Australia is facing a federal election on October 9th with the two main parties having little to separate them in domestic and economic policy. Where the Liberal and Labor parties differ greatly is in foreign policy. The Liberal Party adheres to the "Great and Powerful Friends" doctrine while the Labor Party pursues the doctrine of "Asian Engagement".

Since the September 11th attacks on the United States, terrorism has been thrust to the fore as the dominant security issue facing western nations. Australia has not had a terrorist attack on its shores; but two attacks in Bali and Jakarta have occurred in Indonesia that can be construed as terrorist attacks against Australia. Consequently terrorism for Australia is a foreign policy issue. On this basis the competing foreign policies of the Liberal Party and Labor Party can be compared.

The Great and Powerful Friends Doctrine

The incumbent Liberal Party formed government as a coalition with the National Party and has held government in the Australian House of Representatives since 1996. The Liberal Party, led by Prime Minister John Howard, is largely a centrist party with socially conservative leanings. The Liberal foreign policy, the "great and powerful friends" doctrine, is a very conservative policy. Other than the Hawke and Keating governments, all Australian governments in the 20th century have based their foreign policy decisions on this doctrine.

The "great and powerful friends" doctrine at its core, is where a medium sized nation places its foreign policy in submission to the dominant superpower of the day. This is done with the hope that by furthering the superpower's interests, the medium sized nation will be able to further its own interests via influence on the superpower's policies. By its very definition, this doctrine trades Australian foreign policy independence in return for being under the defence and economic umbrella of the superpower.

The earliest use of this doctrine was by Billy Hughes in 1919 at the Versailles meeting after World War I. Hughes was challenged by the American President, Woodrow Wilson, as to why he should be present at the table. Wilson thought that the British Foreign Minister, Lloyd George, represented the British Commonwealth's interests. Hughes claimed he represented, "60,000 dead" and Hughes; along with the Prime Minister of South Africa, was given a place at the table.

By his presence, Hughes attempted to further British policy and international prestige. In return Hughes wanted access to British markets and the protection of Australia by the Royal Navy. In 1919, eighty percent of Australian exports went to Britain, and there was genuine concern that Australia's main competitor in the British market - Canada - would get preferential treatment. Hughes' furthering British interests was seen by Australians as a down payment in return for open access to the British market and the protection of Australia by the Royal Navy.

This policy continued in the 1930's. Australia funded the development of Singapore as a naval fortress, with the idea that any belligerent would be held up in Singapore, giving the Royal Navy time to sail from the Atlantic to the Pacific and save Australia. Consequently Australia did not bother developing a blue water navy and in 1942 when the Royal Navy was stretched across four oceans, Australia was left to fend for itself against Japan. This is when John Curtin uttered the words during a December 1941 speech;

Australia looks to America, free of any pangs as to our traditional links or kinship with the United Kingdom.

From this point on, the United States replaced Britain as the the "great and powerful friend" in Australian foreign policy. This policy has since taken Australia through supporting the Korean War, the Malayan Emergency, the Vietnam War and in 2002 - the Second Gulf War. Australia was one of two nations who supported the Bush Administration unconditionally into the conflict. It should be noted, John Howard did so against Australian public opinion.

The Howard Years

The Hawke and Keating governments between 1983 and 1996 pursued the new and then quite radical foreign policy of "Asian Engagement". With John Howard's government coming to power, Australian foreign policy reverted back to the conservative philosophy of "great and powerful friends". This firmly roots Australia in the anglosphere. In the conservative mindview - all culture, nationalism and government policy stems from this anglophilic view. The Howard government began the "history wars" in part to reinforce the anglic history and heritage of Australia - possibly to make the policies of the anglosphere more palatable.

Terrorism became a wider security issue for Australia with the September 11th attacks on New York and Washington D.C. The corner stone of Australia's defence agreements in the Cold War had been ANZUS. Despite ANZUS losing its power when the US refused to honour its responsibilities with respect to New Zealand after a dispute in 1982, Australia still placed great importance in the document. With the attacks on US soil, John Howard activated a clause in the document with the claim that the US has been attacked and consequently Australia will defend the USA as per the agreement.

The ANZUS treaty is a cold war document and has little relevance to the 21st century. It is hard not to see Howard activating the agreement as a desperate attempt to keep the treaty relevant. Since September 2001, other than the US thanking Australia for honouring the agreement, there has been no other action on the treaty. It could be argued that Australian support in Afghanistan and Iraq are a result of ANZUS, but both actions were deliberated in Parliament and the Australian media before action was taken.

Nation Building and Failed States

The Howard Government has pursued four nation-building expeditions in the last few years. These have been East Timor, the Solomon Islands, Afghanistan and Iraq. East Timor and the Solomons were not related to terrorism, and Afghanistan was not fully under-taken by Australia as a nation-building task. Iraq did involve Australia adopting, at the very least the political rhetoric of the American view of Iraq as a nation-building exercise, even though Australia did not commit the necessary forces or money to have any effect on the desired outcome of a free and stable Iraq.

East Timor and the Solomons were Australian led missions, that gained their legitimacy from the nations involved. Before Australia committed to East Timor, Australian diplomacy, along with the diplomacy of other nations such as Thailand, managed to get Indonesia to agree with a UN mission to stabilize the former annexed province as it sought independence. East Timor has been held as an example of a successful UN mission. Australian leadership provided this.

The Solomons expedition was similar. Prompted by a report from the Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI) who advocated a nation-building exercise in the Solomons, Australia led a multi-national mission to the failed and lawless state. Like East Timor, this was done after legitimizing the expedition through securing a request from the government of the Solomon Islands to intervene. This is an ongoing mission but is progressing well.

Afghanistan and Iraq

The other two nation-building exercises Australia has embarked upon are Afghanistan and Iraq - both under US leadership. Australia made the point in the Afghan campaign that Australia was there for the "war on terror", not for Afghanistan, and managed to avoid any nation-building commitments. Since Australia is an uncritical supporter of American foreign policy, the success or failure of the nation-building exercise in Afghanistan may stick to Australia, despite only having a single officer attached to the UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA).

Australia was one of three nations to initiate hostilities against Saddam Hussein's Iraq. It was promoted in Australia as a necessity to disarm Hussein, and even with this rhetoric, Australians preferred that Australian involvement required the expeditionary cause to have United Nations (UN) legitimacy. Howard went against the electorate in the deployment to Iraq. Australia committed naval, aviation and special forces assets to the invasion. After hostilities the Australian contingent wound down to just over one thousand personnel. A small and ineffectual number in comparison to America's 140,000.

