George Grey was the New Zealand representative at the 1891 Constitutional Convention. His speech for an elected Governor-General at the Convention in Sydney is contained inside. The debate on this issue continued on for a considerable time after Grey's words.

George Grey

I am afraid I shall lose my chance of moving an amendment to this clause if I do not do it at this stage. I move:

That the words "The Queen may, from time to time, appoint," lines 1 and 2, be omitted with a view to the insertion of the words "There shall be."

The intention is that the governor may be elected. I feel that in bringing this subject under the notice of the Convention I am entering upon very delicate and very debatable grounds But I feel that, in point of fact, the future of vast multitudes of persons will depend upon the manner in which this question is dealt with.

This is a question of the interests of nearly 4,000,000 persons at the present moment who look to us; and it appears to me extremely inexpedient that the power of appointing the governor-general to rule so vast a confederacy should be left in the hands of any minister of the day in Great Britain. The terms used are "the Queen shall appoint"; but we all know perfectly well that that means that the minister for the time-being shall appoint such person as he pleases, whilst such appointment might be absolutely obnoxious to her Majesty herself.

The meaning of the thing is that a friend or any other person chosen by the minister may be appointed without the people of this great confederacy being in any way consulted. I understand that the reason usually alleged for that by persons who support the appointment being made by the Queen is that a social appointment is to be made. That is the term usually applied-it is a social question, and not a political question. I contend that the question is twofold, and those two things cannot be separated. The governor has political functions to exercise and he has social functions to exercise, and in either case I hold that a person so appointed is much less fitted to exercise those functions than a governor-general chosen by the people of the country would be.

I do not understand how it can be said that any social ends whatever, or, at all events, of any magnitude, are attained by the appointment of the governor-general by the Crown; but I do hold that social ties and social questions of the strongest possible kind require that the governor-general should be elected by the people of the confederacy. ....

Take the case of a widowed mother, herself well educated, perhaps brought up as a teacher in one of your public schools, and possessing great ability; imagine her with her orphaned children, deprived of a father, night after night teaching those children, with a hope that the highest offices of the state of every kind may be open to them all. Is not that a social question-a social gathering of the highest and noblest kind?

And hundreds, I may say thousands, of such social gatherings would be witnessed every night in this great commonwealth, if all the highest offices of state were filled by election by the people. If you follow it out, you will find that in all social relations of the family-fathers, mothers, children, brothers, sisters-this question is intimately concerned as being something which binds the whole family together for common objects, and opens paths of distinction to every one of them, if they prove themselves great and deserving men.

Why should you say to all these 4,000,000 of people, "No one of you, nor any one of the other millions who are to occupy this country, shall have the slightest chance of ever attaining to an honor of that kind"-that it shall always be open, as it certainly, or almost certainly would be, to distant persons with no claim whatever upon the inhabitants of this country, all of whom would be shut out from so great an opening as that of which I speak?

It is more materially necessary that we should consider this point now, and that we should come to a just decision upon it, because I will show hereafter, as the discussion on the bill proceeds, that in every instance all hope is shut out from the great masses of the colony to succeed to any one of the important posts which under this bill will be open to the people of Australia.

I say that, looking to our duty to our Sovereign, we owe it to her to select the worthiest man we know to represent her here-to be certain that the man so chosen is worthy to represent her; and in no other way than by his being chosen by ourselves from people whom we know can we be certain that the worthiest man will be chosen to represent the Queen within the limits of the great confederacy which we are about to constitute.

Considering the openings that would be given to every inhabitant of Australasia under such a system as I propose, with so many families, as will necessarily do it, directing their every exertion and effort to raise up children worthy of the great opportunities laid open to them, I ask whether this is not to us a greater social question than a few balls and dinners given at Government House, at which none but those in the immediate vicinity can be present?

I ask what comparison is there between these two things-one great and far-reaching, extending to millions, the other a mere sham, as it were, representing what passes in another place, as if one were looking through the wrong end of a telescope at some procession that was going on?

Description

A group of organisations, without ending their independant existence, create a new common institution to advance their common interests.

