Australian defence is divided in political doctrine between the Regionalists and the Expeditionists. Tempered in with these two doctrines is the "Great and Powerful Friends" doctrine of foreign policy which both major parties follow. Under the Howard Government Expeditionists have been claiming victory, unfortunately procurement in the last nine years has been highly unfocused, and will have a deleterious effect on Australian projection. The Expeditionist viewpoint is inherently limiting as it is dependent upon the "Great and Powerful Friends" doctrine and cannot serve as the basis for an independent Australian military or foreign policy.

Expeditionism vs Regionalism

The expeditionalists believe that Australia's global interests should come first and believe the Australian Defence Force (ADF) should be structured to that end. The regionalist believe that Australian defence needs to be focused regionally and the ADF structured with the necessary projection in mind.

The expeditionists cannot be entwined from the "Great and Powerful Friends" doctrine of foreign policy. This is where Australia places its security in subservience to the current superpower and then tries to influence the superpower toward Australian interests.

This was initially used by Billy Hughes at Versailles in 1919. It has been used by every government since. Menzies and Curtin were both hopelessly dependent upon the doctrine. Hawke and Keating were probably the most indifferent toward the doctrine. The Howard years have seen a re-alignment of foreign policy toward uncritical support of the current superpower/hyperpower.

Given this intersection between political doctrine and strategic doctrine it is worthy to understand just what the purposes of the ADF are. From the Fundamentals of Australian Aerospace Power;

... strategic doctrine is the the collection of fundamental principles associated with the application of military force as part of a national effort .... Senior commanders, attempting to contribute to the employment of national power, are, on a daily basis, exposed to the doctrines of other government organizations. The government of the day, together with its supporting bureaucracy, has its doctrine on which the political party is founded and on which it bases its approach to all matters of national importance ....

Central to the military is power. The "Great and Powerful Friends" doctrine deliberately secedes Australian effort to another nation. Australia's national effort toward a goal is immediately removed as being necessary. The expeditionist school of military power diffuses Australian military power until Australia is absolutely dependent upon a superpower for security. Both these doctrines, political and strategic defray Australian ability to act independently in military and foreign policy matters.

Projection

Central to Australian regional projection is the triumvirate of the F111, Collins Class Attack Submarines and the Orion P3C. A simple fact of Australian geography is that only a long range aircraft with good speed and endurance will get into the sea approaches where we are vulnerable. Australian defence is dominated by an air-sea gap. This air-sea gap is the Timor Sea, the Coral Sea and the North-West shelf. These areas also comprise national assets such as oil and fishing grounds.

The second major component of Australian projection is the logistical side. Australia is a large continent and our interests reach far out into the Pacific Ocean, Indian Ocean and Indonesia Archipelago. Consequently Australian airlift ability and sea-going logistical support across the Timor Sea is highly important.

The expeditionist school also quickly forgets that two of Australia's most successful expeditions were across the Timor Sea and Coral Sea. This is where Australian projected its soft and hard power across the air-sea gap. The F111 has also been a remarkable regional deterrent. It should not be forgotten that the moving of an F111 strike force to the Northern Territory was a necessary prelude to the Indonesian Government requesting the UN to come and secure the East Timor situation.

Recent Procurement

Recent procurement for the ADF has been odd. Given the confusion in Australian Government as to the role of the ADF and the changing manner in which the US has used its forces since September 11th, the Australian Government has responded by entertaining big ticket items that do nothing to resolve either expeditionist or regionalist requirements. It looks like the ADF is taking advantage of a government naive on defence and requesting macro weaponry of little use to Australian strategic doctrine.

The Army recently requested and got Abrams tanks. The tanks were surplus US battle tanks that had seen action in the 1991 Gulf War. The cost for these sixty tanks was $550 million. The rhetoric was that it made the Australian-American alliance closer and gave Australian greater operational compatibility with the US.

The problem is the Australian Army does not do "Operation Desert Storm" and if we did, the thirty or so Abrams that left Wooloomolloo would not be enough. The Abrams is a big ticket item that will see the same role as the HMAS Melbourne did. It can never be a front-line battle tank. Australia doesn't have the tank numbers, nor does it keep up with the cutting edge technology.

