The Australian Government recently announced that it would expand the Army by two Battalions to reduce some of the pressure on the large number of deployments Australia has committed to, and seemingly, the expectation of a long infantry-based conflict with extremists and guerrillas in the Middle East. Fourth Generation Warfare [4GW] is the current buzzword, and has been put into modern language by John Robb who writes about the effects of Global Guerrillas and their effect on modern state and economic structures.

There is also the suggestion that all nation-states will feel some kind of domestic 4GW disturbance, such as France did recently, and that the technology of the nation-state and its military structure is ill-equipped to handle it.

The professional military rose in the nation-state due to the high capital investment that was required in the nation-state's military capability. In the 18th Century the Navy was the dominant form of projection and nation-state power. Ships and maritime technology development was highly expensive and the civil and military bureaucracy that supported them was both expensive and complex. John Reeve writes in The Navy and the Nation ;

Navies have been, for centuries, probably the most complex institutional creations of human society and certainly of human governments. The British Navy - the strategic weapon which built the greatest empire the world has ever seen - was, by the eighteenth century, arguably the largest and certainly the most sophisticated organisation within British society.

To build and sustain a navy has, traditionally, required the balancing and integration of human, technological, environmental, fiscal, economic, political, diplomatic and military factors.

The development of armoured warfare and precision based aerospace warfare place similar demands on the nation-state which develops, supports and sustains such a structure in government, civil and martial backing.

Capitalism is the process of commoditisation of economic products. It works with a fury toward this end until anything on the market approaches its cost of production. Military technology has not been immune to the process of capitalism. Much of the military technology that was unique to nation-states, solely for reasons of capitalisation, are now becoming cheap enough that non-state actors can afford them; satellites, UAVs, chemical weapons, etc.

Governments like professional militaries as they are far more obedient than volunteer, conscripted or militia forces. The American and Australian experience of Vietnam being a case in point. Both countries used conscription and faced social disturbance at home with what was an unpopular war. The coercion of civilians into the military forces spread the social dissatisfaction. New Zealand, in contrast, only sent regular forces to Vietnam, and did not face the same civil disruptions domestically.

Militia

The strength of civilian armies, or militia, has been a basis of republican government for a long time. Machiavelli advocated for militia forces as he believed they were more committed to the state than mercenaries. Presumably this isn't a concern of the modern-state but the conflict in Iraq has shown a disconcerting outsourcing of military functions. Though this may be for domestic political purposes, in order to deflect the true size and cost of the military deployment.

The Jefferson and Madison advocacy for militia was based on the fear of a standing army usurping the constitution; something we saw recently in Thailand, and not so long ago in Pakistan. On our borders we have also seen Suharto's Indonesia where the military become indiscernible from civil government in an unhealthy mix which Indonesia is still struggling to remove from their system. Jefferson wrote in 1799;

I am for relying, for internal defence, on our militia solely, till actual invasion, and for such a naval force only as may protect our coasts and harbours from such depredations as we have experienced; and not for a standing army in times of peace, which may overawe the public sentiment; nor for a navy, which, by its own expenses and eternal wars in which it will implicate us, will grind us with public burthens, and sink us under them.

Capital costs of defence and the level of specialisation in the 1800s quickly surpassed Jefferson's beliefs and the United States ended up with a standing army and navy. It is pretty unavoidable given the level of capitalisation and organisation required - only a nation-state can do it.

Australian Militia

Australia has a strong militia tradition which has only been dropped in the last forty years or so, though it still exists civilly in organisations such as the Bush Fire Brigade and State Emergency Services. The Defence Act of the 1900s enforced a morality on the government's approach to military affairs by requiring that only volunteers serve outside of Australia. This was a very moral law .

This meant that the First and Second Imperial Force's were volunteer forces. The Citizen's Military also played a massive role in World War II, especially in New Guinea which was an Australian territory at the time so the government could send militia units there without contradicting the Defence Act. By the end of the war though the Curtin government had moved the definition of Australia as being somewhere just short of the Phillipines. However, Kokoda was one of the great militia victories.

Australia used to maintain militia air squadrons in the 1950s as well but increasing costs of airwarfare platforms eventually scuttled it. The modern professional military is only a recent thing and prior to the 1960s a large component of the Australian military and readiness was wrapped up in militia.

Australian Militia and 4GW

The modern fourth generation of warfare is exposing the weakness of centrally controlled regular units who rely on firepower and force multipliers to complete their mission. The Iraqi experience has shown that local para-military groups are far more effective in rooting out and destroying insurgents and guerrillas.

Jim Hoagland wrote on the insurgency in Iraq and the realisation that the media and punditry are coming to on the issue of fourth generation warfare;

"Insurgency is here to stay," Jeb Nadaner, deputy assistant defense secretary for stability operations, said at a recent U.S.-British conference in Washington on reorganizing governments to fight irregular warfare.

Other speakers -- including conference organizer John Hillen, the State Department's top political-military expert -- spoke bluntly to the group about the continuing failure of the U.S. military and civilian bureaucracies to adapt to an era in which armor and infantry battles occupy only a small space on the overall battlefield and are in any event too costly to be carried on for very long.

As France has shown there are implications when fourth generation warfare is applied locally. At the domestic level it should be handled by civil responses, such as the police force and in extreme circumstances of emergency the Bush Fire Brigade and State Emergency Services but if the issue does spiral to armed militia the Australian military will be of limited to no use.

The other issue Australia is facing is that it will have great difficulty expanding its Army in a tight labor market and one where soldiers are being deployed everywhere and anywhere. It is best to make up a reserve pool by increasing the militia franchise outside of the Army Reserve format. The Swiss have an interesting compulsory system which is something between a regular and volunteer force. Not unlike the mixes Australia used to have in the early 1900s.

Given the decentralised nature of terrorism and systems disruption, it is probably a good idea to train as many as possible in emergency response, civil (BFB and SES) and military (Regular and Irregular) incase the nation-state suffers catastrophic collapse. I do not think Australia will, but it is wise to lay the foundations of social organisation so that if something of that nature does occur it is quickly and easily dealt with.

We may have to change our thinking of state on state violence as well. It is possible that the capital intensive form of warfare and military sustenance in the industrial era was an aberration which we will not see again. It certainly appears that 4GW has more in common with pre-industrial warfare than twentieth century violence.

I think we should change the structure of the ADF from an industrial military force to a more decentralised one; and this means moving as much of the knowledge and expertise into militia structures as possible.