Australia is facing a federal election on October 9th with the two main parties having little to separate them in domestic and economic policy. Where the Liberal and Labor parties differ greatly is in foreign policy. The Liberal Party adheres to the "Great and Powerful Friends" doctrine while the Labor Party pursues the doctrine of "Asian Engagement".

Since the September 11th attacks on the United States, terrorism has been thrust to the fore as the dominant security issue facing western nations. Australia has not had a terrorist attack on its shores; but two attacks in Bali and Jakarta have occurred in Indonesia that can be construed as terrorist attacks against Australia. Consequently terrorism for Australia is a foreign policy issue. On this basis the competing foreign policies of the Liberal Party and Labor Party can be compared.

The Great and Powerful Friends Doctrine

The incumbent Liberal Party formed government as a coalition with the National Party and has held government in the Australian House of Representatives since 1996. The Liberal Party, led by Prime Minister John Howard, is largely a centrist party with socially conservative leanings. The Liberal foreign policy, the "great and powerful friends" doctrine, is a very conservative policy. Other than the Hawke and Keating governments, all Australian governments in the 20th century have based their foreign policy decisions on this doctrine.

The "great and powerful friends" doctrine at its core, is where a medium sized nation places its foreign policy in submission to the dominant superpower of the day. This is done with the hope that by furthering the superpower's interests, the medium sized nation will be able to further its own interests via influence on the superpower's policies. By its very definition, this doctrine trades Australian foreign policy independence in return for being under the defence and economic umbrella of the superpower.

The earliest use of this doctrine was by Billy Hughes in 1919 at the Versailles meeting after World War I. Hughes was challenged by the American President, Woodrow Wilson, as to why he should be present at the table. Wilson thought that the British Foreign Minister, Lloyd George, represented the British Commonwealth's interests. Hughes claimed he represented, "60,000 dead" and Hughes; along with the Prime Minister of South Africa, was given a place at the table.

By his presence, Hughes attempted to further British policy and international prestige. In return Hughes wanted access to British markets and the protection of Australia by the Royal Navy. In 1919, eighty percent of Australian exports went to Britain, and there was genuine concern that Australia's main competitor in the British market - Canada - would get preferential treatment. Hughes' furthering British interests was seen by Australians as a down payment in return for open access to the British market and the protection of Australia by the Royal Navy.

This policy continued in the 1930's. Australia funded the development of Singapore as a naval fortress, with the idea that any belligerent would be held up in Singapore, giving the Royal Navy time to sail from the Atlantic to the Pacific and save Australia. Consequently Australia did not bother developing a blue water navy and in 1942 when the Royal Navy was stretched across four oceans, Australia was left to fend for itself against Japan. This is when John Curtin uttered the words during a December 1941 speech;

Australia looks to America, free of any pangs as to our traditional links or kinship with the United Kingdom.

From this point on, the United States replaced Britain as the the "great and powerful friend" in Australian foreign policy. This policy has since taken Australia through supporting the Korean War, the Malayan Emergency, the Vietnam War and in 2002 - the Second Gulf War. Australia was one of two nations who supported the Bush Administration unconditionally into the conflict. It should be noted, John Howard did so against Australian public opinion.

The Howard Years

The Hawke and Keating governments between 1983 and 1996 pursued the new and then quite radical foreign policy of "Asian Engagement". With John Howard's government coming to power, Australian foreign policy reverted back to the conservative philosophy of "great and powerful friends". This firmly roots Australia in the anglosphere. In the conservative mindview - all culture, nationalism and government policy stems from this anglophilic view. The Howard government began the "history wars" in part to reinforce the anglic history and heritage of Australia - possibly to make the policies of the anglosphere more palatable.

Terrorism became a wider security issue for Australia with the September 11th attacks on New York and Washington D.C. The corner stone of Australia's defence agreements in the Cold War had been ANZUS. Despite ANZUS losing its power when the US refused to honour its responsibilities with respect to New Zealand after a dispute in 1982, Australia still placed great importance in the document. With the attacks on US soil, John Howard activated a clause in the document with the claim that the US has been attacked and consequently Australia will defend the USA as per the agreement.

The ANZUS treaty is a cold war document and has little relevance to the 21st century. It is hard not to see Howard activating the agreement as a desperate attempt to keep the treaty relevant. Since September 2001, other than the US thanking Australia for honouring the agreement, there has been no other action on the treaty. It could be argued that Australian support in Afghanistan and Iraq are a result of ANZUS, but both actions were deliberated in Parliament and the Australian media before action was taken.

