Gubernatorial NSW

Should NSW have a separate executive?

One thing everyone can agree on: people, media and politicians: is that elections are important. Democracy is the moral under-pinning of our political system. I remember watching the HBO documentary on Diebold and when it was shown that the electronic voting machines could be subverted the people who did the tests were distressed. One woman was openly crying. I understand her anguish - the whole basis for what she considered a just, moral, ethical and legitimate society was questioned. I am not surprised she was emotional.

Since Robert Askin election campaigns have been increasingly Presidential. Last election cycle John Howard and Mark Latham had a presidential debate. This is despite Australia having a parliamentary system where voters do not get to vote for the Prime Minister or Premier directly. Voters only have an implied control over the Executive. NSW is also under the grips of an election cycle and its two main protaganists, Morris Iemma and Peter Debnam recently had a gubernatorial debate. But Premiers are not Governors and elections are a poor determinant in NSW as to who will be Premier - same as they are in the federal system - and for that matter any parliamentary system.

Same deal as before, orange sectors are Premiers who have been removed by elections since 1932.

So what does this mean? Firstly, parliamentary systems give greater control over who the Executive is to parties than voters. That is an inherent function of parliamentary systems as a choice of representative democracy. This is a political technology choice in comparison to a Gubernatorial or Presidential system that has a separate executive which for most of the Australian government systems was made long before the current generations of voters were born. Victoria and NSW are two of the oldest parliamentary system in Australia and date back to the 1850s.

One of the reasons for term limits on the executive is to limit corruption and corruption has been an endemic problem in NSW governance. The pie graph shows that there is sufficient turn over of who leads the executive that term limits are probably not necessary - if they can be applied to a parliamentary system at all without breaking it. Yet corruption is not necessarily a function of who is leading the Executive, but a component that leaks in over time through which party controls the executive. In my opinion, eight years is a good rules of thumb by which corruption can only be flushed through a change in government - both legislative and executive.

This is where a democratic voting strategy of "kick the bastards out" after eight years and voting against the incumbent comes into play. However parties have increased their control in the second half of the twentieth century that they do not have the same electoral liabilities as they used to. NSW is a good example of that. We can effectively separate governance into two periods 1900-1932 and 1932-2007. Since the UAP gained power in 1932, politics has been dominated by the lethargic polarity between Labor and Liberal governments who hang around for long periods.

The next NSW Premier who gains government by an election has every reason to believe they will resign before they get voted out at an election. That is not a good threat to hold over the Executive who is the most prone of any branch of government to corruption. Fortunately for NSW there is ICAC which has unwittingly been a form of term limits on Nick Greiner and Bob Carr - chasing them both out through corruption investigations.

There still remains the tension between our democratic practices and our choice of political technologies. Our politicians run Presidential-Gubernatorial campaigns; our media reports on politics in a Presidential-Gubernatorial manner; and the electorate votes as if it is a Presidential-Gubernatorial system; yet the parliamentary system is none of those. Australia is mature enough to start introducing political systems that have a separate executive - it is not as if they are a new form of political technology.

The upcoming NSW election is a good example where a separate executive would have massive democratic value. I think it is fair to say that the electorate prefers Morris Iemma as Premier (executive) to Peter Debnam - yet the electorate desperately wants to stick the legislative boot into Labor for their recent performance and governance. In a Gubernatorial NSW system a Labor Executive and a Liberal Legislative would be a good out electoral outcome given the current political players in the NSW election.

But that can't happen in a parliamentary system. As one of the bigger states, NSW is a prime candidate for a directly elected Gubernatorial system. That would get my vote.

x-posted at clubtroppo

A Gubernatorial NSW Constitution

I believe that a separate executive is a more democratic form of government than a parliamentary system . In certain situations a gubernatorial system is superior to a parliamentary one. NSW is one such example that would benefit from a separate executive. So here is a gubernatorial NSW constitution which contains nothing innovative or new; it is a modern permutation of the current NSW Constitution Act .

A couple of other things; I basically nicked the Tasmanian electoral system as I made the Legislative a unicameral body. Since NSW is a state and not a federal system I did not see the need for an upper house since the executive is split out into the position of Governor, however I tempered unicameralism with a pluralist legislative body that has multi-member districts - like Tasmania.

