Montesquieu's writings on the doctrine of separation of powers heavily influenced the American founding fathers such as Madison and Hamilton. The American Presidential system has proven to be one of the most stable and clean political systems. Yet other Presidential systems have proven open to usurpation by dictators and tyrants.

The Parliamentary system in comparison was an emergent system that grew out of the need to route power away from a Monarch while still maintaining their ceremonial authority. It mixes the executive and legislative arms of government, yet has proven a fairly stable form of liberal democracy.

It is fair to say that an future evolutionary form of Australian Government, at the state and federal level will have to incorporate a parliamentary system. There are many well established conventions and the Australian people are familiar with the system. Consequently, the positives and negatives of the parliamentary system need to be understood so any evolutionary system encourages the former and inhibits the latter.

Checks and Balances

Montesquieu divided the political sphere into sovereign and administrative. The monarch occupied the sovereign component and the administrative was dominated by the executive, legislative and judicial arms. This is the separation of powers. They are defined by;

• The executive executes laws.
• The legislative makes laws.
• The judicial interprets laws.

For example in a libertarian civic society. The Executive runs the police force. The Legislative makes the laws that the police force enforces and the Judicial interprets those laws to determine any punitive measures against offenders. That is government at its most simplest. Nothing about health, education, roads, child-care, tax-breaks, etc etc etc.

Oneness

An aspect of Montesquieu's political philosophy is that the separation of powers is at its most strongest when no individual can occupy a position in more than one branch of government at the one time. In Madison's implementation of this philosophy in the American republic, separation of powers is the means by which liberty is preserved and government's predilection to tyranny inhibited.

From the Federalist Paper No.47;

One of the principal objections inculcated by the more respectable adversaries to the Constitution, is its supposed violation of the political maxim, that the legislative, executive, and judiciary departments ought to be separate and distinct. In the structure of the federal government, no regard, it is said, seems to have been paid to this essential precaution in favour of liberty. The several departments of power are distributed and blended in such a manner as at once to destroy all symmetry and beauty of form, and to expose some of the essential parts of the edifice to the danger of being crushed by the disproportionate weight of other parts. No political truth is certainly of greater intrinsic value, or is stamped with the authority of more enlightened patrons of liberty, than that on which the objection is founded.

The accumulation of all powers, legislative, executive, and judiciary, in the same hands, whether of one, a few, or many, and whether hereditary, self-appointed, or elective, may justly be pronounced the very definition of tyranny.

Madison saw that having those department's wholly separate from each other an operating in isolation was just as dangerous to liberty as having their powers collapsed into one person. Madison sought to tap the natural negative passions of humanity in the American implementation of Montesquieu's separation of powers, so that the three arms of government were balanced against each other in a kind of natural harmony. Where each arm would be maintaining a watchdog on each other. Protecting their own arm's influence and power while ensuring that the other arms do not gain more influence and power - especially at their own expense.

The magistrate in whom the whole executive power resides cannot of himself make a law, though he can put a negative on every law; nor administer justice in person, though he has the appointment of those who do administer it. The judges can exercise no executive prerogative, though they are shoots from the executive stock; nor any legislative function, though they may be advised with by the legislative councils. The entire legislature can perform no judiciary act, though by the joint act of two of its branches the judges may be removed from their offices, and though one of its branches is possessed of the judicial power in the last resort. The entire legislature, again, can exercise no executive prerogative, though one of its branches constitutes the supreme executive magistracy, and another, on the impeachment of a third, can try and condemn all the subordinate officers in the executive department.

In the United States we see this balancing act in the appointment of Judges to the Supreme Court. The Executive nominates judges. The Legislative has to confirm those appointments.

Governor-General and Prime Minister

In the Australian Parliamentary systems, the Executive is the Governor or Governor-General. The Legislative is the upper and lower houses. In the case of the States it is the Legislative Assemblies and Legislative Councils. For the Commonwealth Government it is the Senate and House of Representatives.