Nation Building and Failed States

The Howard Government has pursued four nation-building expeditions in the last few years. These have been East Timor, the Solomon Islands, Afghanistan and Iraq. East Timor and the Solomons were not related to terrorism, and Afghanistan was not fully under-taken by Australia as a nation-building task. Iraq did involve Australia adopting, at the very least the political rhetoric of the American view of Iraq as a nation-building exercise, even though Australia did not commit the necessary forces or money to have any effect on the desired outcome of a free and stable Iraq.

East Timor and the Solomons were Australian led missions, that gained their legitimacy from the nations involved. Before Australia committed to East Timor, Australian diplomacy, along with the diplomacy of other nations such as Thailand, managed to get Indonesia to agree with a UN mission to stabilize the former annexed province as it sought independence. East Timor has been held as an example of a successful UN mission. Australian leadership provided this.

The Solomons expedition was similar. Prompted by a report from the Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI) who advocated a nation-building exercise in the Solomons, Australia led a multi-national mission to the failed and lawless state. Like East Timor, this was done after legitimizing the expedition through securing a request from the government of the Solomon Islands to intervene. This is an ongoing mission but is progressing well.

Afghanistan and Iraq

The other two nation-building exercises Australia has embarked upon are Afghanistan and Iraq - both under US leadership. Australia made the point in the Afghan campaign that Australia was there for the "war on terror", not for Afghanistan, and managed to avoid any nation-building commitments. Since Australia is an uncritical supporter of American foreign policy, the success or failure of the nation-building exercise in Afghanistan may stick to Australia, despite only having a single officer attached to the UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA).

Australia was one of three nations to initiate hostilities against Saddam Hussein's Iraq. It was promoted in Australia as a necessity to disarm Hussein, and even with this rhetoric, Australians preferred that Australian involvement required the expeditionary cause to have United Nations (UN) legitimacy. Howard went against the electorate in the deployment to Iraq. Australia committed naval, aviation and special forces assets to the invasion. After hostilities the Australian contingent wound down to just over one thousand personnel. A small and ineffectual number in comparison to America's 140,000.

In both these instances these were definite moves by the Howard Government, using the "great and powerful friends" doctrine, against terrorism. Both Afghanistan and more importantly Iraq have been failures. Iraq under Hussein was not a haven for terrorists, but by September of 2004, it has become an chaotic failed state with porous borders. There is no stability in Iraq, and this failure lies completely at the hands of the US, UK and Australia.

Australia's success in Iraq is entirely dependent on American success. Australia has not committed the troops, nor the money to succeed in having Iraq as a secure and stable democracy. Richard Woolcott writes on the issue;

The reality is that Australia's presence, however capable and efficient our forces, can make no meaningful contribution to the two major objectives: the reconstruction of that country and the establishment of a viable democratic government there.

The East Timor and Solomons deployments both gained wider legitimacy before Australia committed. Both deployments were Australian led, with Australia providing the necessary troops, civilian personnel as well as sufficient logistical and economic resources for those expeditions to be a success. The Australian deployment in Iraq, had none of these positive attributes from the Howard Government in their uncritical support of American policy.

Asian Engagement

Australian history has largely been a valiant refusal to recognise Australian geography. Australians have tried to maintain an attachment to Europe and in particular the anglosphere. Gough Whitlam, later Prime Minister, was the first to see beyond this and he beat Richard Nixon in welcoming China to the global community. This localised and regionalized view of foreign policy was further developed under the Hawke and Keating governments as the doctrine of "Asian Engagement".

Paul Keating and Gareth Evans both sought to re-align Australia as an Asian nation, rather than an European nation that was a victim of geographical circumstance. Since three of Australia's biggest four export markets are Japan, China and South Korea, Keating set about strengthening regional trade through the Asia-Pacific Economic Co-operation (APEC) forum. This was during a time of the "Tiger Nations" having remarkable economic growth until "contagion" struck in 1999.

The other aspect of "Asian Engagement" is the premise that the only way Australia's geographic vulnerabilities can be defended is through the promotion of a benign neighbourhood. As a trading nation with multi-national defence links, Australia's geographic vulnerabilities are the North-West Shelf, the Timor Sea and the Coral Sea. Through cultural, economic and defence links with Australia's Asian neighbours these vulnerabilities can be secured.

By contrast the "great and powerful friends" doctrine attempts to solve this issue through a strong Australian-American alliance where the United States Navy (USN) is used to ensure that Australia's vulnerabilities are secured. This assumes that the USN will always be available to maintain authority over those vulnerabilities.

Terrorism

Terrorism for Australia remains a foreign policy issue. The attacks that have been directed at Australia have taken place in Indonesia. The Bali bombing was directed at Australia and the Jakarta bombings had a dual target in trying to destabilize the Indonesia elections, as well as alienate Australian and Indonesia co-operation, through the targeting of the Australian embassy.

