The President of Venezuela, Hugo Chavez, raised the possibility that he may seek a referendum so that he may be elected President longer than the Venezuelan constitution allows. Venezuela's constitution was only instituted in 1999, so it is a bit premature to be changing it.

From the BBC article;

During his [Chavez'] weekly TV show on Sunday, he announced he was thinking of calling a referendum to allow him to run for another term in the 2012 elections.

Mr Chavez, who faces re-election this year, said he did not fear competition.

Mr Chavez was first elected in 1998 and then again in 2000 after the approval of a constitution under which he is barred from running in 2012.

He insisted he would allow the Venezuelan people to vote on the issue.

"If there is no opposition candidate, I would consider signing a decree to hold a referendum asking 'Do you agree Chavez should be allowed to seek a new term?' and let's let the people decide."

Sounds to me like the people decided a mere seven years ago - of which term limiting is IMNSHO a wise addition to a constitution.

This is the Constitution of the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela [Beware a printer pop-up]. From Article 230;

The presidential term is six years. The President of the Republic may be re-elected, immediately and once only, to an additional term.

There are some other restrictions on who can run for the Executive position including not being a member of the clergy, or being in certain public office such as Vice-President, Minister, Governor or Mayor at the time of announcing candidacy.

Six years is overly generous anyway.

So what is the referendum process for Venezuela? From Article 71;

Matters of special national transcendence may be referred to a consultative referendum, on the initiative of the President of the Republic, taken at a meeting of the Cabinet;

by resolution of the National Assembly, passed by a majority vote;

or at the request of a number of voters constituting at least 10% of all voters registered on the national, civil and electoral registry.

Matters of special state, municipal and parish transcendence may also be referred to a consultative referendum.

The initiative shall be taken by the Parish Board, the Municipal Council and to the Legislative Council, by the vote of two third of its members; by the Mayor and the Governor or by a number of voters constituting at least 10% of the total number of voters registered in the pertinent circumscription.

Some crowd wisdom aspects there where ten percent of the voting population can bring an initiative to referenda. The President and National Assembly can also.

I get nervous once members of the Executive start talking about changing term limits. Especially in this case; as the paint is barely dry on the Venezuelan constitution.

If you have a look at a site called 'Freedom House' , and then have a look at the country entry for ' Australia ', you will see that there are 3 divisions; 'Free', 'Partly Free', 'Not Free'.

Australia is listed as 'Free' (thanks guys). On this I mostly agree. We are freer than our northern neighbours in SE Asia (Why then would we want to consider ourselves 'part of Asia' Mr Keating?).

I do however feel that we achieve a level of freedom somewhat less than the ideal. Don't get me wrong there, I have worn the uniform of this country, I believe the political institutions of this country work reasonably well, but it could be better.

That site, which looks to reasonably objective, says some good things about Oz;

...Australia is a constitutional democracy with a federal parliamentary form of government. Citizens participate in free and fair multiparty elections to choose representatives to the parliament...

and;

...Australia is regarded as one of the least corrupt societies in the world and was ranked 9 out of 146 countries surveyed in the 2004 Transparency International Corruption Perceptions Index...

But it also says things that could be problematic in later years;

...The constitution does not provide for freedom of speech and of the press...

...The rights of assembly and association are not codified in law...

What do the likes of me think we should do to fix things?

Firstly, note I support Australia being a Republic. We DO NOT need to be a Republic to enjoy our freedoms. However, the wrong model for a Republic could reduce our freedoms - and I believe the 1999 model was a wrong model - that model would have made the President (or GG) simply a creature of Parliament's choice, not as he/she could be - a final guardian of the people's interests.

Secondly, We need a potent Bill of Rights. Not one that is filtered and vetoed by minority interest groups, but one which entrusts and empowers true citizens in a participatory democracy.

Thirdly, We should adopt the tools of Direct Democracy ; Initiative, Referendum, and Recall, so that we can formulate, or strike down laws by a petitioning and majority vote process (Initiative), and call to account politicians and officials on the public payroll to give account of their actions, and remove them from office by majority vote (Recall). Referendum we already have, but it could be fine-tuned.