The $550 million would have been better spent on creating a new specification for an armoured vehicle to match Australian needs on the continent, and in deployments like East Timor and the Solomons. Australian industry would have leapt at the chance to create a flexible tank that fits the Australian Army's operational needs.

The Landing Helicopter Dock

The Navy has also been on a big ticket item binge. It requested two 27,000 tonne Landing Helicopter Dock flat-tops and the upcoming Air Defence Destroyers. the LHDs look like aircraft carriers but are amphibious ships for the landing of troops on hostile shores. They carry helicopter support and are quite large. They are 7,000 tonnes larger than the last Australian aircraft carrier - the HMAS Melbourne. Hugh White writes ;

One of the Howard Government's key defence policy achievements has been to reorient the army towards operations in our immediate neighbourhood - such as East Timor and Solomon Islands. We need amphibious ships for such missions.

But smaller amphibious ships in the 12,000-tonne range - such as the ones we were planning to buy - are fine for these kinds of lower-level operations, and they would be capable of handling tougher fights against the kinds of forces we might find in our immediate neighbourhood.

The bigger ships come into their own in high-level conflicts. They are designed specifically for what are called amphibious assaults: D-day style operations in which forces are landed directly against strong opponents in well-defended positions. An LHD can launch a lot of helicopters at the same time. That lets you put a lot of troops on the objective at once - a big advantage.

Both the East Timor and Solomons deployments came with the consent of the governments of those nations. The ADF weren't hitting hot landing zones when Australian troops landed. One aspect of the regional expeditions where Australia has had the greatest effect has been the diplomacy that went on before to ensure that it was a security operation, not warfare.

It is questionable whether Australia needs such size and power in amphibious naval ships. The Tasmanian company, Incat, supplied the HMAS Jervis Bay during the East Timor crisis which as a littoral ship performed superbly. Incat has also come up with innovative designs in amphibious and aviation support ships. Before a mammoth piece of iron is bought from overseas, the indigenous designs should be reviewed and exhausted first.

Once again Australian industry is quite capable of supplying platforms that more than meet Australia's strategic and operational needs. All that is missing is the government's confidence in Australian industry to provide those solutions.

Air-Warfare Destroyers

Australia has put out tenders for six billion dollars worth of Air Warfare Destroyers (AWD). These are large ships that are intended to replace the Frigates that are currently in service. The Frigates since the First Gulf War have been used as a token coalition force. Even during the height of Australian contribution to the Second Gulf War, the Frigate forces comprised nearly half of Australian commitments in manpower.

These destroyers are also quite large. Again Hugh White writes;

The proposed new ships look nothing like the ships they are replacing. For a start they will be much bigger. At 6000 tonnes (possibly more), they would be bigger than any frigate, destroyer or cruiser the navy has commissioned since World War II. ....

But the new destroyers are not just big, they are complex. Called Air Warfare Destroyers (AWDs in defence speak), their main task is to defend themselves and other ships from air attack. To do that they have powerful radar and potent anti-aircraft missiles, as well as a lot of other sophisticated systems, all of which have to be made to work together. They will be by far the most complex warships we have ever built.

Why would we want such ships? The Government has never given a comprehensive answer, but the brief comments in the Defence Minister's press releases say that the ships are needed to protect amphibious deployments of Australian land forces. Fair enough: if Australia ever finds itself deploying an amphibious task group against a capable adversary in a major conventional conflict, it would be very important to protect them from air attack. But do we need AWDs to do that?

As long as our ships are operating within range of our own or allied air bases, our fighters would be much more effective than the AWDs in defending the fleet from air attack. And bombing enemy aircraft on the ground before they take off would be even better.

This is the crux of it, the Navy somehow thinks that it will be fighting independently in the Mediterrainian, while the Army thinks that its sixty tanks are going to take Rommel on in North Africa. Even worse, the Government thinks the same way and has been giving the Navy and Army what it wants.

The biggest deficiencies in Australian projection have become Aerospace projection and the diggers on the ground. The Australian Air Force is facing block obsolescence. Its most powerful strike weapon is being phased out early, with nothing to replace it. Our Army is facing deployments in Iraq, East Timor and the Solomons. An Army requires a large tail to teeth ratio - often as high as seven to one - this can leave the teeth stretched as it gets deployed far and wide.