Parliamentary systems have an Executive Council that is composed of the chair and the Executive Cabinet. The Governor or Governor-General is the head of the Executive Council. The Prime Minister or Premier heads the Executive Cabinet who advises the Governor-General or Governor respectively. The cabinet is composed of senior ministers in the majority government such as the Treasurer and Foreign Minister.

A formal reading of the Australian Constitution would have the reader believe all Executive Authority is contained in the Governor-General as the Queen's representative. There is no mention of the position of Prime Minister. Section's 60 through 62 contain the mention of the Executive Council;

61. The executive power of the Commonwealth is vested in the Queen and is exercisable by the Governor-General as the Queen's representative, and extends to the execution and maintenance of this Constitution, and of the laws of the Commonwealth.

62. There shall be a Federal Executive Council to advise the Governor-General in the government of the Commonwealth, and the members of the Council shall be chosen and summoned by the Governor-General and sworn as Executive Councillors, and shall hold office during his pleasure.

63. The provisions of this Constitution referring to the Governor-General in Council shall be construed as referring to the Governor-General acting with the advice of the Federal Executive Council.

The Governor-General is largely a ceremonial position whose Executive powers don't extend far beyond commissioning governments, dissolving parliament and writs for elections. There is also the gnarly reserve powers. The implied power of the Governor-General to dissolve an elected government. This occurred when John Kerr removed the Gough Whitlam Government in 1975, and in NSW when Phillip Game removed the government of Jack Lang during 1932.

The informal power of the Executive arm of government is completely tied up in the Prime Minister and Executive Cabinet. Australia practices one of the most absolute forms of party discipline, consequently most of the Executive power is tied into the Prime Minister. Backbenchers are nothing more than numbers for the policies of the Prime Minister when bills come to parliamentary vote. This is true for the House of Representatives and Senate.

A Foot On Each Bank of the Murrumbidgee

The Australian Prime Minister and State Premiers have a foot in two arms of government; the Executive and Legislative. The Prime Minister and Premiers have control over what laws are enacted, how those laws are funded and how they are implemented. Courtesy of party discipline, the will of the Prime Minister is rarely, if ever crossed.

This congruence of the Executive and Legislative powers is the weakness in the Parliamentary system and where liberty requires the maximum protection. A Prime Minister can write a tyrannous law. Through party discipline can have it passed in the House of Representatives and Senate. Through convention the ceremonial Governor-General passes it. The Prime Minister, through the offices of the Executive; such as the Australian Federal Police, Australian Defence Force, Immigration Department etc; can then execute that law in an arbitrary manner.

We might scoff thinking we are a reasonable people, with a reasonable government, and that this it will never happen in Australia. But Australians are human too, and suffer from the negative passions as much as anyone else from other nations. Australian government history is littered with instances of tyranny against minorities and individuals.

Violence of Faction

Party discipline is very strong in Australia. Conscience voting in the House of Representatives and Assemblies is almost unheard of. Another issue with parties or factions is their potential violence. Once they reach the majority in government, they can use the monopoly on violence and coercion of the government to punish their opponents. Violence can be open, and include baton wielding police and military; it can also be insidious. Other examples of the violence of faction include;

• Abolition of the secret ballot
• Electoral Fraud
• Malapportionment

In the parliamentary system faction can also play a positive as well as negative role. As scrymarch noted, factions can be used to tack upstream against the political opinion of the majority. The change from protectionist policies to economic rationalism, and the volatility those policies entailed, is a good example of this.

Ironically it is likely that the factional structure of the majority government is what keeps the Prime Minister position from becoming a permanent dictator. Westminster systems suffer from a slow oscillation in the change of government, but this preferable to a usurper illegally claiming the Executive position.

The negative passions of humans include the desire for more power, and the desire to rule others in an absolute manner. In a liberal democracy the closest thing to this is the Prime Minister or Premier position. For every Prime Minister there is a Parliament full of Representatives who desire that position. A Prime Minister that reaches too far will be challenged by others wanting the throne.

