The Westminster System is woeful in stopping incumbency. The British system has parties stay in power for close to a quarter of a century at a time, in Australia the churn rate is greater but party's remain in power often for a decade at a time. This is a failing of the Westminster system, if Australia is to persist with a parliamentary system, term limits need to be introduced to increase the churn rate of the elected representatives in order to protect against incumbency, corruption and nepotism.

Poll : Best device to increase the churn-rate?

The State of the System

Since World War II and the change over from the states being the first government to tax income to the federal government getting first lick of the pie, parties have managed to remain in power for overly long period. While not as long as parties have been able to remain in government in the United Kingdom, Australian parties have still managed to average over three terms.

As an example of how static the Australian Westminster is, this is the periods in years parties have held government starting in 1942 ;

• Labor, 7 years (1942-1949)
• Liberal, 23 years (1949-1972)
• Labor, 3 years (1972-1975)
• Liberal, 8 years (1975-1983)
• Labor, 13 years (1983-1996)
• Liberal, 8 years (1996-

If we look at the number of Prime Ministers that were removed by a general election the stagnation and concentration of power in the Westminster system is even worse. Of the thirteen Australian Prime Ministers since 1942, only four have been removed by an election.

• Curtin - died in office
• Forde - removed by party
• Chifley - defeated at general election
• Menzies - retired
• Holt - died in office
• Gorton - removed by no confidence vote
• Whitlam - removed by Governor-General
• Fraser - defeated at general election
• Hawke - removed by party
• Keating - defeated at general election
• Howard - still in government

The defeats that have come at general election have all been "drovers dog" election where the local three-legged cattle-dog could have beaten the incumbent government. This has led to a "waitocracy" in Australian government where opposition leaders either entrench their position in an effort to wait out the current government until their is a drovers dog election.

John Howard has often been held up for his tenaciousness in returning to the leadership of the opposition party when the Hawke and Keating governments were in power. Commonly called, "Lazarus on a triple bypass". Howard's career is a good example of the waitocracy in action. Howard managed to hang around in the leadership position long enough for the drovers dog election of 1996 to come around. Keating was seen as too arrogant and out of touch with the electorate.

If Latham entrenches himself in the opposition as well as Howard did, he will get a chance to be Prime Minister, not because of his - or his party's - abilities, but rather because the incumbent government will exhaust itself on its own power and offer a "drovers dog" election to the people where they will be seen with not having a choice for the incumbent.

Inertia To Change

Humans are adverse to change in the larger aspects of life. Humanity attempts to control its environment as an outlet of this larger aversion to change and the desire for stability. This is completely understandable given the volatile nature of modern life, modern employment and fiscal security. Add the ongoing fear campaigns by government, the media and terrorist groups - the desire for stability is entirely accepted.

In political systems this acquiescence to the appearance of stability often leads to corrupted individual hijacking a democratic system with clear separation of powers into a dictatorship with absolute rule collapsed to a singular person. The current changes in Russia under the arm-twisting of Vladimir Putin is a good example of this. Another is the manner in which Pervez Musharraf in Pakistan has managed to suspend the constitution to support his desire for absolute power.

In democracies the system is set up to balance the negative passions of humans through the principle of the separation of powers (a principle Joh Bjelke-Peterson was oblivious to when questioned by a judge). Even though this is a defence against a dictator, it is not a perfect defence and through the manipulation of other negative passions and appeals to the people's desire for stability, diffuse power can collapse into absolute power for an individual.

One of the purposes of a written and explicit constitution is to have the stability of the democracy not be personified into an individual but rather into the system itself. Leaders of the Executive Cabinet (Prime Ministers) enjoy pursuing the position as celebrity and use the trivial reporting of the news media to entrench themselves further and further into power. There is no need to seek stability through a Prime Minister remaining in the position for long periods.

Deciding Limits

From a subjective point of view governments tend to exhaust themselves after about eight years. This is also the period where the government, and the leaders start to fall into the traps of power such as corruption, abuse and nepotism. In NSW, the Bob Carr government after a long tenure has corruption allegations levelled against it that were sufficient enough for ICAC to visit the issue. Despite the Howard government's re-election there are still issues surrounding the federal government's abuse of power that have to be resolved.

To minimize this entropy that governments display, it is fitting to forcibly retire the head of the Executive Cabinet (Prime Minister and Premier) from parliament (or the assembly) after six years. This is two election periods and more than enough time for the leader of a government to have an effect in the position.

Another natural period of tenure is the generation. This is often construed to be twenty-five years. Elected officials in parliament who create legislation require specialist knowledge in legislative law. Due to party discipline most of these decisions are carried out by the Executive Cabinet, but as back-benchers move to the front-bench and possibly to lead the party then a long enough period for the specialist skills to be developed is necessary.

The period of a generation is suitably long for the specialist skills of legislation to be developed. After this period an elected official should be forced to retire by the constitution. This will be effective in putting an end to the benefits of incumbency, and has been the case of some elected officials in the US Congress, almost dying on the job. A generation is half a working lifetime, and more than enough for an elected official to make their mark on the government, serve the polity, the electorate and the common good.

