In the past the Navy has been the centre of imperial pride. The ships themselves are often inhumanely large, are capital intensive to design and build, not to mention expensive to maintain. Australia has never really done the Navy well, the "great and powerful friends" doctrine of foreign policy has meant we have ended up with a small and dependent Navy that can slot in to either the British or American Navies. Warfare is changing, the potential of conflict between nation-states will continue to exist; but networked warfare between nation-states and non-state actors is appearing as technology and communications commodify. The Navy will have to adapt to meet the traditional challenge of warfare between nation-states, in addition to decentralised systems warfare and national purpose.

The Air-Sea Gap

The military policy of a nation-state is defined by its vulnerabilities. In Australia's case, our geographic vulnerabilities are the North-West shelf, the Timor Sea and the Coral Sea. This vulnerability is commonly known as the Air-Sea gap. This is the area that Australia must project force across, not only to repel any potential aggressor, but also to maintain a sustained presence as there are numerous energy and fishing assets in these areas.

The speedy projection of force is best done by air, and for this Australia has the soon to be retired strike platform of the F111, as well as the long range P3C Orion. it is presumed that the F18, coupled with our aging Boeing 707 Air to air refuelling assets will cover for the F111's huge range, strike power, and autonomy as a weapons platform.

The Navy currently provides blue-water projection through the Collins class submarines and the ANZAC Frigates. The Collins subs are an excellent strike platform, helped by the fact that diesel submarines are quiet, and the ocean is noisy. The Collins class often out-performs itself in naval exercises and operations. The Frigates are the more utilitarian of the Naval platforms and far more suited to the pragmatic and multiple uses which the Australian government forces the Navy to perform.

Unfortunately, the Australian Navy still remains hobbled, mainly by the government's unwillingness to spend the amount of money needed on the weapon and communication systems, as well as force multipliers which would make the Navy an independent and autonomous force, capable of projecting without care or concern for other forces. Money is not the entire issue, however, the dominant problem is the Australian government's inability to untangle its military policy from its submissive foreign policy.

Defeating The Great And Powerful Friends Doctrine

Since Billy Hughes, Australia has practised what is known as the "Great and Powerful Friends" [GAPF] doctrine of foreign policy. This is where Australia becomes submissive to the dominant superpower of the time in its foreign policy, and instead attempts to further the aims of the superpower through Australian diplomacy and foreign policy. Supposedly the gains are that Australia can then assert its will through the superpower and pursue its interests by manipulating the superpower. The other goal of this foreign policy was that it would bring security, defence and economic benefits. Unfortunately, it is a failure.

In 1919, Australia had no significant Navy and Australia's major trading partner was Britain - with approximately eighty per cent of exports heading there. Hughes was concerned that if Canada was more loyal to Britain, it would get favourable trade terms with the UK. He was also worried about the "yellow peril" in the Pacific. As a consequence he sought the Royal Navy in the Pacific to guarantor Australian security. Both premises for his actions were flawed, but that did not stop Hughes perusing this policy.

Unfortunately government's have never stopped doing it, despite putting Australia in grave danger by doing so. In the 1930s, it was known that Singapore was money-sink and would not stop any determined aggressor, or even delay them until the Royal Navy could sail into the Pacific. It was also known that the Royal Navy could not fight a war in the Atlantic and Pacific concurrently, yet Australia still pursued the GAPF.

In 1941 we were left with a Navy that could not act independently, and despite the valiant efforts of the ships and crews, it was the US Navy which established blue-water supremacy in the Pacific. The Australian Navy also suffered from being behind in technology, we did not get an aircraft carrier until the 1950s, and then lost that projection capability in the 1980s with the retirement of the Melbourne.

The Decentralised Navy

The Australian Navy must be able to project a sustained presence, both air and sea, in the areas of national vulnerability. These are the seas and oceans immediately bordering Australia. The assymetry and commodification of technology will mean that the Navy will be facing non-state forces who are capable of disrupting systems of national and economic importance. As the recent attack on a cruise ship by RPG shows, non-state actors can be exceptionally open and disruptive with cheap, low-tech weaponry.