The Prime Minister is not an elected position, those that occupy it do so at the pleasure and patience of the majority party. A President is a singular elected position and more open to being usurped for it. This does not mean that Parliamentary government is superior to a Presidential system. Both have their advantages and disadvantages.

Protecting Liberty

The straddling of the Prime Minister and Executive Cabinet across two arms of government is a cause for concern. It makes the enacting and execution of tyrannous laws particularly easy. In the case of minorities and individuals who have no representation in Parliament, it places them at undue risk to be subject to such laws.

The Australian Republic must first protect liberty. The operation of government is a secondary concern. For the purposes of equity, the Governor-General position must be popularly elected and have the confidence and legitimacy that stems from it. By the same token the Governor-General and Prime Minister must not be squabbling over who has the real Executive authority in the Westminster government.

Taking the protection of liberty and a popularly elected Governor-General as starting points this suggests the role of the Governor-General should be the enforcement of a Bill of Rights. Stopping repugnant and tyrannous legislation that comes from the Parliament. The Bill of Rights will serve to codify the legislation that the Governor-General can veto. If the Governor-General steps outside of that authority, it is impeachment time.

This role for the Governor-General protects the rights of the individual, but does not take in the potential for that role to be polluted by party discipline. Another arm of government is needed, a Fourth Estate in addition to the Executive, Legislative and Judicial. These are the Ratifiers. This is group of individuals, approximately one percent of the population at any time, that are chosen by sortition to give their vote to a particular bill.

The Ratifiers cannot vote yes for a bill, they can only vote no or abstain. An opt-out form of bill voting. They also do not contribute to the debate on a bill as Ratifiers. they can contribute as citizens, but not as Ratifiers. Being a Ratifier on a bill infers no title or authority. They are an anonymous group. A secret ballot for a legislative bill.

The Ratifiers are there as a statistical weight against party politics to stop truly repugnant legislation from ever getting to the Governor-General.

cam

A race condition in software is a bug where two concurrent systems act independently but also interdependently to provide unexpected outcomes. The Australian Constitution contains a potential race-condition between the Governor-General and Prime Minister.

The Australian Constitution requires that the Governor-General in Council must follow the advice of the Executive Council. This is the Executive Cabinet which is headed by the Prime Minister. Yet Section 61 lays all formal executive power in the Governor-General;

The executive power of the Commonwealth is vested in the Queen and is exercisable by the Governor-General as the Queen's representative, and extends to the execution and maintenance of this Constitution, and of the laws of the Commonwealth.

In Section 5 the Governor-General has the authority to dissolve parliament, and then not let any parliament to site for twelve months. The Governor-General could also appoint, and refuse to appoint ministers;

The Governor-General may appoint officers to administer such departments of State of the Commonwealth as the Governor-General in Council may establish.

Such officers shall hold office during the pleasure of the Governor-General. They shall be members of the Federal Executive Council, and shall be the Queen's Ministers of State for the Commonwealth.

So the Governor-General can appoint ministers in departments the Executive Council have advised the Governor-General in Council to exist. Section 64 was the clause used by John Kerr to remove the Whitlam government.

The two faced Governor-General

There are two constitutional faces to the Governor-General. The Governor-General and the Governor-General in Council . The former has the entire formal executive power in their office, including command of the military. The latter must take the advice of the Executive Cabinet and can be removed from their position by the Executive Cabinet. Yet the same position can sack a government, remove the ministers and call an election.

This is the race condition.

There have been two dismissals in Australian political history. The Whitlam dismissal at the federal level, and the dismissal of Jack Lang in NSW by Governor Phillip Game in 1932. There is no guarantee that the next Prime Minister faced with the possible dissolution of their government try to sack the Governor-general first.