Motivation and Discussion

In government, as in other parts of life, great advantages can be gained by scale. Federation is an attempt to gain the benefits of scale without surrendering the identity or idiosyncratic power of the component organisations. War is one of the most obvious areas where scale is advantageous and mutual interest is greatly similar. By contrast with a simple merger or takeover of organisations, Federations are formed on a a principle of subsidiarity, where powers are held by default at the smallest and most individual scale.  

Federations are plastic and high maintenance institutions, prone to deform over time under the many forces acting on them. The new central organisation brought into being by a federation will, like all institutions, tend to draw power to itself. Over time a successful central government can take over more and more responsibilities originally assigned to the component organisations. This is often given philosophical support by appealling to the shared values and economies of scale that initially brought the component organisations together.  As popular allegiance to the central institution grows, the division of power to unevenly sized component organisations may increasingly seem unfair.

Federations involve multiple executives, at the central and component level. They therefore have higher maintenance costs and involve more officials than either a single central institution, or the several component organisations which preceded the Federation. These costs increase as the central institution draws power to itself, duplicating responsibilities nominally vested in the component organisations.  Avoiding an entropic collapse to the centre requires continual revision of the terms of Federation.  

By contrast, when the central institution is trusted with few responsibilities, its capability for advancing the common interest is diminished, and its reason for existence decreases. Where a common interest is no longer apparent, Federations dissolve with unpredictable violence back to their originating organisations.

Examples

Switzerland has been an evolving and enduring federation from 1291 to today, excepting a 5 year interruption under French republican occupation. The original confederacy of three cantons was formed to make common military cause against the Holy Roman Empire, and to manage trade and other shared interests. This fairly lightweight original alliance expanded over time, and under external pressure, to include eight canton communities and more territory under a patchwork of individual treaties. Cities such as Zürich and Berne continued to pursue their own interests including similar alliances with their other neighbours. In 1529 and 1531 inter-cantonal religious civil wars broke out, though due in part to the reputation of Swiss mercenaries Swiss territory was never a major battlefield of the Thirty Years War.  A Switzerland of thirteen cantons achieved formal legal independence at the end of that war with the Treaty of Westphalia of 1648. This regime endured until Switzerland was engulfed by French revolutionary forces in 1798; the occupying army established a centralized Helvetic Republic.

The Helvetic Republic was hugely unpopular, and a political and economic failure. Intervention by Napoleon in 1803 restored some power to the cantons, and Swiss independence was fully restored at the 1815 Congress of Vienna, along with a last expansion of the included cantons, and formal guarantee of its (armed) neutrality by the Great Powers of the day. The political upheaval, tied up with other questions of reform such as the universality of suffrage and the role of the Church in the state, continued amongst domestic political parties until the outbreak of a brief and not particularly deadly Catholic/Protestant civil war in 1847. The victorious Protestant Free Democrat Party promulgated the first singular federal constitution in 1848; it was heavily influenced by the American and French constitutions. This constitution has since been periodically revised, including being wholly revised in 1874, the introduction of continual partial revision by voters in 1899, proportional appointment of the Federal Council in 1959, female suffrage in 1971, and another complete revision in 1999.

The United States of America was created in 1780 as a federation of geographically proximate colonies which declared independence from the British Empire. The initial version of this federation, the Continental Congress, was found to be powerless to the point of uselessness. The revised constitution gave more powers to the federal government, in return for explicit recognition of the rights of individuals within the founding document, as insurance against tyranny. Even then the resulting federation was on very loose, Swiss, lines. Over the two centuries since, a variety of internal and external shocks, including civil war, have seen the central government assume much more power at the expense of the states. Although the written constitution has had around 20 amendments, some as fundamental as banning slavery or alcohol, most of the assumption of power has been through evolutionary processes such as common law or Paymaster techniques.