In both these instances these were definite moves by the Howard Government, using the "great and powerful friends" doctrine, against terrorism. Both Afghanistan and more importantly Iraq have been failures. Iraq under Hussein was not a haven for terrorists, but by September of 2004, it has become an chaotic failed state with porous borders. There is no stability in Iraq, and this failure lies completely at the hands of the US, UK and Australia.

Australia's success in Iraq is entirely dependent on American success. Australia has not committed the troops, nor the money to succeed in having Iraq as a secure and stable democracy. Richard Woolcott writes on the issue;

The reality is that Australia's presence, however capable and efficient our forces, can make no meaningful contribution to the two major objectives: the reconstruction of that country and the establishment of a viable democratic government there.

The East Timor and Solomons deployments both gained wider legitimacy before Australia committed. Both deployments were Australian led, with Australia providing the necessary troops, civilian personnel as well as sufficient logistical and economic resources for those expeditions to be a success. The Australian deployment in Iraq, had none of these positive attributes from the Howard Government in their uncritical support of American policy.

Asian Engagement

Australian history has largely been a valiant refusal to recognise Australian geography. Australians have tried to maintain an attachment to Europe and in particular the anglosphere. Gough Whitlam, later Prime Minister, was the first to see beyond this and he beat Richard Nixon in welcoming China to the global community. This localised and regionalized view of foreign policy was further developed under the Hawke and Keating governments as the doctrine of "Asian Engagement".

Paul Keating and Gareth Evans both sought to re-align Australia as an Asian nation, rather than an European nation that was a victim of geographical circumstance. Since three of Australia's biggest four export markets are Japan, China and South Korea, Keating set about strengthening regional trade through the Asia-Pacific Economic Co-operation (APEC) forum. This was during a time of the "Tiger Nations" having remarkable economic growth until "contagion" struck in 1999.

The other aspect of "Asian Engagement" is the premise that the only way Australia's geographic vulnerabilities can be defended is through the promotion of a benign neighbourhood. As a trading nation with multi-national defence links, Australia's geographic vulnerabilities are the North-West Shelf, the Timor Sea and the Coral Sea. Through cultural, economic and defence links with Australia's Asian neighbours these vulnerabilities can be secured.

By contrast the "great and powerful friends" doctrine attempts to solve this issue through a strong Australian-American alliance where the United States Navy (USN) is used to ensure that Australia's vulnerabilities are secured. This assumes that the USN will always be available to maintain authority over those vulnerabilities.

Terrorism

Terrorism for Australia remains a foreign policy issue. The attacks that have been directed at Australia have taken place in Indonesia. The Bali bombing was directed at Australia and the Jakarta bombings had a dual target in trying to destabilize the Indonesia elections, as well as alienate Australian and Indonesia co-operation, through the targeting of the Australian embassy.

Indonesia has handled the terrorist attacks admirably. This young democracy has embraced the rule of law and rejected the prosecution of the Bali bombers under a back dated post-hoc anti-terrorist law. This was despite blood-curdling pressure from Australia. Indonesia has attacked the problem of terrorism as a civil matter for the police force and as a consequence they have been successful.

The Howard government in the wake of the Bali bombing has sought and found police co-operation with Indonesia in police matters. The five-powers defence agreement has also been upgraded to have terrorism added to its responsibilities. But these attempts at regional engagement have often been flouted by John Howard's often clumsy politics. There is the wider view of Howard as Bush's "Deputy Sherriff" in the South pacific. Consequently there is considerable distrust of his regional policies with Australia's neighbours.

Another clumsy diplomatic effort came during the current election campaign when Howard announced a neo-con platform of pre-emption against any terrorist bases in neighbouring nations. This brought a stern rebuke from Indonesian legislator Alvin Lee, who commented;

[John] Howard should learn to control himself, Indonesia and Australia are both victims. I strongly support increased cooperation among neighboring countries to fight terrorism but not attacks.

Labor's national security policy sees South East Asia as the highest priority in combating terrorism. The policy notes that Indonesia, Singapore and Malaysia have set up maritime patrolling to guard against Jemaah Islamiah (JI) from bringing personnel, supplies and potentially weapons from the Phillipines to Indonesia. Australia did not join this effort, despite it being in Australia's interests and fitting Australian capability well.

Labor's policy also includes education funding for Indonesia to combat the Madrassas', which educate through fundamentalism. Labor will also help fund the Indonesian police in counter-terrorism. The Indonesia police under Suharto's regime were part of the military. An important aspect of the Labor doctrine is that it engages Australia's neighbours diplomatically, economically and culturally.

Conclusion

In terms of terrorism, Indonesia has been taking the hits for Australia, and has handled the stress of terrorism on their civil structures admirably. As a result, terrorism for Australia remains a foreign policy and regional issue.

The Liberal Government's foreign policy through the "great and powerful friends" doctrine has little basis over the last eighty years to recommend it. When faced with terrorism, the uncritical support of the US, and in particular the US adventure into Iraq has been a catastrophic failure. As a result of this pursuit of the bi-lateral Australian-American defence and foreign policy - defence and diplomatic relations between Australia and its neighbours have suffered. Diplomatic pragmatism being the main saving grace.

The Labor foreign policy of "Asian Engagement" is far more suited to the nature of terrorism that is practiced against Australia. Its focus on regional issues and relationships, are necessary in co-operative efforts to combat terrorist cells, international trafficking in arms and border security. The regional focus of Labor's foreign policy, and their stated policy of South East Asia being their primary focus in combatting terrorism, gives Labor's "Asian Engagement" doctrine the advantage in suppressing the likelihood of terrorist attacks against Australia.

Traditionally the Liberal Party has been seen by the electorate to be stronger on security and defence - but the aging and outmoded foreign policy of the Liberal Party has not translated to the current environment of terrorism. The Liberal Party has had three years to establish a terrorism policy, and their uncritical support of the US in Iraq and American foreign policy has been a failure. Where Howard's government has acted regionally, it has more often then not managed to alienate Australia's neighbours.

The Labor doctrine of "Asian Engagement" has its primary focus on Australia's region in the domains of diplomacy, economics and culture. Consequently it is better suited to deal with the current nature of terrorism that has been practiced against Australia. Indonesia will remain the frontline of terror for Australia. Constant, ongoing and comprehensive co-operation with - and support of, the Indonesian battle with terrorism will be required. Labor's style of foreign policy is less reactive than the Liberal policy and would reduce factors in the region that foster terrorism.