Protecting Against the Rules Being Bent

Another truism of politicians is that they will bend the rules to n th degree in order to satiate their personal desire for power. In the case of the head of the Executive Cabinet being forced to retire from the position, there is the possibility that the Prime Minister would leave the position before the six years is up and hand over the party to another representative. Effectively skipping the forced retirement to remain in parliament on the front or back bench.

This would require some additional explicit language in the constitution to protect against officials weaselling out of the intent for term limiting the position. To solve this, the Prime Minister would need to be recognized in the constitution as the formative holder of Executive power. Once the Prime Minister leaves the position they will be required to retire from parliament.

Being Prime Minister is the summit of Australian political achievement, forcing retirement from parliament with the handing over of the position would not detract from that achievement. Another reason to force the Prime Minister to retire from parliament after the relinquish the position is to stop a former Prime Minister going to the back-bench just before being forcibly term-limited and staying in parliament until their twenty-five years is up.

Fixed Term Elections

A final, and the most important change in increasing the churn-rate is the implementation of fixed term elections. Supposedly governments sit for three years before an election but all governments in the Australian system constantly call early elections. The Howard Government is in its fourth term in eight years. The incumbent constantly calls elections as soon as they can, and as soon as they see electoral advantage in doing so. It is a sham.

The government should be given three years (1068 days) between each election unless there is a double dissolution election. Having fixed term elections would be the greatest benefit to democracy and the greatest challenge to the power of incumbency. Three years is more than enough for a government, there is little point in giving a government four years between periods as the they have been calling election every two and bit years anyway. Three years is enough.

The President of Venezuela, Hugo Chavez, raised the possibility that he may seek a referendum so that he may be elected President longer than the Venezuelan constitution allows. Venezuela's constitution was only instituted in 1999, so it is a bit premature to be changing it.

From the BBC article;

During his [Chavez'] weekly TV show on Sunday, he announced he was thinking of calling a referendum to allow him to run for another term in the 2012 elections.

Mr Chavez, who faces re-election this year, said he did not fear competition.

Mr Chavez was first elected in 1998 and then again in 2000 after the approval of a constitution under which he is barred from running in 2012.

He insisted he would allow the Venezuelan people to vote on the issue.

"If there is no opposition candidate, I would consider signing a decree to hold a referendum asking 'Do you agree Chavez should be allowed to seek a new term?' and let's let the people decide."

Sounds to me like the people decided a mere seven years ago - of which term limiting is IMNSHO a wise addition to a constitution.

This is the Constitution of the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela [Beware a printer pop-up]. From Article 230;

The presidential term is six years. The President of the Republic may be re-elected, immediately and once only, to an additional term.

There are some other restrictions on who can run for the Executive position including not being a member of the clergy, or being in certain public office such as Vice-President, Minister, Governor or Mayor at the time of announcing candidacy.

Six years is overly generous anyway.

So what is the referendum process for Venezuela? From Article 71;

Matters of special national transcendence may be referred to a consultative referendum, on the initiative of the President of the Republic, taken at a meeting of the Cabinet;

by resolution of the National Assembly, passed by a majority vote;

or at the request of a number of voters constituting at least 10% of all voters registered on the national, civil and electoral registry.

Matters of special state, municipal and parish transcendence may also be referred to a consultative referendum.

The initiative shall be taken by the Parish Board, the Municipal Council and to the Legislative Council, by the vote of two third of its members; by the Mayor and the Governor or by a number of voters constituting at least 10% of the total number of voters registered in the pertinent circumscription.

Some crowd wisdom aspects there where ten percent of the voting population can bring an initiative to referenda. The President and National Assembly can also.

I get nervous once members of the Executive start talking about changing term limits. Especially in this case; as the paint is barely dry on the Venezuelan constitution.

In a republican context term limits on the executive and legislative is usually framed from the perspective of liberty. Relatively frequent changes of position stop politicians remaining too long and becoming entrenched in the position and estranged from their electorate and popular will. The balance is to make the changes frequent enough to protect liberty, but infrequent enough to enable competence.

The Killfile argued today for term limits from the perspective of good executive governance. His argument is that leaders who stay too long in parliamentary systems destroy the electoral capability of an opposing party. Maybe we could call it the Menzies effect.

From the Killfile:

Still, I think there is an argument to be made for a fixed limit in the top job. The premiers all gave it about ten years before handing over the reigns, which probably means that ten years is too long. Something a little less might be more appropriate.

If NSW is a good example with the Independent Commission Against Corruption [ICAC] both Greiner and Carr were being investigated before the eight year mark, so approximately six to eight years is the optimum for a party leader to provide good governance before the temptations of power catch up with them. As adam noted in the past; term limits save politicians from themselves.

Killfile leans to eight years with four year election cycles, similar to what NSW has:

If we accept that Howard has achieved anything, then he probably would have achieved it all in eight years, if he knew that was all he had.

Importantly, though, he would know that he came with a used-by date, and toward the end of that second term he would have been actively auditioning for a replacement.