If Australia does fall into dictatorship, it will be done constitutionally by a Governor-General with flat-out appeals to the constitutionality of the process of usurpation. This would also be impossible without the military's backing.

The whole reason the Australian system doesn't fall over is through the principle of responsible government. But the past has shown that governments do not follow that principle when it is not on their interests. Some of the events that led to the Whitlam dismissal were because responsible government was not adhered to.

Constitutional rejuvenation, either as a republic, or just constitutional care-taking must force the Governor-General or President to only have one constitutional face - one without any ambiguity at all.

cam

How do you enforce checks and balances in a parliamentary system?

Separating Powers in a Parliamentary System

The separation of powers is a mess in the parliamentary system. Because the executive cabinet can be drawn from both upper and lower houses (in the states that have both), then there is no clean constitutional check on the executive cabinet by the Senate. Not withstanding party discipline muddying the waters further.

So a simple delineation would be to make Senators ineligible for positions on the Executive Cabinet or Executive Council. Senators would then be Senators and purely legislative rather than a mix of Executive/Legislative.

But what of the rise of a-constitutionality that has been appearing. One of the problems is that the founding document of any government is its constitution. In the case of parliaments like the federal parliament and many of the states, such as NSW, Victoria and Queensland; the constitution is a singular document that determines the authority and sovereignty of not only parliament, but also the three branches of government - the executive, the legislative and judicial.

Supposedly the judicial interprets constitutional limits on legislative law-making and executive implementation of those laws. But they require challenges to be brought to them first. They are passive. In the meantime legislation that is unconstitutional or of dubious constitutional stature is implemented anyway.

A good example of this is the Workchoices legislation. There is nothing in the federal constitution which gives the federal parliament authority over industrial relations. It relies on the tenuous interpretation of the corporations power. The constitutionality of the legislation is being challenged by NSW, Western Australia and Tasmania. Yet the legislation has become law in the meantime.

A similar issue arises with rights. This is a basic principle of Republican governance that there are individual political rights. These are basic precepts that cannot be legislated over, nor ignored when executing law.

Governor-General

Since the Governor-General is a pretty candy on a stick, it makes sense to give the Governor-General something to do in terms of a political role. This would need to be an area of modern government that is not being done and needs attention.

Since the Governor-General is the final arbiter of all things executive, it makes sense that the Governor-General should veto legislation that contravenes a Bill of Rights and the Constitution.

It will need to be made plain that the Governor-General cannot veto legislation because the bill costs too much, has too much debt in it, or creates nationalises Randwick Rugby Club. The Governor-General can only veto legislation that is unconstitutional.

Any legislation that the Governor-General veto is sent back down to the Senate (who now doesn't have any executive members in it at all) who can override the Governor-General with a 75% super-majority. This will stop a repugnant Governor-General thwarting genuine legislation.

The Senate will also be able to start criminal proceedings into the Governor-General after achieving a super-majority. This will have to be ratified by the House of Representatives who would also need a super-majority. This will stop factional retribution against the Governor-General.

That covers the check and balance between legislative and executive in relation to unconstitutional legislation being created.

There may also need to be a clause in the constitution where the Governor-General, instead of veto-ing the legislation can pass it immediately to the High-court to judge on its constitutionality.

Again this could be over-ridden by a Senate super-majority. This would stop repugnant legislation being passed and then being decided five years later that it is unconstitutional and no longer valid.

Governor-Magistrate

The other problem is when the Executive acts, rather than legislates, in a manner that is repugnant to the constitution, to political rights , to liberty or even just to common law (ie corruption or delinquence of duty).

This is another check and balance that is needed in the system. The Governor_Magistrate is a mix of Chief Magistrate and Vice-President. The Governor-Magistrate is the head of the Senate and can cast a vote when the Senate is tied.

The Governor-Magistrate can also initiate commissions into the Executive. These have to pass the Senate with a majority. This is the proactive check and balance on how the Cabinet is executing laws.

