Thailand's 'pro-democracy' coup by the military was expected to take a year, but already the Generals are finding that governance is no easy thing . In the South and South-East Pacific the three biggest economies are Australia, Indonesia and Thailand. Their relations, their political stability, their economic liberty and their defence relationship between the three big nations are all very important to the regions on-going harmony and prosperity.

A coup is coup, and a junta a junta, no matter how benevolent the intention as it suspended the highest law of the land and replaced it with a military who has adopted the executive and legislative powers (through an appointed assembly) of government. There is no liberal democratic situation where this can be good. Democracy is messy, and politicians act in their self-interest and often against the common good and public wish, however the restraint the constitution places on politicians, and the branches of government is for the purpose of tying it all together in a recoverable and retrievable manner.

A state of exception situation where the constitution has to be suspended in order to save must be recognised as undemocratic, illiberal, unconstitutional and consequently - criminal.

There are significant foreign policy issues for Australia with the Thai military junta which Australian planners and policy makers will have to take into account. Firstly a destablised Thailand, especially one run by the military, may affect the security of our trade routes with North Asia - which is a massive market for our exports that are transported by sea. Our biggest trading partners include Japan, China and South Korea.

Australia has a free trade agreement with Thailand, even though the free trade agreements are often nothing more than managed trade, it appears that the Australian government has managed to negotiate tariff reductions for Australian business.

It is possible that the Thai military will act internationally and domestically in an arbitrary manner, that may defy rationalism, and be driven by the desire to maintain popular legitimacy . Afflictions which negatively affect the liberality, and the consequent prosperity, of other despotic states such as Burma, North Korea, etc.

Thailand remains a monarchy despite the volatility of its constitution at the hands of coups. While a monarchy can be perceived as a conservative institution, radiating stability and permanence, its presence can confuse separation of powers and checks and balances - especially in relation to the executive position. Royalty also poses a problem in that elected representatives do not see the hereditary political status of the monarch as legitimate . Rightfully so, but this can be cause for open political tension.

The interim constitution which is supposed to operate until a better one can take its place, presumably one that is an improvement over both the previous one as well, that was suspended with the coup. A constitution is not a pact between monarch and government, it is the law which defines the processes and limitations of government.

If the previous constitution was such a failure, then popular will in a representative system suggests that politicians would have represented their electorate in getting it changed somehow. There is some naivety in that statement as the Australian Constitution has largely been ignored or forgotten unless the politicians could squeeze ever greater centralisation and power out of it.

However the popular will for a republic in Australia led to a referendum on constitutional change even though the government at the time was opposed to one. The referendum failed on its merits, but it is preferable to the ADF sweeping in, running over the current constitution with a Texta and sticking their own one in its place.

So where are the issues in the Interim Constitution? For one, the Executive can remove the Prime Minister;

Article 14. The King appoints the Prime Minister and not more than thirty-five other Ministers as advised by the Prime Minister to constitute the Council of Ministers having the duties to carry out the administration of the State affairs.

The King has the prerogative to remove the Prime Minister from office as advised by the Chairman of the Council for National Security and the King has the power to remove Ministers from office as advised by the Prime Minister.

This places the National Security Council outside of being removed by the King, or by the King under the recommendation of the Prime Minister. However, the National Security Council can remove the Prime Minister. It is like the National Security Council is a Governor-General without having the restrictions of the Governor-General in Council. It should be noted the Australian Constitution contains similar hilarity. ie;

63. The provisions of this Constitution referring to the Governor-General in Council shall be construed as referring to the Governor-General acting with the advice of the Federal Executive Council.

64. The Governor-General may appoint officers to administer such departments of State of the Commonwealth as the Governor-General in Council may establish.

Such officers shall hold office during the pleasure of the Governor-General. They shall be members of the Federal Executive Council, and shall be the Queen's Ministers of State for the Commonwealth.

Note that the Governor-General may appoint and dismiss members of the Executive Cabinet (Federal Executive Council) and not the Governor-General in Council who must take recommendations from the Prime Minister.

Check out this corker from the Thai interim constitution;

The Prime Minister and Ministers have the right to attend, provide explanations or express opinions during meeting of the National Assembly but cannot vote.

So all power is in the National Security Council, executive and legislative. The Assembly is for the appearance, or the dog and pony show, of a functioning legislative. The interim constitution digs itself in deeper by claiming a permanent state of national security;

Article 11. During a meeting of the National Assembly, any member of the National Assembly has the right to submit a motion to request the Council of Ministers to give statements of fact or explain important problems in connection with the administration of the State affairs. But the Ministers have the right not to give information when considering that the matter should be treated with confidential for the sake of security and interest of the country or when seeing that the motion is not in line with meeting regulations.

When there are important problems, at least 100 members of the National Assembly have the right to submit a motion for a general debate in the National Assembly for the purpose of requesting the Council of Ministers to provide facts and explanations regarding the problems but the members of the National Assembly cannot make a vote of confidence or vote of no-confidence against the Ministers.

It is all pretty poor. Hopefully Thailand gets itself back to representative democracy quickly and forces all the current coup members to resign permanently from the military with the understanding they will not take part in Thai politics again.

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