I also kept the constitutional language terse. Australia has a strong history of statutory innovation to maintain good governance. The United States on the other hand has constitutional innovations galore in its states' however their statutory innovations are very poor and non-existent. The best outcome would be if Australia gets a little dose of American constitutional innovation while America gets a dose of Australian statutory innovation. I have tried that here by leaving many aspects of the constitution to be supported by statutory acts.

Executive

Executive power shall be vested in the Governor who shall hold office for the term of four years and a maximum of two terms. The Governor shall be elected by electors.

The Governor is disqualified from serving in the Executive if: the Governor is a current member of the executive or judicature; the Governor directly, or indirectly, himself, or by any person whatsoever in trust for him or for his use or benefit or on his account, undertakes, executes, holds, or enjoys in the whole or in part any contract or agreement for or on account of the Public Service of New South Wales; the Governor is bankrupt; convicted of an infamous crime carrying a term of greater than ten years.

Judges, ministers and officials of the executive shall be appointed by the Governor upon the advice and consent of the Legislature. No judge, minister or official may concurrently be a member of the executive and another branch of government. Ministers and official of the executive shall hold office during the Governor's pleasure.

Legislative

The legislature, as a unicameral body, shall, subject to the provisions in this constitution, have power to make laws for peace, welfare and good government of New South Wales.

Every bill shall be presented to the Governor after passage through the Legislature with a majority. Bills shall become an act of legislature when assented to by the Governor.

There shall be a session of the Legislature at the minimum of once in every calendar year such that a period of twelve months is the maximum between sessions.

A member of the Legislature is disqualified from serving in the Legislature if: the person is a current member of the executive or judicature; the person directly, or indirectly, himself, or by any person whatsoever in trust for him or for his use or benefit or on his account, undertakes, executes, holds, or enjoys in the whole or in part any contract or agreement for or on account of the Public Service of New South Wales; the person fails to attend a session of the Legislature; the person is bankrupt; convicted of an infamous crime carrying a term of greater than ten years.

The Legislature shall be composed of members from electorates where each electorate contains three members.

Members of the legislature shall hold their office for the term of two years and may serve a maximum of twelve terms.

Members may resign as a member of the Legislative by hand-written memorandum to the Speaker. Upon receipt of resignation by the Speaker, the seat of the member shall be vacant.

Upon a vacancy in the Legislature the next candidate in the vacant electorate, who is not currently a member, who has the highest number of votes from the electorate shall become a member of the Legislature.

The Speaker shall be the presiding officer of the Legislature and shall be elected by the Legislature, through a secret ballot, upon the first assembly after an election. The Speaker shall be recognized as the Legislature's independent and impartial representative. The Speaker shall preside at all meetings of the Legislature.

Judicature

The highest court is the Supreme Court which has the sole judicial authority to interpret this constitution. The relative status of any other court of New South Wales is to be determined by legislation.

The Chief Justice shall be the office of the Master of the Supreme Court.

The Chief Justice shall issue writs for election on the appropriate dates for the Executive and Legislature.

Local Government

The local governments in New South Wales shall make their own charters and constitutions in order to manage their affairs.

Amendment

The constitution amendment is passed if: a majority of electors voting approves, a super-majority in the legislature, the signature of the Governor.

Exclusions

Since Australia has no bill of rights, this is where Avocadia's Bill of Rights v0.2 would go though termed in the negative rather than declarative.

Critique and amend away!

Update

This constitution has been amended with the suggestions below and some other improvements in a new article.

cam
Felix the Cassowary: Seats, disqualification.: Three members per seats doesn\'t sound like it\'s going to achieve anything, except having thre times the number of members needed (or, a third as much representation as you could get). I would also put such things into regular legislation...

The Governor/A member of the Legislature is disqualified from serving in the Executive/Legislature if: ... convicted of an infamous crime carrying a term of greater than ten years.

or tampering with the electoral system, regardless of the term, of course.
cam: I put the three members per seat in: as it is unicameral so it requires some sort of proportional system to get the pluralism that an upper house allows. Since an electoral act could sabotage that by making it single member electorates with preferential voting (effectively a two-party duopoly) I thought that character of the system needed to be elevated to the constitutional.