Indonesia has handled the terrorist attacks admirably. This young democracy has embraced the rule of law and rejected the prosecution of the Bali bombers under a back dated post-hoc anti-terrorist law. This was despite blood-curdling pressure from Australia. Indonesia has attacked the problem of terrorism as a civil matter for the police force and as a consequence they have been successful.

The Howard government in the wake of the Bali bombing has sought and found police co-operation with Indonesia in police matters. The five-powers defence agreement has also been upgraded to have terrorism added to its responsibilities. But these attempts at regional engagement have often been flouted by John Howard's often clumsy politics. There is the wider view of Howard as Bush's "Deputy Sherriff" in the South pacific. Consequently there is considerable distrust of his regional policies with Australia's neighbours.

Another clumsy diplomatic effort came during the current election campaign when Howard announced a neo-con platform of pre-emption against any terrorist bases in neighbouring nations. This brought a stern rebuke from Indonesian legislator Alvin Lee, who commented;

[John] Howard should learn to control himself, Indonesia and Australia are both victims. I strongly support increased cooperation among neighboring countries to fight terrorism but not attacks.

Labor's national security policy sees South East Asia as the highest priority in combating terrorism. The policy notes that Indonesia, Singapore and Malaysia have set up maritime patrolling to guard against Jemaah Islamiah (JI) from bringing personnel, supplies and potentially weapons from the Phillipines to Indonesia. Australia did not join this effort, despite it being in Australia's interests and fitting Australian capability well.

Labor's policy also includes education funding for Indonesia to combat the Madrassas', which educate through fundamentalism. Labor will also help fund the Indonesian police in counter-terrorism. The Indonesia police under Suharto's regime were part of the military. An important aspect of the Labor doctrine is that it engages Australia's neighbours diplomatically, economically and culturally.

Conclusion

In terms of terrorism, Indonesia has been taking the hits for Australia, and has handled the stress of terrorism on their civil structures admirably. As a result, terrorism for Australia remains a foreign policy and regional issue.

The Liberal Government's foreign policy through the "great and powerful friends" doctrine has little basis over the last eighty years to recommend it. When faced with terrorism, the uncritical support of the US, and in particular the US adventure into Iraq has been a catastrophic failure. As a result of this pursuit of the bi-lateral Australian-American defence and foreign policy - defence and diplomatic relations between Australia and its neighbours have suffered. Diplomatic pragmatism being the main saving grace.

The Labor foreign policy of "Asian Engagement" is far more suited to the nature of terrorism that is practiced against Australia. Its focus on regional issues and relationships, are necessary in co-operative efforts to combat terrorist cells, international trafficking in arms and border security. The regional focus of Labor's foreign policy, and their stated policy of South East Asia being their primary focus in combatting terrorism, gives Labor's "Asian Engagement" doctrine the advantage in suppressing the likelihood of terrorist attacks against Australia.

Traditionally the Liberal Party has been seen by the electorate to be stronger on security and defence - but the aging and outmoded foreign policy of the Liberal Party has not translated to the current environment of terrorism. The Liberal Party has had three years to establish a terrorism policy, and their uncritical support of the US in Iraq and American foreign policy has been a failure. Where Howard's government has acted regionally, it has more often then not managed to alienate Australia's neighbours.

The Labor doctrine of "Asian Engagement" has its primary focus on Australia's region in the domains of diplomacy, economics and culture. Consequently it is better suited to deal with the current nature of terrorism that has been practiced against Australia. Indonesia will remain the frontline of terror for Australia. Constant, ongoing and comprehensive co-operation with - and support of, the Indonesian battle with terrorism will be required. Labor's style of foreign policy is less reactive than the Liberal policy and would reduce factors in the region that foster terrorism.

The Department of External Affairs was still a young government department when Percy Spender took over its reins in 1949 with the successful election of the Menzies Government. Spender was a powerful member of the Liberal Cabinet, and one who Menzies was concerned about as a potential challenger to his leadership of the Liberal Party. Spender's forebears, Doc Evatt and John Burton had attempted to balance direct relationships with super-powers, alongside multi-national foreign policy through the UN with an engagement of Australia's Asian interests through regional foreign policy. Spender came to the department with the ideological lines of the Cold War establishing themselves, he chose the path of whole heartedly embracing the dominant western super-power while maintaining regional foreign policy ties.

Political Realities Post WWII

Robert Menzies was an anglophile of the edwardian dandy school of pomp and circumstance. Despite Menzies' desire for Australia to re-establish itself as British, the reality of the clouds building over what was to become the Cold War showed that America was the new super-power in the west. Britain's back had been broken in World War II, and the incredible scientific, manufacturing and economic might of the United States would come to define the West's response to Soviet Russia.