We should also demand that we have a 'State of the Nation' report annually (or immediately prior to an election), where the head of government reports on the Nation's balance sheet, civil health (crime, economic indicators) and how they plan to address challenges identified especially in the medium to long term. They should also set out their legislative plans for the next year.

None of these things are revolutionary ideas. They all currently work, and have for some time, in places like Switzerland and the US. They should be part of the debate on this nation's plans for it's future.

(This article is reformmated from my Blog entry ; 24May06).

A quick look at the federal referendums as told by graphs in percent states and electors for.

Wikipedia has an excellent section on the Australian Referendums with plenty of data. These graphs are built from there. The Section 128 of the Australian Constitution states (abbreviated);

This Constitution shall not be altered except in the following manner:--

The proposed law for the alteration thereof must be passed by an absolute majority of each House of the Parliament, ...

And if in a majority of the States a majority of the electors voting approve the proposed law, and if a majority of all the electors voting also approve the proposed law, it shall be presented to the Governor-General ...

This is sometimes called the triple majority requirement. An absolute majority in parliament, the states and electors. Which is fair enough in a federalist system where it is expected that state electors would be precious of state's rights.

One of the questions is, does this triple majority make the constitution too difficult to alter, and is this why the High Court has taken to altering constitutional practice outside of referendums; and why the federal government elicits signed agreeance from the states to allow the federal government to oversee what are state responsibilities rather than constitutionally required federal responsibilities.

% States

The referendum which allowed the territories to vote did not allow the territories to count toward a state majority in referendums. So throughout federal referendum history, four of six states must pass a referendum.

The columns marked in green were successful. Note that there were a lot that achieved three out of six states in the for column, but that was not sufficient enough for a majority.

% Electors

Since 1977 the territories count toward the national total for referendums.

The green columns note the successful referendums. An interesting pattern is that many of the referendums hovered just under the fifty percent mark and some over. There are relatively few referendums that had the popular vote and not the state majority, but many of them had high 40s support and no state majority.

What is obvious, is that the referendums which did pass into constitutional change were very popular.

The small number of Australian states can make the results for referendums seem wildly for or against, despite the pattern of the elector's voting to be predominantly be mildly for or mildly against. This makes constitutional change that sparks ambivalence in even a small minority difficult to pass.

These two graphs alone don't answer the question's posed earlier in the article, a closer examination of what the referendum's were, on what topics, and what they represented is needed. I will deal with that in another article.

cam

I have broken the referendums down into the categories of centralisation, democracy, illiberalism and other in order to determine what the voters have been rejecting over the last century. It turns out that voters have been rejecting centralisation, overwhelmingly, with only three referendum being passed in the category, and twenty-four failing.

The referendum's have been categorised as centralisation, democracy, illiberalism and other. The centralisation category is where the federal government has sought to increase its responsibilities via referendum. This isn't to say they are all bad, for instance the referendum on civil aviation makes federalist sense, however many of the referendum for further centralisation did not.

The democracy category is taken as referendums that seeks to increase democratic franchise, democratic practices and ensure individual rights. For instance the referendums asking whether the territories should be counted toward the national majority in a referendum.

The illiberalism category is instances that remove rights or liberty under the liberal democratic system. An immediate candidate for that is the referendum to ban the communist party. The other category is anything that doesn't fit into the others.