Good point on tampering with the electoral system.

cam
Alan: Removal?: I tend to agree with you at state level, although it\'s important for a national government to have a dual executive to prevent presidents from spending too much time masquerading as a man on horseback or in a flightsuit.

I\'m interested in your proposal. How would you provide for removals?
cam: Dont know on removal: As I didn\'t want to put in something too blunt. Not for the state level anyway. What you do for removal inside that style of constitution?

cam
Alan: Removal?: Well, an irremovable executive is a very bad idea. The constitution needs to allow for impeachment or recall. I\'d suugest allowing the the Legislature to impeach the governor before a citizens jury with the chief justice as moderator. Imeachment should not be restricted to high crimes and misdeneanours, which makes it almost useless in the US.

A Novostrocambrianisation of South Africa\'s rule would read:
89 Removal of Governor
(1) The Legislature, by a resolution adopted with a supporting vote of at least two thirds of its members, may remove the Governor from office only on the grounds of-
(a) a serious violation of the Constitution or the law;
(b) serious misconduct; or
(c) inability to perform the functions of office.

You also need to provide for vacancies in the governorship. I\'d argue really strongly that a governor should always be elected and US-style succession belongs back in the Middle Ages. Maybe the chief justice should take over for a brief time until an election can be held.
cam: I decided against an elected: Lieutenant Governor or Attorney General. I didnt want a Lieutenant Governor in the system as they would pollute up the legislative. I am comfortable with the Speaker becoming the Governor until the next election. The legislative has a frequency of 2 years between elections, so a deposed Speaker-become-Governor at max would be 24 months in the job. I would prefer the Speaker to a Chief Justice as the Speaker has to have the confidence of their electorate and the house.

The snippet taken from the South African constitution is good and seems a wise inclusion.

cam

A Gubernatorial NSW Constitution v0.2

An update to the prior gubernatorial NSW constitution . Includes removal of the Governor and what occurs in a vacancy. Also formalises succession from the Speaker and requires an immediate election to replace the Governor. Avo's Bill of Rights have been included. Tampering with the electoral system is now an out on the ear offence too.

It is still a pretty terse constitution. Thanks to Alan and Felix for their suggestions.

Executive

The executive shall, subject to the provisions in this constitution, have the power to execute the laws of the Legislative.

Executive power shall be vested in the Governor, who shall be elected by electors, and hold office for the term of four years with a maximum of two terms.

Judges, ministers and officials of the executive shall be appointed by the Governor upon the advice and consent of the Legislature. No judge, minister or official may concurrently be a member of the executive and another branch of government. Ministers and officials of the executive shall hold office during the Governor's pleasure.

The Governor, upon a resolution adopted with a supporting vote of two-thirds of the Legislative's members, may be removed on the grounds of; a serious violation of the constitution or the law; serious misconduct; or the inability to perform the function of office.

In the event of the Governor's vacancy, the Speaker shall resign from the Legislative and resume the caretaker position of Governor until an election can be held.

The Governor may refuse assent on a bill through veto; by returning the bill to the Legislature with written objection.

Legislative

The Legislature, as a unicameral body, shall, subject to the provisions in this constitution, have power to make laws for peace, welfare and good government of New South Wales.

Every bill shall be presented to the Governor after passage through the Legislature with a majority. Bills shall become an act of legislature when assented to by the Governor; unless the bill is vetoed, in which case, upon a supporting vote of two-thirds of the Legislative's members, the bill shall become an act of legislature.

There shall be a session of the Legislature at the minimum of once in every calendar year such that a period of twelve months is the maximum between sessions.

The Legislature shall be composed of members from electorates where each electorate contains three members.

Members of the legislature shall hold their office for the term of two years and may serve a maximum of twelve terms.

Members may resign as a member of the Legislative by hand-written memorandum to the Speaker. Upon receipt of resignation by the Speaker, the seat of the member shall be vacant.

Upon a vacancy in the Legislature the next candidate in the vacant electorate, who is not currently a member, who has the highest number of votes from the electorate shall become a member of the Legislature.

The Speaker shall be the presiding officer of the Legislature; and shall be elected by the Legislature, through a secret ballot, upon the first assembly after an election. The Speaker shall be recognized as the Legislature's independent and impartial representative. The Speaker shall preside at all meetings of the Legislature.

