Tim Dunlop states that Islam is incompatible with democracy . He is wrong, Bangladesh, Indonesia and Malaysia have all voted in secular political parties, rather than religious ones. The muslims in these nations have chosen good government first. Iraq's problem is that their equivalent of the "Bearded Men" is deciding what the country will look like for the next century.

It took sixty-eight years for Australians to get the racism out of their constitution. It is one of the few referendums that has passed. The people are wise, the politicians - not so much. Once a political meme is established in constitutional or statutory law, it is exceptionally difficult to eradicate in a representative democracy. No matter how damaging those laws are. It took Australia seventy years to remove the White Australia Policy. It took eighty to remove the protectionist policies. We still have not made it with a Bill of Rights or Republican Constitution, both of which were innovations well before the Australian Constitution was written.

Iraq has their version of Deakin, Barton and Griffiths deciding they know what is best for the people. I expect in 2080 a young Iraqi will be writing to the terran nets about how they have finally managed to eradicate sharia law from their constitution with a referendum vote.

When small groups of specialists come together to decide the future of a people, they invariably get it wrong. The Iraqis writing the present constitution are no different. The people are wise, and if this constitution was put to the people, line by line, then they would get back just what a superior constitution should be.

When the people decide, wisdom comes to the fore, when small groups of specialists decide, inferior outcomes inevitably result.

cam

Well, it's now been two weeks since Blackburn MP Jack Straw (the former Foreign Secretary and current Leader of the House Of Commons) penned his now-infamous column regarding the wearing of veils ( niqab ) by women adhering to a certain interpretation of the tenets of Islam. Perhaps surprisingly and perhaps not, the debate is still rumbling unabated .

In the past fortnight, we've had stories of teachers suspended for wearing the niqab and British Airways workers sent home for wearing the cross ; We've had claim and counter-claim, windbaggery of all hues, pompous opinion-mongering from every conceivable angle and the capitalisation thereon so, seeing as everyone's making fat-headed comments on this, one more seems like a grain of sand on a beach of indignance.

This issue is political dynamite precisely because you can spin it to touch on any of a number of "great issues" troubling the world today that you might be keen to debate. If you want to talk about immigration, you can use it to that end; the war on terror likewise; ditto the debates on religion and secularity; the issues of spin and political expediency also; the cynicism and power of the media; the rights of individuals versus those of society; the power of the state etcetera etcetera ... It's a blow-hard's charter. Party on, Garth!

I've read and listened to these debates in a state oscillating between those of cynical, misanthropic stoicism, detached analysis and livid bluster. Billy Connolly used to do a routine about the F-word, stating how all his portable radios ended-up "furry" as they became "pebble-dashed with muesli" from reacting to broadcast fatuity: " FFfffucking ... Bwarstar ... Bllloody ... " etc. This week, I know what he means.

Firstly, there's the natural frustration that this issue is still occupying a disproportionate share of the nation's media bandwidth; it's not that it isn't worth discussing, but it's been something akin to a DDOS attack at times. Secondly, there is the disheartenment felt when, yet again , someone hijacks the issue to talk about something related, but not the issue being discussed. Thirdly, there is just bad logic; Clifford Longley, on this week's Moral Maze [ Real Audio which, like messages in Mission Impossible, will self destruct after one week] rather sneeringly referred to the reaction as being to do with a rising tide of "aggressive secularism". How any religious adherent who doesn't secretly harbour dreams of theocracy could ever be against a strand of robustly-defended secularity is beyond me; it's "aggressive anti-theism " you need to be worried about, bro'.

At its core, the issue has only ever really been about the collision of two noble but only semi-enshrined liberties: The right to wear what one likes versus the right to interact with other people how one wishes (both within "reasonable" limits: The "wearing" of automatic weapons is frowned upon, as is having people interacting with your fists etc.).