The F111

The F111 has been the best deterrent Australia has ever had. it can range up to six thousand kilometres armed with a heavy load of precision weaponry. In comparison the F18 can only manage nine hundred kilometres and the Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) two thousand. The F111 is a powerful, autonomous and independent precision strike weapon.

The F111 is an aging airframe and is expensive to maintain in operational condition. It is necessary to replace it with a similarly potent platform for Australian projection. Unfortunately the Government has decided to retire the platform early in 2010, with nothing to replace it. The JSF is not expected to start service until 2012 - assuming there are no delays in the JSF's development schedule. This leaves a large capability gap.

Australia has bought $450 million worth of cruise missiles, for 2007/2009, to try and replace the loss of projection with the early retirement of the F111. The cruise missile will be able to be fitted on the F18 and P3C aircraft. The cruise missiles are capable of around four hundred kilometres range. They do not replace the F111 unfortunately.

The procurement of the JSF in 2012 will still leave Australia with a drop in projection. The US military has the largest back-end on the planet that is filled to the brim with force multipliers. The United States maintains its power through the heavy use of these force multipliers such as Air to Air Refuelling (AAR) and Airborne Early Warning and Control (AEW&C).

The AAR component of the Australian Air Force is in dire need of modernisation. Currently Australia uses a couple of converted 707s. Australia still does not have an AEW&C system, being entirely reliant on the United States for that capability. Thankfully the the Wedgetail project is nearing deployment . But again, the Australian Government showed their lack of care for Australian projection and opted out of the largely paid for eighth Wedgetail.

For the JSF to achieve the same level of projection as the F111 it will be reliant on the AAR and AEW&C force multipliers. Unfortunately the force multipliers are themselves fat, slow and highly vulnerable targets that need protecting with JSF escort. This diffuses the number of JSF available to project power. If Australia is going to pursue the JSF, then to squeeze the maximum of project from the platform, it will need numbers. The six billion that is thought of being spent on the Air Warfare Destroyers would be better spent on more JSF aircraft.

Australian Solutions for Australian Issues

The fact of the matter is that the world doesn't make weaponry for Australia any longer. If Australia is going to satisfy its strategic and operation needs it is going to need a more vigorous indigenous defence industry that designs and manufactures all manner of systems, from micro to macro.

The United States and United Kingdom are both more interested in global projection, which Australia does not have an interest in, nor the Defence budget to make a reality. The European defence industry are still making point to point weaponry for a mix of western European warfare and colonial deployment. There is none making air-sea gap projection weaponry any longer.

Australia is not alone in this need however, there are several other air-sea gap nations that need these type of defence systems . Japan, South Korea, Taiwan - even Indonesia. If the American and European defence industries are not supplying then Australia must look to its own industries to supply these needs. If the project requires a great deal of capital and knowledge, then we need to look to our regional neighbours as partners; who are equally forgotten in the defence marketplace. There we can forge new defence, technology, industry and political ties.

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In the past the Navy has been the centre of imperial pride. The ships themselves are often inhumanely large, are capital intensive to design and build, not to mention expensive to maintain. Australia has never really done the Navy well, the "great and powerful friends" doctrine of foreign policy has meant we have ended up with a small and dependent Navy that can slot in to either the British or American Navies. Warfare is changing, the potential of conflict between nation-states will continue to exist; but networked warfare between nation-states and non-state actors is appearing as technology and communications commodify. The Navy will have to adapt to meet the traditional challenge of warfare between nation-states, in addition to decentralised systems warfare and national purpose.

The Air-Sea Gap

The military policy of a nation-state is defined by its vulnerabilities. In Australia's case, our geographic vulnerabilities are the North-West shelf, the Timor Sea and the Coral Sea. This vulnerability is commonly known as the Air-Sea gap. This is the area that Australia must project force across, not only to repel any potential aggressor, but also to maintain a sustained presence as there are numerous energy and fishing assets in these areas.

The speedy projection of force is best done by air, and for this Australia has the soon to be retired strike platform of the F111, as well as the long range P3C Orion. it is presumed that the F18, coupled with our aging Boeing 707 Air to air refuelling assets will cover for the F111's huge range, strike power, and autonomy as a weapons platform.

The Navy currently provides blue-water projection through the Collins class submarines and the ANZAC Frigates. The Collins subs are an excellent strike platform, helped by the fact that diesel submarines are quiet, and the ocean is noisy. The Collins class often out-performs itself in naval exercises and operations. The Frigates are the more utilitarian of the Naval platforms and far more suited to the pragmatic and multiple uses which the Australian government forces the Navy to perform.