• 1906 Senate Elections; Democracy - Passed
• 1910 State Debts; Centralisation - Passed
• 1910 Surplus Revenue; Centralisation - Failed
• 1911 Trade and Commerce; Centralisation - Failed
• 1911 Monopolies; Centralisation - Failed
• 1913 Trade and Commerce; Centralisation - Failed
• 1913 Corporations; Centralisation - Failed
• 1913 Industrial Matters; Centralisation - Failed
• 1913 Trusts; Centralisation - Failed
• 1913 Monopolies; Centralisation - Failed
• 1913 Railway Disputes; Centralisation - Failed
• 1919 Legislative Powers; Centralisation - Failed
• 1919 Monopolies; Centralisation - Failed
• 1926 Industry and Commerce; Centralisation - Failed
• 1926 Essential Services; Centralisation - Failed
• 1928 State Debts; Centralisation - Passed
• 1937 Aviation; Centralisation - Failed
• 1937 Marketing; Centralisation - Failed
• 1944 Emergency Powers for Reconstruction; Centralisation - Failed (included rights, but was a cynical attempt to bundle many prior failed referendums with freedom of speech and religion - hence centralisation)
• 1946 Social Services; Centralisation - Passed
• 1946 Marketing; Centralisation - Failed
• 1946 Industrial Employment; Centralisation - Failed
• 1948 Rents and Prices; Centralisation - Failed
• 1951 Communism; Illiberalism - Failed
• 1967 Parliament; Democracy - Failed
• 1967 Aboriginals; Democracy - Passed
• 1973 Prices; Centralisation - Failed
• 1973 Incomes; Centralisation - Failed
• 1974 Simultaneous Elections; Democracy - Failed
• 1974 Mode of Altering the Constitution; Democracy - Failed
• 1974 Democratic Elections; Democracy - Failed
• 1974 Local Government Bodies; Centralisation - Failed
• 1977 Simultaneous Elections; Democracy - Failed
• 1977 Senate Casual Vacancies; Democracy - Passed
• 1977 Referendums; Democracy - Passed
• 1977 Retirement of Judges; Democracy - Passed
• 1984 Terms of Senators; Democracy - Failed
• 1984 Interchange of Powers; Centralisation - Failed
• 1988 Parliamentary Terms; Democracy - Failed
• 1988 Fair Elections; Democracy - Failed
• 1988 Local Government; Centralisation - Failed
• 1988 Rights and Freedoms; Democracy - Failed
• 1999 Republic; Other - Failed
• 1999 Preamble; Other - Failed

I have put the Republic/Preamble in the other category as they didn't actually attempt to change any democratic practices. They were largely aesthetic change to the constitution. Several of the ones I have placed in the democracy category could just have easily gone into the centralisation one.

The results are;

• Centralisation; 3 for and 24 against.
• Democracy; 5 for and 10 against.
• Illiberalism; 1 against.
• Other; 2 against.

Or expressed graphically;

The most obvious conclusion that can be drawn is that Australia has rejected centralisation through referendums; yet somehow we have had ongoing centralisation in the Commonwealth government. That suggests Canberra found ways other than referendums to centralise power in the federal government.

The Democratic referendums have had higher success rates, which suggests that issues which do involve democratic issues are taken seriously and judged rationally by voters.

James McConvill has an article on online opinion titled, Australia's constitution is constrained by people power . Pretty tough headline, however the Online Opinion editors will often modify or create a new headline that they believe will fit the article best. It may not be McConvill's title but matches his argument which is that alteration to the Australian Constitution should not be via popular referendum but instead by parliamentary a majority in a joint sitting.

McConvill writes;

Supporters of the Australian constitution will obviously dispute this, referring doubters to section 128 of the constitution, which provides that it is only the voting public who can change the constitution, by way of referendum. Thus, unlike the United States constitution which can be amended by congressional vote (and approval of two-thirds of state legislatures), Australian citizens really have power when it comes to their constitution.

But in my view, this "power to the people" approach to amending our constitution is the major problem with the document. Counter-intuitively, giving power to the voting public to change the constitution has resulted in a stale document reflecting the attitudes and values of our dead ancestors, rather than a living document representative of our community today.

There is often talk about the need for constitutional reform in Australia, but rarely, if ever, is the referendum process for changing the constitution raised as an aspect of our constitution being in need of change. It should be.

Surprisingly, McConvill is not against the three forms of majority the Australian constitution requires - a majority in both houses of Parliament, a majority of states and a majority of the popular vote - he is against the public referendum process altogether.

Australia was one of the first nations to try and formalise a Westminster system into a single constitutional document. For instance the UK still does not have a formal constitution, and Canada only recently collapsed its multitude of acts that informally made up their constitution into one document. New Zealand does not have a formal constitution, nor do Western Australia, Tasmania and South Australia.

A constitution as the highest law in the land places restriction on the governmental process and is by definition a conservative document. The formal document is also seen as a means to moderate violent minority faction, as a consequence any amendment that may entrench discrimination or violence against a minority is protected by referendums that require a majority.