In the immediate aftermath of World War II, there was a stand off as many governments and nations eyed each other warily wondering what the new system of nation-state power would be. Europe's colonial power was broken, that was obvious, and the United Nations was being set up to establish a forum, and means for the new super-powers to engage in dialogue. By 1950 it had become obvious that there was an ideological war brewing, mainly over what constituted economic management of a nation-state; but which was backed by large and effective militaries.

Due to the constant political salesmanship and mythology of the US alliance, it is assumed that Australia is contributing from a position of weakness. This is as untrue today as it was in 1945. Power politics is played through strength - of which hard and soft power are the two largest determinants. These are acquired by military and economic capability. At the end of World War II Australia was the largest and most powerful of the medium powers. With the defeat of Germany and Japan, Australia had the fourth largest air force on the globe. Our economy was booming so much in the latter parts of World War II that the Citizens Military Forces were being demobilised to attend to the labour shortages and demands of the Australian economy.

Australia's problem has been our politicians, continually dealing our interests with a political cringe. This has manifested itself with Australia being subservant and uncritical toward the current super-power. Prior to World War II this was Britain, since Curtin looked to the East without a pang of regret in 1941, it has been the United States.

Percy Spender

Percy Spender was a barrister, and an experienced minister when he took over the Department of External Affairs. He was well known for brutally efficient and well prepared. Spender spent sixteen months as foreign minister, and then seven years as Australia's Ambassador to Washington. Due to Australia's entwining with the US on foreign policy and defence, he occupied a position of considerable influence in Australian policy making and actions.

It is often easy, simple, or just lazy to seek a black and white ideology from these historical figures in questions such as; "Was Spender a Cold War Warrior?". But for those actually doing the work, ideology is often tempered, if not swamped by, pragmatism. The two big issues in 1950 were Australia's relationship with Asia, and the dual-pronged issue of Soviet Russia and Communist China.

Asia

Australian ideological "Realists" (as opposed to the liberal internationalism of the Optimists) wanted the Asian question resolved by European nations returning to their Asian colonies and slowly relinquishing them to self-governance over several generations. Pragmatism intruded quickly, the Indonesians overthrew the Dutch attempts to re-established the Dutch East Indies, Vietnam simmered as a low intensity conflict between the French and Vietnamese nationalists until it opened up as a vein in the Cold War. Spender's thinking on this issue can be found in a cablegram;

Geographically, Australia is next door to Asia and our destiny as a nation is irrevocably conditioned by what takes place in Asia. This means that our future depends to an ever increasing degree upon the political stability of our Asian neighbours, upon the economic well-being of Asian peoples, and upon the development of understanding and friendly relations between Australia and Asia. Whilst it remains true that peace is indivisible and that what takes place in any part of the world may affect us, our vital interests are closer to home. It is therefore in Asia and the Pacific that Australia should make its primary effort in the field of foreign relations.

The rising and menacing tide of Communism in the East presents us with a definite threat - and not a remote threat either - to our national existence. But the threat is also a challenge. Australia, who with New Zealand has the greatest direct interest in Asia of all Western peoples, must develop a dynamic policy towards neighbouring Asian countries, whose people we must live with, not only to-day and to-morrow, but for all times. We should give leadership to developments in that area.

This leadership saw itself expressed in Spender's Colombo Plan. This was the Commonwealth's answer to this issue through a Co-operative Economic Development in South and Southeast Asia. Spender took on this issue closely and became the chief architect of it. As negotiations were continuing on the Colombo Plan it became known amongst as the Spender Plan. Despite a long period of gestation before being accepted, it grew to include non-Commonwealth countries with the US joining as a donor in 1951 and Indonesia as a recipient in 1953.

The United States

The constant dichotomy in Australian foreign policy is Australia's dislike and inability to act in its own interests outside of its relationship with the current superpower. For instance, the Colombo Plan, was a Commonwealth project initially only targeting Commonwealth nations. This fear and paralysis of foreign policy is the Australian political cringe. Spender was not immune to it, like Menzies he sought solace in a relationship with super-powers;

This in no way implies a lack of recognition of the extreme importance the Government attaches to our continued intimate association with the British Commonwealth; on the contrary, it reinforces it. It must be made stronger, not weaker, Commonwealth relations themselves strikingly manifest the movement of the world's centre towards the East. Of the eight countries of the Commonwealth, there is not one without vital territorial and strategic interests in either the Pacific or the Indian Ocean. The location of the forthcoming Commonwealth Conference at Colombo reflects the importance attached to this area.