Yugoslavia was a federation of Balkan states and ethnic communities united and shattered multiple times during the 20th century. The 19th century saw the Balkans be a violent playground for Great Powers, during the disintegration of the Ottoman and Austrian empires, and the expansion of Russian and other interests in the region. This competition culminated as World War I, and in its aftermath the constitutional monarchy, the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes, was established for mutual defence. This endured only until 1941 when it was invaded by Axis powers as part of WWII. They established a proxy government run by the sympathetic Ustase, extreme Croatian nationalists. At the end of WWII, and with the agreement amongst Great Powers that these states would be under a Soviet sphere of influence, Yugoslavia became a federation of communist republics. Although the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia retained the contempt for individual rights and market economics typical of communist regimes, regional and ethnic politics remained important, and useful elements of political leverage for the federal government. A potent example occurred in the early 1970s, during a resurgence of political liberalism. Marshall Tito supported greater regional autonomy as a way of stealing the liberals' most popular issue, then crushed the liberal movement using standard totalitarian techniques. Nevertheless, an extraordinarily complex constitution was amended in 1974 to include the right of republics to secede, and giving greater autonomy to regions such as Kosovo. This autonomy was expressed in practice even under Tito, and it later made legal secession easier for Croatia, Bosnia and Slovenia. After multi-party elections in 1990 following the collapse of Eastern European communism, these republics declared independence in 1991, though their legal right to do so didn't prevent those secessions sparking a violent civil war.

Other successful states such as Australia, Brazil, Canada and Malaysia have been also established along federal lines and without civil war amongst the constituent states.

Unions such as the American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations (AFL-CIO) or the Australian Council of Trade Unions (ACTU) have been created from smaller unions in order to gain benefits of scale in negotiations with employers and governments. Different trade unions have common interests in their members' working conditions, as well as ensuring the organisation itself plays a role in wage negotiations and setting conditions of work. Trade unions financially and organisationally support political causes, even having formal roles within major political parties in the case of the Labor parties in Britain and Australia. Federated trade unions also suffer from diseconomies of scale - for instance in 2005 several component trade unions threatened to withdraw from the AFL-CIO due to philosophical differences over which politicians to support.

Related Patterns

Suffrage, Paymaster

Deakin marked Thomas Playford from South Australia as a confederate. Deakin can be pretty nasty in his book to those who didn't share his views or competed with him; ie George Reid , so it might be good to check from the 1891 debates what Playford did actually foresee in the Australian Constitution.

Playford was reasonably active at the 1891 convention, chiming in, and interjecting, on several subjects. His opinion on the Senate was that the states should appoint Senators;

This is a point on which we can consult the experience of America, where exactly the same clause has worked for 100 years. I have never learned that they desire to alter their mode of electing senators.

It is a great deal better that we should say distinctly that the parliaments of the colonies should elect the senate in the way they have said it in America, than that we should leave it to the different states to decide the manner and mode of elections.

If the states decided the question we might have a considerable amount of difference in the mode. We know that the American system has given eminent satisfaction; but we have no means of knowing whether the system proposed by the hon. member, Mr. Kingston, would give equal satisfaction.

If the hon. member wishes to carry out his idea, certainly he should not strike out the words he proposes to omit, for this reason: you must provide some mode of election of the senators so as to give the different states an opportunity of deciding how they will elect them, because through some obstinate lower or upper house in some of the states a deadlock might occur, and they might not be able to decide in time for an election on any particular lines. Consequently there would be no persons chosen to represent the state.

The hon. member would, therefore, do better to leave the words as they are, fixing this mode "until the states otherwise direct." I would very much like to give the states the power to decide as to the manner and mode of electing senators if I thought it would be productive of good results; but with the experience of the United States before us I do not think we can do better than to adopt their form of election.

So he was for the American style of appointed Senate. The US Senate is now elected in the same manner as the Australian Senate as multi-member seats divided by state but back in 1891 it was appointed by the states.

Playford engaged in the debate over how electors would be determined for the house. He stated that the type of election be uniform across all states, rather than each state manage the elections locally. Which suggests a federalist approach to the house.

Playford has an exchange with Gillies over limiting the rights of federal government to interfere, or even make legislation repugnant to the states. Gillies seems to be arguing for states rights, or a more restrictive federal constitution, but uses - horror - women's suffrage to make his point. I am not sure if Playford is goading him in the following exchange, but he does say;

Mr. PLAYFORD: Cannot the hon. member trust the federal parliament?