Unfortunately, the Australian Navy still remains hobbled, mainly by the government's unwillingness to spend the amount of money needed on the weapon and communication systems, as well as force multipliers which would make the Navy an independent and autonomous force, capable of projecting without care or concern for other forces. Money is not the entire issue, however, the dominant problem is the Australian government's inability to untangle its military policy from its submissive foreign policy.

Defeating The Great And Powerful Friends Doctrine

Since Billy Hughes, Australia has practised what is known as the "Great and Powerful Friends" [GAPF] doctrine of foreign policy. This is where Australia becomes submissive to the dominant superpower of the time in its foreign policy, and instead attempts to further the aims of the superpower through Australian diplomacy and foreign policy. Supposedly the gains are that Australia can then assert its will through the superpower and pursue its interests by manipulating the superpower. The other goal of this foreign policy was that it would bring security, defence and economic benefits. Unfortunately, it is a failure.

In 1919, Australia had no significant Navy and Australia's major trading partner was Britain - with approximately eighty per cent of exports heading there. Hughes was concerned that if Canada was more loyal to Britain, it would get favourable trade terms with the UK. He was also worried about the "yellow peril" in the Pacific. As a consequence he sought the Royal Navy in the Pacific to guarantor Australian security. Both premises for his actions were flawed, but that did not stop Hughes perusing this policy.

Unfortunately government's have never stopped doing it, despite putting Australia in grave danger by doing so. In the 1930s, it was known that Singapore was money-sink and would not stop any determined aggressor, or even delay them until the Royal Navy could sail into the Pacific. It was also known that the Royal Navy could not fight a war in the Atlantic and Pacific concurrently, yet Australia still pursued the GAPF.

In 1941 we were left with a Navy that could not act independently, and despite the valiant efforts of the ships and crews, it was the US Navy which established blue-water supremacy in the Pacific. The Australian Navy also suffered from being behind in technology, we did not get an aircraft carrier until the 1950s, and then lost that projection capability in the 1980s with the retirement of the Melbourne.

The Decentralised Navy

The Australian Navy must be able to project a sustained presence, both air and sea, in the areas of national vulnerability. These are the seas and oceans immediately bordering Australia. The assymetry and commodification of technology will mean that the Navy will be facing non-state forces who are capable of disrupting systems of national and economic importance. As the recent attack on a cruise ship by RPG shows, non-state actors can be exceptionally open and disruptive with cheap, low-tech weaponry.

Unmanned Aerial Vehicles [UAVs] will most likely become the next cheap technology that ceases to be monopolised by nation-states. Usually only capital intensive weapons remain in the domain of nation-states. The computer chip and minitiarisation mean that the cost of these will be in the domain of anyone who wants it. While a UAV in the US Air Force might be able to concurrently track three hundred angels on a pinhead, a UAV controlled by cell phone is more than able to deliver, in kamikaze fashion, a warhead into a ship, a city, or even an oil platform in the Timor Sea.

The ANZAC Frigates are an excellent platform, which act in a utilitarian manner to the often contradictory political operations the government sends them on. It is retarded to have a four hundred million dollar, finely tuned projection platform such as an ANZAC Frigate pull refugees out of the water. But they do not enable fixed wing projection. Australia will need autonomous platforms that have weapon systems for air, surface and underwater. These platforms will also need to be capable of carrying and operating fixed and rotating wing assets.

The next generation of Frigates will need to have some through-deck ability, or at the least larger landing areas to accommodate larger UAVs and maybe even the VTOL Joint Strike Fighter. As weapon systems have miniaturised, specialisation in ships has not been as necessary. For instance, the battleship, cruiser, destroyer and corvette have largely been collapsed into the one platform. It is time to increase the aviation assets of the current Frigates in a new platform that can carry at least three larger aircraft or UAVs. The Tasmanian company, Incat has designs which lean toward this view.

Operational Autonomy

Australia has never really done the Command and Control [C&C] as a core competency, as this contradicts the expeditionary policies of the government, but when Australia has done command and control, it is has excelled. East Timor being a recent example. This component will need to have money spent on it, so that each sea going platform can act as a C&C platform, for not only the fleet, but also other ADF assets, including airborne force multipliers. The idea behind this is to have the Navy nodal, so if one node goes, then another can quickly replace it. Since threats can be non-state based, it is important that there be instant C&C capability in any locality.

