The Australian Defence Force must defend and project across an air-sea gap. This requires long range autonomous strike weaponry. The Joint Strike Fighter does not solve this issue and detrimentally places added pressure on Australia's limited force of air-to-air tankers. The world's defence manufacturers are not creating strike platforms that solve Australian needs. For this reason, Australia needs to look to other nations with similar defence needs. In this case, Japan, South Korea and Taiwan all face defending an air-sea gap. Australia should enter a partnership with these nations to create a strike fighter that satisfies the strategic needs of defending an air-sea gap. The benefits of such a partnership will be many.

Australian Projection

The primary focus of any nation-state's military force is to ensure the nations sovereignty and independence from external martial coercion. This requirement demands that a military force be able to project force over the geographic approaches to the nation state. As Australia is an island-continent, this requires the Australian Defence Force (ADF) to be able to project over the air-sea gap that exists between Australia and Indonesia. Australia also contains economic assets of oil and fisheries on the continental shelf that may need to be defended as well. Consequently the defence of Australian sovereignty from outside martial force demands weaponry that is capable of projecting across and defending that air-sea gap.

Australia does not invest heavily in force multipliers and back-end support equipment such as logistical support. Certainly not to the level that the United States (US) military does. For this reason, Australian strike weaponry needs to be largely autonomous. While force multipliers such as the Wedgetail Airborne Early Warning and Control (AEW&C) system are a necessity in modern projection, other force multipliers such as tankers are in relative short supply in the ADF. Australia has few enough tankers that the loss of even a couple will have a great bearing in the Air Force's capability and operational tempo. This risk is potentially large enough that the Air Force will not be able to project across the air-sea gap and leave Australia poorly defended.

The General Dynamics F111 which is still in service with the Royal Australian Air Force (RAAF), is an example of an autonomous strike weapon. The F111 is capable of ranging over five thousand kilometres out into the Indian Ocean, across the Timor Sea and up through Java. The F111 carries a large payload of precision weaponry that can be used against multiple targets in the one long operational mission. The F111 is a powerful statement in strike projection. The F111 is nearing the end of its operational life span and there is no replacement to the F111 in the world's armoury.

The Joint Strike Fighter

Australia has recently chosen to join the development phase of the Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) program. Signifying an almost certain procurement of the JSF for the Australian air force. The JSF will be a sophisticated piece of weaponry, but it is designed to solve the strategic needs of the United States and the United Kingdom. Both are nations that desire global projection and have the supporting infrastructure to achieve that role for the JSF. Australia does not have the same infrastructure behind the JSF and will ultimately become reliant on the US to supply that capability in any medium or high intensity conflict.

The JSF has a two thousand kilometre range without supporting tankers. This is an improvement over the F18's one thousand kilometre range but far short of the F111's five thousand. The JSF is being chosen by Australia to replace both the F18 and F111, so it requires the capability to be able to take over the roles that these aircraft fulfilled. For the JSF to be able to perform the capability that the F111 currently satisfies, the JSF requires force multipliers, and most notably tankers to achieve this. The tankers are something that the Australian Air Force has in short supply. There is no governmental discussion of future expansion of this important component of the Australian air force. Consequently the JSF procurement places added pressure on the already in demand and small Australian tanker force.

The tankers come with other issues, since the JSF will use the tankers with greater rapidity than the F111's, this will require the tankers to be placed in positions of greater risk. Consequently, the tankers themselves will be required to be defended by JSF formations. Tieing up strike resources away from strike projection. The Joint Strike Fighter is a global projection weapon that was designed with the understanding that it would be operated by an Air Force that has a complete set of force multipliers such as tankers, and the means to defend those force multipliers. Australia does not require global projection, and does not have the back-end forces to support such a heavily integrated and dependent weapon system as the JSF.

Australian Strategic Needs

Australia's strategic requirement to defend and project across an air-sea gap is not being met by the world defence manufacturers. The United States and Britain are making global projection platforms whose effectiveness is predicated on a large and voluminous support infrastructure of force multipliers. Europe is still making point to point weaponry that is more suitable to western European cold-war conflicts. There is nothing in the world armoury to replace the F111 or to completely fill the requirements that Australia's air-sea gap strategy demands. However - Australia is not alone with these needs.

Several other island and peninsula nations have air-sea gaps to defend. Most notably Japan, South Korea and Taiwan. These nations face similar predicaments to Australia when choosing from the current defence systems that are on the world market. Their requirements for defending across an air-sea gap are not being met either. There is considerable common ground here for Australia to explore - most notably in developing, manufacturing and deploying an Austral-Asian strike weapon as a co-ordinated effort between Australia, Japan, South Korea and Taiwan.