This Conference, it is to be hoped, will produce a positive contribution by Commonwealth countries towards securing the peace of the world. And in our deliberations we should not forget - Australia is certainly not likely to do so - how much our security has depended in the past on the friendly and generous assistance of the United States of America. The events of the last war are too close for that. The United States is the greatest Pacific power. Her policy towards Asia is accordingly of supreme importance to Australia's future.

Spender recognized early on that the Cold War was an economic one, and that prosperity of Asia was important in deterring communism from moving south. He carried no confidence in the United Nations, and removed that institution from his policies. Spender also wanted a Pacific Pact with the US, one that would become, "Somewhat the same relationship as exists within the British Commonwealth.". This is the Great and Powerful friends doctrine in a nutshell, worthy of Billy Hughes, Robert Menzies and John Curtin. Australia sub-ordinates its foreign policy decision making to the current super-power in return for defence commitments and economic advantages. Nice in theory, but a failure in practice. Super-powers play power politics, and those in the weaker position get railroaded.

The 1950s also saw the establishment of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) which bound American and European defence and security commitments. There was the desire by Spender to have a similar type of treaty in the Pacific. Spender initially had no success in trying to get Menzies, the British, or the American State Department interested in a Pacific Pact. The opening of hostilities in Korea, and the sudden success of the Chinese invasion through North Korea helped change the level of interest. Spender leapt on the opportunity to show how good an ally Australia could be and quickly committed Australian troops to Korea before Britain could.

The next year, US envoy, John Foster Dulles came to Australia to take part in talks that would end up being the ANZUS Treaty. The United States was only six years out from defeating Japan in the Central Pacific and was no facing expansionist policies from both Soviet Russia and China. The concern that there would be another World War which encompassed fronts in Europe, Africa and Asia were quite real. The United State sought to stabilise any possible global conflict by securing a peace treaty with Japan and setting up the terms of involvement with Australia, New Zealand and the Phillipines.

The British were initially upset at being left out of the negotiations, and Spender took pains to tell Dulles that despite what was heard from London, Dulles should focus on Australian words and commitment. However, both the United States and Britain saw value in the treaty for stopping what John Curtin had done in 1942. Curtin removed Australian troops in the Middle East, and brought them back to Australia despite the wishes of Churchill and Roosevelt for those troops to remain in the Middle East.

This was mirrored in British policy when the British Chief of Staff, Field Marshall John Slim came to Australia in 1951 asking for an Australian commitment to an expeditionary force in the Middle East should their be global conflict with Soviet Russia. Eventually Menzies gave that commitment to Britain.

Tussle

Australian Prime Ministers have always been strongly involved in foreign policy, often dominating it despite the existence of a foreign minister. Menzies was no exception, he had a strong opinion of what the world should be like. In a short period Percy Spender had negotiated the Colombo Plan and the ANZUS Treaty. Both area's that Menzies was not particularly interested in. Menzies was also concerned that these triumphs from Spender were a challenge to Menzies' leadership.

Menzies decided to assert his strength in foreign policy over Spender, mocking him for thinking that a communist threat may come from Asia and that there was the potential for the domino theory to exist. Menzies recommitted Australia to fighting for the civilisation in Europe and Middle East, rather than Asia. Spender's focus on Asia was marginalised in Australian foreign policy.

Spender retired from the Menzies Cabinet and took a post as Australia's Ambassador in Washington. It does not appear that he was sacked by Menzies, but it is more likely he did not have the numbers to challenge Menzies for the leadership of the Liberal Party and decided to take a position far away from Canberra.

cam

One of the fallacies of the "great and powerful friends" [GAPF] doctrine of foreign policy is that in return for uncritical support of the super-power in foreign policy, we get security and economic benefits. It is a lie we tell, and sell to ourselves. Super-powers play power politics, and the weak get consumed and spat out.

Supposedly the Au-US FTA was one of the economic flow throughs of Australian support in Iraq, yet Chile and Singapore, who didnt support Iraq also got bilateral trade agreements with the US. Costa Rica was another who has FTA. the free-trade agreement is more managed trade, with Australia adopting American intellectual property laws, and US agricultural subsidies and quotas remaining.

Now we have the wheat fiasco . From the article;

AWB Limited has been suspended from a US-funded credit program over its involvement in the Iraqi oil-for-food program, which saw $200 million from the wheat company funnelled to former dictator Saddam Hussein.

AWB says the ban is unjustified, while the Grains Council has accused the US of trying to shut Australian growers out of the world market.

