974 Local Government Bodies; Centralisation - Failed
• 1977 Simultaneous Elections; Democracy - Failed
• 1977 Senate Casual Vacancies; Democracy - Passed
• 1977 Referendums; Democracy - Passed
• 1977 Retirement of Judges; Democracy - Passed
• 1984 Terms of Senators; Democracy - Failed
• 1984 Interchange of Powers; Centralisation - Failed
• 1988 Parliamentary Terms; Democracy - Failed
• 1988 Fair Elections; Democracy - Failed
• 1988 Local Government; Centralisation - Failed
• 1988 Rights and Freedoms; Democracy - Failed
• 1999 Republic; Other - Failed
• 1999 Preamble; Other - Failed

I have put the Republic/Preamble in the other category as they didn't actually attempt to change any democratic practices. They were largely aesthetic change to the constitution. Several of the ones I have placed in the democracy category could just have easily gone into the centralisation one.

The results are;

• Centralisation; 3 for and 24 against.
• Democracy; 5 for and 10 against.
• Illiberalism; 1 against.
• Other; 2 against.

Or expressed graphically;

The most obvious conclusion that can be drawn is that Australia has rejected centralisation through referendums; yet somehow we have had ongoing centralisation in the Commonwealth government. That suggests Canberra found ways other than referendums to centralise power in the federal government.

The Democratic referendums have had higher success rates, which suggests that issues which do involve democratic issues are taken seriously and judged rationally by voters.

In the "Great Mistakes of Australian History" Clive Moore tackles the problem of federation and its choice in 1901. Moore argues that the constitutional process in the 19thC failed to engage with the Pacific and Asia, as well as made the constitution impervious to change. His final point is that political expediency and compromise between the colonies to get them to agree to federation has meant that the colonial boundaries are for ever cast in stone as states.

The first point was probably not socially possible. The 19thC had 'scientifically' convinced itself of the superiority of the white and Briton race. The fortress mentality that led to the White Australia policy was agreed upon by all sides of Australian politics.

It is an immoral chapter in Australian governmental and administrative history but was popular enough that it could not have been stopped. It was not a result of the constitution, as another article in the book notes, Darwin was setup to be a multi-ethnic Hong Kongese style trading centre, but hardening racial opinion never enabled it to achieve that in the late 19thC and early 20thC.

The other persistent myth, which Felix challenged, and has now been empirically determined to be false, is that the Australian Constitution is hard to change. The referendum is structured in a way to satisfy both the national and federal character. For instance:

• Majority in Senate - federal character
• Majority in House - national character
• Majority of popular vote - national character
• Majority of states (ie majority of popular vote in a majority of states) - federal character

This is a federation design choice. The majority of states may seem like an extra step too many, and I think it is, however, despite Australia's small number of states, it has not affected an outcome of a referendum. If a referendum has passed the popular vote, in all cases that I can recall it has all passed the state majority as well.

The high failure rate of Australian referendums has been because of the large number of referndums put forward that were for the increase of Commonwealth power. When the referendums are divided in this manner it becomes obvious that Australian voters were rejecting centralisation.

Moore notes that Canberra has found different ways to get around this:

This has been partially overcome by the occasional (though rare) successful referenda, and the use of the High Court to extend the federal government powers in a way never contemplated by the authors of the Constitution.

The latter is a significant issue. As can be seen by the following chart, the referendums for centralisation dropped off in volume in the second half of the twentieth century as the High Court's decisions and support for centralisation in Canberra has made referendums less necessary for Canberra to achieve the power it wants.

Moore's third complaint, that the states are forever fixed in geopolitical shape by the constitution is a good one. The value of a constitution is that it provides inter-generational stability and certainty of government. It removes the disruption of coups, violence for political power, or warfare between competing political domestic powers. The downside is that it is inherently inflexible by design.

This raises questions of balancing stability and fluidity. Normally when we talk of these areas we consider the stable technology to be constitutionalism while fluidity is provided by statutory legislation.

It is hard to give a national government statutory control over the States as complete centralisation would be a quick process rather than one that has been eroded over a century. The State control over Local Government carries similar pitfalls.