Since the Navy will have sustained projection in the Air-Sea Gap as its primary role this will require more investment in back end and support infrastructure. Logistics is exceptionally important for any military force. Logistics is often the deciding factor in a force's tempo and capability. During the East Timor operation the HMAS Jervis Bay was leased due to a hole in Australia support and logistical capability. This will also help to make US logistical support unnecessary in situations where Australia is maintaining a significant force outside of Australia, in the South Pacific region.

A National Military And Foreign Policy

The GAPF doctrine stands in the way of a genuinely effective navy. We end up uncritical supporters of the super power of the time, and too often Navy procurement is piecemeal and lacking policy direction. The current Air Warfare Destroyers [AWD] do not help maintain projection power in the Air-Sea gap.

Neither do the Landing Helicopter Docks [LHD] which the Navy wants. They are for hitting a hot beach, and the AWDs are for protecting them while they are doing that. It is simpler and cheaper, to have aircraft maintain air superiority over any possible expedition that requires the Navy to perform that duty. In an expeditionary force, the US will provide that capability, so they will only ever likely be used regionally anyway, where they can be under the ADFs air umbrella.

For a truly national defence policy, which incorporates regional projection, an economic factor is required. Several democratic nations in Asia region face similar vulnerabilities to Australia. Japan, South Korea and Taiwan all need to defend an Air-Sea gap. Since Australia will have to develop platforms and weapon systems to provide naval force projection in the region, the cost of this can be defrayed by partnering with other nations.

This would have multiple benefits; it would reduce development costs, there would be genuine technology sharing, it would involve our larger trading partners and lead to greater economic and defence integration.

Conclusion

Our national vulnerabilities require us to have a Navy which is capable of a sustained surface and air presence in the seas and oceans off Australia. This presence may need to deter both nation-states and non-state actors. As a result, ships must be both capable of command and control, individual autonomy, as well as integration into the wider ADF structure.

The Australian Navy needs to develop a platform to replace the ANZAC Frigates which is capable of not only completing the existing tasks that are required of the Frigates, but also capable of carrying helicopters, UAVs and possibly a couple of VTOL JSFs. These would replace the AWDs, LHDs, and eventually the ANZAC Frigates. Several of our democratic trading partners face the same projection and vulnerability challenges as Australia does. These nations can be partnered with to develop a regional projection platform that contains air, surface, underwater and aviation capability.

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John McEwan, the long time deputy Prime Minister to Robert Menzies, claimed in an interview that one of his greatest achievements was the sending of the HMAS Adelaide to New Caledonia in 1940 to do some gunboat diplomacy. Historically, McEwan's claim has not been confirmed, but is possible within the manner that the first Menzies' government managed policy and cabinet decisions. As Peter Edwards wrote in an essay titled, "The Royal Australian Navy in Australian Diplomacy", this instance is interesting because of its rarity. Australian mythology always gives dominance to the Army through the ANZAC legend/myth. This has led to a policy, media and nationalistic view of the military as dominated by the Army and segmented in capability - a jointery.

New Caledonia

In 1940, Australia faced the problem of its sea lines of communication being cut between itself and the United States. Common mythology in Australia is that Japan was seeking to invade Australia. This is not true, Japan wanted Indonesia's oil first and foremost, secondly it wanted to isolate Australia from the United States. Japan did not have the troop numbers to invade Australia, in stead the plan was to take New Guinea, the Solomons and then New Caledonia to deny communication and logistical routes between Australia and America.

Ultimately, the Australian Army denied Japan from establishing themselves in southern New Guinea, and the US Marine Corp denied the Japanese the Solomon Islands. New Caledonia, however, was French, and with the collapse of France, there was a tension between the Free French and the Vichy French. The former were partial to the west, while the Vichy were partial to Japan, potentially creating a liability for Australia with was clouds darkening in the Pacific between Japan and America.

The cruiser, HMAS Adelaide under Henry Showers was dispatched to New Caledonia to enable the Free French to maintain control. Peter Edwards writes;

Showers achieved this goal without a shot being fired - a major achievement in the use of the threat of naval force to gain a diplomatic end.