Judicature

The highest court is the Supreme Court which has the sole judicial authority to interpret this constitution. The relative status of any other court of New South Wales is to be determined by legislation.

The Chief Justice shall be the office of the Master of the Supreme Court.

The Chief Justice shall issue writs for election on the appropriate dates for the Executive and Legislature.

Disqualification

A Governor, Legislator or Chief Justice is disqualified from serving if: the person is concurrently a member of more than one branch of government; the person directly, or indirectly, himself, or by any person whatsoever in trust for him or for his use or benefit or on his account, undertakes, executes, holds, or enjoys in the whole or in part any contract or agreement for or on account of the Public Service of New South Wales; the person is bankrupt; convicted of an infamous crime carrying a term of greater than ten years; or convicted of tampering with the electoral system.

Local Government

The local governments in New South Wales shall make their own charters and constitutions in order to manage their affairs.

Amendment

An amendment to the constitution is passed if; a majority of electors voting approves; two-thirds of the Legislative's members approve; and the amendment has the signature of the Governor.

Exclusions

Exclusions from executive force and legislative intrusion cannot be reduced or suspended; by referendum; by emergency; or declaration of war. The Executive shall execute no law; the Legislative shall make no law; and the Judicature shall endorse no law; that:

    deprives an individual of life; or limits or deprives an individual's; liberty to express their beliefs, opinions or lifestyle; liberty of movement; liberty of association; or liberty of peaceful assembly or protest.

    detains an individual indefinitely without charge; limits or removes an individuals right to have counsel with them upon arrest or questioning; limits or removes an individuals right to a writ of habeous corpus upon detention; back-dates punitive measures for an offence; permits an individual to be detained for longer than six months without trial or resolution; enabling an individual to be tried for an offence more than once.

    limits or removes an individual's right to refuse law enforcement access to their property, or permission to search their person and property, unless there is a warrant issued to search specific property for evidence of a specific crime; limits or removes an individuals choice to divulge no information other than their identity, verbally, when under suspicion from law enforcement for a specific crime.

    limits, reduces or removes an individual's right to own property; deprives the individual of property, or devalues an individual's property without fair exchange or consent.

    on the basis of race, age, gender, sexual preference, wealth, health, religion, associations or prior criminal record; discriminates against an individual; limits or removes equal treatment under the law for an individual; limits or removes access to government services for an individual.

    disenfranchises an elector; denies an elector representation; denies an elector the ability to run for election; reduces or removes an individual the ability to petition their representatives for a redress of grievances.

    abolishes the secret ballot; criminalises, or outlaws a political party; removes access to the Public Service for parties with elected parliamentary members.

The Exclusions section would not be necessary if there was a federal bill of rights. The other thing I added was veto and veto override.

Alan: executive succession: I don\'t think the speaker is a good choice as the acting governor, especially if you require resignation. Strangely enough it was written up in today\'s Washington Post http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/03/02/AR2007030201141.html .
I would specify a time limit for a new gubernatorial election. The \'until a new election can be held\' language is what allowed a VP to declare himself (probably illegally and almost certainly contrary to what was intended) not acting, but permanent, president in the US. A better choice for a shot-term stopgap official would be the chief justice, or perhaps just the cabinet in orer of seniority.

Speakers resign in the US only because, as the articles says, their succession act is extremely dubious in constitutional terms because it allows a member of congress to become president. To avoid any doubt the speaker has to resign his seat.
cam: I agree with Truman: from that article it seems, I think the Speaker has greater confidence because they are an elected position, that has the confidence of their electorate and the majority of the House. I am not prepared to accept the party argument - where the House may be a majority of a different party to the executive - especially when the Cabinet is appointed, as it would be in this constitution. Which is why I do not like the idea of cabinet succession or a chief justice. I think the Speaker is the most democratic choice. Since I made it so there is a gubernatorial bi-election (?) on your suggestion, I think the Speaker can be tolerated for a short period after resigning from the House.