All four nations are Australian trading partners, with democratic forms of government and well established, powerful, technologically based economies. These nations have defence requirements that have left them disenfranchised by the world's defence manufacturers. The partnership to develop a strike platform would have regional economic, defence, security and stability benefits as well as ensuring the nations that have air-sea gaps to defend armed their military with the hardware that matched their needs.

Benefits of an Austral-Asian Strike Fighter

• Strike weaponry that matches Australia's defence requirements exactly
• Increase indigenous aerospace capability
• Genuine technology sharing
• Lesser dependence on US defence manufacturers
• Lesser dependence on US military infrastructure
• Development cost sharing
• Increased regional political focus
• Increased regional focus on security and stability
• Increased potential for disruptive technology

Indigenous Aerospace Industry

The Australian Air Force in the 1930's was faced with the possibility of being cut off from the Europe and the United States with no local aerospace manufacturing capability. Air Marshal Richard Williams recognised this weakness and embarked Lawrence Wackett to head the Commonwealth Aircraft Corporation. This company produced Wacketts, Wirraways and Boomerangs for Australia in the second World War. Even designing innovative prototypes such as the Kangaroo and Woomera.

This indigenous capability was slowly lost as Australian industry became less and less involved in the aircraft Australia purchased. In 2003, Australia signed on to be involved in the development work of the Joint Strike Fighter. A far cry from the involvement Australian industry had in the 1940's and 50's. More importantly, the Joint Strike Fighter program does not allow for much in the way of technology sharing with Australian industry. Australia has become a locked-in vendor to the Pentagon and American defence industries.

Australian applied scientists and engineers are more than the equal of any other nations. The Collins class Submarines and ANZAC Frigates have shown how well Australian industry can design, develop and manufacture world class systems. It is time the aerospace industry received the same confidence and oppurtunities from the Australian government and people as the maritime industries have. Australian aerospace companies, applied scientists and engineers will produce an aircraft that are dominant in their field, economic to develop and maintain as well as innovative technologically.

Genuine Technology Sharing

Of the weapon systems currently being developed or procured by the Australian Defence Force, there is only one system that includes genuine technology sharing. For most weapon systems, especially US developed weapon systems, Australia is not much more than a licensee of vendor equipment. When Australian defence companies are developing the weapon systems that the ADF uses then Australia will have complete access to the technology. This is important for a the creation of a sustainable and self-reliant defence force.

The increasing capitalisation costs of the defence industry have led to the US government putting fewer contracts out to bid for system development. This has led to the consolidation of the US defence industries into a few monstrous behemoths including Lockheed-Martin, Boeing, McDonnell-Douglas and Raytheon. The downside of this consolidation is that these companies are large enough and sufficiently devoted to their main client, the Pentagon, that they can ignore many requests from a small purchaser like Australia. Requests like the need for Australia to have the source code for the systems being purchased. This further entrenches the reliance of the Australian military on outside vendors and places greater restraint on the ability for the ADF to be self-reliant.

Lesser Dependence on US Defence Industries

With the consolidation of the American defence industries into a few extremely large companies, Australia's bartering position with these companies has been weakened. Australia is not a large enough procurer of their weapons and systems to warrant special attention as a large procurer and investor like the United States government is. In the 1990's Australia has faced more and more issues in getting simple things such as the source code for the systems purchased. Without the source code, Australia is largely placed at the mercy of international governments and vendors. Argentina was placed in a similar position during the Falklands War when it was unable to replenish its inventory of Exocet missiles.

Australian companies that integrate the weapon systems on many of the Australian land, naval and air assets often find themselves doing little more than integrating in existing American technologies from the large American defence companies. Australia requires a sustainable and independent force. The powerful place that American defence companies have on Australian weapon systems is not in the ADF's long term interests. Expanding Australia's indigenous defence industries alleviates this reliance.

Lesser Dependence on US Defence Infrastructure

Australian procurement in the last several years was heavily based upon the Australian ability to take advantage of the American support and logistical infrastructure. The purchase of the second-hand Abrams tanks were an example of the Federal Government expecting the ADF to transparently slide into the US military in an operation. This was the same methodology that the Australian Navy was procured with in the 1930's. This was disastrous. It left Australia without an independent Navy in 1942 with little blue water command and control capability. The same policies in the 21st century will produce the same results from 1942 for the ADF, should Australia become involved in a medium or high intensity conflict.

The other lesson from the 1930's was that Britain was quickly and easily over-extended. The US is currently embroiled in a regional conflict in Iraq, the possibility for the US to become over-extended is real should another medium-intensity conflict arise. The policy of relying heavily on the US military infrastructure for Australian capability and operational tempo is a naive, reckless and potentially disastrous policy. The Australian Defence Force should be independent and sustainable. One that is not reliant on an outside military for any capability.