I hate suits. One of the few times I've agreed whole-heartedly with Tony Blair was when he spoke wearily of "the tyranny of the tie". Fortunately, I often work from home, which means that you'll frequently find me shoe-less, unshaven and wearing baggy jeans (in various states of shabbiness) and a sweatshirt. I don't expect to be able to get away with such louche couture in the office, however. Likewise, I'm sure my line manager would rather accept the delusion that I'm up at 5:30am, dressed with militarily crisp cleanliness and working diligently for the greater corporate good.

These trivial examples hide a serious point. The right to wear what we want is only a "soft" right as is, equally, the right to deal with people on our own terms. Your right to swing your arms ends at my face etc. The issue becomes complicated, however, when public money and services get involved. My bank and my employer can largely choose the terms upon which they wish to deal with their customers and employees, but there is no consumer market in governments, although money is taken for services rendered just the same. This is when these vague types of right seem to become overbearingly important.

When the French debated the wearing of the hijab in schools a couple of years ago, we watched with fascination as a French minister told Jeremy Paxman that the idea of children wearing the hijab " is a kind of violence to us ". France is perhaps the most avowedly secular society in the world; their organisational departements are the result of a rational division process (much as it also served to disintegrate feudal loyalties); the metric system was originally a french product and yet they see no inconsistency in declaring the wearing of the hijab "a kind of violence". One could debate for hours what that comment meant, but I think most people can understand it in a socialist (with a small 's') context. I'd remind you that they were talking about schoolchildren , not the wider cultural liberties. Despite being so avowedly secular, religion of many stripes flourishes in France, especially in the south.

When I read Jack Straw's original article (linked above), I remember wondering what the fuss was about. He is well within his rights to ask, and his constituents are well within their rights to refuse. The reaction to the whole affair, though, speaks of a country ill-at-ease with its cultural priorities. Nothing in our laws or cultural heritage justify either the bloviant accusations of racism aimed at Mr. Straw or accusations of militancy, terrorism and fanatical intransigence directed towards the niqab-wearers. Taking a leaf out of Mr. Sartre's book, what we have here is a situation where the crime is actually a failure to choose ; a dithering hope that things will sort themselves out in the wash without society-level proclamations of principle.

We don't do society-level proclamations of principle very well in this country; they are something akin to "a kind of violence" to us. We're British. We "muddle through". We find a happy medium. We have "stiff upper lips" and "quiet determination". We drink tea. Well, that last bit is true, at least. We are a secular nation, albeit one with an official religion. We are a democracy, albeit one with a sitting monarch. We believe in freedom of the press, but doubt the public value of what they print, We have over a thousand years of law and heritage, but no constitution. It's a compromise. It's a mish mash. It's a hack. It's a mess. It kind of works, though.

Except when it doesn't.

The thesis for Chalmers Johnson's book, Nemesis , is that democracy and empire are incompatible. A nation must choose between one or other - as the two cannot co-exist.

He writes:

Over any lengthy period of time, successful imperialism requires that a domestic republic or a domestic democracy change into a domestic tyranny. This is what happened to the Roman Republic; that is what I fear is happening in the United States as the imperial presidency gathers strength at the expense of the constitutional balance of governmental powers as militarism takes even deeper root in the society.

It did not happen in Britain, although it was more likely and altogether less noble than either Arendt or contemporary apologists for British imperialism imply. Nonetheless Britain escaped the transformation into tyranny largely because of a post-World War II resurgence of democracy and popular revulsion at the routine practices of imperialism.

Central to his thesis is that the checks and balances of Madisonian Republicanism cannot exist under the almost permanent state of war an empire finds itself in. This means that the Executive ends up dominating the legislative and judicial. There is ample evidence that the Bush Administration has actively pursued this by claiming that a President in time of war or faced with national security concerns must have absolute power. Vice President Dick Cheney and Attorney-General's lawyer John Yoo have provided the political and legal backing for such a premise even if their arguments directly contradict the US Constitution.

Johnson's use of Britain in his argument is interesting. The British Westminster system has very poor checks and balances. For instance the Executive is embedded in the Legislative, and in the case of Washminster systems like Australia, representatives of the upper house can be a member of the Executive as well - further deteriorating the doctrine of separation of the powers. The London Westminster system, if anything, is know for its complete centralisation which is only now starting to federalise with Scottish and Welsh self-government. It is an Executive dominated form of government.