Good point on setting a time limit on the election to stop usurpation. What is reasonable, administratively, but also restrictive enough to stop an executive state of emergency/exception like what Bangladesh is undergoing. 7 days? 14 days?

cam
cam: The other downside of the Speaker being elevated: is that it can cause turmoil in the House at a time when you want political stability and legislative strength. The Speaker has to be elected from the House in that constitution. Parties cannot always be guaranteed to act in national, stable or common weal.

cam
Alan: the Pelosi administration: Let\'s imagine that both Bush and Cheney leave office in the near unexpectedly for whatever reason. You would not catch me weeping. However, President Pelosi would be left with an impossible situation, A divided America would then have to face a crisis of legitimacy in which the government changed hands without an election. Although Pelosi is elected as representative and as speaker she has only ever faced election in her own district and was relatively unknown until she became speaker.

BTW, since you are using the speaker only as a stopgap, what not simply provide that the speaker cannot vote or preside in the Legislature while acting as governor? There is really no reason for the forced resignation, especially for such a short time as interim governor.

IN France, where the president of the senate becomes interim president of the republic, he happily goes back to the senate as soon as soon a s a new presidential election is copulated.
cam: Cool: That is a probably a better arrangement while still keeping the confidence of the house and having a democratically elected representative. I will do a v0.3 without the forced resignation and a time limit on the transition to the next election.

cam
cam: Found the relevant section: in the French Constitution :

Should the Presidency of the Republic fall vacant for any reason whatsoever, or should the Constitutional Council on a reference from the Government rule by an absolute majority of its members that the President of the Republic is incapacitated, the duties of the President of the Republic, with the exception of those specified in articles 11 and 12, shall be temporarily exercised by the President of the Senate or, if the latter is in turn incapacitated, by the Government.

In the case of a vacancy, or where the incapacity of the President is declared permanent by the Constitutional Council, the ballot for the election of the new President shall, except in the event of a finding by the Constitutional Council of force majeure, be held not less than twenty days and not more than thirty-five days after the beginning of the vacancy or the declaration that the incapacity is permanent.

It also suggests a window of twenty to thirty-five days for the elections to be held in. It is interesting that the French Constitution allows for temporary and permanent vacancy.

cam
Alan: ouch: I really need to watch my spell-checker more carefully. You\'ve inspired to produce my own NSW constitution, but without my expansive bill of rights or too much playing around. The language of the NSW constitution is horrendous.

You should also consider providing:

who has the right to vote

how the governor is elected (preferential voting is the obvious choice)

how the legislature is elected (the 3 member districts are not ideal for proportional representation)

how distributions are done
cam: Since it is a state constitution: I want to leave enough room for statutorial innovation within the character of the constitution. So the constitution describes the framework but allows permutations outside of the constitution but within the character. So I don\'t want to limit how the Governor is elected, just demand the Governor be elected, so there leaves some room for innovation.

On who has the right to vote, since this is a conservative constitution, I have left that to an electoral act, where hopefully the act catches up to universal political equality which I think is necessary for good republican governance. IIRC in the CFC I made the defn of an elector anyone above the age of reason under the jurisdiction of the government.

On the three reps per district, I should mimic the Tasmanian electoral structure exactly, since that is what I want and make it five members per district.

cam
Alan: minimal rights: The argument for including the right to vote is that it is the people. not their representatives, who should determine who can vote. The same applies to the method of voting. Now, it\'s impossible to imagine that a governor would not be elected by IRV, but again, it\'s an invitation to political manipulation to allow parliament to mess about with that process.

Once can imagine a governor with who enjoyed a relative, but not absolute majority, in the electorate being very anxious to ensure that preferences do not come into play or that they do not need to face a runoff. It\'s even possible to imagine someone with a track record like Nick Minchin arguing for an electoral college or something equally bizarre.*

It\'s a short step from there to argue that IRV is a fundamental right that ensures that everyone in the electorate has an opportunity to have their vote counted, not just those who vote for the two leading candidates.

*Minchin gave us the current felony disfranchisement in the federal act and early closure of the rolls. His original cabinet submission on the republic referendum contained 10 questions and the republican option would have been to vote no to the first 9 questions and yes and to the last question.
cam: I am not so glued on to preferential voting: In certain instances, such as single member districts, I think first past the post is better in stopping a duopoly. Preference voting in the Federal House as effectively made it a non-pluralistic body.