Development Cost Sharing

One of the largest costs for a new weapons platform is the development cost. The development cost for the F/A-22 was nineteen billion USD over twelve years, for the JSF it is expected to be over twenty-five billion USD with nations other than the US contributing four and half billion. Australia currently maintains a defence budget of over sixteen billion AUD. This covers salaries, maintaining existing platforms as well as new platform development and procurement. The Australian defence budget is approximately 1.9% GDP which is on the low side compared to the British 2.5% and American 3.5%.

There is room for increased Research and Development in the Australian Defence Budget. Even so, the cost for a new weapons platform is high. With a partnership of other nations, the cost of development for a new platform is defrayed. This will make the task and the cost more acceptable to the Australian treasury and the Australian people.

If Australia was to develop a strike platform the cost could be expected to add approximately three billion AUD to the Australian defence budget each year. If Australia was an equal partner in developing a new strike platform, this cost would drop to approximately an extra one and half billion each year. This money would be going directly to Australian industry. By comparison, the cost of purchasing one hundred JSF aircraft is expected to be eighty billion AUD with most of the money heading off-shore.

Increased Regional Political Focus

Japan, the US, China and South Korea are Australia's top trading partners. Of Australia's top seven export markets, five are regional including Japan, China, New Zealand, South Korea and Taiwan. These are the realities of the modern Australian economy. Australian foreign and defence policy has been far more focused on the United States - to the point of imbalance. A regional partnership between democratic nations such as Australia, Japan, South Korea and Taiwan to develop defence platforms will enhance the the political focus of the Asia-Pacific to regional issues.

While the development of an Austral-Asian strike fighter is intended to overcome deficiencies in the JSF and its lack of bearing on Australia's strategic requirements, there will be added benefits in the recognition of common strategic interests by Australia and its regional partners.

Increased Regional Focus on Security and Stability

A regional partnership for a Strike Fighter will focus more public, media and political attention on the common goal of regional security and stability. China has shown remarkable growth in moving to a market economy and Indonesia will ultimately do the same. As these nations come to economic and political maturity, it is important that their growth to maturity is not hampered or destroyed by regional stability concerns. Increased globalization of capital and trade has made the Pacific-rim economies interdependent. It is only in a stable and secure regional environment that economic growth and its benefits can be sustained.

Increased Potential for Disruptive Technologies

The high-tech boom of the 1990's came through the disruptive technology of the internet. This created demand in new fields such as software that education institutions could not match demand for. The labour markets were expanded as new positions were created, that allowed those who showed endeavour to achieve. The internet came from government investment, by the US military in DARPA and by applied science investment from Europe in CERN. These investments in applied science and engineering led to the high tech boom.

Private companies are unwilling to spend large amounts of high risk capital on research and development in the applied science and engineering fields. It is a risky long term investment and private industry is focused on short term returns for shareholders. Unfortunately, it is the long term investment from research and development that produces disruptive technologies such as the internet. Disruptive technologies also fuel as a by-product labour market expansion and economic expansion. Defence Research and Development spending serves as stable, long-term funding in the applied sciences and engineering. It is from this long term funding that disruptive technologies appear.

Conclusion

The Australian Defence Force is a defending an air-sea gap and must do so without Australia making large investments in back-end support platforms such as tankers. Consequently the strike platforms the ADF requires must be largely autonomous. Australia is not alone in its strategic needs, other democratic nations such as Japan, South Korea and Taiwan are also having their requirements ignored. It would benefit Australia and the region to create a partnership between these nations to develop, manufacture and deploy a strike platform that fits the needs of the respective defence forces. The benefits of undertaking the task of an Austral-Asian Strike Fighter are many.

Cameron Riley

Australian defence is divided in political doctrine between the Regionalists and the Expeditionists. Tempered in with these two doctrines is the "Great and Powerful Friends" doctrine of foreign policy which both major parties follow. Under the Howard Government Expeditionists have been claiming victory, unfortunately procurement in the last nine years has been highly unfocused, and will have a deleterious effect on Australian projection. The Expeditionist viewpoint is inherently limiting as it is dependent upon the "Great and Powerful Friends" doctrine and cannot serve as the basis for an independent Australian military or foreign policy.

Expeditionism vs Regionalism

The expeditionalists believe that Australia's global interests should come first and believe the Australian Defence Force (ADF) should be structured to that end. The regionalist believe that Australian defence needs to be focused regionally and the ADF structured with the necessary projection in mind.

The expeditionists cannot be entwined from the "Great and Powerful Friends" doctrine of foreign policy. This is where Australia places its security in subservience to the current superpower and then tries to influence the superpower toward Australian interests.

This was initially used by Billy Hughes at Versailles in 1919. It has been used by every government since. Menzies and Curtin were both hopelessly dependent upon the doctrine. Hawke and Keating were probably the most indifferent toward the doctrine. The Howard years have seen a re-alignment of foreign policy toward uncritical support of the current superpower/hyperpower.