Mr. GILLIES: We are not speaking of trusting the federal parliament. We might as well say, "We need no provisions in the constitution that will limit their power or tie their hands in any way."

What the hon. member practically contends for is that the federal parliament shall be given a constitution in blank, so that it can do what it likes, without any limitation whatever to its powers. That is the meaning of his interjection.

Mr. PLAYFORD: They will represent the people!

Mr. GILLIES: We will trust the federal parliament on the grounds and on the provisions contained in the constitution.

What is the meaning of the words "state rights" if they do not mean that certain provisions are to be inserted in the constitution which will control the federal parliament, which the hon. gentleman would have us trust implicitly?

His idea is that we should absolutely pass over to the federal parliament the rights of all the states individually, even of the smallest of them. If that were done, we could swamp them tomorrow simply because we had a majority.

It appears that Playford is for the Westminster style of responsible government in the lower house with popular franchise.

Limits on Legislation

One of the points debated was that the federal government should be limited in the area of taxation to tariffs and excises. Playford argues for unlimited Commonwealth taxation for the reason of free trade;

We are not considering, at the present moment, what responsibilities we will take over from the several colonies.

The question we are considering is the power we will give to the parliament of the commonwealth in the matter of taxation; and so far as my reading extends, no commonwealth in the world has existed, or can exist, without possessing unlimited power of taxation.

It is so in the case of the United States, in the case of Canada, and also in the cases of Germany and Switzerland. If you take away the general power, and draw the line at customs and excise duties, then those who believe in a free-trade policy will have no hope whatever of being able to give effect to that policy.

We want the people of these colonies to be perfectly free so far as taxation under the commonwealth is concerned to decide what form or mode of taxation they will adopt for the raising of the necessary revenue.

If you limit the power of the commonwealth in the way suggested, those who hold free-trade views will never be able to give effect to them.

That is a very federalist view, and one that has led us to vertical tax imbalance today.

There is another interesting exchange on the federal government under-writing state debts;

Mr. THYNNE: The colonies are now proposing to give away this security, and the consequence will be, as suggested by the hon. member, Sir Harry Atkinson, that any one of the colonies being unable from misfortune to meet its engagements with its creditor, the federal parliament will of necessity and duty be bound to come to the rescue and take the responsibility upon itself.

Mr. PLAYFORD: There is no harm in that!

That exact situation nearly led to Civil War in Australia in the 1930s when the Premier of NSW, Jack Lang purposely defaulted on loans in order to negotiate better interest rates. The problem was that federal government had under-written those loans, and the Prime Minister, Joe Lyons had no intention of paying NSW's debts.

Before The Governor, Phillip Game dismissed Jack Lang, NSW and the federal government came within an angels breath of open civil war. The Lighthorse was moved to protect Canberra from the NSW police force - who had rifles, steel helmets and armoured cars. There were also federal and state militia forming all over the place.

A hidden part of Australian history that does not get talked about much.

Water and Rivers

Playford's views on the federal government stepping in over water rights has a state focus, especially downstream states. Though Deakin and Playford had an exchange over water conservation (irrigation) in which Playford replied to Deakin;

Leave that to the states!

The Senate Again

I think Playford's speech on the Senate on April 6th gives an understanding as to what those involved in the Constitutional Convention thought the difference between Confederacy and Federation is;

I have been very much astonished in listening to the views put forward by some hon. members. We have been deliberately told that unless we give equal powers to the senate we go for unification [Confederacy], and that if we do give equal powers to the senate we go for federation.

That is a most absurd statement. Hon. members well know that it depends upon the power which you give to parliament whether you take power from the senate or not, and not as to the distribution of that power between the two branches of the legislature.

It is not a question as to whether you distribute powers this way or that as regards state rights; but it is a question as to whether you take from the states certain powers and give them to the parliament.

We are now discussing, not the taking of powers from the states, but as to how we intend to distribute the legislative powers of the commonwealth between the two houses-the senate on the one hand and the house of representatives on the other; and the question of unification or federation does not come in.