The Australian Republican doctrine is built upon, amongst others, principles of independence, autonomy and the belief that Australian solutions to Australian issues are superior. Australian foreign policy has been afflicted for a century by the "Great and Powerful Friends" doctrine. This foreign policy has been a constant failure, has weakened Australian military capability and is not compatible with Republican principles. Consequently the Australian military needs revision.

Australian Republican Doctrine

Australian Republican doctrine is founded on several basic principles that have wider application. These principles have been the basis for Australian Republican doctrine for the last two hundred years and serve as a powerful conduit for individual, cultural and political growth. They are;

• Independence
• Autonomy
• Inviolable Rights
• Equity under the Law
• Australian solutions to Australian issues are superior.
• Self-confidence on the global stage.

These have been achieved at the individual, social and cultural levels - it is only our government that lags behind us. The areas where the government is dragging the ball and chain of the 16th Century with them is in the areas of constutition, foreign policy and military policy. The latter two are entwined issues and need a good dose of Australian Republican doctrine to straighten them out.

Foreign Policy

Australian Governments have used the "Great and Powerful Friends" doctrine of foreign policy since Billy Hughes used Britain's influence at Versaille in an attempt to further Australian international interests. This foreign policy is a failure and has been for a century. As Gareth Evans said;

The ... underlying reality about Australian foreign policy in the contemporary era is that we have very little capacity to advance our interests, however defeined, by relying on our great and powerful friends. Those days are over. Our great and powerful friends have interests of their own.

Evans is incorrect, those days never even existed. One of the worst aspects of the foreign policy is how it defrays Australian military self-sufficiency. The most critical example of this was in 1942 when Australia found itself without a navy to challenge for blue water superiority. Australia also lacked an air-force that could defend Australia.

In 1942 the Royal Navy was tied up in Europe. The Australian Navy was an ad-hoc collection of cruisers that were not capable of command and control, they were themselves designed to slot into a larger British capital ship group. In terms of aerial projection, Australia was defending New Guinea with one fighter squadron. Australia was undefended by any Australian fighter aircraft - fortunately the US supplied a couple of their squadrons to defend Darwin until 1943.

Richard Williams had established an Australian aerospace industry which ultimately produced the CAC Boomerang "Panic Fighter" in late 1942. Without that foundation, the Boomerang would never have appeared. Williams had to fight with the Navy and Singapore for funding. In the 1930s, the Australian Government indulged in defence on the cheap, and what money it did allocate to the Australian military, it gave eighty percent of it to the Navy and Singapore. Both the Navy and Singapore were dismal flops in WWII because they were designed around our "Great and Powerful Friend".

Force Multipliers

Modern capability and projection is a networked affair of multiple inputs that sum to be greater than the parts. Until Australia invests fully in force multipliers it will be a second rate force unable to operate independently or sustainably. What is a force multiplier? From the Fundamentals of Australian Aerospace Power;

Force Multipliers provide external capabilities to increase the effectiveness of combat systems.

In an aerospace context, Air to Air Refueling (AAR) is an example of this. It allows an airborne combat system to increase its endurance, and consequently its capability. Airborne Early Warning and Control (AEW&C) is another example. Space based communications and surveillance systems another. These are areas that the Australian Defence Force (ADF) is highly deficient.

Our tankers are converted 707 from the 1960s. We are only just getting AEW&Cs, and we have no space based capability. We are dependent upon the United States leasing us space capability when we need it. Both major factions - Liberal and Labor - place heavy weight in their political defence doctrine on the United States leasing us what we need when we want it. Even small and simple systems. This is not unlike the Australian Government in the 1930s expecting the Royal Navy to sail into the Pacific en-masse when needed.

Behind The Times

The lack of high-tech systems has been an ongoing issue for Australian combat systems. From "Highest Traditions", an example of an Australian Canberra bomber in Vietnam not having the latest technology putting the crew in peril;

[They] ... were flying ... close to the Loation border ... just as they turned left ofr the attack, the sky to their immediate 2 o'clock position lit up with angry fireballs of flak. .... A hurried call to their United States ground radar controller that they were taking heavy AAA solicited the query, "Roger Magpie, confirm that your ECM gear is on?". The navigator quickly countered: "What ECM? We're a bloody Canberra!"

ECM is electronic counter measures that jams the enemy systems that try to get a firing solution on the aircraft.

Weakened Australia

Another issue that is ongoing with Australian procurement of American weapon systems is that there are so many restrictions placed on it. Every US Senator puts their own little piece of legislation on export of military technology so that Australia is unable to procure complete systems.

The consolidation of the US Defence industry also means that Australia's bartering position against these giant American firms is weakened - to the point that Australia has trouble getting source code from firms like Lockheed Martin, Boeing and General Dynamics.

The large US Defence firms also reduce Australian engineers to integrators of American technology. Of all the defence projects mentioned in the 2003 Defence Budget, only one partnership - between Australia and the UK for a missile system - involved genuine technology sharing. The rest were integration projects.

A Military Doctrine

The "Great and Powerful friends" foreign policy doctrine is a meme that must die. It is the complete anti-thesis of Australian Republican doctrine. The "Great and Powerful friends" is dependent, subservient, weakening and a good example of the Australian political cringe. So that both major factions do not rely on this reflexive cringe any longer, it is important that the Australian military become a capable force based on independent strategic doctrine, autonomous capability and sustainable projection power.

The only way this can be achieved is if Australia creates a technologically perfect force that matches our regional needs. We are not alone in this need. Many of our Asian neighbours are also disenfranchised from American foreign policy and the US Defence industries. Japan recently changed a law that prohibited their defence industry from exporting military technology. This was so they could join in projects that required technology sharing. The oppurtunities are there for Australia to partner in new technology sharing defence projects to fill our capability and projection gaps.

Australian military spending on defence needs to increase by forty percent. This will add approximately six billion to the defence budget. This is an affordable increase that must - and I repeat - must go to research and development. Not toward procurement of American weapon systems. Australia must develop its own technologies or partner with like-minded countries in genuine technology sharing projects with this money. It is not for useless big ticket items that the Navy and Army lust after.

The six billion is a subsidy to applied science and engineering which is essential in any high-tech economy. This coupled with business managers that can turn an R&D dollar into a product/service dollar it makes for a powerful economy. Capitalism is geared toward technology, and it rewards innovative business models that leverage technology. The dot-com boom of the 1990s was on the back of the internet. A classic disruptive technology. The internet came from US Military engineering investment in DARPA and European applied science investment in CERN.