There had to be a transition (to a new head of the party, rather than necessarily to a new Prime Minister, as that would be up to the electorate), so it likely would have been planned and orderly.

Interested parties could have used the time to express their interest, and start making the electorate aware of what they stood for (does anyone seriously know what Peter Costello stands for, even now?).

I think three years is the optimum, the two years of the American Congress is too short, and the four years of NSW parliament is too long. Three years is a good balance. Six years in the top executive position is enough for a leader to make their mark and I agree with Killfile that orderly transition from that period would improve governance.

It would stop the fiasco of Keating taking power where an obvious talent was backbenched, it would also alleviate the Costello situation where a Prime Minister has refused to loose the reigns even when they appear to be in a hopeless position. It is a bit more difficult with Howard however; as until recently he was electorally competitive.

I prefer term limits from the republican point of view and protecting liberty while keeping representatives close to their electorate. It is easier to term limit a separate executive IMO. Harder to do with a parliamentary executive which is more informal than a separate one. For instance the PM is not mentioned in the Australian Constitution at all.

I like the idea of limited the Prime Minister and Premier to two terms or six years. I also like limiting legislators to twenty-five years of service. It is a generation in length and if they haven't achieved anything by then the system should kick them out.

Given that on this site; southsearepublic.org, I have advocated for several political, structural and organizational changes over the last eight years, it probably does good to revisit them and see if those suggestions have been bearing fruit in the real world. One of the positions I advocated for was term limits.

In the parliamentary system I argued for putting term limits on the Prime Minister (or Premier) at the Australian federal and state level. Additionally I argued for term limits on the legislature as well;

Another natural period of tenure is the generation. This is often construed to be twenty-five years. Elected officials in parliament who create legislation require specialist knowledge in legislative law. Due to party discipline most of these decisions are carried out by the Executive Cabinet, but as back-benchers move to the front-bench and possibly to lead the party then a long enough period for the specialist skills to be developed is necessary.

The period of a generation is suitably long for the specialist skills of legislation to be developed. After this period an elected official should be forced to retire by the constitution. This will be effective in putting an end to the benefits of incumbency, and has been the case of some elected officials in the US Congress, almost dying on the job. A generation is half a working lifetime, and more than enough for an elected official to make their mark on the government, serve the polity, the electorate and the common good.

In the United States there were twenty one states which enacted term limits on the legislature. Not all stuck with it, six states repealed the term limits, leaving fifteen states (2012) with term limits of varying lengths. The limit in years is generally 8 years though some states only place a consecutive limit on those years. For instance a representative can retire due to term limits, wait one election cycle and then be eligible again. This is similar to how the Virginian Governor is term limited.

Scholars have been looking at the performance of those legislatures and seeing what the effects are since most of the forced turn over started in 1996 and 1998 when large numbers of legislators became ineligible.

One of the goals of term limits was to make the legislature more open to citizen legislators who would balance the need for laws that citizens must follow rather than the laws by a professional politician who has access to power and is less fearful of laws and their effects. However, research by political scholars has shown that the professional nature of politics and the institutions has not changed with state term limits.

Another goal of term limits was to stymie entrenched corruption, but again this is proving more an inherent part of the institution and the history of the institution than it is an organizational change. External factors are more in play on the issues of corruption than anything else. It also assumes that incoming representatives would not be corrupt either. I could not find any empirical evidence to support either of these assumptions resolutely.

Unfortunately the books that constitute the knowledge on term limits are either in paper form or behind paywalls, so it is difficult to link to, or read online. However in "It's even worse than it looks", the authors summarize the findings with:

Term limits did not usher in a new era of citizen legislators. They neither altered the characteristics of those elected to office nor dissuaded them from pursuing other elected offices, building professional careers in politics, or becoming lobbyists.

If anything the limits amplified the corrosive effects of ambition on the legislators, who focused from day one on how best to use their limited time as a springboard to their next post. ... leave[ing] the long-term mess to their next wave of successors.

and;

Term limited legislators actually became less beholden to their constituents in their geographical districts and more attentive to other interests. And term-limited legislatures were less productive and less innovative in the policies they formed.

One upside was that the term limited legislators at the state level have started seeking office at the national level, more so than un-term limited state legislators, so their limited state experience is translating to the national level. That aside, it appears from empirical evidence it is a bad idea, especially the way it was implemented at the American state level.

So to recap, I advocated for term limiting the Prime Minister of Premier in parliamentary systems. The findings with term limits in US legislatures don't cover that with empirical evidence. However I also advocated that legislators should have term limits of twenty-five years. The evidence points to term limits on legislators producing less than optimal outcomes, especially in Washington system of government.

However, term limits are popular, the US state term limits came through popular ballot (referendum in Australian political language). Citizen legislators appear to be a popular mythology and our political systems will be populated with professional politicians - who seem to do a better job at policy and legislating anyway.

It is possible that one way to give professional politicians enough time to legislate while balancing the popular demand for term limits is the twenty five year rule. Evidence points to no term limits being the simpler and better idea. Hence I am dropping it as a position which I think will produce better political outcomes.