Given this intersection between political doctrine and strategic doctrine it is worthy to understand just what the purposes of the ADF are. From the Fundamentals of Australian Aerospace Power;

... strategic doctrine is the the collection of fundamental principles associated with the application of military force as part of a national effort .... Senior commanders, attempting to contribute to the employment of national power, are, on a daily basis, exposed to the doctrines of other government organizations. The government of the day, together with its supporting bureaucracy, has its doctrine on which the political party is founded and on which it bases its approach to all matters of national importance ....

Central to the military is power. The "Great and Powerful Friends" doctrine deliberately secedes Australian effort to another nation. Australia's national effort toward a goal is immediately removed as being necessary. The expeditionist school of military power diffuses Australian military power until Australia is absolutely dependent upon a superpower for security. Both these doctrines, political and strategic defray Australian ability to act independently in military and foreign policy matters.

Projection

Central to Australian regional projection is the triumvirate of the F111, Collins Class Attack Submarines and the Orion P3C. A simple fact of Australian geography is that only a long range aircraft with good speed and endurance will get into the sea approaches where we are vulnerable. Australian defence is dominated by an air-sea gap. This air-sea gap is the Timor Sea, the Coral Sea and the North-West shelf. These areas also comprise national assets such as oil and fishing grounds.

The second major component of Australian projection is the logistical side. Australia is a large continent and our interests reach far out into the Pacific Ocean, Indian Ocean and Indonesia Archipelago. Consequently Australian airlift ability and sea-going logistical support across the Timor Sea is highly important.

The expeditionist school also quickly forgets that two of Australia's most successful expeditions were across the Timor Sea and Coral Sea. This is where Australian projected its soft and hard power across the air-sea gap. The F111 has also been a remarkable regional deterrent. It should not be forgotten that the moving of an F111 strike force to the Northern Territory was a necessary prelude to the Indonesian Government requesting the UN to come and secure the East Timor situation.

Recent Procurement

Recent procurement for the ADF has been odd. Given the confusion in Australian Government as to the role of the ADF and the changing manner in which the US has used its forces since September 11th, the Australian Government has responded by entertaining big ticket items that do nothing to resolve either expeditionist or regionalist requirements. It looks like the ADF is taking advantage of a government naive on defence and requesting macro weaponry of little use to Australian strategic doctrine.

The Army recently requested and got Abrams tanks. The tanks were surplus US battle tanks that had seen action in the 1991 Gulf War. The cost for these sixty tanks was $550 million. The rhetoric was that it made the Australian-American alliance closer and gave Australian greater operational compatibility with the US.

The problem is the Australian Army does not do "Operation Desert Storm" and if we did, the thirty or so Abrams that left Wooloomolloo would not be enough. The Abrams is a big ticket item that will see the same role as the HMAS Melbourne did. It can never be a front-line battle tank. Australia doesn't have the tank numbers, nor does it keep up with the cutting edge technology.

The $550 million would have been better spent on creating a new specification for an armoured vehicle to match Australian needs on the continent, and in deployments like East Timor and the Solomons. Australian industry would have leapt at the chance to create a flexible tank that fits the Australian Army's operational needs.

The Landing Helicopter Dock

The Navy has also been on a big ticket item binge. It requested two 27,000 tonne Landing Helicopter Dock flat-tops and the upcoming Air Defence Destroyers. the LHDs look like aircraft carriers but are amphibious ships for the landing of troops on hostile shores. They carry helicopter support and are quite large. They are 7,000 tonnes larger than the last Australian aircraft carrier - the HMAS Melbourne. Hugh White writes ;

One of the Howard Government's key defence policy achievements has been to reorient the army towards operations in our immediate neighbourhood - such as East Timor and Solomon Islands. We need amphibious ships for such missions.

But smaller amphibious ships in the 12,000-tonne range - such as the ones we were planning to buy - are fine for these kinds of lower-level operations, and they would be capable of handling tougher fights against the kinds of forces we might find in our immediate neighbourhood.

The bigger ships come into their own in high-level conflicts. They are designed specifically for what are called amphibious assaults: D-day style operations in which forces are landed directly against strong opponents in well-defended positions. An LHD can launch a lot of helicopters at the same time. That lets you put a lot of troops on the objective at once - a big advantage.

Both the East Timor and Solomons deployments came with the consent of the governments of those nations. The ADF weren't hitting hot landing zones when Australian troops landed. One aspect of the regional expeditions where Australia has had the greatest effect has been the diplomacy that went on before to ensure that it was a security operation, not warfare.

It is questionable whether Australia needs such size and power in amphibious naval ships. The Tasmanian company, Incat, supplied the HMAS Jervis Bay during the East Timor crisis which as a littoral ship performed superbly. Incat has also come up with innovative designs in amphibious and aviation support ships. Before a mammoth piece of iron is bought from overseas, the indigenous designs should be reviewed and exhausted first.