It will be just as much a unification, even if the senate have very small powers compared with the other house, if you take away the powers from the states, and give them to the central parliament as a whole; and it will be as much a federation if they leave large or small powers.

The question of unification has nothing to do with the point at present under discussion. The hon. member, Mr. Thynne, asked me one question which I will attempt to answer. Responsible government, he asserted, could adapt itself to any circumstances.

I will ask the hon. member does he know where responsible government has ever adapted itself to the circumstances of two co-equal houses? Nowhere in the world.

I suppose the hon. member has read history sufficiently to enable him to know that in England we never obtained responsible government until the coequal power was taken from the House of Lords.

At one time, in fact, that House had greater power than the Commons; but we never obtained responsible government in the mother country until the power of the House of Lords was taken away and lodged in the House of Commons.

I hold to the opinion I have previously expressed on this point, that I believe you cannot carry on responsible government satisfactorily with two absolutely coequal houses. That is an opinion which I have expressed from the first.

I have also expressed myself to the effect that personally I have not the slightest objection to ask the people of this great continent to agree to a commonwealth in which the two houses shall be coequal, and in which the executive shall be elected by the two houses in the same way as is done in Switzerland.

I find, however, in speaking to hon. members on this subject, that there are very few who agree with me. Even a number of those who are in favour of coequal powers being given to the senate will not go in for doing away with responsible government.

Therefore, so far as this question is concerned, it seems hopeless to argue upon it. I hold to the opinion that responsible government cannot work satisfactorily with two houses coequal in power.

Another point, upon which I wish to say one or two words, has reference to the statement which has been made to the effect that without equal power the small states will be ridden over rough-shod by the larger states that, as the last speaker stated, the smaller states will be practically at the mercy of the larger states.

Will any intelligent man take up this proposed constitution bill and examine the proposals contained in clause 55, and tell me that the smaller states will be at the mercy of the larger states?

First, they have equal representation; secondly, they have equal powers on all matters, excepting money bills, relating to the ordinary annual expenditure on the ordinary service of the year, and dealing with taxation. They have the power of amendment in regard to all but two classes of money bills-the power of absolute amendment coequal with that of the other house.

With regard to those two particular classes of bills, they have a right to suggest to the other house amendments in any clause or parts of a clause. The Constitutional Committee have adopted precisely the mode adopted in the colony of South Australia, where it has been in force for between twenty or thirty years.

We have worked under that system for between twenty or thirty years. The upper house have the right to make suggestions, and those suggestions-taking the case as showing how the system would work if it were adopted for the commonwealth-have been as respectfully treated and considered by the lower house as any amendment which has ever been made in connection with any bill.

They have been quietly and intelligently debated in the lower house; they have been agreed to either with or without amendment, or disagreed to, as the case may be, and they have been sent back to the legislative council precisely in the same way as is proposed here.

Ever since we made the compact in consequence of the claim of the Legislative Council in South Australia to coequal powers with the House of Assembly in dealing with money bills, except as regards initiation-ever since we entered into that compact, nearly thirty years ago, we have never had the slightest trouble with regard to the working of the compact.

It has worked in the most harmonious manner, and, so far as the Legislative Council is concerned, I have never heard a single member of that body-and I have been in the Parliament since 1868-utter a wish that the compact should be broken in any way, though in the Lower House a late treasurer brought forward a motion only a year or so ago to the effect that we should break the compact between the two houses because it gave the Legislative Council too much power.

With the right on the part of the senate, in the first instance, to veto any measure brought before it; with equal powers in respect to all proposed laws, except those imposing taxation, and appropriating the necessary supplies for the year, which the senate may affirm or reject; with a right to insist that any bill dealing with new taxation shall be so subdivided that only one subject at a time can be dealt with-with the senate possessing all these powers, and with the immense preponderance of votes which the smaller colonies will have in the senate, how can any man in his senses say that the smaller colonies need have any fear whatever of being overridden in the legislation of the country if this proposal is adopted? I fail to see any such danger.