I am also aware that every electoral change has been to try and game the system so that the current incumbent maintains/keeps their majority (Chifley and the Senate for instance) but they have pretty much backfired (Labor has never had a majority in the Senate since). IIRC only Steele Hall has made an electoral change for altruistic reasons knowing that it would cost him his government.

I know the current mob in government have used their ideology of \'civic obligation\' to disenfranchise citizens. But that has been covered in the excelusions which make it unconsitutional to disenfranchise an elector. There comes a point where I dont want to load the constitution with so much information/regulation such that it loses its character. Since I have made it only changeable by amendments, it will be slow and hard to change, much more so than if it was a statutory document as most of the current NSW Constitution is, so I dont want to limit innovation outside of the constitution as long as the body retains its constitutional character.

That will mean some not cool stuff will happen - politicians do tend to be party-machine selfish - but it will allow for any future electoral technology changes to be tried/used/adapted.

cam

A Gubernatorial NSW Constitution v0.3

This version changes how the vacancy of a Governor is handled, using the French method of having a leading legislator temporarily take over caretaker duties until an election is held. The members in a district has been increased to five to match the Tasmanian Assembly structure.

The changed vacancy section is:

The amended Constitution in its entirety:

Definitions

"elector" is an individual above the age of seventeen.

Executive

The executive shall, subject to the provisions in this constitution, have the power to execute the laws of the Legislative.

Executive power shall be vested in the Governor, who shall be elected by electors, and hold office for the term of four years with a maximum of two terms.

Judges, ministers and officials of the executive shall be appointed by the Governor upon the advice and consent of the Legislature. No judge, minister or official may concurrently be a member of the executive and another branch of government. Ministers and officials of the executive shall hold office during the Governor's pleasure.

The Governor, upon a resolution adopted with a supporting vote of two-thirds of the Legislative's members, may be removed on the grounds of; a serious violation of the constitution or the law; serious misconduct; or the inability to perform the function of office.

In the event of the Governor's vacancy and until a new Governor is elected, the duties of the Governor shall be temporarily exercised in a caretaker capacity by the Speaker, who shall be prohibited from presiding or voting in the Legislature while performing such duties. A ballot for the election of a new Governor shall be held not less than twenty days and not more than thirty-five days after the beginning of the Governor's vacancy.

The Governor may refuse assent on a bill through veto; by returning the bill to the Legislature with written objection.

Legislative

The Legislature, as a unicameral body, shall, subject to the provisions in this constitution, have power to make laws for peace, welfare and good government of New South Wales.

Every bill shall be presented to the Governor after passage through the Legislature with a majority. Bills shall become an act of legislature when assented to by the Governor; unless the bill is vetoed, in which case, upon a supporting vote of two-thirds of the Legislative's members, the bill shall become an act of legislature.

There shall be a session of the Legislature at the minimum of once in every calendar year such that a period of twelve months is the maximum between sessions.

The Legislature shall be composed of members from electorates where each electorate contains five members.

Members of the legislature shall hold their office for the term of two years and may serve a maximum of twelve terms.

Members may resign as a member of the Legislative by hand-written memorandum to the Speaker. Upon receipt of resignation by the Speaker, the seat of the member shall be vacant.

Upon a vacancy in the Legislature the next candidate in the vacant electorate, who is not currently a member, who has the highest number of votes from the electorate in the previous election, shall become a member of the Legislature.

The Speaker shall be the presiding officer of the Legislature; and shall be elected by the Legislature, through a secret ballot, upon the first assembly after an election. The Speaker shall be recognized as the Legislature's independent and impartial representative. The Speaker shall preside at all meetings of the Legislature.

Judicature

The highest court is the Supreme Court which has the sole judicial authority to interpret this constitution. The relative status of any other court of New South Wales is to be determined by legislation.

The Chief Justice shall be the office of the Master of the Supreme Court.

The Chief Justice shall issue writs for election on the appropriate dates for the Executive and Legislature.

Disqualification

A Governor, Legislator or Chief Justice is disqualified from serving if: the person is concurrently a member of more than one branch of government; the person directly, or indirectly, himself, or by any person whatsoever in trust for him or for his use or benefit or on his account, undertakes, executes, holds, or enjoys in the whole or in part any contract or agreement for or on account of the Public Service of New South Wales; the person is bankrupt; convicted of an infamous crime carrying a term of greater than ten years; or convicted of tampering with the electoral system.