Run-down

• Governor-General is elected
• Governor-Magistrate is elected
• Governor-General cannot pass legislation that is repugnant to the constitution (including bill of rights)
• Senate can over-ride the Governor-General's veto
• Senate can bring criminal proceedings against the Governor-General which must get a super-majority in the house to proceed
• Governor-Magistrate is head of the Senate and has deciding vote in a tie
• Governor-Magistrate can initiate commissions into the conduct of the Executive Cabinet
• Senate must pass any commission before it can proceed

I would prefer if the candidates for Governor-General and Governor-Magistrate didn't run on the same ticket, nor that it be party political, but it will be. I don't think this is a bad thing, just non-ideal.

My entry into the Constitution Fun Challenge. It has three separate branches and attempts to divide any power structure under a principle of elected, specialist and sortitionist.

This started out as a Westminster style system with some modifications that we have discussed in the past like a Rights Referee Governor-General. Then I added a People's Chamber in the house which was a quarter of the house; but I turned it into a sortitionist's body with only a couple of specialists left, with the Treasurer leading the house.

The Senate becomes a supra-national body, able to accept representation outside of Australia itself as needed. The Senate is also composed of elected specialists (ie politicians) and act as the main check on a separate executive.

The Executive contains the Governor-General and Cabinet. The Governor-Magistrate is like a vice-president, but is part of the Judicature. Kind of a mix between VP and Chief Magistrate. The GM is tasked with actively intervening in the executive's actions and setting forth commissions and inquiries. Probably needs some more refinement, but I like the active watchdog role on the executive. The Judicature also has a Citizens Council which is the sortitionist body for the Judicature.

The states get more of a role too, as a federalist system, they get the most involvement in the Judicature which watches the Executive (who corrodes state power the fastest).

Thanks to Avocadia for the use of his Bill of Rights which makes up section 2.8. This entry is incomplete and I will return to it next CFC.

1.Constitution

1. A constitution for the Republic of the Southern Seas.
2. This document defines the Commonwealth Government.
3. The constitution defines the responsibilities of the three equal, but separate, branches of Australian republican government; Executive, Legislative and Judicature.

2.Commons

1. The republic recognizes that the commons cannot be reduced or suspended; by referendum, emergency, or a declaration of war by parliament.
2. The republic recognizes that a citizen is any individual under the jurisdiction of the government of this constitution.
3. The republic recognizes that an individual's political rights are inviolable.
4. The republic recognizes that an elector is a citizen born in Australia, or an individual within the jurisdiction of Australia who is above the age of majority.
5. The republic recognizes that no election is legitimate without a secret ballot; where the ballot sheets are of uniform shape and colour; and where the elector's ballot is cast anonymously.
6. The political limits espoused in this constitution are not complete, and the limits on legislative, executive and juridical authority are far greater, however history has shown these political rights are the ones most commonly transgressed by corrupt and tyrannous government.
7. The Governor Magistrate has the authority to instigate criminal proceedings against the Governor-General, members of parliament or members of the judicature, should the commons be abrogated by an act of the Executive, bill of the Legislative, or legal decision of the Judicature.
8. The Executive shall execute no law; the Legislative shall make no law; and the Judicature shall endorse no law as constitutional; that:
   
   Freedom
   1. deprives an individual of life
   2. limits or deprives an individuals freedom to express their beliefs, opinions or lifestyle.
   3. limits or deprives an individual's freedom of movement
   4. limits or deprives an individual's freedom of association
   5. limits or deprives an individuals freedom to peacefully assemble with other individuals.
   6. limits or deprives an individuals right to peaceful protest.
      