Note to John Howard, play power politics, or you will be rubbed from the global stage, leaving nothing more than a smear. The irony is dripping, super-powers act in their own interests, and muscle out the weak - where is your GAPF now?

John Reeve calls the Anglo dominance of the oceans the Lucky League . Britannia carried blue water supremacy until they obsoleted themselves with the Dreadnought. British supremacy lingered until World War II, when the United States leap-frogged them, and all other nations in a four year bound. America has been the barely disputed champion of the oceans since. Reeve argues that our tangential inclusion in that Anglo dominance has been positive for Australia. He is arguing for the Great and Powerful Friends doctrine [GAPF] of foreign policy.

The Navy And The Nation

John Reeve has written the concluding article for the book, The Navy and the Nation . This book looks at the Navy's role in Australian nationhood. Since the Royal Australian Navy only appeared with the Defence Act of 1903, prior to that Australian naval involvement was as state based littoral ships, a federal tribute to the Royal Navy for defence purposes, and direct Royal Navy control of the colonies. The book focuses on naval influence in Australia rather than independent Australian achievements, even though pioneers such as William Clarkson are discussed.

This is a valid approach in viewing the naval history in Australia. The colony of New South Wales was founded with the intent of establishing a British naval outpost in the Pacific to counter French power in the region. Reeves writes;

The Royal Navy was the initial creator of modern Australia. The first British settlement was intended to serve the strategic interests of a global maritime empire, and the Navy was the protector and effectively director of the new colony.

Until self-government in Victoria and New South Wales in the 1850s, the Governor's of the colonies were naval officers. Some of the big names in Australian political history were naval; for instance Governor's King, Bligh, Macquarie and Hotham.

The book also discusses the achievements of the British officers in the sciences such as botanical and medical sciences in Australia. Joseph Banks being one notable example. But these claims are tangential. They occurred in Australia, rather than being Australian achievements in science. While they are examples of colonial R&D being done through the Royal Navy, they cannot be claimed as contributing to Australian nationhood, or Australian sense of self.

The Australian defence forces are constantly starved for money in R&D - our politicians preferring low risk integration with American technologies than a trust in Australian scientists and engineers to produce revolutionary weapon systems. The integrating of American technologies also aids the GAPF doctrine, where we can slip in easily with the dominant force. Our Frigates in the Gulf being a good example of this.

Naval Conservatism

Reeve argues that a Navy is an extremely complex force to develop, maintain and use. Apart from being capital intensive, it requires a level of social, technological, political and bureaucratic organisation that few societies achieve. He argues that the British Navy in the 18thC was probably the largest and most sophisticated organisation in British society.

But Australia has a pretty small and weak Navy. Until the 1940s we were dependant upon the British Navy for our blue water projection, and since then we have been dependant upon the United States Navy. So if the establishment of a Navy is an achievement in social organisation, we have not progressed far, as the Australian Navy remains a subservient force to our GAPF.

Reeve notes that Australia did not want to give up the imperial protection of the Royal Navy with federation, and was dragged kicking and screaming into creating an indigenous navy. The Australian Navy has been the most conservative of the Australian arms, it maintained the British Naval white ensign until Vietnam which Britain was not involved in. Even then, the British which ensign was only removed on the request of Britain who did not want Australian ships confused with British ones in the warzone.

The Navy did not have the culture of nationalism that the ANZAC myth gave the Army. Nor did it have the rugged individualism myth which the Air Force has. The Air Force was helped on by the very individualistic Richard Williams as well as the gun-toting fighter pilot ace image. It is probably no surprise that Air Force aces in WWII mounted a mutiny to protest that they weren't seeing enough action.

But the conservatism of the Navy can be traced to the conservatism of a political elite who saw foreign policy entwined with security. This is the Great and Powerful Friends doctrine [GAPF] in a nutshell. Since Billy Hughes, every Australian government has placed Australian security in the hands of a super-power. In return Australia makes its foreign policy an extension of the super-power, but Australia also hopes for economic benefits in return.

A good example is the Howard Government. Australian defence is an extension of the US military. We buy Abrams tanks, Joint Strike Fighters, LHDs etc etc. Any military excursion the US military is involved in, Australia supports. For instance Afghanistan and Iraq - even if it is not in Australia's direct interest. In return we hope for economic benefits. The recent Au-US FTA was trumpeted as an example of the benefits of our uncritical support of the US in military and foreign policy goals

Cultural Syncopation

The Navy remains the strongest example of the GAPF in Australia. Frigates have been in the Gulf non-stop since 1991. Other than a short blip when Australian maintained aircraft carriers in the HMAS Sydney and HMAS Melbourne, our blue water projection has not been strong. Even those carriers were not frontline, they would have been relegated to supporting trade routes in any flare up of the Cold War. The Melbourne was also maintained longer than expected due to tensions between Australia and Indonesia.