Local Government

The local governments in New South Wales shall make their own charters and constitutions in order to manage their affairs.

Amendment

An amendment to the constitution is passed if; a majority of electors voting approves; two-thirds of the Legislative's members approve; and the amendment has the signature of the Governor.

Exclusions

Exclusions from executive force and legislative intrusion cannot be reduced or suspended; by referendum; by emergency; or declaration of war. The Executive shall execute no law; the Legislative shall make no law; and the Judicature shall endorse no law; that:

    deprives an individual of life; or limits or deprives an individual's; liberty to express their beliefs, opinions or lifestyle; liberty of movement; liberty of association; or liberty of peaceful assembly or protest.

    detains an individual indefinitely without charge; limits or removes an individuals right to have counsel with them upon arrest or questioning; limits or removes an individuals right to a writ of habeous corpus upon detention; back-dates punitive measures for an offence; permits an individual to be detained for longer than six months without trial or resolution; enabling an individual to be tried for an offence more than once.

    limits or removes an individual's right to refuse law enforcement access to their property, or permission to search their person and property, unless there is a warrant issued to search specific property for evidence of a specific crime; limits or removes an individuals choice to divulge no information other than their identity, verbally, when under suspicion from law enforcement for a specific crime.

    limits, reduces or removes an individual's right to own property; deprives the individual of property, or devalues an individual's property without fair exchange or consent.

    on the basis of race, age, gender, sexual preference, wealth, health, religion, associations or prior criminal record; discriminates against an individual; limits or removes equal treatment under the law for an individual; limits or removes access to government services for an individual.

    disenfranchises an elector; denies an elector representation; denies an elector the ability to run for election; reduces or removes an individual the ability to petition their representatives for a redress of grievances.

    abolishes the secret ballot; criminalises, or outlaws a political party; removes access to the Public Service for parties with elected parliamentary members.

Previous versions of the Gubernatorial NSW Constitution:

cam
Alan: the right to vote: You\'ve effectively created a right to vote by Paragraph 6 of the exclusions, but you haven\'t defined an elector anywhere. The result is that judicial enforcement of Paragraph 6 becomes impossible.
cam: I added a definitions section: but didn\'t mimic the definition language of the NSW Constitution Act . I couldn\'t find any other words that required defining.

How is your NSW constitution coming along?

cam

Australians as a Republican People

This is from Newspoll on December 1999, unfortunately I cannot deep link to it, as it is a pdf in a javascript pop up, but it gives those polled a choice between a directly elected president, an appointed president and the continuation of a constitutional monarchy. The directly elected president led with 50% of respondents replying yes.

The question asked is:

Now I'd like you to consider three broad possibilities for Australia in regards to a republic. One possibility is to change to a republic with a President who is elected by the people. A second possibility is to change to a republic with a president who is appointed by parliament. And a third possibility is to not change anything, keeping the queen and the Governor-General in their current roles. Which one of these possibilities would you yourself most prefer?

The results for this poll were:

A later poll had 30%+ of respondents saying they would vote no in the referendum as there was too much uncertainty over the republican model. This was a direct result of the ARM going against public sentiment for a directly elected President and compromising with the political elites for an appointed President.

Andrew Leigh listed in a recent speech three things opposing Australia becoming a republic, but the Newspoll data suggests that only two aspects of the republican debate need to be publicly taken care of.

One; a republic is not possible until people get to elect their President, and two, that the political elites in Canberra have to be convinced that an elected President is in their interest.

Politicians are easy to take care of, there are well determined mechanisms for influencing their votes and stands; lobbying and public opinion being two well known ones.

Getting republicans to agree on one Constitutional Model with an elected President so that there is a uniform and consistent front on the issue - which matches public opinion - is going to be much harder. Republicanism is rooted in the liberalist tradition, getting republicans to agree can be like herding cats .

Modern republicanism does not require an irritant cause or the rationalistic leap of a revolution - public opinion is already with us. It just becomes us to come up with a suitable model with a directly elected President that minimises tyranny and maximises liberty. In my opinion this inevitably leads to a constitutional model with a separate executive.