Conclusion

The sustained funding of military technology and military research and development will give the Australian Defence Force the systems it requires to become an independent, autonomous and sustainable force. It will remove the anti-Republican "Great and Powerful Friends" doctrine from Australian foreign policy. Finally it will advance Australia away from a commodity-based "hole in the ground" economy toward a high-tech economy that has an increased possibility of supplying the world with the next disruptive technology.

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The recent announcement of Australia sending the SASR to Afghanistan along with a Provincial Reconstruction Team points to the unfocused nature of Australia's involvement in the American led "War on Terror". The Howard government chose to join the United States pursuit of terrorism as a military issue. This is in part due to the "Great and Powerful Friends" (GAPF) doctrine of foreign policy that the Liberal Party adheres to. But equally influential on our policy toward Afghanistan has been the weak manner in which Australia has contributed. We are not in control of the outcome, and consequentially the Howard government is just floating along with no focus, and no possible means to take the expeditions in Afghanistan and Iraq to any conclusion. Australia needs to return to the policy of December 2001, pull out of Iraq, and focus its full energies on defeating Al Queda and the Taliban in Afghanistan.

Afghanistan

In December of 2001, Australia sent the SASR over to Afghanistan to contribute in the over-throw of the Taliban. Australia's policy then was that our military were there for the "War on Terror", not for "Afghanistan". Recently explaining the recent resending of the SASR back to Afghanistan John Howard said;

When Australia withdrew those forces [SASR from Afghanistan in 2002], they were withdrawn against a background that it has always been the Australian position that we would provide some support of an elite kind at the sharp end, and that we were never disposed at the beginning to have that long-term - what I might loosely call - peacekeeping role ...

Between the deployments of the SASR in Afghanistan, Australian maintained a personnel of one in the country - a mine clearance officer. This was fitting with the original Australian policy. Our commitment was minimal, and contributed to the over-throw of the Taliban, unfortunately, in the US, the political climate changed and Afghanistan was quickly cast aside, and Iraq focused on. Australia's GAPF foreign policy meant that John Howard found himself joining the American and British governments in selling a war to an often cynical and unbelieving public.

Afghanistan was never followed through entirely to ensure that the Taliban and Al Queda would not resurge in the mountain ranges of the Pakistani border. Australia did not commit sufficient troops to pursue that goal without American and British support. As a consequence, when the SASR, along with American forces, were moved to the Iraqi border, the Taliban and Al Queda were able to regroup in the harsh eastern Afghan country.

Iraq

Australia followed the United States into Iraq, with the Australian Defence Force (ADF) committing aircraft, special forces, naval vessels and logistical support to the operation. This was quickly wound down after the initial success of the American march on Baghdad. After hostilities ceased the largest numbers of ADF members in the Gulf were an ANZAC Frigate and a Surface to Air Weapon System - totalling approximately 1600 troops. With the recent deployment of 450 additional troops this brings Australia's current commitment to approximately 2000 troops.

John Howard did not make any policy commitment on Iraq, preferring to balance the reticence of a public still not behind the conflict, and the pressure from the United States, Britain and other nations to commit greater forces. Like Afghanistan, it has meant that Australia can have no effect on the outcome, we are dependant upon American success for Australian success. Richard Woolcott commented;

The reality is that Australia's presence, however capable and efficient our forces, can make no meaningful contribution to the two major objectives: the reconstruction of that country [Iraq] and the establishment of a viable democratic government there.

Iraq is an American project that requires an American response - lots of troops, lots of money and lots of patience for an ongoing medium intensity conflict. Only the United States can handle that. Australia is best playing to its strengths, and focusing on Afghanistan.

The SASR are the very tip of the spear in the ADF's land capability, but the spear gets fat pretty quickly with the Australian Army - 1st RAR and 4th RAR both maintain commando battalions. These forces are ideally suited to the Afghanistan conflict which is a low intensity, low tempo, land based conflict requiring a high level of skill and training at the individual and platoon level. The Australian Army has always over-excelled in these situations, and presently has existing assets that fulfil that role perfectly.

Clarity of Policy

Australia's response in 2002 toward Afghanistan should have been an escalation of our commitment there with the purpose of eradicating Al Queda and the Taliban. Iraq was a diversion, a distraction that has defrayed Australian policy; leaving it unfocused. Australia needs the clarity of policy again that was present in December of 2001.

Australia needs to remove its forces from Iraq and make a commitment to the United States and Afghanistan that it will see the "War on Terror" in Afghanistan through to its natural conclusion - which is the eradication of Al Queda and Taliban operatives from the country.

We should deploy the commando battalions as well as another Regiment to Afghanistan along with the necessary Army and Air Force airlift capability. The SASR and Commando Battalions will be able to range independently while the RAR will have the capability to do insertion and extraction with Australian rotating and fixed blade air assets.

More importantly, Australia should establish a command and control structure in Afghanistan where Australian commanders are entirely in control of Australian forces. We have not seen the rise of a Monash or Williams in the recent campaigns because Australian forces have been deployed piecemeal under other nation's forces. Australian solutions to Australian problems are superior, and with Australia taking responsibility and ownership of the destruction of Al Queda and the Taliban in Afghanistan, it will allow Australian commanders to pursue that goal by managing the Australian forces at their most efficient and full capability.

Conclusion

The Australian troops would not be in Afghanistan for nation-building, manning checkpoints, or doing police work. They would be focused on a military goal, and an achievable outcome. This would not be politically untenable with the Australian public and would most likely enjoy greater popularity than the current piecemeal and ad-hoc deployment of troops in Iraq and Afghanistan.

The deployment of the SASR, Commando Battalions and a RAR to Afghanistan along with the support infrastructure, including command and control as well as air assets, would allow Australia to pursue a focused policy that would have genuine value in the conflict with organized Wahabi Extremism. It would give Australia a national and political purpose beyond following whatever the great and powerful friend does. Australia would have ownership over a very important component of this conflict, one that is quantifiable, and one that has an publicly knowable ending.

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There have been several explosions in Indonesia. So far two explosions on Bali have been confirmed . This is on the same day as Australian federal and state politicians have restricted civil liberties in a response to no terrorism having occurred in Australia. Terrorism remains a foreign policy issue for Australia, not a domestic issue.

I have harped on about this in the past at k5 , on SSR , at wsacaucus.org and even at online opinion ; terrorism is a foreign policy issue for Australia that will not be solved by invading nations at the US's behest, or the furphy of restricting civil liberties in Australia.