Yet if we look at Local Government it has remained fairly volatile as to its borders as administrative growth demands. For instance the Brisbane City Council and Penrith City Council were both created by the coalesence of several smaller municipal councils. I don't think anyone would doubt that the growing administrative challenges of those two cities made those amalgamations wide.

They are examples of a centralisation process. Not unlike the Federal Government's encroachment into the States. One of the purposes of Federation is to have powerful decentralised political entities that can rival the national government for power. This keeps overt centralisation, and the propensity for central tyranny and inefficiency in check.

Moore writes:

I am not advocating abolishing the states, having one national government and preserving all of the several hundred (629) local government units.

However, there are clearly regions within Australia that would work well as provincial government units. To name just a few: Wimmera, the Pilbara, Western NSW, New England (a referendum on the New England statehood was narrowly defeated in 1967), Queensland's South-East corner, the Darling Downs, the Cental Queensland coal-basin and Cape York would all function much better under their own regional governments.

In this area Moore is arguing for what Russell Trood called 'regionalism' in his Senate speech. This is a devolution of the states as administrative areas while maintaining their constitutional status in the federal constitution as states.

This minor form of devolution would still leave fairly powerful state bodies. Moore notes that the Brisbane City Council [BCC] has a similar budget to Tasmania and it is implied in Moore's article that he sees the provinces in being something of the BCC's size. He concludes with:

The ideal new government system would have a national government and around 30 provinces, designed for efficient regional operation, with a constitution capable of beind amended as circumstances change.

Moore's idea is not new either. The Prime Minister, John Howard, has remarked on radio:

"If we were starting Australia all over again, I wouldn't support having the existing state structure," he said. "I would actually support having a national government, and perhaps a series of regional governments having the power of, say, the Brisbane City Council.

"But we're not starting Australia all over again, and the idea of abolishing state governments is unrealistic."

Again the BCC is popping up, but it is the exception in Australia and it coincides with the seat of Queensland power - state parliament is in Brisbane as well. The main problems between the national and state governments are fiscal. Namely the vertical fiscal imbalance. This has been used to leverage all manner of control over the states, from the tied grants to the GST, the state's have had their independent fiscal footing removed from them.

John Gorton's and Gough Whitlam's view of federation was that the federal government made policy, funded that policy and the states existed as regional administrative units for the disbursement of federal funds in support of federal policy. This removes all capability of regional or provincial policy making from the states.

So the problem goes far deeper than the geographic boundaries of the states. Whenever these issues are discussed the problem becomes centralisation and Canberra's rapacious desire to be unitary rather than federal.

Incession and secession are already possible in the Australian constitution. The Northern Territory has had a referendum on statehood, while Western Australia has already seceded once and as Moore noted New England in NSW nearly has too. These vehicles exist but have either not been acted upon or not been successful.

The BCC sized provinces are largely national dreaming for a more controllable systems of states from Canberra's point of view. One of the problems with the increasing centralisation is that even the very powerful states, such as NSW and Western Australia, are unable to stop the encroachment of federal government.

In such an environment it makes sense for the subsidiary units to be bigger in order to stand against the larger entity. If the present large states such as NSW and Western Australia were to break up into smaller provinces, the federal government would dominate them politically in short order. We would have a unitary system of government very quickly.

It may be that in our present environment of increasing national power that a couple of the states need to join in order to become stronger against the central entity - maybe NSW and Victoria need to amalgamate in order to stave off federal encroachment. Maybe Tasmania and Victoria need to create a super-state?

I can see where there needs to be incession and devolution of the present state system for administrative purposes, but in the current environment of rampant centralisation, I fail to see how it makes sense. The mechanisms to incede and secede already exist but have only been acted upon in rare cases. As it is they need to be done under the legitimacy of the popular will anyway.

I don't consider the choice of federalism as the guiding a technology an error, nor do I consider the current geo-political boundaries of the states a historical error though I do recognise the fluidity from incession and secession as important for the political and administrative challenges facing regions.

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