I used to be of the opinion that the Westminster system was a hack to route around the absolute power of the monarch. The battles between Pitt the elder and King George were as much about monarch or parliamentary dominance of the executive as they were on foreign and military policy. But Britain's checks and balances are poor anyway: plus they were coming from an executive dominated monarchical system or government to an executive dominated parliamentary system. So there wasn't the same checks and balances to be eroded as their are in the US Constitution or the Roman tribune system.

I don't think the erosion of checks and balances stands up under scrutiny with the British Empire. Which is probably why Johnson sticks to discussing Rome as the historical analogy. I can accept however that the end of empire left Britain with an executive dominated form of democracy. I think it is fairly obvious that in battle between branches of government the Executive wins nine times out of ten - and usually with party machine or judicial backing.

The other major issue he raises, that militarism leads to the degrading of democratic governance, I think is correct. President Eisenhower made a speech warning against the military industrial complex in the 1950s. As Johnson points out, it becomes a political economy, not anchored in economic efficiency but in political patronage and corruption. Where the arguments for a weapons system are not how effective it will be, but how many jobs it will create in a representative's district. A state must be able to defend itself from outside coercion, but not past that point, and certainly not where the military industrial complex becomes what Franklin Spinney calls a 'self-licking ice cream cone'.

This may be where Britain kept its domestic democracy - it dropped the militarism. I am reminded of Immanuel Kant's Perpetual Peace where he argues that international peace is impossible until all nations get their internal constitution's in order - that means keeping Executive practice in constitutional bounds.

x-posted on troppo and eurotrib

Even the broadest definition of democracy cites some form of accountability of power to the citizenry as a whole. But how can there be accountability in the face of widespread apathy? How can a state be democratic if its citizens do not exercise democracy?

In responce I propose five steps for every citizen who wants their "democracy" to be democratic.

1. Actively Gather Information
   In order to exercise power effectively, a citizen must be informed. However information is not provided without bias. Politicians have an overt agenda, and this defines what information they provide. News organizations filter information according to their view of what's important, how much you need to know, and even what opinion you should hold. In order to get around these filters and biases, citizens must seek out a variety of different sources of information, and were possible seek out primary sources.
   
   
2. Discuss Issues, Actions and Policies
   Understanding is born of discussion. It is by discussing information with our peers that we are able to process it for ourselves, rather than just passively accepting the interpretation provided to us.
   
   
3. Vote for the best candidate, not the lesser of two evils.
   If voters are voting for the lesser of two evils, or in other words choosing between the two most viable electoral alternatives, accountability is subverted by the security those two alternatives enjoy. There is no compulsion to be truly accountable when secure in the knowledge that you will one day be re-elected.
   
   
4. Communicate to Power
   Democracy does not end on polling day. Whoever gets elected must be made aware of what is expected of them, what is acceptable, what is unacceptable, what forms of conduct will be endorsed, and what forms of conduct will be resisted. Communication occurs directly to power, through letters, or appointments with a local members, or a telephone call. And it occurs indirectly, by influencing our peers, by writing to newspapers, and by public acts that make the strength of your opinion known.
   
   
5. Hold Power to Account All of this will mean nothing unless the process of accountability is ongoing. Vote against the corrupt, protest injustice, and obstruct the abuse of power. When necissary, protest, boycott, or stand in front of a tank. Only when the abuse of power is actively resisted will it be curbed.
   
   

This five step plan does not apply only to parliament, it applies to all sources of power within society. We do not live in a democracy if only one powerful institution in our democracy makes a pretense at responding to the wishes of the citizenry.

These are not extraordinary measures, but instead the every day duty of every citizen in a democracy, who wishes to continue living in a democracy.

Use it or lose it.

Postscript: yeah, I was feeling naive. Demos kratos... as if!

Cross posted at the Dead Roo , where I spend a lot of time bemoaning the state of current affairs.