To fight terrorism, we must embrace the Indonesian approach to it, which has been through police work and taking bombers through the Indonesian court system and making them face justice. Our military and "national-security state" style of approach has failed. Iraq is a bees nest, and the national-security state is a naked grab for federal government power.

The current Liberal and Labor leaders remain clueless in our current environment, preferring the heavy handed statist approach; using the blunt instrument of the military to achieve civil objectives, creating new areas of shadow government outside of the public domain, and wilfully discriminating against individuals and minorities with nothing more than suspicion and supposition. A sure path to tyranny.

The Department of External Affairs was still a young government department when Percy Spender took over its reins in 1949 with the successful election of the Menzies Government. Spender was a powerful member of the Liberal Cabinet, and one who Menzies was concerned about as a potential challenger to his leadership of the Liberal Party. Spender's forebears, Doc Evatt and John Burton had attempted to balance direct relationships with super-powers, alongside multi-national foreign policy through the UN with an engagement of Australia's Asian interests through regional foreign policy. Spender came to the department with the ideological lines of the Cold War establishing themselves, he chose the path of whole heartedly embracing the dominant western super-power while maintaining regional foreign policy ties.

Political Realities Post WWII

Robert Menzies was an anglophile of the edwardian dandy school of pomp and circumstance. Despite Menzies' desire for Australia to re-establish itself as British, the reality of the clouds building over what was to become the Cold War showed that America was the new super-power in the west. Britain's back had been broken in World War II, and the incredible scientific, manufacturing and economic might of the United States would come to define the West's response to Soviet Russia.

In the immediate aftermath of World War II, there was a stand off as many governments and nations eyed each other warily wondering what the new system of nation-state power would be. Europe's colonial power was broken, that was obvious, and the United Nations was being set up to establish a forum, and means for the new super-powers to engage in dialogue. By 1950 it had become obvious that there was an ideological war brewing, mainly over what constituted economic management of a nation-state; but which was backed by large and effective militaries.

Due to the constant political salesmanship and mythology of the US alliance, it is assumed that Australia is contributing from a position of weakness. This is as untrue today as it was in 1945. Power politics is played through strength - of which hard and soft power are the two largest determinants. These are acquired by military and economic capability. At the end of World War II Australia was the largest and most powerful of the medium powers. With the defeat of Germany and Japan, Australia had the fourth largest air force on the globe. Our economy was booming so much in the latter parts of World War II that the Citizens Military Forces were being demobilised to attend to the labour shortages and demands of the Australian economy.

Australia's problem has been our politicians, continually dealing our interests with a political cringe. This has manifested itself with Australia being subservant and uncritical toward the current super-power. Prior to World War II this was Britain, since Curtin looked to the East without a pang of regret in 1941, it has been the United States.

Percy Spender

Percy Spender was a barrister, and an experienced minister when he took over the Department of External Affairs. He was well known for brutally efficient and well prepared. Spender spent sixteen months as foreign minister, and then seven years as Australia's Ambassador to Washington. Due to Australia's entwining with the US on foreign policy and defence, he occupied a position of considerable influence in Australian policy making and actions.

It is often easy, simple, or just lazy to seek a black and white ideology from these historical figures in questions such as; "Was Spender a Cold War Warrior?". But for those actually doing the work, ideology is often tempered, if not swamped by, pragmatism. The two big issues in 1950 were Australia's relationship with Asia, and the dual-pronged issue of Soviet Russia and Communist China.

Asia

Australian ideological "Realists" (as opposed to the liberal internationalism of the Optimists) wanted the Asian question resolved by European nations returning to their Asian colonies and slowly relinquishing them to self-governance over several generations. Pragmatism intruded quickly, the Indonesians overthrew the Dutch attempts to re-established the Dutch East Indies, Vietnam simmered as a low intensity conflict between the French and Vietnamese nationalists until it opened up as a vein in the Cold War. Spender's thinking on this issue can be found in a cablegram;

Geographically, Australia is next door to Asia and our destiny as a nation is irrevocably conditioned by what takes place in Asia. This means that our future depends to an ever increasing degree upon the political stability of our Asian neighbours, upon the economic well-being of Asian peoples, and upon the development of understanding and friendly relations between Australia and Asia. Whilst it remains true that peace is indivisible and that what takes place in any part of the world may affect us, our vital interests are closer to home. It is therefore in Asia and the Pacific that Australia should make its primary effort in the field of foreign relations.

The rising and menacing tide of Communism in the East presents us with a definite threat - and not a remote threat either - to our national existence. But the threat is also a challenge. Australia, who with New Zealand has the greatest direct interest in Asia of all Western peoples, must develop a dynamic policy towards neighbouring Asian countries, whose people we must live with, not only to-day and to-morrow, but for all times. We should give leadership to developments in that area.

This leadership saw itself expressed in Spender's Colombo Plan. This was the Commonwealth's answer to this issue through a Co-operative Economic Development in South and Southeast Asia. Spender took on this issue closely and became the chief architect of it. As negotiations were continuing on the Colombo Plan it became known amongst as the Spender Plan. Despite a long period of gestation before being accepted, it grew to include non-Commonwealth countries with the US joining as a donor in 1951 and Indonesia as a recipient in 1953.

The United States

The constant dichotomy in Australian foreign policy is Australia's dislike and inability to act in its own interests outside of its relationship with the current superpower. For instance, the Colombo Plan, was a Commonwealth project initially only targeting Commonwealth nations. This fear and paralysis of foreign policy is the Australian political cringe. Spender was not immune to it, like Menzies he sought solace in a relationship with super-powers;

This in no way implies a lack of recognition of the extreme importance the Government attaches to our continued intimate association with the British Commonwealth; on the contrary, it reinforces it. It must be made stronger, not weaker, Commonwealth relations themselves strikingly manifest the movement of the world's centre towards the East. Of the eight countries of the Commonwealth, there is not one without vital territorial and strategic interests in either the Pacific or the Indian Ocean. The location of the forthcoming Commonwealth Conference at Colombo reflects the importance attached to this area.

This Conference, it is to be hoped, will produce a positive contribution by Commonwealth countries towards securing the peace of the world. And in our deliberations we should not forget - Australia is certainly not likely to do so - how much our security has depended in the past on the friendly and generous assistance of the United States of America. The events of the last war are too close for that. The United States is the greatest Pacific power. Her policy towards Asia is accordingly of supreme importance to Australia's future.