This is not true in all Westminster systems, the NSW Constitution [pdf] being an example. The NSW Constitution is essentially a statutory bill rather than a constitutional one. Parts of it are entrenched and certain sections require a Parliamentary majority to be changed , but it is a statutory document and not as conservative as the Australian Constitution.

McConvill is arguing that Parliamentarians in the federal system should be perceived as statutory and constitutional specialists and experts, giving the Parliament the power to alter the constitution. I do not agree with this.

Parties are themselves a minority, even though we give them the appearance of majority backing by democratic elections, party members numbers are tiny minorities and the party-machine itself is a minority of a minority. It leaves the public dependent on a party's good liberalist manners that they won't enact discriminative and violent clauses in the constitution.

McConvill argues that the Australian referendum system is too difficult to get anything to pass;

Since federation, there have been 44 referenda in Australia in which only eight have been successful. Despite consistent commentary that proposed referenda have been rejected because the public are protective of their constitution, this is far from true. Rather, Australians are a conservative bunch who when faced with change - even positive change - that they don't fully understand, vote to maintain or restore the status -quo. No more is this true than when it comes to referenda in Australia.

I would have more empathy with the argument that the majority of states clause be dropped - something I would be in favour of - however. McConvill's argument does not survive empirical scrutiny . When the referendums are categorised, Australian voters are over-whelmingly rejecting centralisation at the federal level ;

This suggests that if the Federal Government stopped trying to expand their power through the referendums then voters may listen sufficiently to vote in favour of them.

McConvill argues that Australian voters are not likely to vote in a referendum that takes away their voting rights in referendums - something which fits entirely with the above graph - so the best way to achieve it is to have the Parliament introduce a new Constitution and replace the existing constitution in its entirety, leaving out section 128;

One way around this, however, is to just get rid of the current constitution in its entirety. Section 128 of the constitution says that a referendum is required to "alter" the constitution, but it is my contention that this process would not apply if a new constitution was enacted by the Federal Parliament to repeal the existing one. The new constitution could be brought before the Federal Parliament for debate as early as the next session. Much of the existing constitution could be retained, but there would be some important changes to be made.

First, the referendum process would be gone. Instead, a change to the constitution would require a positive vote of an absolute majority of the Federal Parliament at a joint sitting.

That is too radical, won't fly and is not politically achievable anyway. Certainly not with a Howard Government facing election next year in what is appearing at this stage to be a tight race.

The Australian Constitution does need reform, a century of operation has exposed structural inconsistencies that need updating as Australia has tried to shoe-horn republican principles of government into a Westminster system.

As much as I prefer the idea of a separate executive, it is not politically achievable with an Australian electorate who is comfortable with the incongruities of the Prime Minister position; however an immediate target for reform is the Senate, in particular making it Legislatively independent of the Executive and adding explicit constitutional language for the Senate to become an active check and balance on the Executive.

The referendum process has been so static and stagnant because so many of the referendums have been to centralise more power in Canberra. Of the areas needing constitutional reform, the referendum process does not rank highly.

cam

The decision of NSW vs Commonwealth of Australia, WA vs Commonwealth etc is on the austlii website. There have been referendums to modify Section 51xx to give the federal government industrial powers but they failed. The High Court decision discounts these failures in their decision.

The Corporations power is Section s51xx;

51.The Parliament shall, subject to this Constitution, have power to make laws for the peace, order, and good government of the Commonwealth with respect to: -

(xx.) Foreign corporations, and trading or financial corporations formed within the limits of the Commonwealth:

The decisions writes that the referendums to modify s51xx were in 1910, 1912 and 1926. I guess the 1926 one was the Industrial Matters referendum and the 1912 is either the 1913 Corporations or Industrial Matters. The 1911 Trade and Commerce referendum must have been the other one.

The decision contains;

In 1910, 1912 and 1926, proposals were put to referendum for amendment of both par (xx) and par (xxxv) of s 51. The amendments proposed to s 51(xx) would in each case have extended the power by authorising the Parliament to make laws with respect to the "creation, dissolution, regulation, and control" of corporations. The amendment proposed to s 51(xxxv) would have extended the federal Parliament's power, in 1910, to making laws with respect to (among other things) "[l]abour and employment, including ... [t]he wages and conditions of labour and employment in any trade industry or calling"; in 1912, to making laws with respect to "[l]abour, and employment, and unemployment"; and in 1926, by omitting from s 51(xxxv) the words "extending beyond the limits of any one State".