The 1950s saw a cultural fault-line develop between conservative and independent minded Australians. When Dutton and Horne were writing their articles and books advocating a republic, Robert Menzies remained in the grips of anglophilia. Thich included loyalist clap-trap such as, "We love the Queen. We honour the Queen. And through her our greatness as a Commonwealth is emphasised and enhanced." This was when he wasn't telling everyone that he fell in love with her when she was passing by.

We cringe at those thoughts today. But this was the conservative political environment that the GAPF and structural basis for the Australian Navy were dreamed up in. Yet despite the Australian people striding this globe with a humble independent self-confidence, the political elite and Navy still have not caught up. Our foreign, military and defence policies remain out of sync with the independent mind of the Australian people.

Economic Development

This is where Reeve's arguments are the strongest. He writes;

The Navy's contribution to the nation has been tangibly material in its roles as a guardian of seaborne trade and as a producer of industrial infrastructure.

The Collins subs, the ANZAC Frigates are modern examples of Australia investing in its local industrial innovation and output. It is sad that we cannot expand this political confidence in the maritime industry to the aerospace industry. We once did, and Australian engineers and scientists responded with designs and innovations that matched Australian strategic needs. That aerospace capability has been lost for over twenty years now.

Naval development is also a capital intensive exercise at the research and industrial level. Aerospace differs significantly in that the research component dwarfs the industrial component. Aerospace is more high-tech, rather than big-industrial. This may be related more to the ability of Australian lobbyists to get the construction capability of the naval weaponry being built done indigenously.

Reeve notes that at the end of the twentieth century ninety-five percent of Australian trade by volume travelled by sea. I can recall being asked by a former American Marine many years ago why Australia doesn't have such a potent Navy. Given Australia's geographic location and ocean-borders he assumed Australia would be a maritime nation. We aren't. I answered, "We use your navy for that mate."

But if brown and blue water trade stability is the reason for our Navy, why are we seeing regional piracy, illegal fishing and even sea-going bandits shooting RPGs at cruise ships? Where are our Frigates, Escort Carriers and naval UAVs in the Celebes, Sulu, Mollucca and Phillipine Seas working with other regional nations to deter this high-seas lawlessness? Once again we hope for the USN to provide it instead.

The Lucky League

Reeve calls the Lucky League those naval nations which stem from the decline of British naval imperialism;

As the maritime residue of the British Empire, including the United States - in the British Isles, North America and Australasia - the lucky league is effectively an extended family bound by various treaties and by informal but powerful bonds.

We are lucky that we are the detritus of a broken empire? This is Donald Horne's thesis in the Lucky Country . It is not by good management, or by good political leadership that Australia is what it is today, it is despite this drag on the nation from the politicians, we have achieved what we have been able to. We have certainly done little to contribute meaningfully to the USN's or Royal Navy's dominance of the oceans. We have been lucky in the same way a cork is lucky in a tide. Without direction, without guidance, or independent input.

Reeve is most likely describing the modern view of the Anglosphere. Compare the above statement of Reeve's to a speech made by Robert Menzies in 1954;

... the Crown serves as the legal nexus between all the British countries and all the British people; and that, because this is so, the existence of the Crown converts what would otherwise be a friendly partnership of people with some common interests into an organic structure rising far superior to a partnership of convenience. That is something tremendously important to us. For, although in the history of our race we have had many old and well tried partnerships and alliances, not one of them has had the unique quality which the association between the British peoples all over the world possess.

Sounds like the same thing, though Reeve includes the USA in the anglosphere, which Menzies cannot in the Commonwealth. Instead the USA is embraced uncritically through the GAPF doctrine. Reeve writes on the international co-operation of this league making the modern globalised world possible;

It was during the twentieth century that the league made its greatest contributions to international stability and the principle of self-determination through the its roles in the two world wars and the Cold War. Sea power, with is ability to create global efforts, was fundamental to those contributions. Only navies could take Australians to France and Palestine, Britons to North Africa, New Zealanders to Italy, Canadians to Normandy and Americans to the South West Pacific. Only navies could support Russia in the 1940s and surround it in the 1980s.

But the league, with its maritime power, has done more than help defeat tyranny. For almost half a millennium it has promoted international contact and commerce, enhanced scientific knowledge and gone on to fight pirates and slavers. It still has its work cut out for it. Its relations with the great powers of Asia and the states of the Middle East will be critical to the future of world peace.