Once again Australian industry is quite capable of supplying platforms that more than meet Australia's strategic and operational needs. All that is missing is the government's confidence in Australian industry to provide those solutions.

Air-Warfare Destroyers

Australia has put out tenders for six billion dollars worth of Air Warfare Destroyers (AWD). These are large ships that are intended to replace the Frigates that are currently in service. The Frigates since the First Gulf War have been used as a token coalition force. Even during the height of Australian contribution to the Second Gulf War, the Frigate forces comprised nearly half of Australian commitments in manpower.

These destroyers are also quite large. Again Hugh White writes;

The proposed new ships look nothing like the ships they are replacing. For a start they will be much bigger. At 6000 tonnes (possibly more), they would be bigger than any frigate, destroyer or cruiser the navy has commissioned since World War II. ....

But the new destroyers are not just big, they are complex. Called Air Warfare Destroyers (AWDs in defence speak), their main task is to defend themselves and other ships from air attack. To do that they have powerful radar and potent anti-aircraft missiles, as well as a lot of other sophisticated systems, all of which have to be made to work together. They will be by far the most complex warships we have ever built.

Why would we want such ships? The Government has never given a comprehensive answer, but the brief comments in the Defence Minister's press releases say that the ships are needed to protect amphibious deployments of Australian land forces. Fair enough: if Australia ever finds itself deploying an amphibious task group against a capable adversary in a major conventional conflict, it would be very important to protect them from air attack. But do we need AWDs to do that?

As long as our ships are operating within range of our own or allied air bases, our fighters would be much more effective than the AWDs in defending the fleet from air attack. And bombing enemy aircraft on the ground before they take off would be even better.

This is the crux of it, the Navy somehow thinks that it will be fighting independently in the Mediterrainian, while the Army thinks that its sixty tanks are going to take Rommel on in North Africa. Even worse, the Government thinks the same way and has been giving the Navy and Army what it wants.

The biggest deficiencies in Australian projection have become Aerospace projection and the diggers on the ground. The Australian Air Force is facing block obsolescence. Its most powerful strike weapon is being phased out early, with nothing to replace it. Our Army is facing deployments in Iraq, East Timor and the Solomons. An Army requires a large tail to teeth ratio - often as high as seven to one - this can leave the teeth stretched as it gets deployed far and wide.

The F111

The F111 has been the best deterrent Australia has ever had. it can range up to six thousand kilometres armed with a heavy load of precision weaponry. In comparison the F18 can only manage nine hundred kilometres and the Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) two thousand. The F111 is a powerful, autonomous and independent precision strike weapon.

The F111 is an aging airframe and is expensive to maintain in operational condition. It is necessary to replace it with a similarly potent platform for Australian projection. Unfortunately the Government has decided to retire the platform early in 2010, with nothing to replace it. The JSF is not expected to start service until 2012 - assuming there are no delays in the JSF's development schedule. This leaves a large capability gap.

Australia has bought $450 million worth of cruise missiles, for 2007/2009, to try and replace the loss of projection with the early retirement of the F111. The cruise missile will be able to be fitted on the F18 and P3C aircraft. The cruise missiles are capable of around four hundred kilometres range. They do not replace the F111 unfortunately.

The procurement of the JSF in 2012 will still leave Australia with a drop in projection. The US military has the largest back-end on the planet that is filled to the brim with force multipliers. The United States maintains its power through the heavy use of these force multipliers such as Air to Air Refuelling (AAR) and Airborne Early Warning and Control (AEW&C).

The AAR component of the Australian Air Force is in dire need of modernisation. Currently Australia uses a couple of converted 707s. Australia still does not have an AEW&C system, being entirely reliant on the United States for that capability. Thankfully the the Wedgetail project is nearing deployment . But again, the Australian Government showed their lack of care for Australian projection and opted out of the largely paid for eighth Wedgetail.

For the JSF to achieve the same level of projection as the F111 it will be reliant on the AAR and AEW&C force multipliers. Unfortunately the force multipliers are themselves fat, slow and highly vulnerable targets that need protecting with JSF escort. This diffuses the number of JSF available to project power. If Australia is going to pursue the JSF, then to squeeze the maximum of project from the platform, it will need numbers. The six billion that is thought of being spent on the Air Warfare Destroyers would be better spent on more JSF aircraft.

Australian Solutions for Australian Issues

The fact of the matter is that the world doesn't make weaponry for Australia any longer. If Australia is going to satisfy its strategic and operation needs it is going to need a more vigorous indigenous defence industry that designs and manufactures all manner of systems, from micro to macro.

The United States and United Kingdom are both more interested in global projection, which Australia does not have an interest in, nor the Defence budget to make a reality. The European defence industry are still making point to point weaponry for a mix of western European warfare and colonial deployment. There is none making air-sea gap projection weaponry any longer.