Spender recognized early on that the Cold War was an economic one, and that prosperity of Asia was important in deterring communism from moving south. He carried no confidence in the United Nations, and removed that institution from his policies. Spender also wanted a Pacific Pact with the US, one that would become, "Somewhat the same relationship as exists within the British Commonwealth.". This is the Great and Powerful friends doctrine in a nutshell, worthy of Billy Hughes, Robert Menzies and John Curtin. Australia sub-ordinates its foreign policy decision making to the current super-power in return for defence commitments and economic advantages. Nice in theory, but a failure in practice. Super-powers play power politics, and those in the weaker position get railroaded.

The 1950s also saw the establishment of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) which bound American and European defence and security commitments. There was the desire by Spender to have a similar type of treaty in the Pacific. Spender initially had no success in trying to get Menzies, the British, or the American State Department interested in a Pacific Pact. The opening of hostilities in Korea, and the sudden success of the Chinese invasion through North Korea helped change the level of interest. Spender leapt on the opportunity to show how good an ally Australia could be and quickly committed Australian troops to Korea before Britain could.

The next year, US envoy, John Foster Dulles came to Australia to take part in talks that would end up being the ANZUS Treaty. The United States was only six years out from defeating Japan in the Central Pacific and was no facing expansionist policies from both Soviet Russia and China. The concern that there would be another World War which encompassed fronts in Europe, Africa and Asia were quite real. The United State sought to stabilise any possible global conflict by securing a peace treaty with Japan and setting up the terms of involvement with Australia, New Zealand and the Phillipines.

The British were initially upset at being left out of the negotiations, and Spender took pains to tell Dulles that despite what was heard from London, Dulles should focus on Australian words and commitment. However, both the United States and Britain saw value in the treaty for stopping what John Curtin had done in 1942. Curtin removed Australian troops in the Middle East, and brought them back to Australia despite the wishes of Churchill and Roosevelt for those troops to remain in the Middle East.

This was mirrored in British policy when the British Chief of Staff, Field Marshall John Slim came to Australia in 1951 asking for an Australian commitment to an expeditionary force in the Middle East should their be global conflict with Soviet Russia. Eventually Menzies gave that commitment to Britain.

Tussle

Australian Prime Ministers have always been strongly involved in foreign policy, often dominating it despite the existence of a foreign minister. Menzies was no exception, he had a strong opinion of what the world should be like. In a short period Percy Spender had negotiated the Colombo Plan and the ANZUS Treaty. Both area's that Menzies was not particularly interested in. Menzies was also concerned that these triumphs from Spender were a challenge to Menzies' leadership.

Menzies decided to assert his strength in foreign policy over Spender, mocking him for thinking that a communist threat may come from Asia and that there was the potential for the domino theory to exist. Menzies recommitted Australia to fighting for the civilisation in Europe and Middle East, rather than Asia. Spender's focus on Asia was marginalised in Australian foreign policy.

Spender retired from the Menzies Cabinet and took a post as Australia's Ambassador in Washington. It does not appear that he was sacked by Menzies, but it is more likely he did not have the numbers to challenge Menzies for the leadership of the Liberal Party and decided to take a position far away from Canberra.

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North Korea today is by all accounts a fairly unpleasant place to live; short on food, big on tyranny, and with a psychotic musical marionette for a leader.  Amongst the political class, however, it is like a soothing aromatherapeutic balm of gravitas and consensus.  North Korea is a rogue state run by evil men with nuclear weapons.  Everyone agrees, which is why a recent essay by Bruce Cumings in the London Review of Books is so refreshing.

It's a scholarly tour of the recent history of the nation, that reminds the reader how entangled the US already was on the Korean peninsula leading up to the Korean War.  Unlike say Kuwait, or Somalia, where the US inserted itself as a white knight, in Korea the US was already there in the wake of the Japanese defeat in WWII.

The American role since 1945 raises another enormous problem of balance and bias, beginning with the simple fact that Rhee, Park and the KCIA's Kim would not have come to power without American backing, and continuing with the common assumption that the US has been an innocent bystander for the past sixty years, having nothing to do with the nature of either Korean regime. Rhee was 70 in 1945, a patriot of the old school who would have been a leading politician in a right-wing regime, perhaps, but had no real political base in the country. In August 1945, the State Department recommended to the American occupation command that Park and Kim be purged for their servile collaboration with Japan (Park got a gold watch from the puppet [Chinese] emperor P'u Yi). Five years later, the US joined the Korean War and carpet-bombed the North until every man, woman and child was living in a tunnel or a cave. Five years after that war ended, the US installed nuclear weapons in the South and kept them there until 1991. Any rudimentary attempt at balance must account for these well-known facts.

This is accompanied by a partisanship more usually associated with another much talked about expeditionary force: he considers Clinton to be the only US President with a worthwhile Korea policy.

There are a few disappointing moments where partisanship disintegrates into boorish culture war - one would think that an academic at the University of Chicago would be able to look up the meaning of "defeat in detail" rather than dismiss it parenthetically - but I still found it a good read.  His similarly partisan 2003 breakdown of the North's nuclear capability is also interesting.

I have long contended that Australian prosperity will come through Indonesia and vice versa. I was glad to see that QANTAS is buying a twenty percent stake in Indonesia's AdamAir . Though it may be prompted in part by Singapore's unruly airline regulation schemes, it is recognition that Indonesia's market is not only growing, but that Australian business has confidence in its economy and legal systems. Indonesia has come a long way since the corruption of the Suharto regime.

Market economies tend to max out GDP per capita as it consumes the entire population into the economic effort. Indonesia has a population of approximately 220 Billion. It is highly likely, if Indonesia continues on the path of a free-market democracy, that in fifty years time it will rival Japan for GDP and economic activity. This will place it somewhere between seven and ten times the size of the Australian economy.

One of the benefits is that we will have a multi-trillion dollar economy right on our northern doorstep to trade with. There is the added advantage of not only regional interests in economic, political and martial stability, but also in both nations prospering. If Australia is going to pursue bi-lateral trade agreements, it should create a genuine free trade agreement with Indonesia.

Not managed trade, but free trade.

Currently Australia and Indonesia are largely complementary economies, and a free trade agreement without any barrier to trade would help both nations on the path to increasing prosperity.

There are other benefits to Indonesia prosperity. A wealthy Indonesia with its political stability predicated on trading and democracy will seek regional stability in its foreign affairs. A far cry from the sabre-rattling, nationalist and arbitrary policies of Sukarno and Suharto.