I try to look at the matter with a dispassionate eye. I try to look at it from the standpoint of a smaller colony, being myself a representative of a small colony.

I think I can foresee as well as any member here what the course of legislation is likely to be, and I have come to the honest conviction that if these clauses are carried the senate will have all the powers they ought to have, and that to give them any more power would be injurious to the interests of the commonwealth.

The people of the community as a whole must rule.

You cannot get away from that, and if you do not provide that this shall be to some degree, at all events, the effect of your legislation I fail to see how it will be possible to induce the larger colonies to come into the federation.

I shall support the clause as it stands in preference to the amendment. I desire to say that I do not agree with the amendment of the hon. member, Mr. Wrixon. As to the bugbear that has been raised, that the smaller colonies are going to be overridden, and their influence destroyed by the larger colonies, if we do not give the senate equal power with the house of representatives, I contend that that is a mistake.

It is a myth; it does not exist, and will not exist if the constitution is adopted in the form now proposed.

I am a bit confused by it, but it seems the point of contention is should the Senate have equal power, and if they do, it is a Confederacy?

Sounds like some wedging was going on in Deakin's book and at the convention. Since the Confederacy lost the US Civil War to the Union (federalists), I guess confederacy in the convention was being equated to weakness and other negative human passions.

Playford seems to believe in the Westminster style where the will of the people comes through the House, while the states moderate against federal excess through the Senate. That seems typical small state thinking in a federation.

I thought it interesting that he alluded to an election of the President in the Swiss manner by both houses. We often forget how influential the Swiss Constitution was during federation; it and the US Constitution pop up constantly.

After that speech by Playford he spends the next series of debates defending himself and the history of the South Australian Legislative Council.

Interestingly Dibbs argues that if the Senate and House cannot agree then they should use the Norwegian method and meet as one house until they have thrashed it out. This is similar to the system Victoria uses today.

Playford's vision of state's rights also included the state appointing their own Governors, rather than the monarch doing so.

Conclusion

I think Deakin painting Playford as a confederate is unfair. I suspect it was more a result of trying to wedge a small colony representative who was more concerned with the rights of small states getting swamped in a federal system by NSW and Victoria. Deakin is also known for being less than gratuitous toward his political competitors.

Playford seemed to be for a strong Senate that represented the states and could act as a limit on federal power. He was for responsible government and a uniformly elected popular house. The US system at the time had an appointed Senate and was no less federalist for it.

I think this was Deakin playing politics, rather than historian in his book.

Since this is my first diary entry, and this is an Australian based blog, I thought I'd better start with the issue of Australian union. Yesterday the New Zealand Herald asked for the opinions of its readers on whether New Zealand should join the Australian federation. I disagreed (with one mistake I didn't notice before publishing!):

"New Zealand has almost all of the advantages of being a state of Australia, without actually being one. We can freely travel and work across the Tasman, our exports enter Australia freely and we enjoy a close defence relationship with Australia. Joining the Australian federation would not change any of these things. It would relegate New Zealand to Australian stateship, and more than likely make little differen[ce] to the outlook of New Zealands economy, save billions of federal funds being spent here (which New South Wales and Victoria more than likely wouldn't want to provide)."

Which is of course the nub of the issue. Contrary to popular belief, New Zealand doesn't have the automatic right of entry into the Commonwealth of Australia under their constitution. The other issue is that the smaller states (And by that I mean states in Australia smaller than New Zealand in terms of population - Western Australia, South Australia, Tasmania and Queensland) wouldn't be too happy that their representation was being watered down by another large state.

x-posted on holdenrepublic.org.nz

NSW was a free trade colony while all the others were protectionist . NSW worried that federation would force them to follow national protectionist policies.

Brian Carrol wrote on then NSW Premier George Reid:

[Reid] likened free trade NSW joining the other five colonies, all Protectionist to varying degrees, to a teetotaller setting up house with five drunkards and leaving the question of beverages to be decided later by majority vote.

As adam mentioned on another site, one of the benefits of federalism is that it creates a mini free traded zone. Federation was a very effective method for NSW to get Victoria, NSW, South Australia and Western Australia to drop their trade barriers.