Australia is not alone in this need however, there are several other air-sea gap nations that need these type of defence systems . Japan, South Korea, Taiwan - even Indonesia. If the American and European defence industries are not supplying then Australia must look to its own industries to supply these needs. If the project requires a great deal of capital and knowledge, then we need to look to our regional neighbours as partners; who are equally forgotten in the defence marketplace. There we can forge new defence, technology, industry and political ties.

cam

The Kokoda Foundation asks of the upcoming replacement of the F111 and F18 platforms; Australia's future Joint Strike Fighter fleet: How much is too little? The Australian government will probably be asking that same question from another angle: How much is enough!

The Kokoda Foundation tested force structures for three, four and five squadrons of JSFs in two scenarios. One regional and one expeditionary. The Foundation discovered that less than sixty-four frontline aircraft forced compromises in Australian government policy and ADF capability. A further discovery was that with eighty frontline aircraft, our force multipliers such as AEW&Cs and tankers inflicted limitations on the JSFs ability to operate.

Joint Strike Fighter and Australia

The JSF will add new capabilities to the ADF, especially in the areas of networked warfare. However the JSF is a high-tech short-run weapons system with a large development budget to recover. It will be expensive and Australia has a finite defence budget. The government will mix politics, foreign policies, budgets, future costs as well as defence needs in their final decision.

Australia maintains a competing and sometimes contradictory foreign policy that often requires the piecemeal deployment of Australian assets within the framework of another nation's forces. This has commonly been termed the conflict between the regionalist and expeditionists.

On the regionalist balance of the ledger is the tasks of;

• Defend Australia. This requires projection over Australia's geographic vulnerabilities. Namely the Air-Sea gap in the North-West Shelf, the Timor Sea and the Coral Sea.
• Contributing to regional security. This requires a mix of conventional projection, especially transport function, as well as possible low-tempo expeditionary deployment capability.
• Peacetime national tasks, items such as disaster recovery.

On the expeditionary side are;

• Supporting Australia's wider interests.

The last task is a function of the Great and Powerful Friends doctrine [GAPF] of foreign policy the government follows, and has done since Billy Hughes used it at Versailles. In recent years with the rise of the United Nations and its doctrine of deploying multi-national forces to support security, international law and humanitarian interests; other nations have joined the idea of multi-national expeditionary forces.

The difference under the GAPF policy is that Australia does it with the current superpower, placing Australian defence and foreign policy uncritically in the hands of that superpower, hoping in return that Australia receives security and economic benefits.

The GAPF has little to commend it, being a lazy policy, and one which has not returned much in the way of benefit. Other than the Keating government, every other Australian government has pursued it with zeal, and as such, it is a reality in any procurement for the ADF.

However, both regionalists and expeditionists believe that Australia must maintain air combat capability to ensure its own sovereignty and not out-source that task to other nations, or rely on the Australian region becoming a benign neighbourhood for the foreseeable future.

The Scenarios

The Kokoda Foundation ran several workshops that ran through scenario's supporting that with differing number of JSF assets;

Source: Australia's future Joint Strike Fighter fleet: How much is too little?

Two scenarios were developed to evaluate the possible strategic utility of three different JSF fleets. The fleet sizes chosen were three, four or five squadrons of sixteen aircraft, plus the necessary additional aircraft for maintenance, attrition and a training unit. In each case the force mix option drew on the planned fleets of six airborne early warning and control (AEW&C) and five multi-role tanker transport (MRTT) aircraft so that the 'total' air combat capability for 2015 could be considered.

The first scenario involved regional defence which involves power projection into the air-sea gap. The second scenario involved an expeditionary deployment outside of Australia's region.

Regional Scenario

For the first scenario where Australia's shores were threatened by a conventional force that had super-power backing the Foundation found;

• Three squadrons would not allow Australia to sustain any significant regional projection. Maritime and land strike operations would be severely limited, and most likely limited to a first strike which if unsuccessful would force Australia into a purely defensive posture. Other problems faced would be that the JSFs would only be able to maintain high-tempo operations in two areas, leaving assets in locations outside of these vulnerable.

• Four squadrons would enable limited regional projection and strike capability, but not in extended or prolonged situation. Strike and defence capability would be limited to one theatre of operations and tempo would not be 24/7. This stance would also make greater use of the back-end infrastructure, using tankers to extend their range and projection. Four squadrons would also limit any capability of the air assets supporting anything but air combat, in other words air support for maritime and land operations would be minimal.

• Five squadrons gives the greatest flexibility enabling the a first strike of up to forty-eight targets while still maintaining sufficient defence. This number would free up JSF aircraft to undertake tasks such as battlespace awareness, maritime strikes, land operations support and close-air support. For this number of JSF, the small number of AEW&C and MRTT become the limiting factor, as they would not be able to sustain operations at the same tempo over a prolonged period as this number of JSFs could.