Indonesia will most likely pass us in defence capability, but if it is a democratic nation that we have strong economic ties this is not a cause for concern. Especially if both our large economies are entwined. Stability will be demanded between the two nations by business leaders and consumers.

Canada and New Zealand also have benefits of being in a benign region. Canada spends approximately 1.2% GDP on its military. This is barely enough to cover salary inflation for its service men and women. Canada's vulnerabilities are protected by the American military behemoth, why should Canada over-fund?

New Zealand is in a similar situation. Australia has a regionally dominant military which covers both Australia's and New Zealand's vulnerabilities. Why should New Zealand maintain an air force with long range strike aircraft when Australia has the capability to cover that possibility.

It will be the same with a prosperous Indonesia for Australia. All our geographic vulnerabilities involve the air-sea gap between us and Indonesia. As the Suharto era Indonesia military retire, or are kicked out, a new generation of Indonesians will rise through the ranks. Rationality will replace dictatorship corruption and involvement in civil affairs. Strong defence ties between Australia and Indonesia will ensure the South Pacific is an area of political, economic and martial stability.

The problem of establishing a perfect civil constitution depends upon the problem of law-governed external relations among nations and cannot be solved until the latter is.

Immanuel Kant

That quote is from Immanuel Kant's Idea for a Universal History with Cosmopolitan Purpose: Seventh Principle which Lee brought to my attention.

Kant argues that natural state of nature for mankind, and nations, is a brutal state of freedom. Where individuals and states act in arbitrary and violent means in order to preserve their perfect freedom and autonomy of action.

To Kant a perfect civil constitution is impossible while there are outside pressures on it, as the permanent state of war, or preparation for war is ultimately destabilising as the state bends the individual to the state's will.

Kant concludes;

As long as states will use all their resources for their vain and violent designs for expansion and thus will continually hinder the slow efforts toward the inner shaping of the minds of their citizens, and even withdraw from their citizens all encouragement in this respect, we cannot hope for much because a great exertion by each commonwealth on behalf of the education of their citizens is required for this goal.

Every pretended good that is not grafted upon a morally good frame of mind is nothing more than a pretence and glittering misery. Mankind will probably remain in this condition until, as I have said, it has struggled out of the chaotic condition of the relations among its states.

International liberalism's answer to this conundrum is meta-national institutions for nations to air their grievances. It attempts to replace violence with direct communication. This philosophy grew out of the depravities of World War I and World War II where violence between the nations consumed the whole globe.

Statesmen such as Woodrow Wilson and Australia's Doc Evatt were heavily involved in the forming of meta-national institutions such as the League of Nations and United Nations. Doc Evatt and John Burton often took the principle of brutal and honest communication to extremes, shocking diplomats from other nations in their plain talk.

The other side to international liberalism is power politics. This seeks to replace communication with sheer power in terms of military and economic might backing up diplomatic movements. The two purist players in power politics are the United States and France, the latter following the Gaullist tradition of foreign policy. Unsurprisingly the Americans and French butt heads often.

The neo-conservative movement in the United States has derided the United Nations as irrelevant. Ironically the United Nations itself often served as an institution for factions in its membership to push their interests. Wars were fought for instance in Korea with the United Nations against North Korea and China.

Power politics has left the Middle East in a maelstrom benefiting the control and collapse of power to the central governments of the United States, Iran and Saudi Arabia. While leaving Iraq and Afghanistan without an enforceable civil constitution. They exist in a vacuum of civil stability.

Is there a third way, or are we just left to hope that trade and globalisation will smooth out the wrinkles between nation-states?

Engagement

Paul Keating and Gareth Evans undertook a foreign policy known as Asian Engagement . This was a radical break from past Australian foreign policy doctrine which I don't think has been fully appreciated yet by political commentators.

The Howard and Hawke governments, as well as every government prior until Billy Hughes practised the Great and Powerful Friends doctrine [GAPF] of foreign policy. It was first developed by Billy Hughes at Versailles in 1919 when he used Australia's efforts of supporting Britain in WWI to get a seat at the table.

He was challenged by Woodrow Wilson to explain why Australia, a dominion of the British Empire, should be represented at the table by Hughes and not by Britain's foreign minister, Lloyd George. Hughes replied that he; " represented 60,000 dead. "

Once gaining a seat Hughes did not advance Australian interests, he advanced British interests. Britain was a huge trading market for Australia and he was worried that if Australia was disloyal, then Canada, and in particular its wheat, would get favoured access to British markets.

Hughes was also concerned that Australian security depended on the Royal Navy. So he subsumed Australian military and foreign policy to replicate British interests - uncritically - in order to guarantee British security for Australia and access to British markets.

It was a bit of a furphy. Britain knew it could not protect Australia if there was simultaneous conflicts in Europe and Asia. Australia knew it too. Australian subservience in foreign policy did not get us any improved access to British markets either. Australians found new markets to export into - as entrepreneurs do.

All The Way With LBJ!

That was Harold Holt's cry when he promised increased Australian involvement in Vietnam. It is indicative of the uncritical nature of our relationship with our Great and Powerful Friend which after World War II was the United States, not Britain.

John Curtin is often acknowledged for his courage in defying Winston Churchill and uttering the words in 1941;

Australia looks to America, free of any pangs as to our traditional links or kinship with the United Kingdom.

This is the same policy - just swapping Britain for America. Since then Menzies followed it, though grudgingly with America, seeking to return to Britain's fold through the Commonwealth. Both Fraser and Hawke did; and now Howard, who returned to the policy with an almost violent thud. Menzies and Curtin could not have scripted Howard's doctrine and its perceived benefits more closely.

Howard has added another permutation to this policy, namely the complete absence of power politics. The Howard government is highly uncritical of the United States, even when there has been plenty of room for meaningful criticism. Howard has acted in a similar way with other countries, particularly China.

The Complete Approach

Asian Engagement is predicated on several premises;

• Australia is located in the South Pacific and South-East Asia
• We are a regional military and economic power
• Our main trading partners are regional (our biggest is Japan)
• Regional stability and prosperity will come through the complete political, military, economic, social and cultural engagement of the nations in the region.
• Australian power and influence can be advanced beyond the region through this engagement doctrine.

It is a kind of diplomatic globalisation where the nations enmesh to such a point that violence, warfare and cutting of communication is unthinkable. The radical nature of it is not only in how Australia projects itself, but also the confidence Australia has in being able to project its identity as well as absorb the identities of others into itself.