      Liberty
   7. detains an individual indefinitely without charge.
   8. limits or removes an individuals right to have counsel with them upon arrest or questioning.
   9. limits or removes an individuals right to a writ of habeous corpus upon detention.
   10. back-dates punitive measures for an offence.
   11. permits an individual to be detained for longer than six months without trial or resolution
   12. enabling an individual to be tried for an offence more than once.
   13. limits or removes an individual's right to refuse law enforcement access to their property, or permission to search their person and property, unless there is a warrant issued to search specific property for evidence of a specific crime.
   14. limits or removes an individuals choice to divulge no information other than their identity, verbally, when under suspicion from law enforcement for a specific crime.
   15. limits, reduces or removes an individual's right to own property
   16. deprives the individual of property, or devalues an individual's property without fair exchange or consent.
       
       Equity
   17. discriminates against an individual on the basis of race, age, gender, sexual preference, wealth, health, religion, associations or prior criminal record.
   18. limits or removes equal treatment under the law for an individual on the basis of race, age, gender, sexual preference, wealth, health, religion, associations or prior criminal record.
   19. limits or removes access to government services for an individual on the basis of race, age, gender, sexual preference, wealth, health, religion, associations or prior criminal record.
       
       Democracy
   20. disenfranchises an elector.
   21. denies an elector representation
   22. denies an elector the ability to run for election
   23. reduces or removes an individual the ability to petition their representatives for a redress of grievances.
   24. abolishes the secret ballot
   25. increases the period between elections beyond eight years.
   26. criminalises, or outlaws a political party.
   27. removes access to the Public Service for parties with elected parliamentary members.

3.Executive

1. The Executive is the sole body in the republic authorised to execute laws.
2. The Executive shall, as demanded in this constitution, faithfully implement and execute the laws passed by the legislative.
3. The Executive shall, as demanded in this constitution, submit to juridical oversight of the execution of laws.

3.4.Governor General

1. The Governor General shall be elected by popular election.
2. The Governor-General cannot serve more than two terms of office or eight years, depending on which comes first.
3. The Governor-General shall veto any law, bill or act which contradicts the limits of Legislative authority in the commons.
4. The Governor-General shall veto any law that does not meet the holder's approval and return the law to the Legislative along with written objections.
5. The Governor-General is the head of the Executive Council.
6. The Governor-General shall nominate the Ministers that comprise the Executive Council.
7. The Governor-General shall nominate a Minister, to replace any Ministers removed by successful no-confidence motions in parliament, who has resigned, or replaced by the Governor-General's choice.
8. The Governor-General shall nominate the Ministerial Departments required to execute the laws passed by the legislative.
9. The Governor-General shall present, to a dual sitting of parliament with the Executive Council present, a report on the Executive Ministries.

3.5.Executive Council

1. The Executive Council shall consist of Ministers who head a Ministerial Department as constructed by Legislative bill.
2. ...

4.Legislative

1. The Legislative is the sole body in the republic authorised to make laws, acts and bills.
2. The Legislative shall make no law that persists beyond twenty-five years.
3. The Legislative shall be composed of two bodies; the Senate and House.
4. The Legislature shall not present a bill to the Governor-General to be signed into law unless both Senate and House have passed the exact same bill.

4.5.Senate

1. The Senate shall be composed of multi-member districts consisting of constituent states, territories and/or extra-national territories.
2. The Senate electoral districts shall be apportioned members based on population of the constituent districts.
3. A Senator cannot serve more than twenty-five years in Parliament.
4. The Senate shall conduct non-budgetary commissions and inquiries into the conduct of the Governor-General, Executive Council and Public Servants in the Executive Ministries.
5. The Senate shall conduct commissions and inquiries into the conduct of the Judicature.
6. The Senate shall, upon majority vote, recommend further investigations into the Executive to the Governor-Magistrate for conduct by the Citizens Council.
7. The Senate shall approve or reject any Judicial nominations.
8. The Senate shall approve or reject any Executive Council nominations.
9. The Senate shall not initiate any money bills.
10. The Senate shall not initiate any no-confidence votes on the non-elected members of the Executive Council.
11. The Senate shall be able to pass by two-thirds majority, no-confidence motions on non-elected members of the Executive Council.