Expeditionary Scenario

For the second scenario the JSF was tested in the role of a force structure geared toward advancing Australia's global interests. In other words, an expeditionary alignment that is popular with the international liberalism style of UN operation and the Australian GAPF doctrine of foreign policy. In this structure it is more important for the forces to be readily deployable and capable of integrating with the forces of other nations.

• Three squadrons would enable Australia to deploy a JSF overseas in support of an international deployment but it would be useless as this number of aircraft would not be able to contribute to operations in a sustainable manner as there are insufficient JSF assets in Australia to rotate the force. This would also leave Australia undefended from a regional incursion.

• Four squadrons would enable Australia to deploy a JSF overseas in support of an international deployment in a sustained manner. There would be sufficient assets for the JSF squadron to rotate through the deployment over a two year period. The problem becomes our force multipliers - we do not have enough AEW&C and MRTT aircraft to maintain that tempo. We could hope that other coalition partners fill that gap for us, but as the Foundation warns, recent conflicts have shown that demand for AEW&C and tankers outstrips supply.

• Five squadrons would enable Australia to maintain, and sustain two separate operations. The limitations in this environment would again be the force multipliers supporting the JSFs, who would only be able to support one deployment at a time.

Foundation's Findings

The report finds that the five squadrons of JSF provide the greatest flexibility and options in terms of regional and expeditionary capability. The additional JSF aircraft enable Australia to maintain both a defence and strike posture regionally. The five squadrons also enables Australia to commit to two overseas expeditionary deployments concurrently. The limiting factor with either four or five squadrons of JSF becomes the force multipliers supporting them;

Given the likely strong demand for its [force multipliers] services, it would make sense to ensure that the JSF fleet is supported by a sustainable fleet of force multipliers, including AEW&C and airborne refuelling aircraft.

and;

This issue is compounded by the fact that in many cases the AEW&C and MRTT fleets, as currently planned, are unlikely to sustain high-tempo operations beyond 30 days. In consequence, the Government should review the resources it intends to devote to AEW&C and MRTT - including aircrew, logistic support and ultimately the number of these aircraft that it intends to buy.

The Foundation also comments that the expansion of capability the JSF offers in networked warfare will pose personnel, information processing, training and organisational challenges for the ADF as well, as the structure will morph to take full advantage of the next generations of technology and capability.

Conclusion

The Australian government has indicated it will buy up to 100 JSF aircraft. The five squadron option that the Kokoda Foundation described is more than one hundred, yet it gives the Australian government the greatest capability in terms of meeting its often conflicting goals of both regional projection and expeditionary commitments.

Will Australia skimp on the purchasing of JSF aircraft? Most likely. It has skimped where it had the chance in other projects such as the Wedgetail AEW&C where it did not take the option of an additional airframe despite the electronics already being paid for . The recent purchase of a small number of C17 transport aircraft also point to this. Yet we are seeing odd purchases such as the Abrams, Air-warfare Destroyers [AWD] and Landing Helicopter Dock ships [LHD]. The latter two in a regional setting being better performed by JSF projection than sea-borne capability.

The other issue with Australian defence procurement, and highlighted in this report is that Australian governments do not understand the importance of investing in the tail. Australia historically has over-achieved in the teeth area - the trigger pullers, the fighter pilots and the bomber aircrew. Our teeth are well recognized and celebrated. A good recent example is how the SASR has performed in Afghanistan and Iraq.

Being a regional power requires investment in the unsexy attributes of the tail, the back-end infrastructure and the force multipliers. It is these that give the teeth their bite.

The report notices that at a certain level the small number of Australian force multipliers limit the capability of the JSFs to maintain a high tempo. This suggests that Australia is under-served in the tail. Which is true.

The F111 was a superior strike platform and regional deterrent for its time, capable of ranging through Asia autonomously. The replacement of the F111 with the JSF left no doubt that the JSF would be a superior weapons platform, more suited to modern combat. The issue always was - would Australia undergo a drop in projection with the retirement of the F111. Unless Australia is willing to invest in the unsexy tail, the answer will be yes.

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The parliamentary library has released a research note which updates information on the JSF project [PDF] and Australia's position and options for it. The two main issues identified are increasing cost of the platform and Australian access to source code.

The cost of the JSF procurement is estimated at being somewhere in the order of 12 to 15.5 billion; up from 10.5 billion. That is not unusual in defence projects which are limited run and cutting edge technology. By way of comparison, the Australian government spends 16.7 billion on defence each year.

Other issues with costs include the possibility that the UK might pull out of the program over disputes with the Pentagon over access to source code. If this occurs the JSF, already a short-run aircraft, will become even shorter run. This will drive up unit costs for the aircraft.

Access to source code is an issue for Australia too. From the research note;

... questions about the release of the computer source code that makes the aircraft so unique have emerged as a potential showstopper for international clients.