This policy is an improvement over the Great and Powerful Friends doctrine and in my opinion is superior for countering terrorism than a policy of hard power and the GAPF policy. I have also argued for the defence style of engagement that is inherent in the Engagement doctrine which would both secure our region while simultaneously advancing our interests.

Back To Kant

Neither of these four foreign policy methods solve the problem that Kant proposed that the constant violence and preparing for violence between nations must first be solved before a perfect civil constitution can be constructed. I believe that the Engagement doctrine is the superior one of all the options.

However, I still maintain that a policy of strong defence capability is necessary.

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Paul Dibbs has an interesting article in the SMH on the changing power relationships in the Middle East and Northern Asia titled; As one nuclear flashpoint reaches a lull, another simmers away . Two paragraphs on South Korea's relationship with its neighbours caught my attention.

Paul Dibbs writes;

Japan's relations with South Korea are at a low point, partly over Japan's view of the history of World War II but also because of territorial disputes, which Seoul has elevated to the level of national pride, threatening the use of military force. This is occurring when, from Tokyo's perspective, South Korea is drifting from the orbit of the US alliance and getting uncomfortably close to China, as well as appeasing North Korea.

South Korea has been a neo-conservative dream. While practicing Asian-capitalism, South Korean youth are moving toward a credit and consumption based economy. Of the North and South-East Asian nations I thought it would be the first to adopt an American/Australian style of economy.

South Korea has also chucked out autocratic rule and in 1988 established a multi-party liberal democracy with firm separation of powers. If the neo-conservative view of foreign policy holds, then South Korea should be forging closer ties to the global trading system within US hegemony - as Australia has done - rather than moving toward China.

I tended to think of South Korea's relationship to North Korea as similar between West and Eastern Germany where ultimately the more modern, wealthier and democratic nation bought its former enemy - amalgamating them into their political and economic system - at great pain to themselves.

The North Koreans desperately need it since China and Russia have discovered it is more profitable to trade with the west than to prop up ideologically compatible but unsustainable isolationist regimes.

This speech in 2003 by Alexander Downer mimics many of the conservative view points of current Australian foreign policy and methodology but contains genuine concern for Australian interests;

Our top four trading partners, for example - Japan, United States, China and South Korea - would be directly affected by any security crisis [on the Korean Peninsula].

However, as per Australian GAPF foreign policy doctrine, Australia participates mainly through its bilateral relationship with the US.

As to Dibbs' claim that South Korea is drifting away from the US and to China seems to be predicated on South Korea not following or adopting US policy toward North Korea.

For instance this article by Lee Kyo-kwan in the Asia Time titled, Seoul and Washington closer to divorce ;

South Korea and the US have drifted so far apart on North Korea policy there is now speculation the longtime partners are getting close to divorce. ...

It is believed US officials no longer trust their South Korean counterparts on North Korea policy.

Kyo-kwan lists several instances where Roh has opposed US policy and pressure toward the Jong-Il regime. It appears the political conflict in South Korea over such a path is a similar one facing Australian foreign policy makers - accept US hegemony in foreign policy and work inside it, or strike out on an independent path;

In South Korea, the progressive camp continues to seek a security policy much more independent of the United States regardless of concern over the weakening partnership, while the conservative camp strives to resurrect the struggling alliance.

South Korea is the tenth largest economy in the world, we may have to ask ourselves, just how big does a country have to be to strike out on a foreign policy path that is independent to the US?

John Ley in 1921 makes a curious statement in a parliamentary debate about foreign policy. It is essentially dated but it equates a pre-modern form of the great and powerful friends doctrine of foreign policy as being constitutionally restricted.

From Mark McKenna's Australian Republicanism: A reader , Ley is quoted;

The next thing I want to point out is that in addition to breaking the constitutional tie, the platform of the Labor Party goes further. It says, "All bills passed by Parliament to receive assent on advice of Australian ministers only."

That means that an Australian parliament should govern our foreign policy, quite apart from England, and it is a constitutional departure of very considerable importance.

If that is carried out, it stands for the separation of Australia from the Empire.

Obviously Australia and Australian politicians out-grew that notion that Australian parliament should not be responsible for making foreign policy but is points to a mentality of the time.

When modern Republicans point to the positives, the negatives, the faults and the flagrant problems with the Australian Constitution, it is important to point out the prevailing mentality that it was created and ratified under, and how different the modern Australian identity is in comparison to that.

That Australian foreign policy would be considered to be vested in the constitution monarchy as dependent on Britain is farcical in 2006. However it was taken seriously by Thomas Ley that foreign policy was a constitutional issue that lay in the domain of Britain - not Australia.

Legislative independence came slowly to Australia, and it was the mind-set of the likes of Ley that prolonged it. Independence is hard to define, but a strict definition of political independence is being able to make laws that are repugnant to other constitutions and legislative bodies.

In Australia's case this means being able to make laws that are repugnant to British Parliament. Despite the constitutional monarchical system, the monarch is a constitutional one, and must take advice of the Prime Minister through the Governor-General.

As George V was when Joe Scullin recommended that Isaac Isaacs become Governor-General, the first Australian born to hold that post. The King and British Parliament were not happy about Scullin's recommendation and sought to dissuade him. Scullin's stance was simple, he would call an election on the issue if the King did not approve Isaacs.

The Governor-General (not in council) retains implied reserve powers and this is where the hole in our constitutional system is. Through this a despotic King can wield influence if they desire. An explicit reading of the constitutional gives the Governor-General the ability to run the Armed Forces, to appoint and remove cabinet members, dissolve parliament and arbitrarily hold parliamentary sessions.

Consequently it is difficult to determine when Australia did become independent from Britain constitutionally and legislatively. At Versailles when Billy Hughes got a seat at the table? Or the Statute of Westminster which was not ratified by Curtin until 1942 despite being enacted in London in 1931?

Or maybe the Australia Act of 1986 which severed all ties between the Australian legislative and judicature with Britain (ie Privy Council).

It has been a slow process and not because the constitutional and legislative tools aren't there but also because of the Australian mentality such as Ley's persisting. Britain has not been tyrannous toward us, so it has been easy to tolerate the less than optimal arrangements.

Australia has also prospered as a nation and rarely been torn by internal strife and dissent which makes a people look inward at drastic improvements; politically and economically.

By the same token Australia has been extremely innovative democratically outside of the constitutional system in areas of electoral technology such as the secret ballot, female suffrage and proportional/preference voting.

Australians are a republican and democratic people. They will continue the on-going process of political improvement - of which the constitution is one aspect requiring modernisation.