In The Great Constitutional Swindle Peter Botsman challenges and explores the triumphalist history surrounding Federation. One of the areas he focuses on is how few of the population voted for federation.

He certainly has a point, voter turn out for both the 1898 and 1899 referendums were low. If those results were obtained today we would not consider it democratically legitimate.

Botsman also has a point on the triumphalist nature of federation history plastering over the cracks and dissent. The Australian history of federation is largely Deakin's history. The early basis of Australia, and the policies which took eighty years to flush out of our system are also largely ascribed to the dominance of Deakin in the early years of the Australian parliament.

There is no denying that the modern form of Australian constitutionalism is based on Victorian liberalism from the late 19thC; amongst whom Deakin was the most able, and capable, as a politician and publicist.

Federation was not popular in NSW, it thought it was getting a raw deal, as it would have to adopt the economic policies of the protectionist Victorian liberals (NSW was free trade) and consequently the NSW Premier George Reid was cast as "yes no Reid" because he was an unenthusiastic supporter of Federation. Deakin's "And Be One People" is pretty horrid in its description of George Reid.

It is not a surprise that the referendum barely passed in NSW and Queensland. NSW had a colonial government that was free trade, and both states were hotbeds of republicanism amongst their elites; as is probably shown in the referendum which was likely patronised by the political elites of society in each colony.

Botsman argues in the book that the triumphalist history hides the real problems with the constitution and those from the colonial era that argued for differing constitutional forms; such as Henry Higgins with his admiration of the Swiss Constitution.

There is also Andrew Inglis-Clark who tried to reconcile modern constitutional innovation in the United States, such as a bill of rights, separation of powers and federalism with the Westminster system. Apparently Clark's first draft contained a bill of rights which was taken out by Barton and Griffiths.

There was the dissent of the New Zealanders such as Grey and Russell who, presciently, feared that the constitution in its current form would collapse too much power to the centre of federation. Their concerns have been played out as now the federal government does 85% of taxation. New Zealand was wise to remain out of federation as it turns out.

While the new constitution in 1901 lacked democratic legitimacy, it certainly has legitimacy today, more and more functions are being sucked up into the political vortex of Canberra and the principles of federalism, which it should be noted Griffiths defended to absolute levels, have been largely forgotten or ignored.

Then again, while Australians are avid democratic participants, constitutionally, our knowledge is lacking; and often it is assumed that the American system is the same as Australia's. For instance many Australians believe they have an explicit constitutional protection of free speech, as America does.

Federations are defined by having a national character and a federal character. For instance the House of Representatives in Australia's parliament is organised with a national character while the Senate has a federal character. The House has equal sized electorates and single members, while the Senate has the states as its electoral boundaries and each state has an equal number of members. So the Senate represents the states, which are the federal components of the Federation, while the House represents the Australian people, which is the national character of the government.

One of the innovations of American constitutional design was to put the national and federal characters into tension so that the national government would not grow to consume the states, yet have enough national character that the states would not assert themselves over the national government. This vertical balance of powers in the federation was designed to protect liberty and cemented through constitutional limited government.

One of the blind spots in Australian politics is that federalism is ignored as a technology to ensure liberty and natural rights. Too often people assume the role of government is service delivery, not limited government, and seek to order the political structures accordingly.

The Australian constitution is weak on separation of powers between the different branches of government. This is a flaw in Westminster systems in general. The Australian constitution is also limited in how it enhances and maintains the federal character of the system. Other than the Senate it is a weak constitutionally federalist system. TO add to its woes the national character of the Judicial branch has aided and abetted the executive (who resides in the national character of the House) in expanded the centralised role of the government in Canberra.

We find ourselves in 2007 with a national government that does over 80% of all tax revenue collection and provides approximately half of all state budgets. We have a constitution which has leaked national character through the judicial to the point that the heads of power can be viewed in isolation and justify nearly any expansion into state responsibilities. We also have all the major parties at the national level; Liberal, Labor, Greens, Democrats and Nationals, who have policies to abolish the states and replace them with smaller and more easily controlled regional councils.