Those referendums look to be good explicit constitutionalism trying to expand centralised power through the constitution rather than statutory means and hoping the High Court agrees. Which is what Workchoices was. The referendums were rejected by the electorate which has been fairly consistent for Australian referendums that try to centralise power.

The decision argues that these referendums cannot be used to determine the constitutionality of the challenges to Workchoices as the questions are not the same;

There are insuperable difficulties in arguing from the failure of a proposal for constitutional amendment to any conclusion about the Constitution's meaning. First, there is a problem of equivalence. The argument must assume that the proposal which was defeated was as confined as is the question that now falls for determination. If the proposal was wider than the immediate question for decision, it is not open to conclude that a majority of those to whom the proposal was put (whether they are described as "the people of Australia", the "sovereign force" or, as in s 128, "the electors qualified to vote for the election of members of the House of Representatives") reached any view about the ambit of the (unamended) constitutional power, or that they reached any view about that part of the proposal that appears to deal with the immediate issue.

None of the proposals relied on in this matter was so confined. And the fact that the early proposals (of 1910 and 1912) were prompted by the decision in Huddart Parker does not confine those proposals to the questions that now fall for decision in the present matters.

I can understand what they mean, and why they would reserve that right, but Lionel Murphy's Doctrine of Constitutional Implication looks for the implied, rather than explicit, meanings in the constitutional , legislative practice and wider society in interpreting these decisions. The constitution is ultimately the people's, despite the Judicature having the end authority to interpret the constitution, so with the doctrine of constitutional implication I find rejecting the referendum results as a bit disingenuous.

The decision also claims that referendum's cannot be interpreted as the people's will toward the constitution;

few referendums have succeeded. It is altogether too simple to treat each of those rejections as the informed choice of electors between clearly identified constitutional alternatives. The truth of the matter is much more complex than that.

For example, party politics is of no little consequence to the outcome of any referendum proposal. And much may turn upon the way in which the proposal is put and considered in the course of public debate about it. Yet it is suggested that failure of the referendum casts light on the meaning of the Constitution.

Did they just call the Australian electorate idiots and a bunch of sheep? The failure of a referendum does cast the popular will and feeling toward the constitutional nature of the referendum; if people want it, it will pass, if they do not, it will fail.

I find this dismissal by the High Court of the popular process for constitutional reform as not possibly having any meaning or bearing on their decision as disingenous, especially when the Doctrine of Constitutional Implication is an entirely artificial one designed to enable High Court activism.

That doctrine has led to increasing centralisation of power in Canberra - non-partisan too I should add - both major parties have benefited from it. The High Court has been as anti-federalist as Parliament has. The decision argues in favour of modern interpretation of what should be explicit language, and that a referendum's rejection of additional explicit language has no bearing on modern interpretation;

Finally, is the rejection of the proposal to be taken as confirming what is and always has been the meaning of the Constitution, or is it said that it works some change of meaning? If it is the former, what exactly is the use that is being made of the failed proposal? If it is the latter, how is that done? The plaintiffs offered no answers to these questions.

I disagree with that. Referendum outcomes are the popular voice on the constitution. If the electorate rejects a constitutional amendment it has set a benchmark that must be met for those powers to become constitutional in the future. It is a conservative approach but a right and just one. For the Commonwealth to adopt those powers in the future, they should only be able to do so by constitutional referendum.

The decision also argues for separation of powers and constitutional authority on the High Court to have the final interpretation;

Constitutional construction is not so simple a process as the argument from failed referendums would have it. If, as is so often the case, a question about the meaning and operation of the Constitution is controversial, it is for this Court to determine the answer that is to be given. Chapter III, particularly s 76(i), indicates that the determination of matters arising under or involving the interpretation of the Constitution is committed to the judicial power of the Commonwealth. The phrase "or involving its [the Constitution's] interpretation" encompasses later curial disputation concerning earlier decisions respecting the Constitution[169].

