More: Arming, Financing and Recruiting of the Insurgency in Iraq, Thomas E. Ricks.

The Gamble charts the strategic change in direction the US military took in Iraq under the Generalship of Patreaus and Odierno. The strategy was known as 'the surge' and was sold that way politically to the American people who were by that time sick of the Iraq war and its mismanagement. By 2006 the Bush Administration had been tuned out politically by the population after ballots were cast throwing out Republicans from Congress and the Senate. This actually gave political cover for the surge where all of the US reserves were thrown into Iraq for the new strategy.

Outside of its political sell, 'The surge' is the locating of American troops amongst the population rather than in big operational bases out of town, and the protection of the Iraqi population form violence; whether from Al Queda in Iraq or Militia (Shia or Sunni). The violent groups were bought off were necessary in order to reduce civil violence. Once the Iraqi population became comfortable that the American troops were not leaving they started to give more information to American troops.

It appears from a military point of view the surge has worked in dampening violence. Where it hasn't worked is politically. The Iraqi government is still dysfunctional and only Kurdish politicians enjoy the popular backing of their constituents. It also appears from the book that the surge managed to reduce levels of violence to how it was in 2005; which is still pretty high. There also remains the issue of the Sons of Iraq - former Sunni militia's - being on the US payroll and what will happen when they are no longer receiving US cash.

I can respect the courage of Patreaus and Odierno in implementing this strategy despite the support back home being minimal for it. You get the feeling they wanted to do things right and complete their task. They did downgrade the objectives from the ridiculous neo-con and Bush Administration claims such as Iraq being a beacon of free-market democracy in the Middle East and a new Israel.

I can also respect the courage of US military commanders who came back to Iraq on their third and fourth tours and asking themselves how they can improve the situation without losing one hundred men in the process, like they had with the clean and hold strategy.

There are other downsides as well, most of the ethnic cleansing had already occurred in many neighbourhoods by the time the surge started. Iraqi's through passive government pressure and in genuine fear for their lives had already fled the country. Once full neighbourhoods were filled with only 20% of the original population. It is horrific the chaos we have wrought there because of the failed Bush Administration policies. For instance Shawn Brimley is quoted as saying:

In many ways the entire war was a huge gamble, risking America's future power and prestige on a war that, at best, is likely to be inconclusive.

It has meant that the US is stuck in Iraq and will be for a long, long, long time. What a mess, but that isn't really the focus of the book. The book is about the courage of US military generals going around the normal power channels such as the Pentagon and White House, and devising a strategy to dampen the chaos in Iraq and give the room for political advancement in Iraq. That they succeeded in. For those insights, competency and persistence they, and the US military should be thanked.

The Gamble documents that the military downgraded the definition of success in Iraq from the Bush Administration's pie in the sky hopes of Jeffersonian Democracy to one of 'sustainable stability'. Ricks writes:

This was key: The grandiose goals of the past three years, of turning Iraq into a beacon of democracy that would transform the Middle East, or even into turning Iraq into a dependable ally of the United States, were quietly put on hold. Bush Administration rhetoric didn't always reflect this shift. But on the ground in Iraq, the new goal was simply to getting to a more or less peaceful Iraq that didn't explode into regional war or implode into a civil war.

I think one of the reasons that the surge was not taken seriously politically was that it seemed like another attempt by the Bush Administration to achieve the goal of a democratic Iraq, one which had been written off by the voting public as a facetious argument. Even in 2006 it was wrapped up in the political trappings of those against it are traitors to America.

The book notes that Patreaus tried to talk Bush into down-grading his administration's rhetoric, but there was little gain in that area, especially with Bush, Cheney and other neo-cons continuing to espouse idealistic goals that had no bearing on the reality, or the political fatigue, suspicion and cynicism in which they were held by the voting public.

While Iraq was a failure of political and military strategy, it is also a large failure of politics. The military tends to see things through a nationalistic eye - being a highly nationalistic body and institution. Anything done without the full national backing and as a national project can have heavy ramifications on military morale; let alone a series of failed strategies both military and political.

The Bush Administration used the Iraq war to divide and polarise a country for short-term political gain. They did not even have the decency to be competent in that goal. They are now in a powerless minority due to their incompetence in government and politics. The Iraq War carries all the worst follies, failures and mess-ups of the Bush Administration; from the 'game-changer' ideology of Bush, to the 'show of force' mentality of Cheney, the myopic idealism of the neo-conservatives and the 'your numbers and our numbers' reality making of Rovian politics.

I suspect that if the voting public had not of turned off to the Bush Administration and the Iraq War, and Patreaus been allowed to speak more on his and Odierno's strategy, they may have been given a better chance. The surge to the voting layman, as another political wedge, appeared like throwing more good troops at a bad situation with no hope of achieving anything positive.