This helped to secure, and stabilise Australia's out-lying region, and vulnerable areas to ensure that the sea lanes between Australia and the United States were not threatened with changing circumstance between Japan, Australia and America.

But that was in World War II, when big grey hulled ships sailed the oceans and fought for blue water supremacy in massive battles between air and ocean going fleets. The modern environment contains mixes of tensions between nation-states, between nation-states and non-state actors, as well as the possibility of nearby nation-states balkanizing, or flat out failing in their ability to maintain consistent law and order. Is the ANZAC myth, and our "Great and Powerful Friends" [GAPF] doctrine sufficient in such a complex and demanding environment.

Nationalising The ANZAC Myth

Myths overtake reality and often end up forming a popular narrative of their own. The ANZAC myth is a perpetuation of the popular bushman myth from the 1800s, propagated into a Nietzschian creation of the nation-state through national blood letting. It is not a surprise that the bushman myth and ANZAC myth were combined in a song, "And the band played Waltzing Matilda".

The ANZACs are commonly equated with the battles at Gallipoli, where Australian forces fought in close proximity to Turkish troops, in what was often brutal, bloody and misguided battles. The Australians achieved, despite the horrendous conditions, and often naive leadership, from both the Australian and British leaders, but ultimately could not stave off defeat and had to withdraw.

It was Charles Bean, the official historian, who propelled Gallipoli into the ANZAC myth. He helped popularise the ANZACs in 1915 with a book describing the heroics and valour of the troops in Gallipoli. This was continued with the description of the "Black ANZACs" who led the first Australian charge in Europe once Australian Imperial Force troops were deployed in France and Belgium. The men who fought at Gallipoli called themselves "Peninsula Men", and there was prestige in World War I amongst the troops between them, especially if they were Lighthorse.

The focus on the ANZACs, especially in modern times has led to a focus on the Army as the strength of the Australian military. This has been helped by Australia's constant focus on an expeditionary foreign policy inside the GAPF doctrine. Yet, in World War I, Australia was the only dominion to develop and deploy a Flying Corps, which was to become the Australian Air Force. The Navy has had a harder time, as it has never been developed by government policy into an independent and autonomous force. Consequently, myth has overtaken a consolidated view of the Australian military as achieving national objectives.

The Tip Of The Spear

The military is one of the few government institutions who must be finely tuned to national objectives. The Jeffersonian view of the Republic sees a standing military as being an offence to liberty, as a central government will use, and abuse it for tyrannous ends. This was challenged during the United States' war with England in 1812, when the US Navy, or Adams' wooden walls were the only capable defence for the US in the early stages of the war.

Another reality of a nation-state, is that generally only the collective wealth of the people can fund, maintain, and develop such a capital intensive arm of government as a standing military of highly technical platforms and manned by professionals. Because of the expeditionary focus of Australian foreign policy, we tend to think of the Australian spear as being the Army, and in particular the Army's rapid deployment forces, such as the SAS and Commandos.

This does a dis-service to the technical capability of the Air Force and Navy. Since the late 1960s, the force projection into Australia's national vulnerabilities has been the F111, the P3C Orion, and attack submarines; the latter recently being filled by the Collins class. In expeditionary deployments, it has usually been the Army that has born the brunt, to the point that conscription was needed during the Vietnam conflict. The Air Force and Navy have been deployed in either piecemeal fashion, or as a small component integrated into a large force, such as the US Air Force or Navy.

More recently, with deployments to East Timor and the Solomons, the Australian Defence Force has been required to provide integrated solutions that incorporate the Army, Navy and Air Force; rather than focusing on one arm to the exclusion of the others. The Iraq conflict also involved considerable aviation assets, but it has been the SAS which has garnered the most media attention. Security is also based on perception, both international and domestic. Unfortunately the integrated capability of the ADF to provide regional solutions has been largely ignored, and the 2003 election included a fight between the two major parties over who was the most committed to the US Alliance.

Bill Hayden has also lamented in the past that the electorate's marriage to the ANZUS Treaty often defies reality, but it is politicians that have enforced that dependency, through their rhetoric, policy and actions. Australians have not seen the ADF act as an integrated capable force, even when it has. The GAPF doctrine, the media, the ANZAC myth and the political attempt to militarise political history have seen this glossed over. As a consequence the GAPF doctrine becomes self-prophesying at the political and public opinion levels.

