The near-history biographical view that Gellman offers of Cheney is an interesting one. It discredits the economic vandalism of a Cheney having Halliburton's interests ahead of the nations, or the politicism that we would ascribe to the likes of Karl Rove, yet Cheney falls into a caricature of maximal power and unerringly remains there.

It appears that Cheney did act in what he thought was the national interest prior to and after September 11th and was remarkably selfless in his economic and political dealings within the executive. However his opinions and knowledge of what the executive could achieve was at odds with the nation and consequent public opinion.

There is also an element of amorality too, in the unitary executive, in the view of the executive in wartime, in the abuse of a weak and incurious President, and in the manipulation of lower positions in the executive policy making process. This amorality and the seeking of absolute power is probably what has damaged US power and perception most.

The Cold War thinking was the biggest restraint on the understanding of Cheney and the threat of terrorism. Cheney see complex systems as fragile and lacking resilience. However the truth is the opposite. Cheney was the fall of government as making the nation fragile when in reality the US is sufficiently well governed that DC is replaceable. So the maximal response Cheney sought with a shadow government was quickly rejected by the likes of Hastert and Byrd who were part of it. Ironically that resilience of Hastert and Byrd is why the US is strong in this area.

The over-reaction by Cheney and the fearfulness of anarchy without strong leadership of a centralized government warped the perceptions of the threat of terrorism. A group that flew aircraft into building with box-cutters became state-sponsored terrorism with nukes in suitcases, When the US needed a Madison, it got a Cheney.

Madison refused in the war of 1812 to under-cut the republican principles of government as he believed it would remove the great strength of America and would make it weaker. Cheney thought opposite and had no faith in the American republican principles - for him clandestine operations were the answer. Madison won the war of 1812, Cheney leaves with what is viewed as one of the worst executives in the history of the US. The lesson is probably under-estimate the wisdom and strength of the American people at our own peril. Madison was on the right side of that argument.

One of the consistencies of Cheney as Vice President was the demonstration of power. He was happy to lose a battle in order to win a war. Unfortunately his gains were exceptionally short term. Almost immediately after the Bush Administration was weakly advanced into power, Cheney fought with the Senate over legislation, isolating the moderate Republicans.

One of them was Jim Jeffords who threatened to caucus with the Democrats. Cheney refused to compromise, and Jeffords, in the face of an unwilting executive turned independent. Cheney did not care, but the Republicans lost control of the Senate.

The view of the demonstration of power was that it sent a warning and others would back off with the knowledge that the White House was willing to demonstrate its power both absolutely and arbitrarily. Which is fine when it is politically sustainable, a recipe for bad governance when it is not.

Iraq fell under this doctrine. The Administration knew that in terms of political tolerance of terrorism that Pakistan and Saudi Arabia topped the list. Iraq became a demonstration of power under Cheney who mixed realpolitick of power, containment and politics.

It became the farce that the old Cold War view was what they hung their hat upon; to paraphrase, show where you are strong as a deterrent to other players, and contain the rest; such as Iran, until they fail on their own accord. Instead it has done little more than dissipate American power.

In Angler we see bad policy upon bad policy made under an executive that was a mix of genuinely fearful, cowardly, lacked faith in American strength, and took advantage of an incurious and disengaged President. There are also the monsters that legally backed up the horrors that have accompanied it - like John Yoo - the amorality is obvious and the disengagement in the ideological sustainment of the unitary executive obvious.

You are left wondering how such monsters as Cheney, Addington and Yoo were able to operate within the framework of the executive. It comes down to a weak Congress, and a disengaged President. I doubt an 'Angler' or Cheney Vice Presidency could have survived in a Clinton, Bush I, Reagan, or any other presidency.