Such decisions may also be followed by the passage of a proposed law for the alteration of the text of the Constitution pursuant to s 128. But the opening words of s 128, "[t]his Constitution shall not be altered except in the following manner ...", must be read with those of Ch III to which reference is made above. The constitutional text must be treated as the one instrument of federal government.

The decision sums up the past referendum's influence on the case as;

The failure of successive referendums to alter s 51(xx) and s 51(xxxv) provides no assistance in the resolution of the present matters.

I have a hard time reconciling that comment when the High Court uses implication as its guiding doctrine. We chose the technology of formalised constitutionalism of which referendums are a hard power component of change; a constitutional rejection is as valid as a passed referendum in defining constitutional law.

Yes, the judicature as the final say on the interpretation of the constitution, but constitutional law does not exist in isolation; and yes, the questions may not be the same, but if the High Court judges are prepared to go into past constitutional decisions to determine the answer, then they must be prepared to take into account what has been rejected too.

A referendum is an explicit rejection or constitutional addition that comes before the High Court in the constitutional hierarchy. It has to, a referendum is the only explicit way to modify the language of the constitution itself as the highest law in the land; Constitution -> Referendum -> High Court ...

Centralisation has been an on-going pursuit by Canberra and it has been aided by the High Court, enough that in the 1920s this decision would have had to go to referendum and in 2006 it can be pushed through statutorily.

There is no political or judicial will to stop this centralisation. At the last federal election the Democrats and Greens had formal policies to abolish the states. The Labor have it as an informal policy and John Howard had been quoted in the media with the comment that if Australia was done all over again, there would be no states.

Federalism is badly out of vogue.

cam [IANAL]

In the "Great Mistakes of Australian History" Clive Moore tackles the problem of federation and its choice in 1901. Moore argues that the constitutional process in the 19thC failed to engage with the Pacific and Asia, as well as made the constitution impervious to change. His final point is that political expediency and compromise between the colonies to get them to agree to federation has meant that the colonial boundaries are for ever cast in stone as states.

The first point was probably not socially possible. The 19thC had 'scientifically' convinced itself of the superiority of the white and Briton race. The fortress mentality that led to the White Australia policy was agreed upon by all sides of Australian politics.

It is an immoral chapter in Australian governmental and administrative history but was popular enough that it could not have been stopped. It was not a result of the constitution, as another article in the book notes, Darwin was setup to be a multi-ethnic Hong Kongese style trading centre, but hardening racial opinion never enabled it to achieve that in the late 19thC and early 20thC.

The other persistent myth, which Felix challenged, and has now been empirically determined to be false, is that the Australian Constitution is hard to change. The referendum is structured in a way to satisfy both the national and federal character. For instance:

• Majority in Senate - federal character
• Majority in House - national character
• Majority of popular vote - national character
• Majority of states (ie majority of popular vote in a majority of states) - federal character

This is a federation design choice. The majority of states may seem like an extra step too many, and I think it is, however, despite Australia's small number of states, it has not affected an outcome of a referendum. If a referendum has passed the popular vote, in all cases that I can recall it has all passed the state majority as well.

The high failure rate of Australian referendums has been because of the large number of referndums put forward that were for the increase of Commonwealth power. When the referendums are divided in this manner it becomes obvious that Australian voters were rejecting centralisation.

Moore notes that Canberra has found different ways to get around this:

This has been partially overcome by the occasional (though rare) successful referenda, and the use of the High Court to extend the federal government powers in a way never contemplated by the authors of the Constitution.

The latter is a significant issue. As can be seen by the following chart, the referendums for centralisation dropped off in volume in the second half of the twentieth century as the High Court's decisions and support for centralisation in Canberra has made referendums less necessary for Canberra to achieve the power it wants.

Moore's third complaint, that the states are forever fixed in geopolitical shape by the constitution is a good one. The value of a constitution is that it provides inter-generational stability and certainty of government. It removes the disruption of coups, violence for political power, or warfare between competing political domestic powers. The downside is that it is inherently inflexible by design.

This raises questions of balancing stability and fluidity. Normally when we talk of these areas we consider the stable technology to be constitutionalism while fluidity is provided by statutory legislation.