4.6.House

1. The House shall be composed of two internal bodies, of which one will be elected, and the other chosen from the general population by sortition.
2. A House member cannot serve more than twenty five years in Parliament.
3. The elected members shall be known collectively as the House Elected Body and individually as House Electors.
4. The sortitionist members shall be known collectively as the House Citizens Body and individually as House Citizens.
5. The House elected body shall consist of a maximum of one House Elector for each state, and territory.
6. The Treasurer shall be chosen by majority in the House Elected Body as the head of the House.
7. The Treasurer shall chair, or delegate the position of chair, all inquiries and commissions into the budgetary needs and financial conduct of the Executive, Legislative and Judicature.
8. The Treasurer shall present each year, to a dual sitting of parliament with the Executive Council present, a report on the budget.
9. The House Citizens Body shall not consist of less than one sortitionist for each twenty thousand of population.
10. The House Citizens Body shall vote on all bills.
11. The House Citizens Body shall be chosen by lot each year.
12. A citizen who has been chosen for consecutive House Citizen Bodies shall be disqualified and another sortitionist, who is not a current, nor immediately prior member of the House Citizens Body, shall take their place.
13. A House Citizen shall be able to vote in absence.
14. A House Elector shall not vote in absence.
15. The House shall be able to pass by two-thirds majority, no-confidence motions on non-elected members of the Executive Council.
16. A House Citizen may introduce legislation, in person or anonymously.

4.7.Sergeant at Arms

1. ...

5.Judicature

5.1.Governor Magistrate

1. The Governor-Magistrate shall be appointed by the States.
2. The Governor-Magistrate cannot serve in office more than two terms of or eight years depending on which comes first.
3. The Governor-Magistrate can divert bills or acts, prior to their signing into law by the Governor-General, deemed to be of dubious constitutionality to the High Court to determine their constitutionality.
4. The Governor-Magistrate can recommend commissions and inquiries into the conduct of the Legislature for the Citizen's Council to conduct.
5. The Governor-Magistrate shall forward all Senatorial recommendations for commissions and inquiries into the Executive for the Citizen's Council to conduct.
6. The Governor-Magistrate shall present all findings of commissions and inquiries into the conduct of the Executive and Legislature to joint sittings of Parliament with the Executive Council present.

5.2.High Court

1. The High Court shall be the sole authority to interpret the constitution.
2. The High Court shall contain a Chief Justice and as many other Justices, but no less than two, as parliament determines necessary.
3. A Justice shall not serve on the High Court, for more than twenty-five years.
4. A Justice shall not serve on, or be appointed to, the High Court if they are above seventy years of age.

5.3.Citizens Council

1. The Council shall be composed of sortitionists chosen by lot from the states and territories.
2. A citizen who has been chosen for consecutive Citizen's Councils shall be disqualified and another sortitionist, who is not a current, nor immediately prior member of the Citizens Council, shall take their place.
3. The Council shall ensure fair access by citizenry to the data and documents produced by government.
4. The Council shall grant or reject; as well as oversee, freedom of information access by the citizenry.
5. The Council shall grant or reject, as well as oversee, national security access by the citizenry.
6. The Council shall conduct commissions and inquiries, as recommended by the Governor Magistrate, into the conduct of the Legislative.
7. The Council shall conduct all commissions and inquiries into ethics for the Legislative.
8. The Council shall conduct all commissions and inquires into corruption for the Legislative.

6.States

1. The States shall nominate a qualified Judge, by majority, to fill any vacancy in the High Court.
2. The States shall bring forward proceedings of impeachment against a member of the High Court who has approved into constitutional law legislation that abrogates the Commons.
3. Upon impeachment the decision shall only be over-turned by a super-majority of Senate and House.
4. ...

7.Other

1. Auditor General
2. Citizen Auditors
3. Referendum
4. Citizen Referenda