Greg Barns' op-ed views government and political boundaries in service delivery terms. He argues for a return to the New Federalism push of the early 90s but where government is organised along maximum service delivery efficiency - which is a social economist's view of the nation-state. But this raises issues of republicanism, democracy and politics which are not catered for. It is a state down approach to federalism rather than a citizen, or individual, up approach.

From the op-ed:

Today, we need to revive the non-ideological atmosphere of the new federalism discussions of 18 years ago. It is extraordinary that in 2007, we still have chronic duplication in areas such as health care, education and transport, or roads, where federal, state and local governments fall over themselves to cut the ribbon whenever a new strip of bitumen is laid.

This is the same argument as those that wish to abolish the states and replace it with a big Canberra government and local councils such as the Brisbane City Council [BCC]. John Howard in interviews has said that this structure would fit his view of Australia if federation was being done now.

Canberra likes this structure as it removes economic rivals to its power. NSW, Western Australia and Victoria can be peskily independent at times despite having half their budgets dependent upon GST and federal grants. NSW has a budget of approximately thirty billion a year, while the BCC has a budget of one billion. Which is a large difference of economic and political power.

Government service delivery to the levels it currently is probably reached its zenith after WWII when many aspects of economic life remained or were nationalised (for lack of a better word as many states maintained banks - but not the feds). It is really only a new thing, back when James Monroe was the Governor of Virginia it was a big deal that a new Jail was being built. Today the judicial landscape is littered with jails; public and private.

Barns continues with:

Take Tasmania and South Australia, for example. Their population is ageing and declining at an alarming rate. Providing high-quality services to the people of those states over the course of this century will become increasingly problematic as a result. Should they exist as separate states today given this bleak outlook?

Again he argues that political boundaries be based on service delivery, which means the government is organised relative to its ability to raise capital - ie tax. Canberra can tax heavily, while SA and Tasmania can't, hence by Barns' logic, those states should be abolished, and presumably become territories under Canberra's wing.

Barns' view of democracy becomes one of political economy. Republics were founded to minimise tyranny in government, of which democracy was a technology or participative method to keep representatives close to the public and easy to remove by popular will when they were under-performing or had fallen into tyranny.

Under Republicanism and Democracy as the method of political organisation, the government(s) are ordered in a way to minimize tyranny and maximise public participation. Under the service-delivery view of governments this directly impacts the capital poor (not much tax to harvest) and capital intensive areas (the opposite of poor tax harvest) of the electorate.

I am reminded of the view of the nation-state where it spends on the slow part of the country to make them catch up, while the market-state enables local regions to innovate more rapidly than central governance and service delivery can provide.

I do not think that service delivery should be the guiding philosophy behind the organisation of political boundaries and governmental forms.

Two articles on Thailand; one an editorial from the WaPo which argues that the coup in Thailand, and the military's subsequent political management, was a blunder. The other a perspective in the Bangkok Post by Tunya Sukpanich which documents the disagreements with the junta's drafting of a new constitution which is less democratic than the prior one.

From the WaPo:

When and if elections finally are held, there will be no way for the military to ensure against another victory by Mr. Thaksin's surrogates, if the vote is free and fair. If another party is propelled into office by manipulation, it may lack the legitimacy to restore confidence in the economy or combat the insurgency.

The only way to purge Thailand of Mr. Thaksin's influence was for his policies to fail and for voters to reject them in an election. That's why the military intervention led the country into a blind alley; an exit will not be easy to find.

From the Bangkok Post:

At the present time much of the public is confused about the draft constitution and the forthcoming general election. Amidst ongoing political conflicts, the general election is considered to be the only solution to guiding the country back to normalcy - with a new government, an elected Parliament and other bodies chosen in a democratic process to run the country.

People tend to believe that they have no real choice but to say yes in the referendum and promulgate the draft charter, so that the general election can follow. One academic noted that the people's hands are being forced to tick yes on the referendum ballot if they want an early election.