Reeve jumps around the fact that 99% of this lucky league as he describes it is the United States Navy. If we are part of the lucky league, it is by six degreees of connection and highly tangential, as opposed to a central or guiding role. Under this description, the Australian Navy isn't really an Australia Navy it is a "lucky league" navy. One that isn't demanded for national defence, or regional projection but for the purpose of slotting in to the nearest great and powerful friend. This is an argument for the GAPF and an anglospheric reading of it as a strategic and national defence policy.

Conclusion

Reeve brings nothing new to the debate, just an argument for the status quo. If the Navy is supposed to help provide national identity and purpose, the Australian Navy has failed that. According to Reeve, we are part of a lucky league, based on a collapsed naval empire, and where our national naval identity is subsumed by the GAPF. In the entire section of his article on the Lucky League there is no mention of the Australian Navy, just an amorphous international mix of naval assets.

The GAPF is more Horne-ish than anything else and a left over of an Australian political demand to subserviency despite federation and self-government.

cam

One of the claims of the 'Great and powerful friends' doctrine [GAPF] of foreign policy is that it brings economic benefits to the smaller partner from the powerful friend. This stems back to Billy Hughes in 1919 being concerned that if Australia was seen as disloyal to Britain, then Canada would get privileged access to the British wheat markets. Which was a false assumption to base a foreign policy upon. Today the Free Trade Agreement [FTA] is being touted as an example of the GAPF working to Australia's benefit. It is worth reflecting if this is true.

International liberalism got a leg up as policy fashion after World War II with the successful establishment of the United Nations [UN]. Which has proven to be a resilient institution, surviving the Cold War and more recently American Neo-conservative policy. One of the other multi-national institution is the World Trade Organisation [WTO].

Fitting with international liberalism, and similar to the UN, the WTO was intended to be a forum for nations to voice their concerns over being shut out of trade in a non-violent body. Its goals were the increase of global trade and the lowering of protectionist barriers. It also contained arbitration bodies for nations to appeal to should they feel there were being unfairly dealt with in trade.

The WTO has fallen out of favour in international circles for several reasons. Along with the World Bank and IMF, it was unable to handle the issues of the Asian Economic Crisis and Contagion in the late 90s. The oughts saw the rise of Neoconservatism in the United States where international bodies, and the policy of international liberalism, were eschewed. Policy became unilateral and bilateral co-operation outside of the former meta-national structures such as the UN and WTO.

This has led to the international fashion of bilateral trade agreements - commonly called FTAs. The free trade part of an FTA is a misnomer, they are more managed trade agreements than free trade ones as a true FTA would be about three sentences in total.

The United States prefers bilateral agreements as they are a huge nation in terms of economic, military and diplomatic might, and a bilateral negotiations suits the US's manner of power politics. Inevitably, in any bilateral agreement, the US will get the better of it. This is just a fact of power politics and why the United States see it to their benefit to negotiate directly, rather than collectively through the UN or WTO.

So Free Trade Agreements have become the fashion. Has Australia's GAPF relationship with the US earned Australia our FTA? The answer is no. Back in 2002 the big issue in the Australian and American relationship was Iraq. The Howard Government became an avid supporter of, and promoter for, the Iraqi conflict.

By the run-up to the 2004 election, the Au-US FTA had been negotiated to the point that the Howard Government decided to put it through parliament. This was undoubtedly a political decision, done to try and wedge the Liberal party's opponents in parliament on the issue - splitting out the free trade Labor supporters and industrial protectionist advocates. It did not seem to have the desired effect, however, it is worthy to note it was used for domestic political purposes.

One of the political reasons given for Australia achieving a FTA with the United States was our support for the war in Iraq. From that same period the US had also negotiated FTAs with Jordan, Singapore, Chile and Costa Rica. Of these nations only Chile had supported the conflict in Iraq, and they had not sent any assets to the theatre. The other nations opposed the war - yet this was not an inhibition to a FTA with the United States.

If a nation was willing to give in on intellectual property provisions and agricultural quotas then the US would negotiate an FTA to its conclusion. The Au-US FTA contains the American provisions for intellectual property, including a DMCA-like clause, as well as quotas for agricultural trade - thus satisfying US requirements.

So the premise that Australia got a free trade agreement with the United States because of our close relationship with the US and the GAPF is false. Free Trade Agreements are the current fashion amongst nations and more representative of the loss of prestige of the WTO than anything else.

In 1919 when Billy Hughes dreamed up the GAPF foreign policy, something like eighty percent of our exports went to Britain. Today the United States is one of several nations that we trade with heavily. The other include Japan, our biggest trading partner, China and South Korea. Unsurprisingly Australia is pursuing FTAs with these three nations, further falsifying the claim that the Au-US FTA was a result of our foreign policy.

cam