The Canberran Presidential System?

Bryan Palmer linked to this late night live broadcast discussing electoral polling. If you didn't know Australia was a parliamentary system, after listening to that radio show, you could be excused for thinking Australia was a Presidential one.

All the commentary was Howard this and Rudd that. The only time an electorate popped up was as a reminder that the Bennelong issue was separate to the re-election of the government. But even that is in relation to Howard.

The media treats the political system as Presidential, the politicians do as well, and the public seems to. We are half-way there with our 'Wash-minster Mutation', we may as well complete the task and establish a Canberran Presidential System.
Damian DOyle: The media treats the political system as Presidential, the politicians do as well, and the public seems to.

That certainly rings true if you scan the news headlines of the major outlets.
Guy: Commenting and writing about politics as if we were actually in a presidential system simplifies things. The mainstream media likes to simplify things for its readers - as exemplified by your comment on supermodel's views on condoms over at Polemica the other day.

I am not sure if it is true or not that the majority of people want their political commentary simplified, but that's certainly what the major media outlets in this country provide most of the time. Thanks to the almost communist level of domination that certain corporations have over our fledgling media market, we don't have any alternatives that seriously challenge the big players.

Most Popular on South Sea Republic

The articles that have been viewed the most:

Most Popular Restaurants in Phoenix

Phoenix Eats Out is the restaurant review site for Phoenix, Scottsdale and Old Town Scottsdale which lists the modernist and contemporary restaurants, taverns and bars in the greater Phoenix area. This is the list of the most popular restaurants pages from phoenixeatsout.com that have been viewed the most; My personal favourite restaurants in Phoenix are AZ88, Postinos, Bomberos with Grazie, Humble Pie, Orange Table, The Vig, Fez and others coming close behind. View the complete list with the photo-journalistic style images on phoenixeatsout.com

Most Popular Hikes in Arizona

Arizona is an outdoor state and has lots of hiking in the city and around the state. Phoenix is unusual for most cities in having several large mountains in the center of the city with great hiking. Anyone who comes to Phoenix has to do the Echo Canyon trail on Camelback and the Summit Hike on Squaw Peak or Piesta Peak. The views of the city, suburbs and surrounding mountains are wonderful from Camelback and Piesta Peak. For more experienced hikers there is the McDowell Mountains in North Scottsdale that has several difficult and strenuous hikes in Tom's Thumb and Bell Pass. Alternatively, you can hike the highest mountain in Arizona. At 12,600 feet Humphrey's Peak is a long and difficult hike.

Alternate Australian Constitutions

Between 2004 and 2009 this site, southsearepublic.org, was a constitutional blog based on scoop which focused on Australian and global constitutional issues. One of the strongest aspects of it was the development of constitutions by those involved in the blog. These constitutions are the outcome: The constitutions were built using principles from Montesquieu's separation of powers, the enlightnment's universal political rights and the ancient Athenian technology of sortition and choice by lot.

Archives For South Sea Republic

South Sea Republic started in 2004 as an Australian constitutional blog in 2004 based on scoop software. It was an immigrative outgrowth of Kuro5hin. The archives for each year since then; The articles are ordered by views.

Who Is Cam Riley

Cam Riley I am an Australian living in the United States as a permanent resident. I am a software developer by trade and mostly work in Java and jump between middleware and front end. I originally worked in the New York area of the United States in telecommunications before moving to Washington DC and working in a mix of telecommunications, energy and ITS. I started my own software company before heading out to Arizona and working with Shutterfly. Since then I have joined a startup in the Phoenix area and am thoroughly enjoying myself.

I do a lot of photography which I post on this website, but also on flickr. I have a photo-journalistic website which lists the modernist and contemporary restaurants in phoenix. I have a site on the Australian Flying Corps [AFC] which has been around since the 1990s and which I unfortunately lost the .org URL to during a life event; however, it is under the www.australianflyingcorps.com URL now. The AFC website has gone through several iterations since the 90s and the two most recent are Australian Flying Corps Archives(2004-2002) and Australian Flying Corps Archives(2002-1999) which are good places to start.

Websites Worth Reading

Websites of friends, colleagues and of interest;