Back To ANZAC

Claims to nationalism and security are a cheap political means to collapse opinion and power to the centre. James Madison warned at the founding of the United States, that was is to be avoided as it offers nothing but executive aggrandizement. Cries to insecurity serve the same purpose, something we have seen recently with the open ended "War on Terror" and the political manoeuvring to make the Australian population's concern for their safety dependent upon the federal government.

This federal government's reaction to the war on terror has been to militize Australian policy both internationally and domestically. We have seen piecemeal deployments to Afghanistan and Iraq in support of the US, as well as media shots of black balaclava'd special troops dropping from Blackhawks at home. This is despite a terrorists rarely being armed with more than a bomb - which state police could easily handle.

Another irony of this domestic view of anti-terror, is that our troops are clad in black masks to hide their identity, as are the jihadists which appear on Al-Queda training and propaganda videos. While ours drop from Blackhawks, Al-Queda jump over obstacle courses, clutching AK47s and other cheap arms. This is a totally inappropriate image of domestic security, most likely designed to install the same fear in the population that terrorism does. Terror is a civil issue, best handled by state police, and it is the face of the state police which should be equated with terrorism, not the ADF.

At the same time, the Liberal Party has also moved to try and militarise Australian history, and equate it with the Liberal Party. We have had odd claims such as making children in school learn about Simpson and his donkey as an example of Australian values. History is an essential component of any education, but warping it to political ends through the education system is an inferior way to impart knowledge.

The GAPF doctrine of foreign policy is inherently limiting, it denies Australian independence, autonomy and self-destiny. Equating the ANZAC myth to political nationalism will only serve to further entrench the flawed, and failed policy of the GAPF. The ANZUS Treaty is no longer relevant, being a cold war document which helped enforce the GAPF in the Australian political mind. It needs to be junked, and the Australian politicians starting to focus on the wider capability of the ADF as the nucleus of a larger, more capable, integrated force that it is, and can be in the popular mind.

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The Australian has a pre-release discussion of it. No mention of the report, or its impending release from the defence website media room .

From the article;

The Prime Minister all but gave a guarantee yesterday that cabinet will soon approve a continuation of the 3per cent real increase in the defence budget beyond 2010, which will mean billions of extra dollars for the military.

That will probably only stave off inflationry pressures. IIRC the ADF gets about 17 billion a year, so a three percent increase comes in at 510 million. To put that in comparison, last election the money that was "found" in the budget and used for electoral bribes was 6 Billion.

The update envisages that new military capabilities -- including a larger, more mobile and better protected army, together with the navy's new amphibious ships and air warfare destroyers -- could contribute to coalition operations further away from Australia's neighbourhood. The blueprint details regional military trends, including China's military modernisation, India's rise and the US's future military posture in East Asia.

So the Navy is getting their 30,000 tonne LHD behemoths. I am interested to see their strategic and doctrinal justification for both the LHD and AWDs.

He said any new Australian commitment to Iraq would depend on Japan, Britain and the views of the new Iraqi government after this month's elections.

America will make that decision for us. Iraq is becoming politically untenable in the US. It will leave us no choice.

One of Australia's claims is that in WWI/WWII it punched above its weight in terms of contribution and hitting power. A coupe of things are in favor of that, for one Australia contributed troops, aircraft and ships when the major powers had either hit catastrophe or were in dire straits. Having a strong record helps when you are in a target rich environment. Compare that to Australian troops doing mop up operations in New Guinea in 1944 when the Pacific War was in Okinawa.

Another reason is that Australia used to rely on Britain for its command and logistical structure. As a consequence, Australia supplied teeth, not tail. It is not the same today. Despite Australia slotting into the US military machine, it is still dependent on American logistics, however, doctrine is different. In 1940 it was doctrine to get a retired British person and then make them Australian Chief of Staff or head of the Air Force.

Vincent P. O'Hara records the number of ship borne surface engagements in the Mediteranean during World War II;

50 Great Britain
36 Italy
11 Germany
9 Australia
8 France
3 United States
2 Greece
2 New Zealand
2 Netherlands

HMAS Sydney was in the thick of things in the Mediterranean and surface combat seemed to follow her about.