Unmanned Aerial Vehicles [UAVs] will most likely become the next cheap technology that ceases to be monopolised by nation-states. Usually only capital intensive weapons remain in the domain of nation-states. The computer chip and minitiarisation mean that the cost of these will be in the domain of anyone who wants it. While a UAV in the US Air Force might be able to concurrently track three hundred angels on a pinhead, a UAV controlled by cell phone is more than able to deliver, in kamikaze fashion, a warhead into a ship, a city, or even an oil platform in the Timor Sea.

The ANZAC Frigates are an excellent platform, which act in a utilitarian manner to the often contradictory political operations the government sends them on. It is retarded to have a four hundred million dollar, finely tuned projection platform such as an ANZAC Frigate pull refugees out of the water. But they do not enable fixed wing projection. Australia will need autonomous platforms that have weapon systems for air, surface and underwater. These platforms will also need to be capable of carrying and operating fixed and rotating wing assets.

The next generation of Frigates will need to have some through-deck ability, or at the least larger landing areas to accommodate larger UAVs and maybe even the VTOL Joint Strike Fighter. As weapon systems have miniaturised, specialisation in ships has not been as necessary. For instance, the battleship, cruiser, destroyer and corvette have largely been collapsed into the one platform. It is time to increase the aviation assets of the current Frigates in a new platform that can carry at least three larger aircraft or UAVs. The Tasmanian company, Incat has designs which lean toward this view.

Operational Autonomy

Australia has never really done the Command and Control [C&C] as a core competency, as this contradicts the expeditionary policies of the government, but when Australia has done command and control, it is has excelled. East Timor being a recent example. This component will need to have money spent on it, so that each sea going platform can act as a C&C platform, for not only the fleet, but also other ADF assets, including airborne force multipliers. The idea behind this is to have the Navy nodal, so if one node goes, then another can quickly replace it. Since threats can be non-state based, it is important that there be instant C&C capability in any locality.

Since the Navy will have sustained projection in the Air-Sea Gap as its primary role this will require more investment in back end and support infrastructure. Logistics is exceptionally important for any military force. Logistics is often the deciding factor in a force's tempo and capability. During the East Timor operation the HMAS Jervis Bay was leased due to a hole in Australia support and logistical capability. This will also help to make US logistical support unnecessary in situations where Australia is maintaining a significant force outside of Australia, in the South Pacific region.

A National Military And Foreign Policy

The GAPF doctrine stands in the way of a genuinely effective navy. We end up uncritical supporters of the super power of the time, and too often Navy procurement is piecemeal and lacking policy direction. The current Air Warfare Destroyers [AWD] do not help maintain projection power in the Air-Sea gap.

Neither do the Landing Helicopter Docks [LHD] which the Navy wants. They are for hitting a hot beach, and the AWDs are for protecting them while they are doing that. It is simpler and cheaper, to have aircraft maintain air superiority over any possible expedition that requires the Navy to perform that duty. In an expeditionary force, the US will provide that capability, so they will only ever likely be used regionally anyway, where they can be under the ADFs air umbrella.

For a truly national defence policy, which incorporates regional projection, an economic factor is required. Several democratic nations in Asia region face similar vulnerabilities to Australia. Japan, South Korea and Taiwan all need to defend an Air-Sea gap. Since Australia will have to develop platforms and weapon systems to provide naval force projection in the region, the cost of this can be defrayed by partnering with other nations.

This would have multiple benefits; it would reduce development costs, there would be genuine technology sharing, it would involve our larger trading partners and lead to greater economic and defence integration.

Conclusion

Our national vulnerabilities require us to have a Navy which is capable of a sustained surface and air presence in the seas and oceans off Australia. This presence may need to deter both nation-states and non-state actors. As a result, ships must be both capable of command and control, individual autonomy, as well as integration into the wider ADF structure.

The Australian Navy needs to develop a platform to replace the ANZAC Frigates which is capable of not only completing the existing tasks that are required of the Frigates, but also capable of carrying helicopters, UAVs and possibly a couple of VTOL JSFs. These would replace the AWDs, LHDs, and eventually the ANZAC Frigates. Several of our democratic trading partners face the same projection and vulnerability challenges as Australia does. These nations can be partnered with to develop a regional projection platform that contains air, surface, underwater and aviation capability.

cam