Via lm: Lessons in Forced Democracy. Vedantam argues that the Philippines is a better analogy for Iraq and consequently offers more insight. The numbers inthe article for the probability of success for forced democracy are low with only 41 cases of democracy being implemented by force successfully over the last two hundred years. The recidivism rates are high too; a third of democracies imposed by force fail within ten years. Of the weak democracies which survive the first ten years, seventy-five percent fail within twenty to thirty years. While ninety percent fail within sixty years.

From the article:

Those two success stories had all four of the ingredients that Enterline and Greig found make for successful impositions of democracy: large occupation forces early on to stamp out nascent insurgencies; a clear message that occupation forces were willing to spend years to make democracy work; an ethnically homogenous population, where politics was less likely to splinter along sectarian lines; and finally, the good fortune to have neighbors that also were democratically minded, or at least neighbors who could be kept from interfering.

The counter argument to ethnic splits making democracy impossible is India; however India used to include Pakistan and Bangladesh. The article ends with the warning:

"We have to get it right now, or it would be much more difficult to do in the future," Greig said. When an imposed democracy fails, "citizens learn that democratic institutions are not effective in dealing with the problems in their societies, so the society becomes less likely to push for democracy in the future."

Ilnur Cevik has an interesting comment in the New Anatolian:

The starting point is the fact that everyone says the current constitution was drafted under a military junta and despite the fact that 30 percent of it has been amended since 1982 it is still the product of an authoritarian rule. So everyone also agrees that Turkey should have a new and modern constitution that befits a civilized country...

Cevik is arguing that a democratic constitution cannot have legitimacy unless it is created and affirmed in a democratic manner.

Cevik argues for a parliamentary led deliberation rather than a constitutional convention which is the American and Australian manner of hashing out the issues. Cevik wants the parties to all draft their notion of an ideal constitution and then debate, deliberate and find consensus through parliament in order to come up with a legitimate democratic constitution.

Mead argues that the democratic nature of American foreign policy has been superior to the isolated genius' behind continentalist policy (ie Bismarck or Kissinger). Mead writes:

The [democratic policy making] system is stable because it is homeostatic; although interest groups perceive themselves in a constant struggle, the net effect of all those struggles is to keep society constantly seeking the point at which dissatisfaction is minimised.

A very succinct description of the liberal republican process.

Fareed Zakaria in the Future of Freedom argues that democracy as a form of political organisation is a luxury of a wealthy post-capitalistic society.

He identifies two trends. One, that the rule of law and the principles of limited government such as universal rights, limited executive powers and constitutionalism are developed through the process of capitalism and market economies.

Second, that it is often per capita wealth which determines if a society will be able to maintain democracy as a form of political organisation. Countries with per capita income of over $6,000 survive as democracies. This suggests that democracy requires a great deal of population buy in, as well as being energy and cost intensive to maintain.

Zakaria calls the political forms of organisation that functions limited government constituional liberalism. This is what I, and Deniehy and Harpur, call republicanism. This is where liberalism is the political philosophy, and republicanism is the political science that puts into place the structures and technologies, such as constitutionalism, which support that philosophy of liberalism.

Zakaria also identifies that democracy is now the only thing that gives a political regime legitimacy. He argues that this has led to premature establishment of democracies without the liberal and republican institutions to back them up, consequently, illiberal democracy comes into being with strongman dictators using the structures of a weak democracy to entrench their executive rule. Schmittian conservatism and 'state of exception' rule is a technology to achieve that inside a democratic and republican system with a constitution and separation of powers.

It is a hard thesis to swallow for those that advocate increasing liberty as it means political ogres and tyrants such as Pinochet and Suharto become stepping stones on the path to the social organisation of a democratic market economy of which Chile and Indonesia are two newly thriving forms. For the same reason we all watch China with out fingers crossed and hope for a liberal democratic China.

Zakaria is one of the most interesting of the mainstream pundits, certainly more thinking and rational than the political shock jocks which dominate Sunday talk shows, radio talk back and the current affairs style sensationalists. If nothing else his views are challenging.