It is hard to give a national government statutory control over the States as complete centralisation would be a quick process rather than one that has been eroded over a century. The State control over Local Government carries similar pitfalls.

Yet if we look at Local Government it has remained fairly volatile as to its borders as administrative growth demands. For instance the Brisbane City Council and Penrith City Council were both created by the coalesence of several smaller municipal councils. I don't think anyone would doubt that the growing administrative challenges of those two cities made those amalgamations wide.

They are examples of a centralisation process. Not unlike the Federal Government's encroachment into the States. One of the purposes of Federation is to have powerful decentralised political entities that can rival the national government for power. This keeps overt centralisation, and the propensity for central tyranny and inefficiency in check.

Moore writes:

I am not advocating abolishing the states, having one national government and preserving all of the several hundred (629) local government units.

However, there are clearly regions within Australia that would work well as provincial government units. To name just a few: Wimmera, the Pilbara, Western NSW, New England (a referendum on the New England statehood was narrowly defeated in 1967), Queensland's South-East corner, the Darling Downs, the Cental Queensland coal-basin and Cape York would all function much better under their own regional governments.

In this area Moore is arguing for what Russell Trood called 'regionalism' in his Senate speech. This is a devolution of the states as administrative areas while maintaining their constitutional status in the federal constitution as states.

This minor form of devolution would still leave fairly powerful state bodies. Moore notes that the Brisbane City Council [BCC] has a similar budget to Tasmania and it is implied in Moore's article that he sees the provinces in being something of the BCC's size. He concludes with:

The ideal new government system would have a national government and around 30 provinces, designed for efficient regional operation, with a constitution capable of beind amended as circumstances change.

Moore's idea is not new either. The Prime Minister, John Howard, has remarked on radio:

"If we were starting Australia all over again, I wouldn't support having the existing state structure," he said. "I would actually support having a national government, and perhaps a series of regional governments having the power of, say, the Brisbane City Council.

"But we're not starting Australia all over again, and the idea of abolishing state governments is unrealistic."

Again the BCC is popping up, but it is the exception in Australia and it coincides with the seat of Queensland power - state parliament is in Brisbane as well. The main problems between the national and state governments are fiscal. Namely the vertical fiscal imbalance. This has been used to leverage all manner of control over the states, from the tied grants to the GST, the state's have had their independent fiscal footing removed from them.

John Gorton's and Gough Whitlam's view of federation was that the federal government made policy, funded that policy and the states existed as regional administrative units for the disbursement of federal funds in support of federal policy. This removes all capability of regional or provincial policy making from the states.

So the problem goes far deeper than the geographic boundaries of the states. Whenever these issues are discussed the problem becomes centralisation and Canberra's rapacious desire to be unitary rather than federal.

Incession and secession are already possible in the Australian constitution. The Northern Territory has had a referendum on statehood, while Western Australia has already seceded once and as Moore noted New England in NSW nearly has too. These vehicles exist but have either not been acted upon or not been successful.

The BCC sized provinces are largely national dreaming for a more controllable systems of states from Canberra's point of view. One of the problems with the increasing centralisation is that even the very powerful states, such as NSW and Western Australia, are unable to stop the encroachment of federal government.

In such an environment it makes sense for the subsidiary units to be bigger in order to stand against the larger entity. If the present large states such as NSW and Western Australia were to break up into smaller provinces, the federal government would dominate them politically in short order. We would have a unitary system of government very quickly.

It may be that in our present environment of increasing national power that a couple of the states need to join in order to become stronger against the central entity - maybe NSW and Victoria need to amalgamate in order to stave off federal encroachment. Maybe Tasmania and Victoria need to create a super-state?

I can see where there needs to be incession and devolution of the present state system for administrative purposes, but in the current environment of rampant centralisation, I fail to see how it makes sense. The mechanisms to incede and secede already exist but have only been acted upon in rare cases. As it is they need to be done under the legitimacy of the popular will anyway.

I don't consider the choice of federalism as the guiding a technology an error, nor do I consider the current geo-political boundaries of the states a historical error though I do recognise the fluidity from incession and secession as important for the political and administrative challenges facing regions.

cam