So why have we lost our federal character politically? Sport is often cited as the great Australian tribalism, yet the State Of Origin games are the greatest rugby league games on the planet and a massive display of federalist tribalism.

The increasing intrusion into state responsibilities by the national government has been ongoing. The Engineers case is often cited as a turning point. We saw in the 1930s NSW and the National Government face off in what was nearly a civil war over loan responsibilities. The national government (had through constitutional amendment) under-written loans for NSW. When NSW defaulted deliberately under Lang to negotiate better interest rates it became a national issue.

Another large intrusion was the adoption of income tax by the national government in world war two under emergency need. When the war was over and the emergency gone, the national government never gave that responsibility back to the states. It liked the money too much. That is one of the main origins for the vertical tax imbalance.

It is often assumed that Whitlam was where the 'crash or crash through' approach came from in terms of national/federal relationships, but the idea was bi-partisan at the national level. John Gorton believed that the natural relationship in Australian federation was for the national government to do revenue raising and policy. This would leave the states as bureacratic departments to disburse national funds in support of national policy.

This has been called many things. Co-operative Federalism for instance, but it really is the nationalisation of politics. Unless the states are independent policy making and revenue raising entities the federal character of the system is lost.

Ken Parish has written several articles on federalism recently. His second documents how a strongly national character system; ie the national government and the territory which has self-government through a statutory constitution, leads directly to the erosion of property rights. Which are a fundamental and inalieanable right in a system of limited government. Worse; the leases were conducted under arbitrary government and national whim. This is little different to the Howard government's anti-federalist foray into the Tasmanian health system.

We can deduce that a strong national character of federation is a direct threat to liberty.

Ironically Ken argues in the next article for the Gortonisation of the Australian system under a form of co-operative federalism where the national government makes all policy and the states are reduced to disbursing (their own) funds in support of that policy. This is the structure that removed Territorians property rights in the first place. Other than the vertical tax imbalance it is what we have now.

So the continued nationalisation or Gortonisation of Australian politics will place more Australians under the arbitrary whim of the national government, and even occasionally tyranny of the national government (such as the removal of property rights) with the states neutered in being able to resist national policy. I like NSW and Western Australia getting annoyed at the national government. In the recent ersatz electoral campaign we have not seen the Territory or Tasmania fight back. They have swallowed the national government's lumps despite the obvious bad policy.

The Harpurian Republican view of political structures, or social organisation as Charles Harpur calls it, is that maximum liberty and minimisation of tyranny enable greater moral expression. Morality in this instance isn't the caricature of no abortions or abstinence from sex before marriage. Morality is public good in a private and social context. As an example, economists often like to quote the economic liberty through markets as public good or social capital etc. To Dan Deniehy and Charles Harpur tyranny was the greatest inhibitor to human improvement and moral expression. This is Harpur's "for the faith that is in them."

Most modern Australian politicians, constitutional theorists and commentators see government in terms of service delivery. Greg Barns for instance recently divided the political entities up in Australia by abolishing states such that service delivery could be maximised. Ken Parish's new co-operative federalism takes a similar service delivery approach with policy making occurring at the national level.

But, Australia is a liberal democracy that practices constitutionally limited government. The first priority of such a system is the maximisation of liberty. This is where limited government is supposed to be the most efficient - in the constitutional protections of individual liberty. Republicanism is the ideal technology for this as it is the political science to liberalism's political philosophy.

This does not deny a liberal democracy from deciding that government should provide services, however, it can not become the reason for re-ordering government such that service delivery is maximised at the cost of a loss of liberty and the opening up of individuals to potentially suffer from arbitrary government, executive whim, loss of rights and even tyranny.

Harpur and Deniehy's republican philosophy must come first and in Australia this means a system of government with a strong federal character; federally independent entities that are autonomous in policy and tax revenues; and increasing constitutional restrictions on the national government such that they cannot Gortonise or Whitlamise the system.

We can learn from the 19thC Australian Republicans as liberty informed their philosophy. This is a word that has been lost in 20thC Australian politics.