The source code in question refers to the millions of lines of computer code that allow this 21st-century aircraft to fly and to fight.

Without complete access to this source code, Australia will be unable to modify or even maintain the aircraft independently--as it has done so successfully for many years with the F-111. The question about the release of the source code to Australia has not been confirmed publicly.

It is understood that maintenance of the JSF will be undertaken in a regional logistics and maintenance centre run by Lockheed Martin.

Without access to the source code, Australia may in coming decades be put in the invidious position of having no option but to pay whatever Lockheed Martin asks during future contract negotiations for the ongoing maintenance of Australia's strike fighters.

In other words, vendor lock-in.

The research note poses other issues, such as the increase in the technology and usefulness of the unmanned aerial vehicles [UAV]. It is possible that UAV will be a disruptive technology and leave the JSF as the last of manned strike aircraft.

Another issue raised is the choice of a less-stealthier platform, such as the F15 which has no development costs associated with it. The research note argues that the technology of the JSF, such as network-centric warfare, will filter down into other platforms; effectively commoditising.

The JSF still has a ways to go, the first test flight has not been performed and many of the technologies for the JSF are yet to fully mature under development. Australia will be watching with interest.

More Information

• JSF, How Much Is Enough?
• Australian Power Projection
• Austral-Asian Strike Fighter

I have argued previously in; Do We Need a 2005 Defence White Paper , that we need an updated Defence White Paper, and that the supporting documents released since do not fully answer some changes in the strategic environment regionally and domestically. As a result I was interested to see the Howard Government's reply to the Joint Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade recommendations.

This is the recommendations on defence in the Senate Hansard;

Recommendation 2:

The committee recommends that the Defence Minister develop a new Defence White Paper for issue during 2005-06. From the introduction of this White Paper, a new Defence White Paper should be developed every four years through a rolling four year program.

The proposed new White Paper should re-emphasise the point that Australia's defence policy is ultimately defensive. The committee would envisage that `power projection ashore' would relate to instances where Australian forces, as part of coalitions, have been requested to assist with the affairs in other nations.

The Government, in developing the new White Paper, should take into account the conclusions made by the committee including:

• Australia's strategic objectives be the defence of Australia and its direct approaches together with greater focus on, and acquisition of, capabilities to operate in the region and globally in defence of our non-territorial interests;
• clear articulation of why Australia's security is interrelated with regional and global security;
• the continuation of the commitment to `self-reliance' in those situations where Australia has least discretion to act;
• focusing on measures that will enhance interoperability with Australia's allies such as the US; and
• developing and implementing a maritime strategy which includes the elements of sea denial, sea control and power projection ashore. (paragraph 4.124)

Those are sensible recommendations in my opinion and serious questions that need well articulated answers that a white paper would produce.

The Government's response was;

Government Response:

On releasing Defence 2000: Our Future Defence Force, the Government undertook to review our defence posture periodically to ensure Australia continues to have the appropriate mix of concepts, capabilities and forces to meet any changes to the strategic environment.

In response to the attacks of September 2001 and October 2002, a review of Defence strategy, in the form of Australia's National Security: A Defence Update 2003 was undertaken. This review, and the subsequent one undertaken in 2005, confirmed that the principles set out in the 2000 White Paper remain sound.

Defence 2000, the Defence Update 2003, and the Defence Update 2005 include the Government's position on the issues raised in the committee's recommendation.

The Government does not agree with the recommendation that White Papers be developed every four years. The Government will continue to implement Defence 2000 and will maintain an up-to-date strategic assessment to inform changes in our capability priorities, defence planning and wider national security requirements.

It will, from time to time, continue to provide public updates of its strategic assessment of our security environment and the policy priorities that flow from this.

There is a lack of a defining doctrine or philosophy in Australian defence and it shows in the confused procurement that has gone on recently. There needs to be clarity of vision in this area as political decisions can have structural and operational repercussions in the ADF for the next quarter of a century.

The Committee also recommended more force multipliers in the form of Air to Air refuelling assets;

Recommendation 5

The committee recommends that the Department of Defence review the number of air-to-air refuelling (AAR) aircraft that it will need to mount effective operations. The committee is of the view that Defence may require more AARs than has currently been planned. (paragraph 5.72)

Government Response:

The Government does not agree that further review of the number of air-to-air refuelling (AAR) aircraft required to mount effective operations is required, as detailed analysis was completed as part of the process to acquire the AAR aircraft.

The number of AAR aircraft being acquired has been determined based on assessment of what would be needed to support credible contingencies.

AAR assets are constantly in short supply when the ADF is on international and coalition deployments. Relying on the US to make up for our lack of the force multipliers is a mistake. The US uses all theirs to an absolute maximum as well.

If Australia procures JSFs, the AAR assets will become doubly important as the JSF cannot operate over a wide area independently. Air to air refuelling assets will become essential for Australian force projection.